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A number of recent and influential accounts of military ethics have argued that there exists a distinctive “role morality” for members of the armed services—a “warrior code.” A “good warrior” is a person who cultivates and exercises the “martial” or “warrior” virtues. By transforming combat into a “desk job” that can be conducted from the safety of the home territory of advanced industrial powers without need for physical strength or martial valour, long-range robotic weapons, such as the “Predator” and “Reaper” drones fielded by the United States, call the relevance of the “martial virtues” into question. This chapter investigates the implications of these developments for conceptions of military virtue and, consequently, for the future of war.

The U.S. military has a long and checkered history of research involving human subjects. Although federal guidelines and military directives provide service members with procedural safeguards, the protections are diluted by military hierarchy and culture, military-specific regulatory exceptions (such as informed consent waivers and “field-test” exceptions), and legal doctrines (including sovereign immunity and the state secrets privilege). While federal regulations governing human subjects research identify certain categories of individuals as vulnerable populations and afford these sub-populations with additional protections, federal guidelines do not classify military personnel as a vulnerable population. This chapter argues that regulations governing human subjects research should identify military personnel as a vulnerable population. Such a classification not only would acknowledge that service members are a class of individuals that is subject to coercion or undue influence, it would require that regulators enact guidelines that provide service members with additional safeguards. When one considers the military’s current and emerging focus on biomedical enhancements, affording service members with additional safeguards is necessary to ensure the harmonization of national security interests, patient autonomy, and research ethics.

The prospect of robotic warriors striding the battlefield has, somewhat unsurprisingly, been shaped by perceptions drawn from science fiction. While illustrative, such comparisons are largely unhelpful for those considering potential ethical implications of autonomous weapons systems. In this chapter, I offer two alternative sources for ethical comparison. Drawing from military history and current practice for guidance, this chapter highlights the parallels that make mercenaries—the ‘dogs of war’—and military working dogs—the actual dogs of war—useful lenses through which to consider Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems—the robot dogs of war. Through these comparisons, I demonstrate that some of the most commonly raised ethical objections to autonomous weapon systems are overstated, misguided, or otherwise dependent on outside circumstance.

This chapter examines the supposed duty to risk state forces in armed conflicts when, for example, a state chooses to use air power to minimize risk to its own troops. It begins with an overview of civilian harm and the rationale of the duty to risk before discussing the interaction between international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law in the duty to risk. Reviewing IHL and military ethics, the chapter challenges the argument that a state has a categorical duty to risk its forces even when IHL would not so require according to the principle of proportionality. As an alternative, it proposes a structural approach to counterinsurgency that pivots around the relationship between a violent nonstate actor and at-risk civilians. It suggests that traditional IHL principles may be most fair to civilians and soldiers and that duties to the state that exceed IHL requirements may blunt the decisiveness needed by commanders.

This chapter explores the use of drone technology from the perspective of professional military ethics, asking when and how drone use is consistent with achieving legitimate and ethically permissible military purposes. It traces how technological advances and the changing nature of conflict have combined to influence security policy and military culture. Acknowledging the tactical and short-term operational advantages of drones, the chapter notes that the use of drone weapons may have a negative strategic impact, such as increasing recruitment rates among militant groups. The chapter also discusses the impact of drone weapons on those who operate them and addresses the potential erosion of the ‘warrior ethos.’ Robotic warfare alters the moral meaning of war as patriotic duty and risks making targeting killing appear normal and antiseptic.

This chapter responds to the interesting lack of formal movement by states toward the development of practical ethical frameworks for military applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Despite prominent depictions of autonomous weapon systems as the first step toward a dystopian future and almost seven years of international discussions under the auspices of the United Nations, only the United States has developed explicit principles for military AI. In the absence of similar efforts by other states, the underlying technologies have continued to develop, particularly in the civilian sphere. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to review ethical principles that were originally developed for civilian applications of AI and then propose a version that could be deployed to armed forces that seek to deploy autonomous systems and military AI. This chapter will consider the limitations of such an approach and argue in favor of the development of a ‘minimally-just AI’ to ensure that autonomous weapons cannot be used for blatant violations of the laws of war. The Military Ethical AI principles outlined in this chapter are intended for use as a high-level framework and shared language to enable discussion among various stakeholders on the ethical and legal concerns that remain with militarized AI.

Combat automation, enabled by rapid technological advancements in artificial intelligence and machine learning, is a guiding principle in the conduct of war today. Yet, empirical data on the impact of algorithmic combat on military personnel remains limited. This chapter draws on data from a historically unprecedented survey of Australian Defence Force Academy cadets. Given that this generation of trainees will be the first to deploy autonomous systems (AS) in a systematic way, their views are especially important. This chapter focuses its analysis on five themes: the dynamics of human-machine teams; the perceived risks, benefits, and capabilities of AS; the changing nature of (and respect for) military labor and incentives; preferences to oversee a robot, versus carrying out a mission themselves; and the changing meaning of soldiering. We utilize the survey data to explore the interconnected consequences of neoliberal governing for cadets’ attitudes toward AS, and citizen-soldiering more broadly. Overall, this chapter argues that Australian cadets are open to working with and alongside AS, but under the right conditions. Armed forces, in an attempt to capitalize on these technologically savvy cadets, have shifted from institutional to occupational employers. However, in our concluding remarks, we caution against unchecked technological fetishism, highlighting the need to critically question the risks of AS on moral deskilling, and the application of market-based notions of freedom to the military domain.

Setting aside the military advantages offered by Autonomous Weapons Systems for a moment, international debate continues to feature the argument that the use of lethal force by “killer robots” inherently violates human dignity. The purpose of this chapter is to refute this assumption of inherent immorality and demonstrate situations in which deploying autonomous systems would be strategically, morally, and rationally appropriate. The second part of this chapter objects to the argument that the use of robots in warfare is somehow inherently offensive to human dignity. Overall, this chapter will demonstrate that, contrary to arguments made by some within civil society, moral employment of force is possible, even without proximate human decision-making. As discussions continue to swirl around autonomous weapons systems, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that fire-and-forget weapons are not morally exceptional or inherently evil. If an engagement complied with the established ethical framework, it is not inherently morally invalidated by the absence of a human at the point of violence. As this chapter argues, the decision to employ lethal force becomes problematic when a more thorough consideration would have demanded restraint. Assuming a legitimate target, therefore, the importance of the distance between human agency in the target authorization process and force delivery is separated by degrees. A morally justifiable decision to engage a target with rifle fire would not be ethically invalidated simply because the lethal force was delivered by a commander-authorized robotic carrier.

Although there are few restrictions on killing combatants, the contemporary law of war bans weapons that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Because military necessity and humanitarian norms often conflict, no clear regulations have emerged. Instead, states sometimes ban weapons because they cause horrific wounds. But this determination is subjective and has led the Red Cross to seek objective medical guidelines on unnecessary suffering. A close look shows how it is often difficult to apply these guidelines to new non-lethal technologies, which include electromagnetic, pharmacological, and neurological weapons. These weapons do not cause obvious injury and suffering and may even reduce combatant and civilian injuries. Nevertheless, they can cause intense transient pain or impinge upon human dignity when they undermine cognitive capabilities. Weighing the costs of new technologies against their benefits remains an abiding challenge for humanitarian law.

This introductory chapter sets out the scope of the analysis to be covered in the book. It introduces the subject of radical asymmetry, clarifies the theoretical and empirical dimensions of the topic, and provides an overview of historical iterations of this challenge. Following a brief review of the existing debate, the chapter outlines the methodological framework of the book, highlighting the distinction between its ethical and moral focus. Following this, the chapter offers a summary of the central argument. A brief breakdown of the overall structure of the book is then provided. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the significance of this subject.

The discourse surrounding Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) should encourage deeper consideration of how perceptions and reactive attitudes toward AWS could evolve in such a way to no longer reflect their deterministic nature. As AWS become more sophisticated and demonstrate increased behavioral complexity, it may well become more difficult for soldiers and policymakers to continue to view these systems dispassionately. This chapter draws on P.F. Strawson’s work to demonstrate how humans may find it impossible to fully rid themselves of reactive attitudes toward AWS. This chapter goes on to consider the consequences of humans and AWS in a shared environment. Human beings, whether enemy combatants or civilians, may respond to AWS not as sophisticated but ultimately deterministic actors, but rather as free agents and thus targets for feelings of gratitude or resentment. The link between behavior interpretation, perceived agency, and emotional attitudes has important implications for the deployment of AWS. A common argument in favor of AWS is that they would reduce collateral damage in counterinsurgency operations. It is far from certain that even the detached, calculated, and objective decision-making of an AWS would reduce the reactive response of the local populace. This chapter concludes by noting that some resentment to the lethal use of force is inevitable among civilians and combatants and argues that the deployment of an AWS is an unreliable tool for reducing this response.

This chapter locates the role of reciprocal risk within the warrior ethos. It first outlines that exposure to personal, physical risk has long been regarded as a key element in the ethos-based conception of legitimate violence. It demonstrates this through analysis of ancient warfare, both Greek and Roman, as well as the medieval code of chivalry. As will be further shown, however, the warrior ethos is an evolving framework; one that gives increasing consideration to factors such as restraint and professionalism in determinations of ethical status. This will be confirmed through analysis of premodern, modern, and ‘post-heroic’ warfare. As this chapter will illustrate, the adaptive quality of the warrior ethos is a key explanatory factor in the historical resolution of asymmetry-challenges.