Caroline M. Barron
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199257775
- eISBN:
- 9780191717758
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199257775.003.01
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Medieval History
This chapter analyses the different areas in which the Crown made demands upon the City. The most obvious demand was for financial help, but the Crown also sought military aid from the city and ...
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This chapter analyses the different areas in which the Crown made demands upon the City. The most obvious demand was for financial help, but the Crown also sought military aid from the city and pageantry for royal celebrations. On occasion, the Crown attempted to reward royal servants with civic offices. All these demands had to be negotiated and such issues were highlighted when the Crown, as was frequently the case, was in contention, and rival claimants sought the support of the City.Less
This chapter analyses the different areas in which the Crown made demands upon the City. The most obvious demand was for financial help, but the Crown also sought military aid from the city and pageantry for royal celebrations. On occasion, the Crown attempted to reward royal servants with civic offices. All these demands had to be negotiated and such issues were highlighted when the Crown, as was frequently the case, was in contention, and rival claimants sought the support of the City.
Ira A. Hunt
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780813142081
- eISBN:
- 9780813142449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813142081.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Chapter Two describes the experiences of Ira Hunt in his position as USSAG deputy commander, specifically the development of the U.S. military’s understanding of both allied (RVNAF) and communist ...
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Chapter Two describes the experiences of Ira Hunt in his position as USSAG deputy commander, specifically the development of the U.S. military’s understanding of both allied (RVNAF) and communist (NVA/VC) capabilities and their relative manpower; the North Vietnamese infiltration of supplies and equipment; a review of the South Vietnamese Air Force, Navy, and Army armor and artillery capabilities; and the key U.S. funding situation, to include the effects of the worldwide oil-induced inflation on South Vietnam. In addition, it provides a combat analysis of both the South Vietnamese attempts to defend against the communists’ landgrabbing operations and the RVNAF’s undertaking of what it described as “security operations,” as evidenced by the four major types of enemy initiations that continued after the ceasefire: attacks by fire, contacts, harassments, and terrorism. It also looks at the effects of Congress’ decision to reduce military aid funding on the RVNAF’s inability to maintain defense of the country and the resulting fall of South Vietnam.Less
Chapter Two describes the experiences of Ira Hunt in his position as USSAG deputy commander, specifically the development of the U.S. military’s understanding of both allied (RVNAF) and communist (NVA/VC) capabilities and their relative manpower; the North Vietnamese infiltration of supplies and equipment; a review of the South Vietnamese Air Force, Navy, and Army armor and artillery capabilities; and the key U.S. funding situation, to include the effects of the worldwide oil-induced inflation on South Vietnam. In addition, it provides a combat analysis of both the South Vietnamese attempts to defend against the communists’ landgrabbing operations and the RVNAF’s undertaking of what it described as “security operations,” as evidenced by the four major types of enemy initiations that continued after the ceasefire: attacks by fire, contacts, harassments, and terrorism. It also looks at the effects of Congress’ decision to reduce military aid funding on the RVNAF’s inability to maintain defense of the country and the resulting fall of South Vietnam.
Geoffrey Marshall
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198762027
- eISBN:
- 9780191695179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198762027.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter provides a historical account on the use and duties of the army by dividing it into three periods: the pre-1914 period, the inter-war period, and the post-1945 period. The author first ...
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This chapter provides a historical account on the use and duties of the army by dividing it into three periods: the pre-1914 period, the inter-war period, and the post-1945 period. The author first traces the possible origin of the use of armed forces in the course of industrial disputes in the twentieth century in 1908. The inter-war period showcased how immediately after the First World War, the peace could only be kept by military reinforcement of the police, or on occasion by way of substitution for the police. The post-1945 period demonstrates that the use of military personnel to replace strikers in carrying out work is essential. The constitutional implications on the discussion of military aid to the civil power, whether it is for the purpose of maintaining order or supplies and services, are demonstrated.Less
This chapter provides a historical account on the use and duties of the army by dividing it into three periods: the pre-1914 period, the inter-war period, and the post-1945 period. The author first traces the possible origin of the use of armed forces in the course of industrial disputes in the twentieth century in 1908. The inter-war period showcased how immediately after the First World War, the peace could only be kept by military reinforcement of the police, or on occasion by way of substitution for the police. The post-1945 period demonstrates that the use of military personnel to replace strikers in carrying out work is essential. The constitutional implications on the discussion of military aid to the civil power, whether it is for the purpose of maintaining order or supplies and services, are demonstrated.
Kenton Clymer
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801454486
- eISBN:
- 9781501701023
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801454486.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter explains that although the United States had assisted in the withdrawal of the Kuomintang (KMT) troops, the American objective of preventing communist domination of Burma remained fully ...
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This chapter explains that although the United States had assisted in the withdrawal of the Kuomintang (KMT) troops, the American objective of preventing communist domination of Burma remained fully intact. The United States was interested in providing economic and military aid to strengthen the government's ability to take on the communist rebels, and to maintain its independence from China. In December 1954, President Eisenhower stated that the administration's interest in Asia was to stop the “Communist menace.” During his time, however, the “menace” remained, so the United States continued to be involved in Asia, including Burma. Because of Burma's determined adherence to nonalignment, it insisted that whatever aid was provided had to come without conditions. Since U.S. law often did require conditions, the bargaining was quite difficult. The chapter shows how Burma's ethnic rebellions also posed unique challenges for the United States.Less
This chapter explains that although the United States had assisted in the withdrawal of the Kuomintang (KMT) troops, the American objective of preventing communist domination of Burma remained fully intact. The United States was interested in providing economic and military aid to strengthen the government's ability to take on the communist rebels, and to maintain its independence from China. In December 1954, President Eisenhower stated that the administration's interest in Asia was to stop the “Communist menace.” During his time, however, the “menace” remained, so the United States continued to be involved in Asia, including Burma. Because of Burma's determined adherence to nonalignment, it insisted that whatever aid was provided had to come without conditions. Since U.S. law often did require conditions, the bargaining was quite difficult. The chapter shows how Burma's ethnic rebellions also posed unique challenges for the United States.
Matthew K. Shannon
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781501713132
- eISBN:
- 9781501709708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501713132.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter analyses the efforts by the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations to establish educational programs and networks for Iranian students. It demonstrates how, on the one hand, ...
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This chapter analyses the efforts by the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations to establish educational programs and networks for Iranian students. It demonstrates how, on the one hand, Iranians who studied and received training in the United States were enmeshed in a transnational web of conflicting interests, torn between their concerns about Iran’s vanishing democracy and the economic development of their country. On the other hand, American proponents of international education were caught between an intensifying Iranian nationalism and Washington’s security interests in the Persian Gulf region.Less
This chapter analyses the efforts by the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations to establish educational programs and networks for Iranian students. It demonstrates how, on the one hand, Iranians who studied and received training in the United States were enmeshed in a transnational web of conflicting interests, torn between their concerns about Iran’s vanishing democracy and the economic development of their country. On the other hand, American proponents of international education were caught between an intensifying Iranian nationalism and Washington’s security interests in the Persian Gulf region.
Andrew Mertha
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452659
- eISBN:
- 9780801470738
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452659.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Asian Politics
When the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in 1975, they inherited a war-ravaged and internationally isolated country. Pol Pot's government espoused the rhetoric of self-reliance, but Democratic ...
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When the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in 1975, they inherited a war-ravaged and internationally isolated country. Pol Pot's government espoused the rhetoric of self-reliance, but Democratic Kampuchea was utterly dependent on Chinese foreign aid and technical assistance to survive. Yet in a markedly asymmetrical relationship between a modernizing, nuclear power and a virtually premodern state, China was largely unable to use its power to influence Cambodian politics or policy. This book traces this surprising lack of influence to variations between the Chinese and Cambodian institutions that administered military aid, technology transfer, and international trade. Today, China's extensive engagement with the developing world suggests an inexorably rising China in the process of securing a degree of economic and political dominance that was unthinkable even a decade ago. Yet, China's experience with its first-ever client state suggests that the effectiveness of Chinese foreign aid, and influence that comes with it, is only as good as the institutions that manage the relationship. By focusing on the links between China and Democratic Kampuchea, the book peers into the “black box” of Chinese foreign aid to illustrate how domestic institutional fragmentation limits Beijing's ability to influence the countries that accept its assistance.Less
When the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in 1975, they inherited a war-ravaged and internationally isolated country. Pol Pot's government espoused the rhetoric of self-reliance, but Democratic Kampuchea was utterly dependent on Chinese foreign aid and technical assistance to survive. Yet in a markedly asymmetrical relationship between a modernizing, nuclear power and a virtually premodern state, China was largely unable to use its power to influence Cambodian politics or policy. This book traces this surprising lack of influence to variations between the Chinese and Cambodian institutions that administered military aid, technology transfer, and international trade. Today, China's extensive engagement with the developing world suggests an inexorably rising China in the process of securing a degree of economic and political dominance that was unthinkable even a decade ago. Yet, China's experience with its first-ever client state suggests that the effectiveness of Chinese foreign aid, and influence that comes with it, is only as good as the institutions that manage the relationship. By focusing on the links between China and Democratic Kampuchea, the book peers into the “black box” of Chinese foreign aid to illustrate how domestic institutional fragmentation limits Beijing's ability to influence the countries that accept its assistance.
James R. Stocker
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781501700774
- eISBN:
- 9781501704154
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501700774.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
This book examines the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon during a transformational period for Lebanon and a time of dynamic changes in U.S. policy toward the ...
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This book examines the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon during a transformational period for Lebanon and a time of dynamic changes in U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Drawing on tens of thousands of pages of declassified materials from U.S. archives and a variety of Arabic and other non-English sources, the book provides a new interpretation of Lebanon's slide into civil war, as well as insight into the strategy behind U.S. diplomatic initiatives toward the Arab–Israeli conflict. During this period, the book argues that Lebanon was often a pawn in the games of larger powers. After a series of internal crises in 1969, 1970, and 1973, the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975. The conflict reached a temporary halt after a Syrian military intervention the following year, but this was only an end to the first stage of what would be a sixteen-year civil war. During these crises, the United States sought to help the Lebanese government in a variety of ways, including providing military aid to the Lebanese military, convincing Arab countries to take measures to help the Lebanese government, mediating Lebanon's relations with Israel, and even supporting certain militias.Less
This book examines the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon during a transformational period for Lebanon and a time of dynamic changes in U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Drawing on tens of thousands of pages of declassified materials from U.S. archives and a variety of Arabic and other non-English sources, the book provides a new interpretation of Lebanon's slide into civil war, as well as insight into the strategy behind U.S. diplomatic initiatives toward the Arab–Israeli conflict. During this period, the book argues that Lebanon was often a pawn in the games of larger powers. After a series of internal crises in 1969, 1970, and 1973, the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975. The conflict reached a temporary halt after a Syrian military intervention the following year, but this was only an end to the first stage of what would be a sixteen-year civil war. During these crises, the United States sought to help the Lebanese government in a variety of ways, including providing military aid to the Lebanese military, convincing Arab countries to take measures to help the Lebanese government, mediating Lebanon's relations with Israel, and even supporting certain militias.
Ian Brownlie
- Published in print:
- 1963
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198251583
- eISBN:
- 9780191681332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198251583.003.0021
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter describes the problems of responsibility for forms of ‘indirect aggression’. Charges of ‘aggression’ are often based on allegations of military aid to, and control over, rebels in a ...
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This chapter describes the problems of responsibility for forms of ‘indirect aggression’. Charges of ‘aggression’ are often based on allegations of military aid to, and control over, rebels in a civil war. There remain some rather assorted problems relating to self-defence. The question of lawful defensive measures in the face of indirect aggression is specifically explored. The instruments relating to the use of force do not incorporate any references to animus aggressionis. The absence of such a requirement is an advantage for a number of reasons.Less
This chapter describes the problems of responsibility for forms of ‘indirect aggression’. Charges of ‘aggression’ are often based on allegations of military aid to, and control over, rebels in a civil war. There remain some rather assorted problems relating to self-defence. The question of lawful defensive measures in the face of indirect aggression is specifically explored. The instruments relating to the use of force do not incorporate any references to animus aggressionis. The absence of such a requirement is an advantage for a number of reasons.
Andrew Mertha
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452659
- eISBN:
- 9780801470738
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452659.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Asian Politics
This chapter presents the first of three case studies driving the argument of this book, namely that Chinese influence was largely insignificant when it came to shaping Democratic Kampuchea (DK) ...
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This chapter presents the first of three case studies driving the argument of this book, namely that Chinese influence was largely insignificant when it came to shaping Democratic Kampuchea (DK) goals and means of achieving them. The case involves the planning and construction of Krang Leav airfield, located just outside the Cambodian village of Palarng. First, the case shows that decision to place the airfield in Kampong Chhnang is just one of many instances where DK preferences won out over Chinese ones. Second, even if China wanted to, it was unable to influence DK in the implementation of policy because the bureaucracy in charge of the airfield, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea's (RAK) Division 502, was among the strongest and most centralized in the country. As a result, Krang Leav is a rare instance in which a major Chinese assistance project in DK was an unqualified success; indeed, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 was the only thing that prevented the airfield from becoming fully operational.Less
This chapter presents the first of three case studies driving the argument of this book, namely that Chinese influence was largely insignificant when it came to shaping Democratic Kampuchea (DK) goals and means of achieving them. The case involves the planning and construction of Krang Leav airfield, located just outside the Cambodian village of Palarng. First, the case shows that decision to place the airfield in Kampong Chhnang is just one of many instances where DK preferences won out over Chinese ones. Second, even if China wanted to, it was unable to influence DK in the implementation of policy because the bureaucracy in charge of the airfield, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea's (RAK) Division 502, was among the strongest and most centralized in the country. As a result, Krang Leav is a rare instance in which a major Chinese assistance project in DK was an unqualified success; indeed, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 was the only thing that prevented the airfield from becoming fully operational.
Jose V. Fuentecilla
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252037580
- eISBN:
- 9780252095092
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252037580.003.0007
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Asian Studies
This chapter focuses on the lobbying efforts of political exiles. Marcos and his military establishment were essential to the considerable U.S. interests in the Philippines. In turn, Marcos' military ...
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This chapter focuses on the lobbying efforts of political exiles. Marcos and his military establishment were essential to the considerable U.S. interests in the Philippines. In turn, Marcos' military had an ongoing need for hardware and training from the United States. This symbiotic relationship dictated the ebb and flow of military aid money each year. By portraying U.S.-supplied security forces as the chief instrument keeping Marcos in power, the opposition hoped to either eliminate or reduce the amount of military aid earmarked for the Philippines. During deliberations on the 1973 aid bill, an amendment was introduced by Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota on December 5, 1973, that would deny assistance to any country that imprisoned its citizens for political purposes. An earlier Abourezk amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 would have prohibited the use of aid funds for police, prisons, internal intelligence, or the maintenance of internal security forces. Both amendments were defeated. Given the United States' utter dependence on its Philippine bases, it was unrealistic to think that Congress would risk losing them by cutting off all aid to Marcos. The best the exile lobbyists could hope for was a moderation in the regime's behavior, such as releasing political prisoners or dropping the use of torture.Less
This chapter focuses on the lobbying efforts of political exiles. Marcos and his military establishment were essential to the considerable U.S. interests in the Philippines. In turn, Marcos' military had an ongoing need for hardware and training from the United States. This symbiotic relationship dictated the ebb and flow of military aid money each year. By portraying U.S.-supplied security forces as the chief instrument keeping Marcos in power, the opposition hoped to either eliminate or reduce the amount of military aid earmarked for the Philippines. During deliberations on the 1973 aid bill, an amendment was introduced by Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota on December 5, 1973, that would deny assistance to any country that imprisoned its citizens for political purposes. An earlier Abourezk amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 would have prohibited the use of aid funds for police, prisons, internal intelligence, or the maintenance of internal security forces. Both amendments were defeated. Given the United States' utter dependence on its Philippine bases, it was unrealistic to think that Congress would risk losing them by cutting off all aid to Marcos. The best the exile lobbyists could hope for was a moderation in the regime's behavior, such as releasing political prisoners or dropping the use of torture.
William J. Rust
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780813167428
- eISBN:
- 9780813167435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813167428.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, Political History
In the fall of 1960, the US national security bureaucracy tried to develop a military aid program for Cambodia that would be sufficiently large to forestall a request by Sihanouk for similar ...
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In the fall of 1960, the US national security bureaucracy tried to develop a military aid program for Cambodia that would be sufficiently large to forestall a request by Sihanouk for similar assistance from communist nations. The leader of the Cambodian mission to Washington was Lon Nol, the commander in chief of the country’s armed forces and its minister of defense. He was disappointed by the small increase in US military aid but seemed pleased by the VIP treatment he received. With the civil war in Laos intensifying, Sihanouk appealed to the international community to guarantee the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia. He proposed an international conference that became the basis for the fourteen-nation Geneva conference on Laos (May 1961–July 1962). The Eisenhower administration, seeking to strengthen the military position of the Lao anticommunists and contemplating SEATO or unilateral American intervention, opposed Sihanouk’s proposal.Less
In the fall of 1960, the US national security bureaucracy tried to develop a military aid program for Cambodia that would be sufficiently large to forestall a request by Sihanouk for similar assistance from communist nations. The leader of the Cambodian mission to Washington was Lon Nol, the commander in chief of the country’s armed forces and its minister of defense. He was disappointed by the small increase in US military aid but seemed pleased by the VIP treatment he received. With the civil war in Laos intensifying, Sihanouk appealed to the international community to guarantee the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia. He proposed an international conference that became the basis for the fourteen-nation Geneva conference on Laos (May 1961–July 1962). The Eisenhower administration, seeking to strengthen the military position of the Lao anticommunists and contemplating SEATO or unilateral American intervention, opposed Sihanouk’s proposal.
Andrew Johnstone
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801453250
- eISBN:
- 9780801454738
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801453250.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter discusses the development of the Century Group, which reflected yet another strand of American internationalism. As early as May 15, 1940, Winston Churchill appealed to Franklin ...
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This chapter discusses the development of the Century Group, which reflected yet another strand of American internationalism. As early as May 15, 1940, Winston Churchill appealed to Franklin Roosevelt for assistance in the form of naval destroyers. One month later, faced with the imminent fall of France and the loss of the French, Danish, and Norwegian coastlines to Nazi Germany, Churchill asked “as a matter of life or death” for reinforcement on the seas to defend Great Britain. The U.S. Navy was in the process of reconditioning more than one hundred old destroyers, but there was no guarantee they would be given to Britain. It was in this context that the Century Group was born. The Century Group was notably more interventionist in its outlook than the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA); whereas the latter organization sought all possible aid to the Allies, the former advocated all-out war, arguing that this was America's war to fight.Less
This chapter discusses the development of the Century Group, which reflected yet another strand of American internationalism. As early as May 15, 1940, Winston Churchill appealed to Franklin Roosevelt for assistance in the form of naval destroyers. One month later, faced with the imminent fall of France and the loss of the French, Danish, and Norwegian coastlines to Nazi Germany, Churchill asked “as a matter of life or death” for reinforcement on the seas to defend Great Britain. The U.S. Navy was in the process of reconditioning more than one hundred old destroyers, but there was no guarantee they would be given to Britain. It was in this context that the Century Group was born. The Century Group was notably more interventionist in its outlook than the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA); whereas the latter organization sought all possible aid to the Allies, the former advocated all-out war, arguing that this was America's war to fight.
Jessica M. Chapman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801450617
- eISBN:
- 9780801467417
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801450617.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines the rise of nationalism in South Vietnam within the context of the Cold War. On February 1, 1950, a U.S. State Department working group articulated the logic for providing ...
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This chapter examines the rise of nationalism in South Vietnam within the context of the Cold War. On February 1, 1950, a U.S. State Department working group articulated the logic for providing American military aid to France during the Indochina war. Over the next four years, Washington increased its economic support to France and pressured it to continue the fight against falling dominoes in Southeast Asia. This chapter argues that the United States pressed the French to grant greater independence to the noncommunist nationalist government they had established in Saigon not because of concern over Vietnam's internal affairs, but because of its perceived strategic significance within the Cold War international system. It also suggests that the United States was driven by fears that it might be losing ground to the Soviet Union in a competition for the allegiance of the rapidly decolonizing world.Less
This chapter examines the rise of nationalism in South Vietnam within the context of the Cold War. On February 1, 1950, a U.S. State Department working group articulated the logic for providing American military aid to France during the Indochina war. Over the next four years, Washington increased its economic support to France and pressured it to continue the fight against falling dominoes in Southeast Asia. This chapter argues that the United States pressed the French to grant greater independence to the noncommunist nationalist government they had established in Saigon not because of concern over Vietnam's internal affairs, but because of its perceived strategic significance within the Cold War international system. It also suggests that the United States was driven by fears that it might be losing ground to the Soviet Union in a competition for the allegiance of the rapidly decolonizing world.
William J. Rust
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780813167428
- eISBN:
- 9780813167435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813167428.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Political History
Although Western delegates to the Geneva conference in 1954 to restore peace in Indochina thought that Vietnam posed the most difficult military and political challenges, issues related to Cambodia ...
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Although Western delegates to the Geneva conference in 1954 to restore peace in Indochina thought that Vietnam posed the most difficult military and political challenges, issues related to Cambodia and Laos threatened to paralyze the conference. Cambodia opposed any settlement limiting the kingdom’s capacity for self-defense, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) insisted that Cambodia’s self-defense plans exclude US military assistance. Of the three so-called Associated States, only Cambodia emerged from the conference intact, without a regrouping zone for the country’s communist-led forces. The Geneva conference, which enhanced Sihanouk’s reputation as a defender of his kingdom’s independence, was the high point of US approval of Sihanouk and his government. The US government agreed to provide direct economic and military assistance to Cambodia and appointed Robert M. McClintock as the first resident ambassador in Phnom Penh.Less
Although Western delegates to the Geneva conference in 1954 to restore peace in Indochina thought that Vietnam posed the most difficult military and political challenges, issues related to Cambodia and Laos threatened to paralyze the conference. Cambodia opposed any settlement limiting the kingdom’s capacity for self-defense, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) insisted that Cambodia’s self-defense plans exclude US military assistance. Of the three so-called Associated States, only Cambodia emerged from the conference intact, without a regrouping zone for the country’s communist-led forces. The Geneva conference, which enhanced Sihanouk’s reputation as a defender of his kingdom’s independence, was the high point of US approval of Sihanouk and his government. The US government agreed to provide direct economic and military assistance to Cambodia and appointed Robert M. McClintock as the first resident ambassador in Phnom Penh.
Justin du Rivage
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300214246
- eISBN:
- 9780300227659
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300214246.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter tackles the questions over how best to reconcile the demands of colonial defense with the interests of the British Empire. Americans had repeatedly demanded British military aid, raised ...
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This chapter tackles the questions over how best to reconcile the demands of colonial defense with the interests of the British Empire. Americans had repeatedly demanded British military aid, raised large sums of money for the king's troops, and praised the empire as a force for good. And although there is little doubt that colonial assemblies clashed with royal governors, they often worked closely together to expand colonial fiscal-military states. But, as in Britain, the growth of armies, taxes, and debts created new burdens and stirred intense controversy. However, these conflicts were not, fundamentally, between localists and imperialists or libertarians and statists; rather, they were between radical Whigs and authoritarian reformers. They turned on competing conceptions of political economy and government, and they exposed deep ideological rifts within colonial society.Less
This chapter tackles the questions over how best to reconcile the demands of colonial defense with the interests of the British Empire. Americans had repeatedly demanded British military aid, raised large sums of money for the king's troops, and praised the empire as a force for good. And although there is little doubt that colonial assemblies clashed with royal governors, they often worked closely together to expand colonial fiscal-military states. But, as in Britain, the growth of armies, taxes, and debts created new burdens and stirred intense controversy. However, these conflicts were not, fundamentally, between localists and imperialists or libertarians and statists; rather, they were between radical Whigs and authoritarian reformers. They turned on competing conceptions of political economy and government, and they exposed deep ideological rifts within colonial society.
Piero Gleijeses
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781469609683
- eISBN:
- 9781469612515
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469609683.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter discusses the Cuban withdrawal and Namibian independence talks that had been broken off to protest the Reagan administration's announcement that it was extending military aid to UNITA. ...
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This chapter discusses the Cuban withdrawal and Namibian independence talks that had been broken off to protest the Reagan administration's announcement that it was extending military aid to UNITA. In late 1986, they informed Washington that they were interested in resuming the talks. The Reagan administration responded favorably. In Moscow, in March 1987, Angolan foreign minister M'Binda informed Soviets and Cubans that a new round of negotiations was about to begin. No one objected. Risquet repeated that Cuba was willing to remain in Angola until the abolition of apartheid. “Pretoria's arms are long and aggressive,” he warned. Even if Namibia were independent and South Africa had withdrawn its troops south of the Orange River, it could easily attack Angola by traversing Namibia or by sea or by air.Less
This chapter discusses the Cuban withdrawal and Namibian independence talks that had been broken off to protest the Reagan administration's announcement that it was extending military aid to UNITA. In late 1986, they informed Washington that they were interested in resuming the talks. The Reagan administration responded favorably. In Moscow, in March 1987, Angolan foreign minister M'Binda informed Soviets and Cubans that a new round of negotiations was about to begin. No one objected. Risquet repeated that Cuba was willing to remain in Angola until the abolition of apartheid. “Pretoria's arms are long and aggressive,” he warned. Even if Namibia were independent and South Africa had withdrawn its troops south of the Orange River, it could easily attack Angola by traversing Namibia or by sea or by air.
