David Wolfsdorf
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195327328
- eISBN:
- 9780199870646
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327328.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
Scholarship on Plato's dialogues persistently divides its focus between the dramatic or literary and the philosophical or argumentative dimensions of the texts. But this hermeneutic division of labor ...
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Scholarship on Plato's dialogues persistently divides its focus between the dramatic or literary and the philosophical or argumentative dimensions of the texts. But this hermeneutic division of labor is naïve, for Plato's arguments are embedded in dramatic dialogues and developed through complex, largely informal exchanges between literary characters. Consequently, it is questionable how readers can even attribute arguments and theses to the author himself. The answer to this question lies in transcending the scholarly divide and integrating the literary and philosophical dimensions of the texts. This is the task of Trials of Reason.The study focuses on a set of fourteen so-called early dialogues, beginning with a methodological framework that explains how to integrate the argumentation and the drama in these texts. Unlike most canonical philosophical works, the early dialogues do not merely express the results of the practice of philosophy. Rather, they dramatize philosophy as a kind of motivation, the desire for knowledge of goodness, and as a discursive practice, motivated by this desire and ideally governed by reason. And they dramatize the trials to which desire and reason are subject, that is, the difficulties of realizing philosophy as a form of motivation, a practice, and an epistemic achievement. In short, Trials of Reason argues that Plato's early dialogues are as much works of metaphilosophy as philosophy itself.Less
Scholarship on Plato's dialogues persistently divides its focus between the dramatic or literary and the philosophical or argumentative dimensions of the texts. But this hermeneutic division of labor is naïve, for Plato's arguments are embedded in dramatic dialogues and developed through complex, largely informal exchanges between literary characters. Consequently, it is questionable how readers can even attribute arguments and theses to the author himself. The answer to this question lies in transcending the scholarly divide and integrating the literary and philosophical dimensions of the texts. This is the task of Trials of Reason.
The study focuses on a set of fourteen so-called early dialogues, beginning with a methodological framework that explains how to integrate the argumentation and the drama in these texts. Unlike most canonical philosophical works, the early dialogues do not merely express the results of the practice of philosophy. Rather, they dramatize philosophy as a kind of motivation, the desire for knowledge of goodness, and as a discursive practice, motivated by this desire and ideally governed by reason. And they dramatize the trials to which desire and reason are subject, that is, the difficulties of realizing philosophy as a form of motivation, a practice, and an epistemic achievement. In short, Trials of Reason argues that Plato's early dialogues are as much works of metaphilosophy as philosophy itself.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our ...
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The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.Less
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
Frank Jackson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250616
- eISBN:
- 9780191597787
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250614.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious ...
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Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without it, we cannot address a whole raft of important questions.I have always been suspicious of excessively abstract theorizing in philosophy. I think that an important test of metaphilosophical claims is whether they make good sense in the context of particular problems. The discussion in the book is, accordingly, anchored in particular philosophical debates. The basic framework is developed in the first three chapters via a consideration of the role of conceptual analysis in the debate over the doctrine in metaphysics known as physicalism, with digressions on free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, and then applied in the last three chapters to current debates over colour and ethics.Less
Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without it, we cannot address a whole raft of important questions.
I have always been suspicious of excessively abstract theorizing in philosophy. I think that an important test of metaphilosophical claims is whether they make good sense in the context of particular problems. The discussion in the book is, accordingly, anchored in particular philosophical debates. The basic framework is developed in the first three chapters via a consideration of the role of conceptual analysis in the debate over the doctrine in metaphysics known as physicalism, with digressions on free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, and then applied in the last three chapters to current debates over colour and ethics.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199588879
- eISBN:
- 9780191744716
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588879.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in ...
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This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. For it is argued here that his fundamental idea is not a new conception of language (as most commentators have supposed), but rather a revolutionary conception of what philosophy is — one that is opposed to the construction of philosophical theories. This idea is what lies behind Wittgenstein's distinctive treatments of specific issues within the subject: issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, religion, and so on. Thus the first aim of the present work is to preset a clear and compelling account of his meta-perspective, to explain and justify his view of how philosophy should (and should not) be conducted, and of what it might achieve. The second aim is to defend that view against a variety of objections, and thereby to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as a good analysis of philosophy itself. The third aim is to examine its application to a wide collection of particular topics, but most thoroughly to meaning and to experience. The centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support are admittedly controversial assumptions, but they are vindicated here — not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them. Thus the book simultaneously offers a fresh account of Wittgenstein's thought and dramatically deflationary picture of the entire subject.Less
This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. For it is argued here that his fundamental idea is not a new conception of language (as most commentators have supposed), but rather a revolutionary conception of what philosophy is — one that is opposed to the construction of philosophical theories. This idea is what lies behind Wittgenstein's distinctive treatments of specific issues within the subject: issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, religion, and so on. Thus the first aim of the present work is to preset a clear and compelling account of his meta-perspective, to explain and justify his view of how philosophy should (and should not) be conducted, and of what it might achieve. The second aim is to defend that view against a variety of objections, and thereby to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as a good analysis of philosophy itself. The third aim is to examine its application to a wide collection of particular topics, but most thoroughly to meaning and to experience. The centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support are admittedly controversial assumptions, but they are vindicated here — not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them. Thus the book simultaneously offers a fresh account of Wittgenstein's thought and dramatically deflationary picture of the entire subject.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199694877
- eISBN:
- 9780191745706
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694877.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Heidegger's early ‘fundamental ontology’ offers a vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit that can appear to be simply truer to life. It allows us to understand the creature that ...
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Heidegger's early ‘fundamental ontology’ offers a vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit that can appear to be simply truer to life. It allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it — a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet. It also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heidegger's vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. This book offers a new way of understanding that vision. Drawing on an examination of Heidegger's work throughout the 1920s, it takes as central to that vision the proposals that propositional thought presupposes a mastery of what might be called a ‘measure’, and that mastery of such a ‘measure’ requires a recognizably ‘worldly’ subject. These insights provide the basis for a novel reading of key elements of Heidegger's ‘fundamental ontology’, including his concept of ‘Being-in-the-world’, his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity, and philosophy itself. According to this interpretation, Heidegger's central ideas identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us.Less
Heidegger's early ‘fundamental ontology’ offers a vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit that can appear to be simply truer to life. It allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it — a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet. It also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heidegger's vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. This book offers a new way of understanding that vision. Drawing on an examination of Heidegger's work throughout the 1920s, it takes as central to that vision the proposals that propositional thought presupposes a mastery of what might be called a ‘measure’, and that mastery of such a ‘measure’ requires a recognizably ‘worldly’ subject. These insights provide the basis for a novel reading of key elements of Heidegger's ‘fundamental ontology’, including his concept of ‘Being-in-the-world’, his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity, and philosophy itself. According to this interpretation, Heidegger's central ideas identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us.
Marcel van Ackeren (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780197266298
- eISBN:
- 9780191872891
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266298.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. Some scholars analyse historical texts without reference to ...
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Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. Some scholars analyse historical texts without reference to current debates and their terminology, while others pursue first-order philosophy by focusing on problems instead of doxography—that is, without reference to their predecessors. A growing group, though, doubts that philosophy can be studied effectively on the basis of this sharp division. But does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to current philosophy? And, if it does, what precisely is the contribution? Does making such a contribution depend on using a specific method which determines how the historical perspective is related to systematic philosophy and philosophy in general? More generally, how do our assumptions about the relationship between historical and systematic perspectives affect our methodology and metaphilosophy or philosophy of philosophy? This volume presents and debates answers to these questions, which deserve to be addressed in their own right and not just as an adjunct to other discussions. The contributors of this volume provide diverse answers based on historical references, stretching from ancient philosophy to the most current debates, and also refer to various philosophical sub-disciplines.Less
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. Some scholars analyse historical texts without reference to current debates and their terminology, while others pursue first-order philosophy by focusing on problems instead of doxography—that is, without reference to their predecessors. A growing group, though, doubts that philosophy can be studied effectively on the basis of this sharp division. But does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to current philosophy? And, if it does, what precisely is the contribution? Does making such a contribution depend on using a specific method which determines how the historical perspective is related to systematic philosophy and philosophy in general? More generally, how do our assumptions about the relationship between historical and systematic perspectives affect our methodology and metaphilosophy or philosophy of philosophy? This volume presents and debates answers to these questions, which deserve to be addressed in their own right and not just as an adjunct to other discussions. The contributors of this volume provide diverse answers based on historical references, stretching from ancient philosophy to the most current debates, and also refer to various philosophical sub-disciplines.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it ...
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With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it bears to “common sense”. The book argues that Berkeley's metaphysics is the metaphysics of the “mob” so long as the mob is properly understood to be the mob of professing monotheists. It further argues that core aspects of traditional monotheism inevitably tend toward support for immaterialism. Wilfred Sellars' metaphilosophy from Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man is used to both elucidate and map Berkeley's core metaphysical commitments.Less
With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it bears to “common sense”. The book argues that Berkeley's metaphysics is the metaphysics of the “mob” so long as the mob is properly understood to be the mob of professing monotheists. It further argues that core aspects of traditional monotheism inevitably tend toward support for immaterialism. Wilfred Sellars' metaphilosophy from Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man is used to both elucidate and map Berkeley's core metaphysical commitments.
Peter van Inwagen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245604
- eISBN:
- 9780191715310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The central thesis of these chapters is that the argument from evil is a failure. But what is it for a philosophical argument to fail? This chapter proposes a test: a philosophical argument fails if ...
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The central thesis of these chapters is that the argument from evil is a failure. But what is it for a philosophical argument to fail? This chapter proposes a test: a philosophical argument fails if it cannot win assent from the members of a neutral audience who have listened to an ideal presentation of the argument. That is, the argument is presented by an ideal proponent of the argument to an ideal audience whose members, initially, have no tendency either to accept or to reject its conclusion. The proponent lays out the argument in the presence of an ideal critic whose brief it is to point out any weaknesses it may have to the audience of ‘ideal agnostics’. If — given world enough and time — the proponent of the argument is unable to use the argument to convince the audience that they should accept its conclusion, the argument is a failure.Less
The central thesis of these chapters is that the argument from evil is a failure. But what is it for a philosophical argument to fail? This chapter proposes a test: a philosophical argument fails if it cannot win assent from the members of a neutral audience who have listened to an ideal presentation of the argument. That is, the argument is presented by an ideal proponent of the argument to an ideal audience whose members, initially, have no tendency either to accept or to reject its conclusion. The proponent lays out the argument in the presence of an ideal critic whose brief it is to point out any weaknesses it may have to the audience of ‘ideal agnostics’. If — given world enough and time — the proponent of the argument is unable to use the argument to convince the audience that they should accept its conclusion, the argument is a failure.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This ...
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The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This introductory chapter provides an overview and taxonomy of views about what intuitions are and what role they play in philosophical practices such as the method of cases, thought experimentation and conceptual analysis. It outlines two key arguments that can be appealed to in favor of Centrality: the first is based on how philosophers use “intuitions”-vocabulary, and the second on the kind of judgements that philosophers’ make about cases. Part I of the book explores the first argument and Part II the second.Less
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This introductory chapter provides an overview and taxonomy of views about what intuitions are and what role they play in philosophical practices such as the method of cases, thought experimentation and conceptual analysis. It outlines two key arguments that can be appealed to in favor of Centrality: the first is based on how philosophers use “intuitions”-vocabulary, and the second on the kind of judgements that philosophers’ make about cases. Part I of the book explores the first argument and Part II the second.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the renewed interest in natural law theory in general and the natural law canon proposed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa ...
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This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the renewed interest in natural law theory in general and the natural law canon proposed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. This book aims to explore the metaphilosophy and the metaphysics needed to explain the Aristotelian meta-ethics as seen through the eyes of Aquinas. It examines Aquinas' appropriation of the important categories and concepts from the philosophy system of Aristotle.Less
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the renewed interest in natural law theory in general and the natural law canon proposed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. This book aims to explore the metaphilosophy and the metaphysics needed to explain the Aristotelian meta-ethics as seen through the eyes of Aquinas. It examines Aquinas' appropriation of the important categories and concepts from the philosophy system of Aristotle.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines the concepts central to the moral theory of philosopher Henry Veatch. It reveals that Veatch has adopted a metaphysical realism structurally similar to that of Aristotle and ...
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This chapter examines the concepts central to the moral theory of philosopher Henry Veatch. It reveals that Veatch has adopted a metaphysical realism structurally similar to that of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as the ontological foundation of his naturalist meta-physics. It explains the concepts used by Veatch as presuppositions and analyses how his method differs from much contemporary philosophical activity in analytical ethical theory. This chapter also compares Veatch’s metaphilosophy with that of John Finnis.Less
This chapter examines the concepts central to the moral theory of philosopher Henry Veatch. It reveals that Veatch has adopted a metaphysical realism structurally similar to that of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as the ontological foundation of his naturalist meta-physics. It explains the concepts used by Veatch as presuppositions and analyses how his method differs from much contemporary philosophical activity in analytical ethical theory. This chapter also compares Veatch’s metaphilosophy with that of John Finnis.
Max Deutsch
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262028950
- eISBN:
- 9780262327374
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental ...
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This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” (xphi) and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking.Less
This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” (xphi) and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking.
Daniel Colucciello Barber
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780748686360
- eISBN:
- 9780748697144
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748686360.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Conclusion returns to the introductory context of Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God is dead,” and it does so specifically in order to revisit the question of the future. It develops three ...
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The Conclusion returns to the introductory context of Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God is dead,” and it does so specifically in order to revisit the question of the future. It develops three theses. First, it articulates the concept of immanent belief as a means by which immanence necessarily adopts a radically critical perspective on the secular. Second, it articulates the concept of metaphilosophy as a means by which immanence necessarily refuses tendencies that reduce it to affirmation or positivity. Finally, it articulates fabulation as a means by which immanence is necessarily conceived as the production of icons.Less
The Conclusion returns to the introductory context of Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God is dead,” and it does so specifically in order to revisit the question of the future. It develops three theses. First, it articulates the concept of immanent belief as a means by which immanence necessarily adopts a radically critical perspective on the secular. Second, it articulates the concept of metaphilosophy as a means by which immanence necessarily refuses tendencies that reduce it to affirmation or positivity. Finally, it articulates fabulation as a means by which immanence is necessarily conceived as the production of icons.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199694877
- eISBN:
- 9780191745706
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694877.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Previous chapters provide a sense of why Heidegger claims that assertion ‘has not a primary cognitive function but only a secondary one’; but they also cast doubt on an important construal of ...
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Previous chapters provide a sense of why Heidegger claims that assertion ‘has not a primary cognitive function but only a secondary one’; but they also cast doubt on an important construal of Heidegger's repeated depiction of assertions as ‘secondary’ in the activity of the philosopher too. The present chapter explains how that earlier discussion suggests another construal of that depiction. It identifies a problem that the idea of ‘original havings’ raises and which the project Heidegger envisaged for Being and time may have attempted (unsuccessfully) to address; but it also identifies another metaphilosophical vision at work in Heidegger's texts which avoids that problem and suggests a novel understanding of his attitude towards philosophical propositions. The chapter explains how this vision, which focuses on a needed ‘reminding’ of our ‘understanding of Being’, can be seen at work in earlier discussion; but it also stresses the turmoil of Heidegger's early metaphilosophical reflections.Less
Previous chapters provide a sense of why Heidegger claims that assertion ‘has not a primary cognitive function but only a secondary one’; but they also cast doubt on an important construal of Heidegger's repeated depiction of assertions as ‘secondary’ in the activity of the philosopher too. The present chapter explains how that earlier discussion suggests another construal of that depiction. It identifies a problem that the idea of ‘original havings’ raises and which the project Heidegger envisaged for Being and time may have attempted (unsuccessfully) to address; but it also identifies another metaphilosophical vision at work in Heidegger's texts which avoids that problem and suggests a novel understanding of his attitude towards philosophical propositions. The chapter explains how this vision, which focuses on a needed ‘reminding’ of our ‘understanding of Being’, can be seen at work in earlier discussion; but it also stresses the turmoil of Heidegger's early metaphilosophical reflections.
Márton Dornbach
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823268290
- eISBN:
- 9780823272495
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823268290.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature
Endemic to the Enlightenment project is a pedagogical quandary identified by Rousseau, Diderot, and Hamann: How can independent thought be induced by another? This quandary is exacerbated in the ...
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Endemic to the Enlightenment project is a pedagogical quandary identified by Rousseau, Diderot, and Hamann: How can independent thought be induced by another? This quandary is exacerbated in the German idealist context by the consequences of Kant’s claim that insight into the metaphysical character of the subject requires an exercise of moral freedom. In the experiment of self-construction that the readers of Fichte are urged to perform, the foundational role of freedom entails an abyss of incomprehension between the dogmatic standpoint of ordinary consciousness and the standpoint of transcendental idealism. The chapter highlights the esotericist implications of Fichte’s metaphilosophical conception by examining his reflections on authorship, the possibilities and limits of writing, and the duality of letter and spirit.Less
Endemic to the Enlightenment project is a pedagogical quandary identified by Rousseau, Diderot, and Hamann: How can independent thought be induced by another? This quandary is exacerbated in the German idealist context by the consequences of Kant’s claim that insight into the metaphysical character of the subject requires an exercise of moral freedom. In the experiment of self-construction that the readers of Fichte are urged to perform, the foundational role of freedom entails an abyss of incomprehension between the dogmatic standpoint of ordinary consciousness and the standpoint of transcendental idealism. The chapter highlights the esotericist implications of Fichte’s metaphilosophical conception by examining his reflections on authorship, the possibilities and limits of writing, and the duality of letter and spirit.
Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609192
- eISBN:
- 9780191758973
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science, e.g. in thought experiments, as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions ...
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What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science, e.g. in thought experiments, as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This book brings together leading early- to late-career philosophers, to tackle such questions. It presents state-of-the-art thinking on the topic. The chapters in the first part of the book discuss the epistemological and metaphysical standing of intuitions; the chapters in the second part look at how intuitions are used in disciplines besides philosophy, and in sub-disciplines of philosophy; the chapters in the final part consider the challenges to intuitions-driven philosophy from experimental philosophy and contemporary analytic metaphysics.Less
What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science, e.g. in thought experiments, as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This book brings together leading early- to late-career philosophers, to tackle such questions. It presents state-of-the-art thinking on the topic. The chapters in the first part of the book discuss the epistemological and metaphysical standing of intuitions; the chapters in the second part look at how intuitions are used in disciplines besides philosophy, and in sub-disciplines of philosophy; the chapters in the final part consider the challenges to intuitions-driven philosophy from experimental philosophy and contemporary analytic metaphysics.
Marcel van Ackeren
Marcel van Ackeren and Lee Klein (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780197266298
- eISBN:
- 9780191872891
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266298.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of current philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. In this Introduction, I first explain the main questions ...
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Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of current philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. In this Introduction, I first explain the main questions of this debate: Does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to philosophy? What is this contribution? Is there a specific method relating the historical perspective to current philosophy? What does this mean for our view on philosophy in general? Second, I critically discuss doubts about the usefulness of the debate and defend its importance. Third, I briefly discuss the relation of the historical perspective and its relation to the philosophy of philosophy, and finally I summarize the evolution of the debate and some of its main positions.Less
Since the rise of analytical philosophy, the relation of current philosophy and its past is more hotly debated among philosophers than ever. In this Introduction, I first explain the main questions of this debate: Does the study of the history of philosophy contribute to philosophy? What is this contribution? Is there a specific method relating the historical perspective to current philosophy? What does this mean for our view on philosophy in general? Second, I critically discuss doubts about the usefulness of the debate and defend its importance. Third, I briefly discuss the relation of the historical perspective and its relation to the philosophy of philosophy, and finally I summarize the evolution of the debate and some of its main positions.
Andrew Melnyk
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199696499
- eISBN:
- 9780191744983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
An exercise in metaphilosophy, this chapter addresses one aspect of the relationship between science and philosophy. Non-naturalized, analytic metaphysics has not yielded results at all comparable ...
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An exercise in metaphilosophy, this chapter addresses one aspect of the relationship between science and philosophy. Non-naturalized, analytic metaphysics has not yielded results at all comparable with those achieved by mathematics and logic. Metaphysics needs to be naturalized, but how can scientific findings be made relevant to metaphysics—as evidence, as sources of new problems, or in other ways? Must some traditional metaphysical problems be abandoned as intractable? What sort of problems might take their place? Answers to these questions arise from detailed criticism of the answers given in Ladyman, Ross, et al., Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Naturalized metaphysics requires outstanding questions that we want answered but that don’t fall within the province of the sciences; there look to be such questions, including that of how to unify science; but whether we can answer them is best determined by trying to do so.Less
An exercise in metaphilosophy, this chapter addresses one aspect of the relationship between science and philosophy. Non-naturalized, analytic metaphysics has not yielded results at all comparable with those achieved by mathematics and logic. Metaphysics needs to be naturalized, but how can scientific findings be made relevant to metaphysics—as evidence, as sources of new problems, or in other ways? Must some traditional metaphysical problems be abandoned as intractable? What sort of problems might take their place? Answers to these questions arise from detailed criticism of the answers given in Ladyman, Ross, et al., Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Naturalized metaphysics requires outstanding questions that we want answered but that don’t fall within the province of the sciences; there look to be such questions, including that of how to unify science; but whether we can answer them is best determined by trying to do so.
Adriaan T. Peperazak
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780823240173
- eISBN:
- 9780823240210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823240173.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
To broach a discussion about the relationships between philosophy and friendship, this chapter begins by asking: to what extent should friendship play a role in philosophy, and to what extent can ...
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To broach a discussion about the relationships between philosophy and friendship, this chapter begins by asking: to what extent should friendship play a role in philosophy, and to what extent can philosophy play a role in friendship? If friendship is a topic of ethics, and if a reflection on the practice and theory of philosophy constitutes a metaphilosophy, a meditation on the relations between philosophy and friendship belongs to the ethical part of metaphilosophy or the metaethical part of ethics. Ethical considerations remain too abstract if they are not preceded and followed by an analysis of the social and political situation from which ethical questions emerge and an examination of the connections that bind our virtues to the various dimensions of philia. This chapter first describes philosophy as a social practice that has its own political conditions, and then focuses on some ethical aspects of the more or less friendly kinds of exchange between philosophers. It also discusses institutions of the philosophical republic, and the initiation and education of a philosopher.Less
To broach a discussion about the relationships between philosophy and friendship, this chapter begins by asking: to what extent should friendship play a role in philosophy, and to what extent can philosophy play a role in friendship? If friendship is a topic of ethics, and if a reflection on the practice and theory of philosophy constitutes a metaphilosophy, a meditation on the relations between philosophy and friendship belongs to the ethical part of metaphilosophy or the metaethical part of ethics. Ethical considerations remain too abstract if they are not preceded and followed by an analysis of the social and political situation from which ethical questions emerge and an examination of the connections that bind our virtues to the various dimensions of philia. This chapter first describes philosophy as a social practice that has its own political conditions, and then focuses on some ethical aspects of the more or less friendly kinds of exchange between philosophers. It also discusses institutions of the philosophical republic, and the initiation and education of a philosopher.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198814719
- eISBN:
- 9780191852404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198814719.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Fixing Language is a book about ways in which language (and other representational devices) can be defective and improved. In all parts of philosophy there are philosophers who criticize the concepts ...
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Fixing Language is a book about ways in which language (and other representational devices) can be defective and improved. In all parts of philosophy there are philosophers who criticize the concepts we have and propose ways to improve them. Once one notices this about philosophy, it’s easy to see that revisionist projects occur in a range of other intellectual disciplines and in ordinary life. That fact gives rise to a cluster of questions: How does the process of conceptual amelioration work? What are the limits of revision (how much revision is too much)? How does the process of revision fit into an overall theory of language and communication? This book is an effort to answer those questions. In so doing, it is also an attempt to draw attention to a tradition in twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy that isn’t sufficiently recognized as a unified tradition. There’s a straight intellectual line from Frege (e.g. of the Begriffsschrift) and Carnap to a cluster of contemporary work that isn’t typically seen as closely related: much work on gender and race, revisionism about truth, revisionists about moral language, and revisionists in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. These views all have common core commitments: revision is both possible and important. They also face common challenges: how is amelioration done, what assumptions need to be made, e.g., about the nature of concepts, and what are the limits of revision?Less
Fixing Language is a book about ways in which language (and other representational devices) can be defective and improved. In all parts of philosophy there are philosophers who criticize the concepts we have and propose ways to improve them. Once one notices this about philosophy, it’s easy to see that revisionist projects occur in a range of other intellectual disciplines and in ordinary life. That fact gives rise to a cluster of questions: How does the process of conceptual amelioration work? What are the limits of revision (how much revision is too much)? How does the process of revision fit into an overall theory of language and communication? This book is an effort to answer those questions. In so doing, it is also an attempt to draw attention to a tradition in twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy that isn’t sufficiently recognized as a unified tradition. There’s a straight intellectual line from Frege (e.g. of the Begriffsschrift) and Carnap to a cluster of contemporary work that isn’t typically seen as closely related: much work on gender and race, revisionism about truth, revisionists about moral language, and revisionists in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. These views all have common core commitments: revision is both possible and important. They also face common challenges: how is amelioration done, what assumptions need to be made, e.g., about the nature of concepts, and what are the limits of revision?
