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This chapter analyses the different areas in which the Crown made demands upon the City. The most obvious demand was for financial help, but the Crown also sought military aid from the city and pageantry for royal celebrations. On occasion, the Crown attempted to reward royal servants with civic offices. All these demands had to be negotiated and such issues were highlighted when the Crown, as was frequently the case, was in contention, and rival claimants sought the support of the City.

Chapter Two describes the experiences of Ira Hunt in his position as USSAG deputy commander, specifically the development of the U.S. military’s understanding of both allied (RVNAF) and communist (NVA/VC) capabilities and their relative manpower; the North Vietnamese infiltration of supplies and equipment; a review of the South Vietnamese Air Force, Navy, and Army armor and artillery capabilities; and the key U.S. funding situation, to include the effects of the worldwide oil-induced inflation on South Vietnam. In addition, it provides a combat analysis of both the South Vietnamese attempts to defend against the communists’ landgrabbing operations and the RVNAF’s undertaking of what it described as “security operations,” as evidenced by the four major types of enemy initiations that continued after the ceasefire: attacks by fire, contacts, harassments, and terrorism. It also looks at the effects of Congress’ decision to reduce military aid funding on the RVNAF’s inability to maintain defense of the country and the resulting fall of South Vietnam.

This chapter provides a historical account on the use and duties of the army by dividing it into three periods: the pre-1914 period, the inter-war period, and the post-1945 period. The author first traces the possible origin of the use of armed forces in the course of industrial disputes in the twentieth century in 1908. The inter-war period showcased how immediately after the First World War, the peace could only be kept by military reinforcement of the police, or on occasion by way of substitution for the police. The post-1945 period demonstrates that the use of military personnel to replace strikers in carrying out work is essential. The constitutional implications on the discussion of military aid to the civil power, whether it is for the purpose of maintaining order or supplies and services, are demonstrated.

This chapter analyses the efforts by the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations to establish educational programs and networks for Iranian students. It demonstrates how, on the one hand, Iranians who studied and received training in the United States were enmeshed in a transnational web of conflicting interests, torn between their concerns about Iran’s vanishing democracy and the economic development of their country. On the other hand, American proponents of international education were caught between an intensifying Iranian nationalism and Washington’s security interests in the Persian Gulf region.

This chapter explains that although the United States had assisted in the withdrawal of the Kuomintang (KMT) troops, the American objective of preventing communist domination of Burma remained fully intact. The United States was interested in providing economic and military aid to strengthen the government's ability to take on the communist rebels, and to maintain its independence from China. In December 1954, President Eisenhower stated that the administration's interest in Asia was to stop the “Communist menace.” During his time, however, the “menace” remained, so the United States continued to be involved in Asia, including Burma. Because of Burma's determined adherence to nonalignment, it insisted that whatever aid was provided had to come without conditions. Since U.S. law often did require conditions, the bargaining was quite difficult. The chapter shows how Burma's ethnic rebellions also posed unique challenges for the United States.

This chapter describes the problems of responsibility for forms of ‘indirect aggression’. Charges of ‘aggression’ are often based on allegations of military aid to, and control over, rebels in a civil war. There remain some rather assorted problems relating to self-defence. The question of lawful defensive measures in the face of indirect aggression is specifically explored. The instruments relating to the use of force do not incorporate any references to animus aggressionis. The absence of such a requirement is an advantage for a number of reasons.

Using the logic of a game theoretic model, this chapter argues that the project to cement American dominance over the global energy market failed because the U.S. security guarantee created a series of perverse incentives. Host leaders recognized that they would only receive American support if the threat of terrorism persisted, and that they would receive relatively more economic and military aid if the threat of terrorism became significant. Therefore, these host states had no incentive to disarm their terrorists. As a result, terrorism escalated throughout the energy market in the 2000s, leading to spiraling costs to the U.S. and a political backlash. Pressure mounted on American leaders to begin scaling back the war. To forestall this possibility, and protect the lucrative petrodollar system, the U.S. needed to quickly develop a strategy to force the host states to proactively address the terrorist threats in their territories.

This chapter presents the first of three case studies driving the argument of this book, namely that Chinese influence was largely insignificant when it came to shaping Democratic Kampuchea (DK) goals and means of achieving them. The case involves the planning and construction of Krang Leav airfield, located just outside the Cambodian village of Palarng. First, the case shows that decision to place the airfield in Kampong Chhnang is just one of many instances where DK preferences won out over Chinese ones. Second, even if China wanted to, it was unable to influence DK in the implementation of policy because the bureaucracy in charge of the airfield, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea's (RAK) Division 502, was among the strongest and most centralized in the country. As a result, Krang Leav is a rare instance in which a major Chinese assistance project in DK was an unqualified success; indeed, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 was the only thing that prevented the airfield from becoming fully operational.

The third chapter, based on research from the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, FRUS, and the Congressional Record, explores congressional reactions to Nixon’s request for $2.2 billion in emergency military aid for Israel, as well as U.S. efforts to restart the peace process. Despite efforts by Fulbright and several other legislators, along with the Nixon administration’s lack of effort to justify such a massive aid package, Congress passed the emergency aid bill in full. Legislators successfully argued that Israel needed the immense amount of aid in order to feel strong enough to take risks in peace negotiations. But by May 1974, fearful that Israel felt too strong, the Nixon administration started to threaten to cut off all military aid to soften Israel’s position in peace negotiations. The fall of Nixon due to Watergate sapped the power of the White House at precisely the moment when a strong president was needed to advance such an ambitious program of U.S. peace diplomacy. Also important, Kissinger had to work against pro-Israel elements that sought to scuttle his gradual approach to a comprehensive peace.

This chapter focuses on the lobbying efforts of political exiles. Marcos and his military establishment were essential to the considerable U.S. interests in the Philippines. In turn, Marcos' military had an ongoing need for hardware and training from the United States. This symbiotic relationship dictated the ebb and flow of military aid money each year. By portraying U.S.-supplied security forces as the chief instrument keeping Marcos in power, the opposition hoped to either eliminate or reduce the amount of military aid earmarked for the Philippines. During deliberations on the 1973 aid bill, an amendment was introduced by Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota on December 5, 1973, that would deny assistance to any country that imprisoned its citizens for political purposes. An earlier Abourezk amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 would have prohibited the use of aid funds for police, prisons, internal intelligence, or the maintenance of internal security forces. Both amendments were defeated. Given the United States' utter dependence on its Philippine bases, it was unrealistic to think that Congress would risk losing them by cutting off all aid to Marcos. The best the exile lobbyists could hope for was a moderation in the regime's behavior, such as releasing political prisoners or dropping the use of torture.

In the fall of 1960, the US national security bureaucracy tried to develop a military aid program for Cambodia that would be sufficiently large to forestall a request by Sihanouk for similar assistance from communist nations. The leader of the Cambodian mission to Washington was Lon Nol, the commander in chief of the country’s armed forces and its minister of defense. He was disappointed by the small increase in US military aid but seemed pleased by the VIP treatment he received. With the civil war in Laos intensifying, Sihanouk appealed to the international community to guarantee the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia. He proposed an international conference that became the basis for the fourteen-nation Geneva conference on Laos (May 1961–July 1962). The Eisenhower administration, seeking to strengthen the military position of the Lao anticommunists and contemplating SEATO or unilateral American intervention, opposed Sihanouk’s proposal.

This chapter discusses the development of the Century Group, which reflected yet another strand of American internationalism. As early as May 15, 1940, Winston Churchill appealed to Franklin Roosevelt for assistance in the form of naval destroyers. One month later, faced with the imminent fall of France and the loss of the French, Danish, and Norwegian coastlines to Nazi Germany, Churchill asked “as a matter of life or death” for reinforcement on the seas to defend Great Britain. The U.S. Navy was in the process of reconditioning more than one hundred old destroyers, but there was no guarantee they would be given to Britain. It was in this context that the Century Group was born. The Century Group was notably more interventionist in its outlook than the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA); whereas the latter organization sought all possible aid to the Allies, the former advocated all-out war, arguing that this was America's war to fight.

This chapter focuses on Guatemala, where evangelical dictator General José Efraín Ríos Montt seized power in a coup in 1982. It talks about Ríos Montt's religious beliefs and staunch anticommunism that led politically influential evangelical leaders and nongovernmental organizations in the United States to support and promote his regime. It also discusses direct fundraising and evangelical organizations that lobbied Congress to restore military aid to Guatemala, which Jimmy Carter had suspended due to ongoing human rights violations. The chapter investigates why many evangelical groups argued that Ríos Montt's Christian faith would compel him to improve the human rights situation in Guatemala despite mounting evidence that the dictator's military campaign against the “communist insurgency” in his country involved the mass killing of indigenous Mayans. It demonstrates how evangelical engagement with Ríos Montt reshaped society and politics in Guatemala, as well as policymaking in the United States.

This chapter examines the rise of nationalism in South Vietnam within the context of the Cold War. On February 1, 1950, a U.S. State Department working group articulated the logic for providing American military aid to France during the Indochina war. Over the next four years, Washington increased its economic support to France and pressured it to continue the fight against falling dominoes in Southeast Asia. This chapter argues that the United States pressed the French to grant greater independence to the noncommunist nationalist government they had established in Saigon not because of concern over Vietnam's internal affairs, but because of its perceived strategic significance within the Cold War international system. It also suggests that the United States was driven by fears that it might be losing ground to the Soviet Union in a competition for the allegiance of the rapidly decolonizing world.

Although Western delegates to the Geneva conference in 1954 to restore peace in Indochina thought that Vietnam posed the most difficult military and political challenges, issues related to Cambodia and Laos threatened to paralyze the conference. Cambodia opposed any settlement limiting the kingdom’s capacity for self-defense, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) insisted that Cambodia’s self-defense plans exclude US military assistance. Of the three so-called Associated States, only Cambodia emerged from the conference intact, without a regrouping zone for the country’s communist-led forces. The Geneva conference, which enhanced Sihanouk’s reputation as a defender of his kingdom’s independence, was the high point of US approval of Sihanouk and his government. The US government agreed to provide direct economic and military assistance to Cambodia and appointed Robert M. McClintock as the first resident ambassador in Phnom Penh.

The fifth and final chapter examines the controversial and secret executive agreements connected to Sinai II, concluded in September 1975, in the context of a congressional effort to restrict the broad use of such agreements. The agreements committed the United States to providing for Israel’s military and economic security and pledged to not advance any steps in the peace process without Israel’s approval. Numerous legislators argued that the agreements marked a fundamental and questionable shift in U.S.-Israel relations and that they resembled treaties, which required Senate approval. Based on research from the Congressional Record, Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and congressional hearing reports, the chapter shows that legislators felt handcuffed. They felt obligated to pass a resolution to allow for U.S. technicians to man an early-warning station in the Sinai Peninsula in order to preserve the agreement between Israel and Egypt. But by passing the resolution, Congress also authorized, by what Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) called “backdoor” approval, the executive agreements that committed the United States to providing for the future economic, military, and energy needs of Israel, regardless of Israel’s willingness to adhere to the spirit of U.N. Resolution 242.

This chapter tackles the questions over how best to reconcile the demands of colonial defense with the interests of the British Empire. Americans had repeatedly demanded British military aid, raised large sums of money for the king's troops, and praised the empire as a force for good. And although there is little doubt that colonial assemblies clashed with royal governors, they often worked closely together to expand colonial fiscal-military states. But, as in Britain, the growth of armies, taxes, and debts created new burdens and stirred intense controversy. However, these conflicts were not, fundamentally, between localists and imperialists or libertarians and statists; rather, they were between radical Whigs and authoritarian reformers. They turned on competing conceptions of political economy and government, and they exposed deep ideological rifts within colonial society.

This chapter discusses the Cuban withdrawal and Namibian independence talks that had been broken off to protest the Reagan administration's announcement that it was extending military aid to UNITA. In late 1986, they informed Washington that they were interested in resuming the talks. The Reagan administration responded favorably. In Moscow, in March 1987, Angolan foreign minister M'Binda informed Soviets and Cubans that a new round of negotiations was about to begin. No one objected. Risquet repeated that Cuba was willing to remain in Angola until the abolition of apartheid. “Pretoria's arms are long and aggressive,” he warned. Even if Namibia were independent and South Africa had withdrawn its troops south of the Orange River, it could easily attack Angola by traversing Namibia or by sea or by air.