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My aim in this book is to interpret and evaluate the central argument of The Methods of Ethics, in a way that brings out the important conceptual and historical connections between Sidgwick's views and contemporary moral philosophy. I suggest that the most exciting, interpretively troubling, and ultimately rewarding parts of the Methods are the parts where Sidgwick is discussing conflicts between the different methods: most centrally III XI, III XIII, IV II, and the Concluding Chapter. I focus on these (as I think) most interesting parts of the Methods: on the metaethical and epistemological views that shape his treatment of the conflicts, as articulated particularly in I III and I VIII, and on the two key conflicts, between, respectively, utilitarianism and intuitionism, and utilitarianism and egoism. By focusing on them, I believe we can see most of what is most important and distinctive about Sidgwick.

This chapter examines Henry Sidgwick's utilitarianism. It first considers Sidgwick's agnosticism before discussing his views on subjects ranging from hedonism and colonialism to poverty, common-sense morality, and politics and political economy. It then looks at some of Sidgwick's writings, such as The Development of European Polity, The Elements of Politics, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant, and The Methods of Ethics. It also explores the current reconstructions and appropriations of many of Sidgwick's positions in the works of philosophers like Roger Crisp, Rob Shaver, Peter Singer, Derek Parft, and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, and argues that they have contributed to a true renaissance of hedonistic and rational intuition-based utilitarianism (or at least rationalistic consequentialism) that few saw coming even in the late twentieth century.

By ‘a method of ethics’ Sidgwick means a rational procedure for deciding what we ought to do. He groups these rational procedures into three different types: egoism, intuitionism, and utilitarianism. We examine Sidgwick’s conception of the task of the philosopher investigating ethics, and consider whether Sidgwick has, by limiting his ‘methods of ethics’ to just three, pre-empted any viable ethical theories from receiving a proper hearing in his work.

This chapter presents a new argument for thinking of traditional ethical theories not as criteria of rightness and wrongness, but rather as methods that can be used in first-order moral inquiry. It begins from outlining how ethical theories such as consequentialism and contractualism are flexible frameworks in which different versions of these theories can be formulated to correspond to different first-order ethical views. This chapter then argues that, as a result, the traditional ethical theories cannot be evaluated in terms of their truth or correctness. Instead, it suggests that these theories should be understood as providing different kinds of ways of thinking about difficult moral problems. Finally, the chapter recommends a certain kind of an attitude of pragmatic pluralism as something that should guide our theory choice in normative ethics—it may well be that different moral problems are better approached through different ethical theories.

This chapter focuses on the relation between Green and Sidgwick. Both Green and Sidgwick were schoolmates at Rugby. Their friendship lapsed during their undergraduate studies, but was renewed during a vacation together in Switzerland in 1862. Although they seemed to have had intellectual respect for each other, this was insufficient to enable them to form a just assessment of each other's views. Most of Sidgwick's criticisms focus on some genuine obscurity or ambiguity in Green' s argument; he has a good eye for philosophical extravagance; and some of his criticisms pose significant worries. It is argued that Sidgwick never manages to engage Green's perfectionism sympathetically, which prevents him from recognizing its strengths and from seeing potential weaknesses in his own hedonism.

This chapter covers some of the major background issues in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s own philosophical development is described, in the light of his own description of it in his ‘Preface’, and his modest ‘quietist’ metaethics examined. Sidgwick’s objections to several forms of naturalism are explained, and an account is offered of Sidgwick’s non-naturalism and of his rationalist views on justification and his internalism about motivation. Methods are distinguished from principles, and Sidgwick’s focus on only three ethical theories is defended. Sidgwick is criticized for seeking excessive precision in ethics, and for use of unnecessary ethical concepts. The chapter ends with a section on Sidgwick’s views of politics, where it is argued that there is a stronger case than Sidgwick allows for seeing political theory as a branch of ethics.

This chapter focuses on The Methods of Ethics, Book I, Chapters I and VI. Its topics are Sidgwick’s project and the three methods. The chapter introduces the three methods: egoism, intuitionism, and utilitarianism. It discusses critically Sidgwick’s argument that there are just these three methods. It introduces and discusses the distinctive terminology Sidgwick employs—of “methods of ethics” and of “first principles”—and asks how much difference it makes to use this terminology rather than the standard contemporary terminology of “moral theories.” And it argues that Sidgwick’s conceptual framework, with “ought” as the fundamental moral concept, is better suited to fairly consider the merits of egoism and of intuitionism than are the conceptual frameworks of his most important intuitionist successors, G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross.

Modern social contract theory is a form of constructivism in ethics. Constructivism is both a normative programme and a meta-ethical programme. One objection to contract theory is that it is a ‘spare wheel’, adding nothing to first-order ethical argument. However, this line of argument runs up against the problem that there are certain practices, for example rape in marriage, that are better understood in terms of contractual morality than in terms of intuitive or common sense morality. Contract theory cannot be fully reductionist in a meta-ethical sense, because the theorist needs some intuitions to define an appropriate construction. One important role for contract theory is to evidence the social conditions for relations of justice among persons. Moreover, contract theory can sometimes be presented as though the theoretical construction is rigged, but this is a distortion of constructivist ambitions. Universalizability remains a challenge, as does the question of the determinateness of the results of contract reasoning.

This chapter focuses on The Methods of Ethics I.VII and Book II. Its topics are the method of egoism and Sidgwick’s views about the nature and measurability of happiness (or pleasure). The first section discusses the method (or, strictly, methods) of egoism, noting that his treating egoism as a method of ethics reflects his broad conception of ethics as practical reason. The second section discusses Sidgwick’s views on the nature of happiness: his rejection of J. S. Mill’s proposal to distinguish higher from lower pleasures, and his definition of pleasure as desirable consciousness. The third section concerns his discussions of difficulties in measuring pleasure and pain. The topic of the fourth section is his argument in II.V that sanctions do not make it the case that egoism and intuitionism always agree in their recommendations. The fifth section raises the concern that Sidgwick is much harder on the intuitionist method than he is on the egoist method.

This chapter argues that the moral theory developed in the preceding chapters is the only viable inheritor of the utilitarian tradition of ethical reasoning, the contractarian tradition, and the golden rule tradition in both its Kantian and non-Kantian varieties. These traditional methods of ethics are reconciled by the true moral theory.

This chapter focuses on The Methods of Ethics, Book III, Chapters I through XI. Its topic is Sidgwick’s critique of the theory he calls “common-sense morality” or “dogmatic intuitionism.” The first section introduces this theory, noting problems with both Sidgwick’s names for it. The second section discusses the project of Chapters I through XI, making the principles of common-sense morality clear and precise. The third section introduces the four conditions Sidgwick uses to test putative axioms. The fourth section outlines his argument that none of the principles of common-sense morality satisfy the four conditions, focusing on the example of promissory obligation. The fifth section considers two responses: defending absolutist deontology, and moving to moderate deontology by introducing, as W. D. Ross does, the concept of prima facie duty. The final section raises questions about the fairness of Sidgwick’s critique.

This chapter focuses on The Methods of Ethics, Book IV, Chapters I and II. Its topics are Sidgwick’s discussions of the meaning and of the proof of utilitarianism. The first section discusses Book IV Chapter I, noting that Sidgwick there notices issues and makes distinctions of enduring significance for the utilitarian tradition. The second section is concerned with Sidgwick’s brief but rich discussion of the connection between egoism and a Humean view of personal identity. The third section discusses strict proof, “proof” (in scare quotes), and sanctions. The fourth section discusses Sidgwick’s claim that the “proof” of utilitarianism as against egoism fails, exploring the contrast between his view on this issue and G. E. Moore’s. The fifth section discusses the “proof” of utilitarianism as against intuitionism, which Sidgwick thinks succeeds. The final section is an overview discussion of secondary literature on Sidgwick’s metaethics and moral epistemology.