John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599486
- eISBN:
- 9780191595806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599486.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Political Theory
The evolution of operational art has seemingly reached a critical point following almost two decades of strategic bewilderment caused by the end of the Cold War, exasperating peace operations, and ...
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The evolution of operational art has seemingly reached a critical point following almost two decades of strategic bewilderment caused by the end of the Cold War, exasperating peace operations, and 9/11. But regardless of the form that future conflicts may take, officers will find themselves tasked with translating short-term operations into a larger operational design that links their near-term actions to the strategic aim of the campaign. Undoubtedly, interpretations and applications of operational art will differ widely in accordance with each commander's mission, personality, and priorities. Yet there is a common thread: from a problem-solving perspective, operational art will make it possible to take an unstructured problem and give it sufficient structure to ensure that further planning can lead to useful action. Understanding operational art improves the fundamental understanding of military operations per se, and therefore underlies all military successes. Consequently, whatever else officers may study and master — organization, leadership, intelligence, technology, logistics — they must have operational art at their fingertips.Less
The evolution of operational art has seemingly reached a critical point following almost two decades of strategic bewilderment caused by the end of the Cold War, exasperating peace operations, and 9/11. But regardless of the form that future conflicts may take, officers will find themselves tasked with translating short-term operations into a larger operational design that links their near-term actions to the strategic aim of the campaign. Undoubtedly, interpretations and applications of operational art will differ widely in accordance with each commander's mission, personality, and priorities. Yet there is a common thread: from a problem-solving perspective, operational art will make it possible to take an unstructured problem and give it sufficient structure to ensure that further planning can lead to useful action. Understanding operational art improves the fundamental understanding of military operations per se, and therefore underlies all military successes. Consequently, whatever else officers may study and master — organization, leadership, intelligence, technology, logistics — they must have operational art at their fingertips.
Nils Melzer
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199533169
- eISBN:
- 9780191714511
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533169.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
This chapter begins by introducing the concepts of ‘armed conflict’, ‘hostilities’, and ‘military necessity’, each of which is intrinsically linked to the paradigm of hostilities. It then identifies ...
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This chapter begins by introducing the concepts of ‘armed conflict’, ‘hostilities’, and ‘military necessity’, each of which is intrinsically linked to the paradigm of hostilities. It then identifies the normative frameworks from which that paradigm is derived. The various conditions and modalities governing the use of lethal force during the conduct of hostilities, and the influence of human rights law on these conditions and modalities are examined. The results obtained shall provide the basis for a concluding analysis of the international permissibility of targeted killing as a method of conducting hostilities.Less
This chapter begins by introducing the concepts of ‘armed conflict’, ‘hostilities’, and ‘military necessity’, each of which is intrinsically linked to the paradigm of hostilities. It then identifies the normative frameworks from which that paradigm is derived. The various conditions and modalities governing the use of lethal force during the conduct of hostilities, and the influence of human rights law on these conditions and modalities are examined. The results obtained shall provide the basis for a concluding analysis of the international permissibility of targeted killing as a method of conducting hostilities.
Patricia Sullivan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199878338
- eISBN:
- 9780199950294
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199878338.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military ...
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Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are these states so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins? Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, this book argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. The book does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But it provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives. The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes. The results challenge existing theories about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.Less
Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are these states so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins? Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, this book argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. The book does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But it provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives. The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes. The results challenge existing theories about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.
Nigel D. White
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218592
- eISBN:
- 9780191705595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218592.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law
The deployment of large numbers of British troops to both Korea in 1950 and to Kuwait in 1990 followed similar domestic and international legal paths, though the political contexts were quite ...
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The deployment of large numbers of British troops to both Korea in 1950 and to Kuwait in 1990 followed similar domestic and international legal paths, though the political contexts were quite different, one occurring at the outset of the Cold War and the other at its end. Britain was instrumental in shaping the idea of coalitions acting under the authority of the UN as an alternative to the more centralized application of military force envisaged under the UN Charter. This chapter traces the Parliamentary and international political debates that led to the development of this as a form of lawful military action. In particular, it concentrates on why it was necessary to obtain UN authority for these actions when they could readily be justified as exercise of the right of collective defence.Less
The deployment of large numbers of British troops to both Korea in 1950 and to Kuwait in 1990 followed similar domestic and international legal paths, though the political contexts were quite different, one occurring at the outset of the Cold War and the other at its end. Britain was instrumental in shaping the idea of coalitions acting under the authority of the UN as an alternative to the more centralized application of military force envisaged under the UN Charter. This chapter traces the Parliamentary and international political debates that led to the development of this as a form of lawful military action. In particular, it concentrates on why it was necessary to obtain UN authority for these actions when they could readily be justified as exercise of the right of collective defence.
David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159386
- eISBN:
- 9781400848676
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159386.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This concluding chapter identifies the implications of this book's study for both future research and policy makers. One implication of this study is the shedding of light on the forum-shopping ...
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This concluding chapter identifies the implications of this book's study for both future research and policy makers. One implication of this study is the shedding of light on the forum-shopping process associated with military interventions. Forum shopping occurs when countries have more than one option from which to choose when deciding whether and how to intervene. The experiences of Afghanistan and Libya show that while there may be other outlets for multilateral military operations, NATO, despite its limitations, is almost always the preferred intervention forum for its member states. The second set of implications deals with the use of principal-agency theory in civil–military relations. Ultimately, the cases of Afghanistan and Libya are ideal for comparative analysis on how countries react to various domestic and international pressures.Less
This concluding chapter identifies the implications of this book's study for both future research and policy makers. One implication of this study is the shedding of light on the forum-shopping process associated with military interventions. Forum shopping occurs when countries have more than one option from which to choose when deciding whether and how to intervene. The experiences of Afghanistan and Libya show that while there may be other outlets for multilateral military operations, NATO, despite its limitations, is almost always the preferred intervention forum for its member states. The second set of implications deals with the use of principal-agency theory in civil–military relations. Ultimately, the cases of Afghanistan and Libya are ideal for comparative analysis on how countries react to various domestic and international pressures.
Gabriel Sheffer
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198279945
- eISBN:
- 9780191684326
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198279945.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Out of political necessity and some mutual respect, Shertok and Ben–Gurion strove to maintain their troubled coalition, but it was inevitable that the two would continue to clash. The next ...
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Out of political necessity and some mutual respect, Shertok and Ben–Gurion strove to maintain their troubled coalition, but it was inevitable that the two would continue to clash. The next disagreement between the two concerned Ben–Gurion's dissatisfaction with the ceasefire and his impatience to resume the war. He asserted then that Israel's most dangerous enemy was a truce without an end. According to him, it placed a question mark over the existence of the state in the conscience of the world, it meant the presence of UN observers in Israel, and it enabled the Arabs to prepare and choose their own time for an offensive against the Jewish state. Boasting about the immense increase in Israel's military might during the cease-fire, the prime minister and minister of defence firmly believed that most of Israel's security problems could, and should, be solved through the application of that force. He was therefore only seeking a pretext to unleash a spectacular military operation.Less
Out of political necessity and some mutual respect, Shertok and Ben–Gurion strove to maintain their troubled coalition, but it was inevitable that the two would continue to clash. The next disagreement between the two concerned Ben–Gurion's dissatisfaction with the ceasefire and his impatience to resume the war. He asserted then that Israel's most dangerous enemy was a truce without an end. According to him, it placed a question mark over the existence of the state in the conscience of the world, it meant the presence of UN observers in Israel, and it enabled the Arabs to prepare and choose their own time for an offensive against the Jewish state. Boasting about the immense increase in Israel's military might during the cease-fire, the prime minister and minister of defence firmly believed that most of Israel's security problems could, and should, be solved through the application of that force. He was therefore only seeking a pretext to unleash a spectacular military operation.
KEITH JEFFERY
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239672
- eISBN:
- 9780191719493
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239672.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, Military History
At the War Cabinet, David Lloyd George outlined what he regarded as the four alternative policies for Britain with respect to World War I. First was concentration of the entire British forces on the ...
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At the War Cabinet, David Lloyd George outlined what he regarded as the four alternative policies for Britain with respect to World War I. First was concentration of the entire British forces on the Western Front; second was to concentrate mainly on the Western Front, but utilise the forces now in the various overseas theatres as actively as possible; the third option was essentially a holding operation until Russia recovered and the United States was supplying enough troops to ensure superiority; and the final one consisted of ‘knocking the props from under Germany’ by military and diplomatic operations against enemy allies such as Turkey and Bulgaria. The Prime Minister preferred for some combination of the second and last options. With this in mind, John French and Henry Wilson were to report on the current state of the war and the future prospects and future action to be taken.Less
At the War Cabinet, David Lloyd George outlined what he regarded as the four alternative policies for Britain with respect to World War I. First was concentration of the entire British forces on the Western Front; second was to concentrate mainly on the Western Front, but utilise the forces now in the various overseas theatres as actively as possible; the third option was essentially a holding operation until Russia recovered and the United States was supplying enough troops to ensure superiority; and the final one consisted of ‘knocking the props from under Germany’ by military and diplomatic operations against enemy allies such as Turkey and Bulgaria. The Prime Minister preferred for some combination of the second and last options. With this in mind, John French and Henry Wilson were to report on the current state of the war and the future prospects and future action to be taken.
Kevin A O'Brien
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199228485
- eISBN:
- 9780191711435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228485.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
A second prerequisite for meaningful discussion of regulation is clarity as to the subject to be regulated. Serious analysis in this area is often frustrated by the lack of agreement as to what it is ...
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A second prerequisite for meaningful discussion of regulation is clarity as to the subject to be regulated. Serious analysis in this area is often frustrated by the lack of agreement as to what it is that PMCs actually do. This chapter surveys the industry and creates a typology of private actors in the military environment. It then proposes a theoretical model of regulation, establishing the tightest oversight of military operations aimed at altering the strategic environment. A combination of licensing and registration regimes would provide the most adequate solution on the national level, though its effectiveness would depend on complementary action on the international level.Less
A second prerequisite for meaningful discussion of regulation is clarity as to the subject to be regulated. Serious analysis in this area is often frustrated by the lack of agreement as to what it is that PMCs actually do. This chapter surveys the industry and creates a typology of private actors in the military environment. It then proposes a theoretical model of regulation, establishing the tightest oversight of military operations aimed at altering the strategic environment. A combination of licensing and registration regimes would provide the most adequate solution on the national level, though its effectiveness would depend on complementary action on the international level.
Patricia L. Sullivan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199878338
- eISBN:
- 9780199950294
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199878338.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter asks why states with tremendous capabilities and resources—the most powerful in the world—are often unable to attain even limited objectives through the use of military force against ...
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This chapter asks why states with tremendous capabilities and resources—the most powerful in the world—are often unable to attain even limited objectives through the use of military force against much weaker adversaries. The primary goal is to identify the conditions under which powerful states achieve their political objectives when they use military force against weak targets and the factors that limit their ability to use force as a policy instrument. Of particular interest is how the nature of a strong state's political objectives affects the likelihood that the state will attain its war aims. The first section of this chapter briefly describes the dependent, explanatory, and control variables used in the quantitative analyses in this chapter. The second presents a series of statistical models exploring the effects of these factors on the outcomes of major military operations by five of the most powerful states in the international system.Less
This chapter asks why states with tremendous capabilities and resources—the most powerful in the world—are often unable to attain even limited objectives through the use of military force against much weaker adversaries. The primary goal is to identify the conditions under which powerful states achieve their political objectives when they use military force against weak targets and the factors that limit their ability to use force as a policy instrument. Of particular interest is how the nature of a strong state's political objectives affects the likelihood that the state will attain its war aims. The first section of this chapter briefly describes the dependent, explanatory, and control variables used in the quantitative analyses in this chapter. The second presents a series of statistical models exploring the effects of these factors on the outcomes of major military operations by five of the most powerful states in the international system.
KEITH JEFFERY
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239672
- eISBN:
- 9780191719493
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239672.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Fifty years after the end of the World War I, Sir Charles Deedes, who had served under Henry Wilson in the War Office of Ireland before 1914, firmly stated that it was Wilson's energy, determination, ...
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Fifty years after the end of the World War I, Sir Charles Deedes, who had served under Henry Wilson in the War Office of Ireland before 1914, firmly stated that it was Wilson's energy, determination, and foresight that brought the British army to a state of readiness to proceed overseas in August 1914. Allowing that the British commitment to war alongside France was (as Wilson fervently believed) both morally and politically the right thing to do, it may be that Wilson's four years as director of military operations constituted the most productive and successful of his whole career. An alternative view, however, is that Wilson's achievements during these years were disastrous for Britain. This chapter discusses Wilson's planning in preparation for Britain's joining France in the war with Germany.Less
Fifty years after the end of the World War I, Sir Charles Deedes, who had served under Henry Wilson in the War Office of Ireland before 1914, firmly stated that it was Wilson's energy, determination, and foresight that brought the British army to a state of readiness to proceed overseas in August 1914. Allowing that the British commitment to war alongside France was (as Wilson fervently believed) both morally and politically the right thing to do, it may be that Wilson's four years as director of military operations constituted the most productive and successful of his whole career. An alternative view, however, is that Wilson's achievements during these years were disastrous for Britain. This chapter discusses Wilson's planning in preparation for Britain's joining France in the war with Germany.
Larissa Fast
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395914
- eISBN:
- 9780199776801
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395914.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Inherent in the many conceptualizations of strategic peacebuilding is the concept of coordination among multiple actors and roles. Fast grapples with the complex and wide-ranging idea of ...
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Inherent in the many conceptualizations of strategic peacebuilding is the concept of coordination among multiple actors and roles. Fast grapples with the complex and wide-ranging idea of coordination, exploring the need for third-party coordination in conflict settings and the dilemmas of coordination and integration, which may compromise an organization’s independence, neutrality or security. Engaging both sides of the debate on integrating humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, Fast argues that it is not the aim or within the scope of humanitarian action to promote social change or build peace; rather, separate space must be preserved for humanitarian action. Humanitarian action should, however, avoid contributing to conflict.Less
Inherent in the many conceptualizations of strategic peacebuilding is the concept of coordination among multiple actors and roles. Fast grapples with the complex and wide-ranging idea of coordination, exploring the need for third-party coordination in conflict settings and the dilemmas of coordination and integration, which may compromise an organization’s independence, neutrality or security. Engaging both sides of the debate on integrating humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, Fast argues that it is not the aim or within the scope of humanitarian action to promote social change or build peace; rather, separate space must be preserved for humanitarian action. Humanitarian action should, however, avoid contributing to conflict.
David P. Oakley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813176703
- eISBN:
- 9780813176727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
During the Clinton presidency, international and domestic conditions drove changes within the CIA and DoD that affected their partnership. The CIA and the DoD had been established during the Cold ...
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During the Clinton presidency, international and domestic conditions drove changes within the CIA and DoD that affected their partnership. The CIA and the DoD had been established during the Cold War, so a significant amount of their energy had been focused on the Soviet Union. After the Soviet fall, both organizations wrestled with their roles in a multipolar world, while policy makers slashed budgets and looked for ways to reorient both organizations. Various national and institutional issues influenced the DoD/CIA partnership in the 1990s. These seemingly separate issues merged to shape the organizations and therefore influenced how the DoD/CIA relationship evolved during the 1990s.Less
During the Clinton presidency, international and domestic conditions drove changes within the CIA and DoD that affected their partnership. The CIA and the DoD had been established during the Cold War, so a significant amount of their energy had been focused on the Soviet Union. After the Soviet fall, both organizations wrestled with their roles in a multipolar world, while policy makers slashed budgets and looked for ways to reorient both organizations. Various national and institutional issues influenced the DoD/CIA partnership in the 1990s. These seemingly separate issues merged to shape the organizations and therefore influenced how the DoD/CIA relationship evolved during the 1990s.
Nora Bensahel
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804753999
- eISBN:
- 9780804768092
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804753999.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter defines the alliances and the widespread assumption that institutions can effectively aggregate the capabilities of their members. It also elaborates how the independent variables ...
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This chapter defines the alliances and the widespread assumption that institutions can effectively aggregate the capabilities of their members. It also elaborates how the independent variables influence the dependent variable of military effectiveness, clustering the findings according to the categories of skill and quality, integration, and responsiveness. It is found that alliance operations influenced the strategic command and control, tactical command and control, and intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. It is expected that alliance operations result to the reduction of integration, skill, and responsiveness and their capabilities grow increasingly heterogeneous. The political benefits provided by legitimacy are strong enough that state leaders will frequently look for allies and partners in military operations, despite some of the operational and tactical costs.Less
This chapter defines the alliances and the widespread assumption that institutions can effectively aggregate the capabilities of their members. It also elaborates how the independent variables influence the dependent variable of military effectiveness, clustering the findings according to the categories of skill and quality, integration, and responsiveness. It is found that alliance operations influenced the strategic command and control, tactical command and control, and intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. It is expected that alliance operations result to the reduction of integration, skill, and responsiveness and their capabilities grow increasingly heterogeneous. The political benefits provided by legitimacy are strong enough that state leaders will frequently look for allies and partners in military operations, despite some of the operational and tactical costs.
Panos Koutrakos
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199692729
- eISBN:
- 9780191752254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692729.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Public International Law
This chapter analyses the military operations of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These include: EUFOR Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003), Operation Artemis (RD ...
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This chapter analyses the military operations of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These include: EUFOR Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003), Operation Artemis (RD Congo, 2003), EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004–present), EU Support to AMIS Action (Darfur, 2005–2007), EUFOR (RD Congo, 2006), EUFOR (Tchad/RCA, 2008–2009), EUNAVFOR Somalia — Operation ATALANTA (2008–present), EUTM Somalia (2010–2012). It is argued that military operations of the Union so far illustrate a lack of ambition. While their objective is commendable, their size, mandate, terrain, and conditions under which they are deployed suggest rather small contributions to very big problems.Less
This chapter analyses the military operations of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These include: EUFOR Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003), Operation Artemis (RD Congo, 2003), EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004–present), EU Support to AMIS Action (Darfur, 2005–2007), EUFOR (RD Congo, 2006), EUFOR (Tchad/RCA, 2008–2009), EUNAVFOR Somalia — Operation ATALANTA (2008–present), EUTM Somalia (2010–2012). It is argued that military operations of the Union so far illustrate a lack of ambition. While their objective is commendable, their size, mandate, terrain, and conditions under which they are deployed suggest rather small contributions to very big problems.
Geoffrey S. Corn
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231152358
- eISBN:
- 9780231526562
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231152358.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional ...
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This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional opinion that military operations against transnational terrorists which do not fall neatly within the state-centric conflict categories derived from the Geneva Conventions should be treated as extraterritorial law enforcement activities. It argues that the humanitarian law framework must be extended to counterterrorist military operations by appealing to core historical principles of humanitarian law and to military protocol, namely, the mandate in the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Program to “comply with the principles of the law of war during all military operations.” It contends that it is invalid and disingenuous to characterize counterterror military operations employing combat power under a “deadly force as a first resort” authority as extraterritorial law enforcement. The chapter also considers the underlying nature and purpose of the existing law-triggering paradigm, the different nature of the authority derived from the law of armed conflict compared to the law enforcement framework, and the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.Less
This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional opinion that military operations against transnational terrorists which do not fall neatly within the state-centric conflict categories derived from the Geneva Conventions should be treated as extraterritorial law enforcement activities. It argues that the humanitarian law framework must be extended to counterterrorist military operations by appealing to core historical principles of humanitarian law and to military protocol, namely, the mandate in the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Program to “comply with the principles of the law of war during all military operations.” It contends that it is invalid and disingenuous to characterize counterterror military operations employing combat power under a “deadly force as a first resort” authority as extraterritorial law enforcement. The chapter also considers the underlying nature and purpose of the existing law-triggering paradigm, the different nature of the authority derived from the law of armed conflict compared to the law enforcement framework, and the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
C. T. Sandars
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198296874
- eISBN:
- 9780191685293
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296874.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the rivalry between Great Britain and the U.S. during World War II. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's objective in the war was the survival of Britain as a nation ...
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This chapter discusses the rivalry between Great Britain and the U.S. during World War II. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's objective in the war was the survival of Britain as a nation while the U.S., which experienced no direct threat to its territory, saw the war as an opportunity to create a new world order based on the ideals propounded by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered the U.S. government's emphasis on self-determination as incompatible with the maintenance of European colonial empires after the war. Throughout the war, senior American military and civilian officials showed deep distrust of British motives in planning military operations.Less
This chapter discusses the rivalry between Great Britain and the U.S. during World War II. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's objective in the war was the survival of Britain as a nation while the U.S., which experienced no direct threat to its territory, saw the war as an opportunity to create a new world order based on the ideals propounded by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered the U.S. government's emphasis on self-determination as incompatible with the maintenance of European colonial empires after the war. Throughout the war, senior American military and civilian officials showed deep distrust of British motives in planning military operations.
Stephen Conway
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199253753
- eISBN:
- 9780191719738
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253753.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History
This chapter presents a brief and broadly chronological account of military and naval operations. In the interests of manageability, it focuses on the areas of British involvement; however, as ...
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This chapter presents a brief and broadly chronological account of military and naval operations. In the interests of manageability, it focuses on the areas of British involvement; however, as campaigns elsewhere were widely reported in the contemporary press, and seem to have excited much interest, reference is also made to the Austro-Prussian struggles in Central Europe that were at the heart of the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, to the Russian intervention in both conflicts, and to the fighting in Italy in the 1740s, which mainly revolved around the competition between the Austrians and their French and Spanish enemies.Less
This chapter presents a brief and broadly chronological account of military and naval operations. In the interests of manageability, it focuses on the areas of British involvement; however, as campaigns elsewhere were widely reported in the contemporary press, and seem to have excited much interest, reference is also made to the Austro-Prussian struggles in Central Europe that were at the heart of the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, to the Russian intervention in both conflicts, and to the fighting in Italy in the 1740s, which mainly revolved around the competition between the Austrians and their French and Spanish enemies.
James Kraska
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199773381
- eISBN:
- 9780199895298
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199773381.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was created from the near-shore or littoral waters, so assessing the effect of the EEZ on contemporary expeditionary operations begins with a historical ...
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The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was created from the near-shore or littoral waters, so assessing the effect of the EEZ on contemporary expeditionary operations begins with a historical understanding of the importance of military operations in the coastal zone. This chapter discusses sea power in the ancient world; the development of naval powers in Portugal, Spain and the Dutch Republic; and Anglo-American expeditionary naval power.Less
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was created from the near-shore or littoral waters, so assessing the effect of the EEZ on contemporary expeditionary operations begins with a historical understanding of the importance of military operations in the coastal zone. This chapter discusses sea power in the ancient world; the development of naval powers in Portugal, Spain and the Dutch Republic; and Anglo-American expeditionary naval power.
Aaron Rapport
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801453588
- eISBN:
- 9780801455643
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801453588.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter studies the Truman administration's assessment and planning for noncombat operations during the Korean War. The strategic assessments made at the highest levels in the Truman ...
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This chapter studies the Truman administration's assessment and planning for noncombat operations during the Korean War. The strategic assessments made at the highest levels in the Truman administration during the Korean War were sound in that they made use of available information and attempted to enumerate the short-term costs and risks that could impact the success of the occupation of the peninsula. For the majority of officials, concerns about the feasibility of ongoing and near-future military operations trumped evaluations of the desirability of unifying Korea, since that goal was never given much weight prior to the war. Even after the U.S. government decided to expand its war aims, most framed the decision as a necessary response to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK).Less
This chapter studies the Truman administration's assessment and planning for noncombat operations during the Korean War. The strategic assessments made at the highest levels in the Truman administration during the Korean War were sound in that they made use of available information and attempted to enumerate the short-term costs and risks that could impact the success of the occupation of the peninsula. For the majority of officials, concerns about the feasibility of ongoing and near-future military operations trumped evaluations of the desirability of unifying Korea, since that goal was never given much weight prior to the war. Even after the U.S. government decided to expand its war aims, most framed the decision as a necessary response to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK).
David French
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198222996
- eISBN:
- 9780191678561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198222996.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This chapter examines the role of Sir James Edmonds, chief editor and principal compiler of the British Official History, in writing the historiography of World War I. It explains that as head of ...
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This chapter examines the role of Sir James Edmonds, chief editor and principal compiler of the British Official History, in writing the historiography of World War I. It explains that as head of Official History, Edmonds imposed his own idiosyncratic views on how the war should be presented to the public and he guided, assisted, or obstructed those soldiers and statesmen who planned to write memoirs or histories. His most notable work was the multi-volume Military Operations France and Belgium, 1914–1918.Less
This chapter examines the role of Sir James Edmonds, chief editor and principal compiler of the British Official History, in writing the historiography of World War I. It explains that as head of Official History, Edmonds imposed his own idiosyncratic views on how the war should be presented to the public and he guided, assisted, or obstructed those soldiers and statesmen who planned to write memoirs or histories. His most notable work was the multi-volume Military Operations France and Belgium, 1914–1918.
