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This chapter on Pakistan examines the phenomenon of public support for militant Islamic groups that promote violence in Pakistan's neighbors as well as in Pakistan itself. Since Pakistanis tend to self-identify as Muslims, the fact that Pakistanis support such groups might seem to support the hypothesis that religiosity coincides with an increase in violence as well as the toleration of violence. Parsing two large sets of polling data, the chapter questions such hypotheses. It finds considerable data to suggest that Pakistanis do not fully understand radical Islamic groups, nor do they understand the activities in which they engage. It suggests that current data does not support the claim that increased personal commitment to Islam has led the Pakistani public to support Islamic groups that engage in violence either within or outside of Pakistan.

Militant leaders must not only understand the folly of terrorism, but prevent members from carrying it out. Members are known to harm civilians even when their leaders oppose this targeting practice. This disconnect between the preferences of leaders and behavior of subordinates is due to what economists call a principal–agent problem. This chapter explains the principal–agent problem facing militant leaders and how they can overcome it. The second rule for rebels is grasping this organizational predicament to minimize it. Smart leaders know not only the political costs of civilian attacks, but how to restrain their members from committing them.

This chapter analyzes the Taliban groups in northwest Pakistan and their various alliances and target sets. It first addresses the crosscutting background issues that shape militancy in the region. It then examines the importance of Mullah Omar, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, and drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It considers the idioms and concepts used to understand the militant actors in the FATA, and summarizes militancy in each FATA agency and Swat.

This chapter highlights transnational interactions that are exemplified by accounts of the interactions between Osama Bin Laden and Pakistani Sunni militant groups. It acknowledges the role of the army, specifically the military intelligence known as the Pakistani secret services (ISI), an institution which decided to use jihadi groups against India in a more systematic manner in the 1990s. Networks of personal relationships often played a substantial role, especially among the former Islamic volunteers who fought in Afghanistan from 1984 to 1992. The chapter also highlights the Uzbeks and Tajiks that fought shoulder to shoulder between 1992 and 1997. It discusses the consequence that members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were able to find in the refuge and protection of the upper Gharm valley in Tajikistan between 1998 and 2000.

Chapter 7 lays out an integrated model for conducting comparative studies of proto-states media systems. It begins by reviewing the applicable elements from current state-based, media system models that have ongoing relevance in the proto-state context. It then expands conventional media systems theory by establishing the need for considerations of four new rubrics: transhistorical identity formulations, transpatial identity formulations, material condition–attention interactions, and material condition–resiliency interactions. Taking each of the elements in turn, the chapter describes key factors associated with the new rubric, demonstrates its application to Sunni militant groups, and speculates on its application to other militant groups. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how attention to the four new rubrics has implications for winning hearts and minds in the online environment.

This chapter describes the Taliban factions in Bajaur, the smallest of the seven administrative units of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of northwest Pakistan. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, fleeing militants crossed the border into Bajaur and exploited the tribal code of Pashtunwali, which requires hospitality and the giving of shelter. Bajauris treated the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters as guests. Bajaur still functions as a logistical base for the Taliban on both sides of the Durand Line, which divides Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This chapter first provides a summary of the book’s main arguments and findings and then discusses their scope. It presents evidence that these arguments may be useful in understanding the preferences, choices, and consequences of religious parties and religious organizations well beyond Muslim-majority countries. It then discusses some of the nuances and variations that future research must examine in order to further improve our understanding of the social and political implications of the rise of religious parties. This include addressing the role of militant groups, ideological differences, external donors, and unpacking the internal dynamics of coalitions and parties. Finally, it illustrates how the findings in this book regarding the behaviors of religious parties and religious lobbies can be used to address specific outstanding questions in institutions, comparative politics, and political economy, including judicial independence, the strength of populist movements, democratic backsliding, and environmental policies.

In this first chapter, we present two speeches by Islamic State movement founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The first dates from 1994 and contains evidence of him adopting the unique framework of ideas, largely inspired by his perspective as an Islamist in Jordan, that would become very familiar to students of the current Islamic State. The second speech, from 2004, allows us a glimpse of Zarqawi’s worldview as his insurgency in Iraq is poised to transition from a small network to a nationwide movement with an expanding global reach.

This chapter examines the extent to which the push and pull factors of youth recruitment in Al-Shabaab have reinforced radicalization in Somalia. Whereas the push factors are facilitated by negative dynamics, such as the hostile environment and indoctrination, the pull factors are reinforced by issues of identity, ideology, and economic exclusion. Methodologically, the chapter is based on intensive one-on-one and group interviews with former Al-Shabaab defectors. Understanding Al-Shabaab from various angles through an empirically grounded analysis is crucial for two reasons. First, it will help the Somali government to find ways of tackling the threats posed by ongoing insurgency activities. Second, it will contribute to the efforts of creating peace and stability in southern Somalia.

This chapter discusses the results of key interviews with Somalis regarding their perceptions about Al-Shabaab. Respondents expressed concerns about Al-Shabaab's indiscriminate and excessive use of violence, which are considered inconsistent with Islam, and its restrictions on freedom of speech and movement. However, they spoke positively about Al-Shabaab's strict enforcement of rules and their impartial resolution of disputes. They also compared Al-Shabaab favourably to the government in terms of reducing clan influence over politics or the allocation of resources, and in terms of minimizing corruption in ‘tax’ collection, but noted the group's failure to provide social services. Three-quarters of respondents expressed support for a negotiated solution to the conflict, but doubted Al-Shabaab would be willing to engage.

This chapter considers the issue of why fighters join Al-Shabaab and why they quit, based on an analysis of over 100 interviews with individuals currently and previously in the group. It concludes that a majority seek a sense of belonging and purpose, influenced by Al-Shabaab's claim to be acting in defence of Islam. Younger members are attracted by the opportunity for adventure, prospects of economic security, and because of the encouragement of friends who have already joined. Fighters often leave because life in the group, and the treatment of its members, are harsher than expected, or they find that the group does not abide by its religious principles, especially in its brutality and use of arbitrary detentions. Interestingly, six Al-Shabaab leaders interviewed suggested that the group was fighting a political rather than ideological battle, and that its members had little interest in Al-Qaida's global agenda.