Thomas McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Plural predication is a pervasive part of ordinary language. We can say that some people are fifty in number, are surrounding a building, come from many countries, and are classmates. These ...
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Plural predication is a pervasive part of ordinary language. We can say that some people are fifty in number, are surrounding a building, come from many countries, and are classmates. These predicates can be true of some people without being true of any one of them; they are non-distributive predications. Yet the apparatus of predication and quantification in standard modern logic does not allow a place for such non-distributive predicates. This book explores the enrichment of modern logic with plural predication and quantification. We can have genuinely non-distributive predication without relying on singularizing procedures from set theory and mereology. The fundamental ‘among’ relation can be understood in a way that does not generate any hierarchy of plurals analogous to a hierarchy of types or a hierarchy of higher-order logics. Singular quantification can be understood as a special case, with the general type being quantifiers that allow both singular and plural quantification. The ‘among’ relation is formally similar to a ‘part of’ relation, but the relations are distinct, so that mass quantification and plural quantification cannot be united in the same way that plural and singular are united. Analysis of singular and plural definite descriptions follows, with a defence of a fundamentally Russellian analysis, but coupled with some new ideas about how to be sensitive to the role of context. This facilitates an analysis of some central features of the use of pronouns, both singular and plural.Less
Plural predication is a pervasive part of ordinary language. We can say that some people are fifty in number, are surrounding a building, come from many countries, and are classmates. These predicates can be true of some people without being true of any one of them; they are non-distributive predications. Yet the apparatus of predication and quantification in standard modern logic does not allow a place for such non-distributive predicates. This book explores the enrichment of modern logic with plural predication and quantification. We can have genuinely non-distributive predication without relying on singularizing procedures from set theory and mereology. The fundamental ‘among’ relation can be understood in a way that does not generate any hierarchy of plurals analogous to a hierarchy of types or a hierarchy of higher-order logics. Singular quantification can be understood as a special case, with the general type being quantifiers that allow both singular and plural quantification. The ‘among’ relation is formally similar to a ‘part of’ relation, but the relations are distinct, so that mass quantification and plural quantification cannot be united in the same way that plural and singular are united. Analysis of singular and plural definite descriptions follows, with a defence of a fundamentally Russellian analysis, but coupled with some new ideas about how to be sensitive to the role of context. This facilitates an analysis of some central features of the use of pronouns, both singular and plural.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Logical and mathematical truths differ from the empirical sciences in being necessary; they can be discovered a priori and in general can be proved (contra Quine). How is this possible? This problem ...
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Logical and mathematical truths differ from the empirical sciences in being necessary; they can be discovered a priori and in general can be proved (contra Quine). How is this possible? This problem is partly met by recognizing that the rational sciences are sciences of the possible. Only the mathematical structures that are instantiated in space‐time are existents. Furthermore, using the Entailment Principle, it is seen that only the logico‐mathematical axioms require truthmakers. We should recognize laws in these sciences, but laws that are necessary. Such laws will be truthmakers for truths about uninstantiated structures, for instance large infinite numbers. What is the source of these necessary laws? Perhaps it is a necessity in the nature of things.Less
Logical and mathematical truths differ from the empirical sciences in being necessary; they can be discovered a priori and in general can be proved (contra Quine). How is this possible? This problem is partly met by recognizing that the rational sciences are sciences of the possible. Only the mathematical structures that are instantiated in space‐time are existents. Furthermore, using the Entailment Principle, it is seen that only the logico‐mathematical axioms require truthmakers. We should recognize laws in these sciences, but laws that are necessary. Such laws will be truthmakers for truths about uninstantiated structures, for instance large infinite numbers. What is the source of these necessary laws? Perhaps it is a necessity in the nature of things.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
An account is given of the Forrest‐Armstrong theory of number (Peter Forrest). Natural numbers are argued to be relations holding between a certain property and a certain mereological whole (black ...
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An account is given of the Forrest‐Armstrong theory of number (Peter Forrest). Natural numbers are argued to be relations holding between a certain property and a certain mereological whole (black swan on the lake now, and the whole that these swans make). With the rational numbers and the real numbers the relation becomes one of proportion, they are the units that measure the proportion. It is pointed out, however, that this view is largely to be found in Isaac Newton, and is even anticipated in Aristotle. What it is for a mathematical entity such as a number to be ‘instantiated’ is considered.Less
An account is given of the Forrest‐Armstrong theory of number (Peter Forrest). Natural numbers are argued to be relations holding between a certain property and a certain mereological whole (black swan on the lake now, and the whole that these swans make). With the rational numbers and the real numbers the relation becomes one of proportion, they are the units that measure the proportion. It is pointed out, however, that this view is largely to be found in Isaac Newton, and is even anticipated in Aristotle. What it is for a mathematical entity such as a number to be ‘instantiated’ is considered.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
David Lewis' major contribution to the ontology of classes is to perceive that many‐membered classes are mereological sums of the singletons (unit‐classes of their members: {a, b, c, d, . . .} is ...
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David Lewis' major contribution to the ontology of classes is to perceive that many‐membered classes are mereological sums of the singletons (unit‐classes of their members: {a, b, c, d, . . .} is identical with {a + {b} + }c} + {d} . . . This raises the question of what singletons are ontologically. My proposal that they are all states of affairs was refuted by Gideon Rosen. But a more limited claim is tenable. Only some singletons are states of affairs. Because set theory is a mathematical system it will produce structures that may not be instantiated, and therefore are no more than possibilities. Nelson Goodman's protest at using set theory to do metaphysics is endorsed. The null class is rejected as an existent.Less
David Lewis' major contribution to the ontology of classes is to perceive that many‐membered classes are mereological sums of the singletons (unit‐classes of their members: {a, b, c, d, . . .} is identical with {a + {b} + }c} + {d} . . . This raises the question of what singletons are ontologically. My proposal that they are all states of affairs was refuted by Gideon Rosen. But a more limited claim is tenable. Only some singletons are states of affairs. Because set theory is a mathematical system it will produce structures that may not be instantiated, and therefore are no more than possibilities. Nelson Goodman's protest at using set theory to do metaphysics is endorsed. The null class is rejected as an existent.
Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199583164
- eISBN:
- 9780191725647
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583164.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The growth of both philosophy of mind and cognitive science has developed our understanding of the human mind in ways that just a few decades ago were unthinkable. As ideas from philosophy of mind ...
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The growth of both philosophy of mind and cognitive science has developed our understanding of the human mind in ways that just a few decades ago were unthinkable. As ideas from philosophy of mind begin to cross over into philosophy of religion, there is renewed interest in questions about the divine mind, about how it might relate to a human body, and about whether incarnation itself might be articulated with the conceptual tools offered by the current research developments in the philosophy of mind. This book offers chapters by leading philosophers of religion representing these new approaches to theological problems such as incarnation. The doctrine of incarnation—that Jesus Christ was God become human—has always been one of the most central and distinctive features of Christianity. Similar doctrines about divine humans can be found in other religions, from the claims to divinity made by ancient kings and emperors to the concept of avatars in Hinduism. But many people regard the notion that a human being could also be divine as unjustifiable or incoherent, and none of the many attempts to articulate it philosophically has earned general acceptance. The chapters explore, from a variety of different viewpoints, whether any metaphysically rigorous and coherent model of incarnation can be defended today.Less
The growth of both philosophy of mind and cognitive science has developed our understanding of the human mind in ways that just a few decades ago were unthinkable. As ideas from philosophy of mind begin to cross over into philosophy of religion, there is renewed interest in questions about the divine mind, about how it might relate to a human body, and about whether incarnation itself might be articulated with the conceptual tools offered by the current research developments in the philosophy of mind. This book offers chapters by leading philosophers of religion representing these new approaches to theological problems such as incarnation. The doctrine of incarnation—that Jesus Christ was God become human—has always been one of the most central and distinctive features of Christianity. Similar doctrines about divine humans can be found in other religions, from the claims to divinity made by ancient kings and emperors to the concept of avatars in Hinduism. But many people regard the notion that a human being could also be divine as unjustifiable or incoherent, and none of the many attempts to articulate it philosophically has earned general acceptance. The chapters explore, from a variety of different viewpoints, whether any metaphysically rigorous and coherent model of incarnation can be defended today.
PETER SIMONS
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199241460
- eISBN:
- 9780191696930
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book has shown that mereology was dominated by a single theory: classical extensional mereology (CEM), present in two logical guises — the Calculus of Individuals and Mereology — each in a ...
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This book has shown that mereology was dominated by a single theory: classical extensional mereology (CEM), present in two logical guises — the Calculus of Individuals and Mereology — each in a number of variants. CEM is algebraically neat: only a complete Boolean algebra is neater. It is also strong. CEM is tenseless, non-modal, upholds extensionality of parts, and upholds the conditioned existence of general sums. The first two characteristics are privative, while the last two are positive. Among approaches at variance with CEM, most retain the first three characteristics and drop the last in favour of some weaker conditional existence principle. In the face of apparent temporal and modal variation, two major strategies have been followed. The first ignores modality and attempts to retain the third characteristic by recourse to an ontology of four-dimensional objects. The second strategy, that of Roderick Chisholm, takes both time and modality seriously, but preserves the third characteristic by putting forward an ontology, opposed to common sense, of modally and temporally invariable objects.Less
This book has shown that mereology was dominated by a single theory: classical extensional mereology (CEM), present in two logical guises — the Calculus of Individuals and Mereology — each in a number of variants. CEM is algebraically neat: only a complete Boolean algebra is neater. It is also strong. CEM is tenseless, non-modal, upholds extensionality of parts, and upholds the conditioned existence of general sums. The first two characteristics are privative, while the last two are positive. Among approaches at variance with CEM, most retain the first three characteristics and drop the last in favour of some weaker conditional existence principle. In the face of apparent temporal and modal variation, two major strategies have been followed. The first ignores modality and attempts to retain the third characteristic by recourse to an ontology of four-dimensional objects. The second strategy, that of Roderick Chisholm, takes both time and modality seriously, but preserves the third characteristic by putting forward an ontology, opposed to common sense, of modally and temporally invariable objects.
Geoffrey Hellman
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198240341
- eISBN:
- 9780191597664
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198240341.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to ...
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Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to abstract entities. Modal logic is combined with notions of part/whole (mereology) enabling a systematic interpretation of ordinary mathematical statements as asserting what would be the case in any (suitable) structure there (logically) might be, e.g. for number theory, functional analysis, algebra, pure geometry, etc. Structures are understood as comprising objects, whatever their nature, standing in suitable relations as given by axioms or defining conditions in mathematics proper. The characterization of structures is aided by the addition of plural quantifiers, e.g. ‘Any objects of sort F’ corresponding to arbitrary collections of Fs, achieving the expressive power of second‐order logic, hence a full logic of relations. (See the author's ‘Structuralism without Structures’, Philosophia Mathematica 4 (1996): 100–123.) Claims of absolute existence of structures are replaced by claims of (logical) possibility of enough structurally interrelated objects (modal‐existence postulates). The vast bulk of ordinary mathematics, and scientific applications, can thus be recovered on the basis of the possibility of a countable infinity of atoms. As applied to set theory itself, these ideas lead to a ‘many worlds’—– as opposed to the standard ‘fixed universe’—view, inspired by Zermelo (1930), respecting the unrestricted, indefinite extendability of models of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms. Natural motivation for (‘small’) large cardinal axioms is thus provided. In sum, the vast bulk of abstract mathematics is respected as objective, while literal reference to abstracta and related problems with Platonism are eliminated.Less
Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to abstract entities. Modal logic is combined with notions of part/whole (mereology) enabling a systematic interpretation of ordinary mathematical statements as asserting what would be the case in any (suitable) structure there (logically) might be, e.g. for number theory, functional analysis, algebra, pure geometry, etc. Structures are understood as comprising objects, whatever their nature, standing in suitable relations as given by axioms or defining conditions in mathematics proper. The characterization of structures is aided by the addition of plural quantifiers, e.g. ‘Any objects of sort F’ corresponding to arbitrary collections of Fs, achieving the expressive power of second‐order logic, hence a full logic of relations. (See the author's ‘Structuralism without Structures’, Philosophia Mathematica 4 (1996): 100–123.) Claims of absolute existence of structures are replaced by claims of (logical) possibility of enough structurally interrelated objects (modal‐existence postulates). The vast bulk of ordinary mathematics, and scientific applications, can thus be recovered on the basis of the possibility of a countable infinity of atoms. As applied to set theory itself, these ideas lead to a ‘many worlds’—– as opposed to the standard ‘fixed universe’—view, inspired by Zermelo (1930), respecting the unrestricted, indefinite extendability of models of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms. Natural motivation for (‘small’) large cardinal axioms is thus provided. In sum, the vast bulk of abstract mathematics is respected as objective, while literal reference to abstracta and related problems with Platonism are eliminated.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy ...
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This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.Less
This book contains 15 papers by the influential American philosopher, David Lewis. All previously published (between 1966 and 80), these papers are divided into three groups: ontology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. Lewis supplements eight of the fifteen papers with postscripts in which he amends claims, answers objections, and introduces later reflections. Topics discussed include possible worlds, counterpart theory, modality, personal identity, radical interpretation, language, propositional attitudes, the mind, and intensional semantics. Among the positions Lewis defends are modal realism, materialism, socially contextualized formal semantics, and functionalism of the mind. The volume begins with an introduction in which Lewis discusses his philosophical method.
PETER SIMONS
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199241460
- eISBN:
- 9780191696930
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical ...
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This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical defects of most of this tradition, and suggests why, where, and how it should be put right. The standardly accepted formal theory of part-whole is classical extensional mereology, which is known in two logical guises, the Calculus of Individuals of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman, and the Mereology of Stanislaw Leśniewski. Despite the discrepancies between the underlying logics of these two approaches, there is a precise sense in which both say the same things about parts and wholes. The book also considers the mereology of continuants and brings modality and mereology together as they are found in the work of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the century and later in that of Roderick Chisholm.Less
This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical defects of most of this tradition, and suggests why, where, and how it should be put right. The standardly accepted formal theory of part-whole is classical extensional mereology, which is known in two logical guises, the Calculus of Individuals of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman, and the Mereology of Stanislaw Leśniewski. Despite the discrepancies between the underlying logics of these two approaches, there is a precise sense in which both say the same things about parts and wholes. The book also considers the mereology of continuants and brings modality and mereology together as they are found in the work of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the century and later in that of Roderick Chisholm.
Theodore Sider
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244430
- eISBN:
- 9780191598425
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924443X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language ...
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According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language quantifies over and names—with aggregates of temporal parts (‘space‐time worms’), but an attractive alternate version of four‐dimensionalism identifies ordinary continuants with instantaneous temporal slices and accounts for temporal predication using temporal counterpart theory. Arguments for four‐dimensionalism include the following: (1) Either substantivalism or relationalism about space‐time is true, but given substantivalism one might as well identify continuants with regions of space‐time, which have temporal parts, or with instantaneous slices of space‐time, whereas relationalism about space‐time cannot be made to work without temporal parts. (2) It can never be vague how many objects exist; if temporal parts do not exist, then a restrictive account of which filled regions of space‐time contain objects must be given, but no such account can be given that is plausible and non‐vague. (3) Four‐dimensionalism—especially the alternate, counterpart‐theoretic version—provides the most satisfying overall account of the ‘paradoxes of material constitution’, in which numerically distinct material objects (e.g. statues and lumps of clay) apparently share exactly the same parts. Objections to four‐dimensionalism (involving, e.g., motion in homogeneous substances and de re modal properties) may be answered. While logically independent of the question of four‐dimensionalism, the book also defends related theses, including (1) a robust meta‐ontology according to which unrestricted existence‐statements are non‐vague, non‐analytic, and uninfected by human convention; (2) the B‐theory of time (the opposite of presentism); (3) unrestricted composition; and (4) counterpart theory (both modal and temporal).Less
According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language quantifies over and names—with aggregates of temporal parts (‘space‐time worms’), but an attractive alternate version of four‐dimensionalism identifies ordinary continuants with instantaneous temporal slices and accounts for temporal predication using temporal counterpart theory. Arguments for four‐dimensionalism include the following: (1) Either substantivalism or relationalism about space‐time is true, but given substantivalism one might as well identify continuants with regions of space‐time, which have temporal parts, or with instantaneous slices of space‐time, whereas relationalism about space‐time cannot be made to work without temporal parts. (2) It can never be vague how many objects exist; if temporal parts do not exist, then a restrictive account of which filled regions of space‐time contain objects must be given, but no such account can be given that is plausible and non‐vague. (3) Four‐dimensionalism—especially the alternate, counterpart‐theoretic version—provides the most satisfying overall account of the ‘paradoxes of material constitution’, in which numerically distinct material objects (e.g. statues and lumps of clay) apparently share exactly the same parts. Objections to four‐dimensionalism (involving, e.g., motion in homogeneous substances and de re modal properties) may be answered. While logically independent of the question of four‐dimensionalism, the book also defends related theses, including (1) a robust meta‐ontology according to which unrestricted existence‐statements are non‐vague, non‐analytic, and uninfected by human convention; (2) the B‐theory of time (the opposite of presentism); (3) unrestricted composition; and (4) counterpart theory (both modal and temporal).
Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659081
- eISBN:
- 9780191745201
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They ...
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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the seventh volume in the series. Topics covered include counterpart theory, the idea of absolute generality, humean supervenience, coincident objects, open future, presentism, laws, and identity.Less
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the seventh volume in the series. Topics covered include counterpart theory, the idea of absolute generality, humean supervenience, coincident objects, open future, presentism, laws, and identity.
Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603039
- eISBN:
- 9780191725418
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this ...
More
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the sixth volume in the series. It contains essays by Jason Turner, Ross P. Cameron, Gabriel Uzquiano, Raul Saucedo, Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams, Matti Eklund, Richard Woodward, and Rory Madden.Less
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the sixth volume in the series. It contains essays by Jason Turner, Ross P. Cameron, Gabriel Uzquiano, Raul Saucedo, Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams, Matti Eklund, Richard Woodward, and Rory Madden.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
The main purpose of this book is to give an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. ...
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The main purpose of this book is to give an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. Particular focus is placed on the question of how the parts of such objects are related to the wholes which they compose. Many philosophers today find themselves in the grip of an exceedingly deflationary conception of what it means to be an object, according to which any plurality of objects, no matter how disparate or gerry-mandered, itself composes an object, even if the objects in question fail to exhibit interesting similarities, internal unity, cohesion, or causal interaction amongst each other. This commitment to initially counterintuitive objects follows from the belief that no principled set of criteria is available by means of which to distinguish intuitively gerry-mandered objects from common-sensical ones. The project of this book is to persuade the reader that systematic principles by means of which composition can be restricted can be found, and hence, that we need not embrace this deflationary approach to the question of what it means to be an object. To this end, a more full-blooded neo-Aristotelian account of parthood and composition is developed according to which objects are structured wholes: it is integral to the existence and identity of an object, on this conception, that its parts exhibit a certain manner of arrangement. This structure-based conception of parthood and composition is explored in detail, along with some of its historical precursors as well as some of its contemporary competitors.Less
The main purpose of this book is to give an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. Particular focus is placed on the question of how the parts of such objects are related to the wholes which they compose. Many philosophers today find themselves in the grip of an exceedingly deflationary conception of what it means to be an object, according to which any plurality of objects, no matter how disparate or gerry-mandered, itself composes an object, even if the objects in question fail to exhibit interesting similarities, internal unity, cohesion, or causal interaction amongst each other. This commitment to initially counterintuitive objects follows from the belief that no principled set of criteria is available by means of which to distinguish intuitively gerry-mandered objects from common-sensical ones. The project of this book is to persuade the reader that systematic principles by means of which composition can be restricted can be found, and hence, that we need not embrace this deflationary approach to the question of what it means to be an object. To this end, a more full-blooded neo-Aristotelian account of parthood and composition is developed according to which objects are structured wholes: it is integral to the existence and identity of an object, on this conception, that its parts exhibit a certain manner of arrangement. This structure-based conception of parthood and composition is explored in detail, along with some of its historical precursors as well as some of its contemporary competitors.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter is devoted to an exposition of the main concepts and principles of standard mereology, the system originally developed by Stanislaw Leśniewski and introduced into the English-speaking ...
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This chapter is devoted to an exposition of the main concepts and principles of standard mereology, the system originally developed by Stanislaw Leśniewski and introduced into the English-speaking world in the guise of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman's ‘Calculus of Individuals’. The main source for this chapter is Peter Simons', Parts: A Study in Ontology, in particular his instructive gradual development of standard mereology, which shows how stronger and stronger principles may be added gradually to a minimal core, until we arrive at the full-strength theory of standard mereology. Despite standard mereology's merits as a formal theory, however, it remains to be seen whether it is of any use to the metaphysician in characterizing ordinary mereological concepts, as they apply to our scientifically informed, common-sense ontology.Less
This chapter is devoted to an exposition of the main concepts and principles of standard mereology, the system originally developed by Stanislaw Leśniewski and introduced into the English-speaking world in the guise of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman's ‘Calculus of Individuals’. The main source for this chapter is Peter Simons', Parts: A Study in Ontology, in particular his instructive gradual development of standard mereology, which shows how stronger and stronger principles may be added gradually to a minimal core, until we arrive at the full-strength theory of standard mereology. Despite standard mereology's merits as a formal theory, however, it remains to be seen whether it is of any use to the metaphysician in characterizing ordinary mereological concepts, as they apply to our scientifically informed, common-sense ontology.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter returns to the question, postponed in Chapter 2: why, from a three-dimensionalist perspective, the properties of ordinary material objects are not already adequately accounted for by ...
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This chapter returns to the question, postponed in Chapter 2: why, from a three-dimensionalist perspective, the properties of ordinary material objects are not already adequately accounted for by Thomson's modified and weakened version of standard mereology. To this end, the work of Kit Fine is examined, who, in a series of papers, has provided powerful reasons for abandoning the standard conception of composition. In its stead, Fine proposes an alternative, neo-Aristotelian model, which is in some respects close to the positive framework advocated later in this book. The chapter begins by examining Fine's reasons for parting ways with the standard conception; these reasons are found to be utterly persuasive and fatal to the standard conception. The later sections of the chapter provide a detailed discussion of Fine's own positive proposal and indicate in what respects it might be found to be unsatisfactory.Less
This chapter returns to the question, postponed in Chapter 2: why, from a three-dimensionalist perspective, the properties of ordinary material objects are not already adequately accounted for by Thomson's modified and weakened version of standard mereology. To this end, the work of Kit Fine is examined, who, in a series of papers, has provided powerful reasons for abandoning the standard conception of composition. In its stead, Fine proposes an alternative, neo-Aristotelian model, which is in some respects close to the positive framework advocated later in this book. The chapter begins by examining Fine's reasons for parting ways with the standard conception; these reasons are found to be utterly persuasive and fatal to the standard conception. The later sections of the chapter provide a detailed discussion of Fine's own positive proposal and indicate in what respects it might be found to be unsatisfactory.
Kathrin Koslicki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539895
- eISBN:
- 9780191716300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter demonstrates that a structure-based neo-Aristotelian mereology for ordinary material objects can be defended utilizing a single relation of parthood with relatively straightforward ...
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This chapter demonstrates that a structure-based neo-Aristotelian mereology for ordinary material objects can be defended utilizing a single relation of parthood with relatively straightforward formal properties. A substantive restriction on composition can be derived from a comparatively minimal and metaphysically neutral independently motivated ontology of kinds. The thoroughly mereological conception of composition defended here recommends itself based on Leibniz's Law and the Weak Supplementation Principle. Among its benefits are the following: it yields the Uniqueness of Composition as a derived principle; it contributes to the Problem of Constitution and, possibly, the Grounding Problem; and it clarifies the relation between a whole and both its material and its structural components. Finally, it is demonstrated how, on the approach defended here, wholes can be thought of as both ontologically committing and genuinely unified, despite the apparent Aristotelian regress caused by a never-ending demand for further principles of unity.Less
This chapter demonstrates that a structure-based neo-Aristotelian mereology for ordinary material objects can be defended utilizing a single relation of parthood with relatively straightforward formal properties. A substantive restriction on composition can be derived from a comparatively minimal and metaphysically neutral independently motivated ontology of kinds. The thoroughly mereological conception of composition defended here recommends itself based on Leibniz's Law and the Weak Supplementation Principle. Among its benefits are the following: it yields the Uniqueness of Composition as a derived principle; it contributes to the Problem of Constitution and, possibly, the Grounding Problem; and it clarifies the relation between a whole and both its material and its structural components. Finally, it is demonstrated how, on the approach defended here, wholes can be thought of as both ontologically committing and genuinely unified, despite the apparent Aristotelian regress caused by a never-ending demand for further principles of unity.
PETER SIMONS
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199241460
- eISBN:
- 9780191696930
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Although Stanislaw Leśniewski's Mereology was the first extensional part—whole theory to be rigorously developed, it is expressed in the formal language of the general logic Leśniewski called ...
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Although Stanislaw Leśniewski's Mereology was the first extensional part—whole theory to be rigorously developed, it is expressed in the formal language of the general logic Leśniewski called ‘Ontology’, and which is sometimes called his calculus of names. This language is, by comparison with those of predicate logic and set theory, still relatively little known, so mereological concepts and principles are first introduced. Leśniewski's notation can then be introduced without any great difficulty in its intended meaning. As far as the narrower issues of extensional mereology are concerned, there is no important difference between Leśniewski and other writers. This chapter discusses meteorological principles, classical extensional meteorology, and the questions of atomism.Less
Although Stanislaw Leśniewski's Mereology was the first extensional part—whole theory to be rigorously developed, it is expressed in the formal language of the general logic Leśniewski called ‘Ontology’, and which is sometimes called his calculus of names. This language is, by comparison with those of predicate logic and set theory, still relatively little known, so mereological concepts and principles are first introduced. Leśniewski's notation can then be introduced without any great difficulty in its intended meaning. As far as the narrower issues of extensional mereology are concerned, there is no important difference between Leśniewski and other writers. This chapter discusses meteorological principles, classical extensional meteorology, and the questions of atomism.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199890576
- eISBN:
- 9780199980031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to present an overview of Bolzano's universe from the point of view of his metaphysics and its relationship to logic, relying fundamentally on Bolzano's ...
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This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to present an overview of Bolzano's universe from the point of view of his metaphysics and its relationship to logic, relying fundamentally on Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre. The author's preferred reading of Bolzano is one according to which he is a ‘platonistic nominalist’: a platonist about propositions and a nominalist about properties. Bolzano's nominalistic tendencies are particularly conspicuous in his mereological analyses, which play a major role in every aspect of his philosophy. The author's second aim is to answer the open question of whether in Bolzano there is any ‘ontology of truth’. This chapter argues for a negative answer. Bolzano does not make room for any special object which plays the role of the counterpart of a truth-bearer, or at least his propositions do not connect semantically in a direct way to anything that would count as such a special object.Less
This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to present an overview of Bolzano's universe from the point of view of his metaphysics and its relationship to logic, relying fundamentally on Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre. The author's preferred reading of Bolzano is one according to which he is a ‘platonistic nominalist’: a platonist about propositions and a nominalist about properties. Bolzano's nominalistic tendencies are particularly conspicuous in his mereological analyses, which play a major role in every aspect of his philosophy. The author's second aim is to answer the open question of whether in Bolzano there is any ‘ontology of truth’. This chapter argues for a negative answer. Bolzano does not make room for any special object which plays the role of the counterpart of a truth-bearer, or at least his propositions do not connect semantically in a direct way to anything that would count as such a special object.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282579
- eISBN:
- 9780191712463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282579.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins with an attempt to analyze the relation of being in perfect contact. Five proposals are evaluated and the final proposal endorsed. Along the way, puzzles invoking zeno-series and ...
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This chapter begins with an attempt to analyze the relation of being in perfect contact. Five proposals are evaluated and the final proposal endorsed. Along the way, puzzles invoking zeno-series and mereology yield refutations of intuitive views about contact and surprising results about receptacles and topology. The topics of boundaries and borders furnish a number of metaphysical puzzles, and some of these are explored with emphasis on the proper analysis of ‘boundary’, boundary ownership, vague boundaries, and concealed boundaries. A delightful puzzle about contact and boundaries is presented without final solution, yet together with a number of suggested solutions each of which seems genuinely terrible. Finally, these reflections on contact and boundaries make their way into the History of Zenopia, a brief story in which the celebrated four-color conjecture is subjected to counterexample (or at least in which two of its most famous three formulations are subjected to counterexample).Less
This chapter begins with an attempt to analyze the relation of being in perfect contact. Five proposals are evaluated and the final proposal endorsed. Along the way, puzzles invoking zeno-series and mereology yield refutations of intuitive views about contact and surprising results about receptacles and topology. The topics of boundaries and borders furnish a number of metaphysical puzzles, and some of these are explored with emphasis on the proper analysis of ‘boundary’, boundary ownership, vague boundaries, and concealed boundaries. A delightful puzzle about contact and boundaries is presented without final solution, yet together with a number of suggested solutions each of which seems genuinely terrible. Finally, these reflections on contact and boundaries make their way into the History of Zenopia, a brief story in which the celebrated four-color conjecture is subjected to counterexample (or at least in which two of its most famous three formulations are subjected to counterexample).
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282579
- eISBN:
- 9780191712463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282579.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A substantivalist dualist who believes in spacetime and material objects is committed to a relation of occupation or location. This chapter explores different candidate descriptions of this relation ...
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A substantivalist dualist who believes in spacetime and material objects is committed to a relation of occupation or location. This chapter explores different candidate descriptions of this relation and investigates some of the philosophical difficulties which arise for the resulting conceptions. One reason to focus on the metaphysics of occupation relations is that some of them seem to make room for the possibility of extended mereological simples. The chapter critically evaluates several philosophical attempts to promote the cause of extended simples. Four problems are then advanced to yield the conclusion that extended mereological simples are conceptually possible yet metaphysically impossible: the problem of spatial intrinsics, the problem of shapes, the problem of parsimony, and the problem of diachoric identity.Less
A substantivalist dualist who believes in spacetime and material objects is committed to a relation of occupation or location. This chapter explores different candidate descriptions of this relation and investigates some of the philosophical difficulties which arise for the resulting conceptions. One reason to focus on the metaphysics of occupation relations is that some of them seem to make room for the possibility of extended mereological simples. The chapter critically evaluates several philosophical attempts to promote the cause of extended simples. Four problems are then advanced to yield the conclusion that extended mereological simples are conceptually possible yet metaphysically impossible: the problem of spatial intrinsics, the problem of shapes, the problem of parsimony, and the problem of diachoric identity.
