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This chapter discusses the administration of criminal justice in Germany under military government. The report claims that German criminal law conflicts in many respects not only with the theories and practices for which German criminal law had previously stood, but also with the theories which, in Anglo-American countries, are traditionally linked to the functions of criminal law. This conflict alone does not suffice to impose upon military government a duty to revise or revoke criminal legislation. The chapter considers changes in the German criminal justice system which are necessary not only for the security of the occupying army and the orderly development of German political and social life, but also for the execution of the policies and purposes of the United Nations. It also makes a number of recommendations with respect to military government's approach to criminal law, substantive law, procedural law, problems of jurisdiction, amnesty problems, prosecution of Nazi offenders against German citizens, and problems of administration.

The advent of military government in Chile, following the coup of September 1973, stimulated a substantial emigration of political opponents seeking safety in exile overseas from persecution at home. This chapter details the extent of the emigration and the influence that exiled political parties managed to continue to exert on political life in Chile, and on the international relations of the Pinochet regime. The period under discussion provides a useful case study of the interplay between internal (consent) and external (control) factors in the struggle for democratization, and of such struggle as involving an attempted redefinition of the country's national and international identity. Even today, the links between Chilean political parties and their counterparts overseas remain active and influential, and Chilean politics will continue to have a strong international dimension.

This chapter examines the restructuring of the public sphere in Southern Cone societies in democratic terms after the end of the rule of military governments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. This restructuring involved the recognition of the centrality of legal principles or basic human and civil rights, and of the possibility of autonomous actions by citizens. After this, all the issues suppressed during military rule came to the fore, triggering confrontation and debate around the legacy of human rights violations, attainment of public knowledge, and accountability.

Malaysia and Pakistan sought to address their problems through economic growth and the management of ethnic tensions. Malaysia pursued the New Economic Policy (NEP) to favor Malay bumiputras (sons of the soil), and Pakistan, under a military government, pursued aggressive economic growth. However, these strategies did not resolve ethnic tensions as in Malaysia it did not alleviate the economic problems facing Malays, and in Pakistan it favored Punjab at the cost of other provinces, especially East Pakistan. Both states continued to experience serious challenges to their authorities in the form of racial tensions in Malaysia and the Bangladesh movement in Pakistan.

This chapter discusses the general principles of government administration and Civil Service in Germany. It begins with an overview of the administrative problems facing military government as well as the characteristics of the present-day administration. In particular, it considers the two features of the German administrative organization: the emergence of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich as supreme governmental authority, and the cropping up of numerous special commissioners, who are appointed whenever regular agencies fail or new urgent tasks arise. The chapter proceeds by assessing the fate of the German central agencies, the German Civil Service, and the problem of Civil Service replacements. It concludes with recommendations regarding the policy towards German agencies.

This chapter offers suggestions for the revival of German political and constitutional life under military government, with a view to providing an environment in which cooperation of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union could be maximized. It examines a number of issues, such as the dismissal or retention of an existing German government; the appointment of a temporary central German authority by military government; the political, social, and economic policies to be pursued in Germany; the time and conditions under which local and national elections are to be held; and the time and method of the disestablishment of military government. The chapter considers the legal continuity of a German government existing at the time of occupation, the policy of military government toward a German government, and the establishment of a central German administrative authority. It also discusses basic issues in German politics under military government and the problem of elections.

This chapter discusses events following the demise of Iraq's monarchy in 1958. The demise of the monarchy was met with almost universal approval by the Iraqi people. During the first week after the military coup, huge demonstrations filled the streets of the country's major cities, all proclaiming their devotion and commitment for the infant republic and their support for the new military leaders. While the military's initial political moves suggested a promising proclivity for sharing power with like-minded civilians, it would not be long before those who had a monopoly over coercive force would hold sway over all institutions of the state. For the following decade, the military would radically and consequentially impact the ideas and institutions of governance, democracy, and identity.

This chapter deals with forms of military government, a government instituted by military officers through a military chain of command. Military government readily appears archaic and not merely because of the increasing preference for such terms as civil administration and international territorial administration to refer to what are in fact instances of military occupation. It appears archaic because of the increasing reality of the involvement of civilians and civilian agencies in military occupation. Military government also appears archaic because the isolation of the occupier from the occupied inherent in the definition of military occupation gives it a caste-like character that is at odds with a world in which it is common to speak of global ‘governance’.

Chapter 2 establishes how formal US Army doctrine influenced eventual planning for and implementation of US military government. Most notably, the publication of US Army doctrine, primarily in the form of Field Manual (FM) 27–5: Military Government, provided the seminal guidance on how to train, to plan, and eventually to implement military government. In particular, FM 27–5’s unyielding insistence on military necessity as the guiding principle for postwar occupation governance profoundly informed and influenced subsequent military governments. Doctrine led to training, and FM 27–5 served as the official basis for establishing the School of Military Government where thousands of military government officials were trained during the war years in anticipation of postwar occupation roles. Finally, along with the development of doctrine and education came the formation of military government units that would administer postwar American occupation and the creation of a military government bureaucracy within the War Department that would influence postwar occupation decision making within and outside the army.

This chapter considers a variety of methods of treating Germany. The main objective of the United Nations in the treatment of Germany is to prevent it from ever again becoming a threat to the security of the world. The problem of securing this objective could be approached through destruction of Germany's industrial potential, destruction of Germany as a political entity, and removal from German society of the causes of aggression. The chapter shows that the first two solutions should be deferred until it is clear that the third alternative proves unworkable. In order to eliminate the causes of aggressiveness in German society, temporary and long-term disabilities should be imposed upon Germany. The chapter also examines the causes of German aggression, the United States' policy toward Germany, short-term measures during the period of military government, conditional measures during the probationary period, and permanent impositions upon Germany.

This chapter looks at the U.S.-Argentine relations in 1960–1976. In the early 1960s, Argentine military leaders looked to the French, rather than the Americans, for military assistance and training. Although recognizing the potential benefits of the Argentine–French anticommunist initiative, U.S. policymakers set out to significantly increase U.S. ties with the Argentine military, enticing the armed forces more fully into the internal security role envisioned by the Alliance for Progress. By the second half of the decade, the United States had displaced the French as the primary military influence on the Argentine armed forces and established a close relationship with the military government led by the army commander in chief Juan Carlos Onganía. As Cold War ties between the two nations solidified, U.S. military training and aid played a defining role in the formulation of the Argentine military’s national security doctrine.

This chapter deals with the problem of defining military occupation. This might seem a simple task, and some accounts of military occupation presume that it is. It is not. The concept of military occupation only gained clarity slowly, in distinction from the concept of conquest, and was subsequently muddied by the attempts of occupiers to evade that status. The definition of military occupation is important because it potentially gives greater clarity about the moral status of military occupiers as well as the range of instances covered by the term. However, it tells us little about the contours of military government itself.

This chapter offers some final reflections on the difficulties inherent in trying to understand military occupation as a political phenomenon and the nature of the challenges it poses to those engaged in it. Military occupation pushes sovereignty to the point at which its existence and meaning are precarious. All that is left is a hollow shell whose significance lies in a negative fact: the occupier is not sovereign. The desperation to deny this lies behind the frenetic efforts of ousted elites to demonstrate the efficacy of their legitimacy, and behind calls for the occupier to return sovereignty to the people, as if it were something in the occupier's possession. The structure of military government also matters because it can be used to flatten indigenous institutions, to substantially undermine the very potential of the society subject to occupation to exist as a political entity.

This chapter focuses on the policy toward the revival of old political parties and the establishment of new ones in post-war Germany from the point of view of the security of the occupying forces and the elimination of Nazism. It evaluates the prospective parties according to their probable attitude toward these two objectives of Allied military government. It also makes recommendations solely on the basis of these objectives. It is assumed, however, that the elimination of Nazism, as one of the purposes of the military occupation of Germany, includes the gradual restoration to the German people of the liberties necessary for the reconstruction of their society in a democratic form, which alone can eliminate the roots of Nazism in Germany. Accordingly, the parties and organizations which may be expected to oppose a democratic reconstruction of Germany are considered in relation to a possible revival of Nazism.

This chapter analyzes political developments in Iraq from 1936 to 1958. Any growth of democratic ideas and institutions that had been achieved earlier came to an abrupt halt in 1936 following the military coup. Army officers, custodians of political power between 1936 and 1941, cared little, if at all, about democratic institutions and practices. They were succeeded by civilian governments, openly abetted by the Palace, which systematically interfered in the workings of the country's supposed representative institutions. Political parties and groupings operating within the straitjacket of military government and martial law had all but disappeared from the political scene. And successive governments made certain to emasculate Parliament of even the flimsiest pretense of independence and impartiality.

Letters informing on compatriots were not unusual in Israel's Arab villages in the 1950s and 1960s. Some reported on people who provided safe houses for infiltrators, and others turned in Arabs who owned weapons. On occasion, such letters were sent by known collaborators who sought to prove their efficacy or by Arabs who wanted to ingratiate themselves with the authorities. The security or political charges the letters contained were intended to prompt police action. The Communists' overt opposition to the military government and its laws, their fundamental position that Israel should withdraw to the 1947 partition borders, and the systematic way they recruited supporters all made them the major rival of Mapai (and the security agencies, which were in the hands of Mapai) in the Arab public. The Israeli establishment thus viewed them as a clear and present danger to the Jewish state. Clashes between Communist activists and the police and military government became routine. Two Arab personages who enjoyed the support of the Israeli establishment in their contention with the Communists were Mutran Hakim and Muhammad Nimer al-Hawwari.

The shah had said on several occasions that he had expected turmoil as the price of liberalization, but it was a passing political spasm and the country would soon return to calm and tranquility. The Americans, particularly President Carter, generally encouraged the shah along these lines. The Americans had monitored the gradual increase of violence since 1 January 1978, when President Carter had last been in Tehran. On 5 November 1978 Tehran was on fire. Rebellion enveloped the city. Major companies, cinemas, liquor stores, buses, and cars were vandalized and burned, but banks were the primary targets. The shah was caught between his military commanders, who advised him to show an iron fist, and civilians whose sense of guilt foreshadowed and encouraged his, advising him the opposite. On 29 December 1978 the shah asked Bakhtiar to form a government.