Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It shows that the norm against mercenary use has explained four different puzzles in international history. First, ...
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This chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It shows that the norm against mercenary use has explained four different puzzles in international history. First, anti-mercenary feeling can help illustrate why states gained control over the independent mercenary and established a controlled international trade in mercenaries. Second, it can help explain why, even though the controlled trade in private fighters was effective, it was abandoned in favour of citizen armies across Europe in the 19th century. Third, it is impossible to understand why international law on mercenaries is so flawed without understanding that states were attempting to adhere to a very strong norm against mercenary use which was difficult to translate into law, and was simultaneously supported by the norms of national self-determination and undermined by the norms of state responsibility and freedom of movement. Fourth, the growth of PMCs, their disappearance, and the rise of PSCs cannot be understood without understanding the normative obstacles modern-day mercenaries face, and the international community's response to the emergence of PMCs is likewise impossible to understand without attention to widespread normative discomfort with the use of private force.Less
This chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It shows that the norm against mercenary use has explained four different puzzles in international history. First, anti-mercenary feeling can help illustrate why states gained control over the independent mercenary and established a controlled international trade in mercenaries. Second, it can help explain why, even though the controlled trade in private fighters was effective, it was abandoned in favour of citizen armies across Europe in the 19th century. Third, it is impossible to understand why international law on mercenaries is so flawed without understanding that states were attempting to adhere to a very strong norm against mercenary use which was difficult to translate into law, and was simultaneously supported by the norms of national self-determination and undermined by the norms of state responsibility and freedom of movement. Fourth, the growth of PMCs, their disappearance, and the rise of PSCs cannot be understood without understanding the normative obstacles modern-day mercenaries face, and the international community's response to the emergence of PMCs is likewise impossible to understand without attention to widespread normative discomfort with the use of private force.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The main aim of this book is to argue that the use of private force by states has been restricted by a norm against mercenary use. It traces the evolution of this norm, from mercenaries in medieval ...
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The main aim of this book is to argue that the use of private force by states has been restricted by a norm against mercenary use. It traces the evolution of this norm, from mercenaries in medieval Europe through to private security companies in modern day Iraq, telling a story about how the mercenaries of yesterday have evolved into those of today in the process. The norm against mercenaries has two components. First, mercenaries are considered to be immoral because they use force outside legitimate, authoritative control. Second, mercenaries are considered to be morally problematic because they fight wars for selfish, financial reasons as opposed to fighting for some kind of larger conception of the common good. The book examines four puzzles about mercenary use, and argues that they can only be explained by understanding the norm against mercenaries. First, the book argues that moral disapproval of mercenaries led to the disappearance of independent mercenaries from medieval Europe. Second, the transition from armies composed of mercenaries to citizen armies in the 19th century can only be understood with attention to the norm against mercenaries. Third, it is impossible to understand why international law regarding mercenaries, created in the 1970s and 1980s, is so ineffective without understanding the norm. Finally, the disappearance of companies like Executive Outcomes and Sandline and the development of today's private security industry cannot be understood without the norm.Less
The main aim of this book is to argue that the use of private force by states has been restricted by a norm against mercenary use. It traces the evolution of this norm, from mercenaries in medieval Europe through to private security companies in modern day Iraq, telling a story about how the mercenaries of yesterday have evolved into those of today in the process. The norm against mercenaries has two components. First, mercenaries are considered to be immoral because they use force outside legitimate, authoritative control. Second, mercenaries are considered to be morally problematic because they fight wars for selfish, financial reasons as opposed to fighting for some kind of larger conception of the common good. The book examines four puzzles about mercenary use, and argues that they can only be explained by understanding the norm against mercenaries. First, the book argues that moral disapproval of mercenaries led to the disappearance of independent mercenaries from medieval Europe. Second, the transition from armies composed of mercenaries to citizen armies in the 19th century can only be understood with attention to the norm against mercenaries. Third, it is impossible to understand why international law regarding mercenaries, created in the 1970s and 1980s, is so ineffective without understanding the norm. Finally, the disappearance of companies like Executive Outcomes and Sandline and the development of today's private security industry cannot be understood without the norm.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the norm against mercenary use. It then discusses existing literature on mercenaries. It argues that the anti-mercenary norm has restricted state ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the norm against mercenary use. It then discusses existing literature on mercenaries. It argues that the anti-mercenary norm has restricted state use of mercenaries at the same time it has influenced, and often constrained, the opportunities available for mercenaries themselves. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the norm against mercenary use. It then discusses existing literature on mercenaries. It argues that the anti-mercenary norm has restricted state use of mercenaries at the same time it has influenced, and often constrained, the opportunities available for mercenaries themselves. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the early origins of the norm against mercenary through three major cases of mercenary use, broadly covering the period that runs from the 12th century through to the 16th ...
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This chapter examines the early origins of the norm against mercenary through three major cases of mercenary use, broadly covering the period that runs from the 12th century through to the 16th century. It looks at mercenaries in France and England from the 12th to the 14th century, with a particular focus on the routiers and écorcheur of 14th-century France. It also discusses Swiss mercenaries from the 13th to the 16th centuries. Finally it looks at Italian mercenaries during the same period. The military enterpriser system in the German states during the Thirty Years War is also considered. These four cases show that the anti-mercenary norm ultimately led to a major shift away from mercenary use by the end of the 17th century. Rulers brought the mercenary trade entirely under the control of the state, eliminating the independent, entrepreneurial mercenary from the international stage. After the 17th century, states bought and sold units of mercenaries or allowed the recruitment of individual mercenaries on their territory under strict licence.Less
This chapter examines the early origins of the norm against mercenary through three major cases of mercenary use, broadly covering the period that runs from the 12th century through to the 16th century. It looks at mercenaries in France and England from the 12th to the 14th century, with a particular focus on the routiers and écorcheur of 14th-century France. It also discusses Swiss mercenaries from the 13th to the 16th centuries. Finally it looks at Italian mercenaries during the same period. The military enterpriser system in the German states during the Thirty Years War is also considered. These four cases show that the anti-mercenary norm ultimately led to a major shift away from mercenary use by the end of the 17th century. Rulers brought the mercenary trade entirely under the control of the state, eliminating the independent, entrepreneurial mercenary from the international stage. After the 17th century, states bought and sold units of mercenaries or allowed the recruitment of individual mercenaries on their territory under strict licence.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the book. It adopts a constructivist approach, which explains how norms influence behaviour and how their impact can be studied. The first section ...
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This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the book. It adopts a constructivist approach, which explains how norms influence behaviour and how their impact can be studied. The first section explains what a norm is, and defines proscriptive norms. It moves on to explain the three main theoretical approaches to defining norms, and argues that a constructivist approach is the most appropriate for capturing the influence of the norm against mercenary use. The third section outlines the relationships between norms and the related concepts of law, morality, and interests. In the fourth section, the ways in which norms influence politics and state behaviour are examined. The fifth section argues that a narrative methodology is most appropriate to describe and explain the influence of norms on state behaviour. The chapter concludes by addressing some of the challenges inherent in a study of norms.Less
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the book. It adopts a constructivist approach, which explains how norms influence behaviour and how their impact can be studied. The first section explains what a norm is, and defines proscriptive norms. It moves on to explain the three main theoretical approaches to defining norms, and argues that a constructivist approach is the most appropriate for capturing the influence of the norm against mercenary use. The third section outlines the relationships between norms and the related concepts of law, morality, and interests. In the fourth section, the ways in which norms influence politics and state behaviour are examined. The fifth section argues that a narrative methodology is most appropriate to describe and explain the influence of norms on state behaviour. The chapter concludes by addressing some of the challenges inherent in a study of norms.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter defines the term ‘mercenary’ and identifies the problematic qualities which differentiate mercenaries from other types of fighters. It states that mercenaries do not fight for an ...
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This chapter defines the term ‘mercenary’ and identifies the problematic qualities which differentiate mercenaries from other types of fighters. It states that mercenaries do not fight for an appropriate cause and that they are not controlled by the state or another legitimate actor. It argues that these problematic qualities form the core of the proscriptive norm against mercenary use.Less
This chapter defines the term ‘mercenary’ and identifies the problematic qualities which differentiate mercenaries from other types of fighters. It states that mercenaries do not fight for an appropriate cause and that they are not controlled by the state or another legitimate actor. It argues that these problematic qualities form the core of the proscriptive norm against mercenary use.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the three arguments that seek to explain why states stopped using mercenaries in the 19th century. The first argument is largely realist, making the case that material changes ...
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This chapter focuses on the three arguments that seek to explain why states stopped using mercenaries in the 19th century. The first argument is largely realist, making the case that material changes pressured states to adopt citizen armies. The second argument is based more on the role of ideas, arguing that the developing relationship between states and citizens and the increasing role of neutrality in international law combined to render the use of mercenaries obsolete. The third argument suggests that while ideas and material pressures are important antecedent conditions, the change to a citizen army is best explained by domestic politics and path dependency.Less
This chapter focuses on the three arguments that seek to explain why states stopped using mercenaries in the 19th century. The first argument is largely realist, making the case that material changes pressured states to adopt citizen armies. The second argument is based more on the role of ideas, arguing that the developing relationship between states and citizens and the increasing role of neutrality in international law combined to render the use of mercenaries obsolete. The third argument suggests that while ideas and material pressures are important antecedent conditions, the change to a citizen army is best explained by domestic politics and path dependency.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the decision in the late 18th and early 19th centuries to adopt a citizen army and stop the long-standing practice of hiring mercenaries from abroad, using four case studies. It ...
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This chapter examines the decision in the late 18th and early 19th centuries to adopt a citizen army and stop the long-standing practice of hiring mercenaries from abroad, using four case studies. It is shown that an intellectual tradition of dislike of mercenaries provided the framework for the subsequent changes in the relationship between citizens and states, and the effect that having (or not having) a citizen army had on state identity, ultimately leading to the end of mercenary use.Less
This chapter examines the decision in the late 18th and early 19th centuries to adopt a citizen army and stop the long-standing practice of hiring mercenaries from abroad, using four case studies. It is shown that an intellectual tradition of dislike of mercenaries provided the framework for the subsequent changes in the relationship between citizens and states, and the effect that having (or not having) a citizen army had on state identity, ultimately leading to the end of mercenary use.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the absence of an effective international regulatory regime for mercenaries. The first section examines the argument, made most forcefully by the international lawyer Antonio ...
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This chapter examines the absence of an effective international regulatory regime for mercenaries. The first section examines the argument, made most forcefully by the international lawyer Antonio Cassese, that the international law on mercenaries, particularly the definition found in Article 47 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, is full of loopholes intentionally left by states, who were uninfluenced by any moral dislike of mercenaries and who could and did pursue the creation of law that was more about preserving advantage than enshrining concern over mercenaries. The second section of this chapter takes a close look at the argument that only states directly affected by mercenaries, those in Africa, had any interest in dealing with mercenaries through the creation of international law. The third section examines a different facet of the argument that anti-mercenary sentiment was not universal.Less
This chapter examines the absence of an effective international regulatory regime for mercenaries. The first section examines the argument, made most forcefully by the international lawyer Antonio Cassese, that the international law on mercenaries, particularly the definition found in Article 47 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, is full of loopholes intentionally left by states, who were uninfluenced by any moral dislike of mercenaries and who could and did pursue the creation of law that was more about preserving advantage than enshrining concern over mercenaries. The second section of this chapter takes a close look at the argument that only states directly affected by mercenaries, those in Africa, had any interest in dealing with mercenaries through the creation of international law. The third section examines a different facet of the argument that anti-mercenary sentiment was not universal.
Sarah Percy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199214334
- eISBN:
- 9780191706608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214334.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter demonstrates the continued influence of the norm against mercenary use by examining the development of PMCs and PSCs starting in the mid-1990s. It argues that the shift away from the ...
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This chapter demonstrates the continued influence of the norm against mercenary use by examining the development of PMCs and PSCs starting in the mid-1990s. It argues that the shift away from the provision of combat services can only be explained by the anti-mercenary norm. It then traces the continued relevance of the anti-mercenary norm to the private security industry, looking at state control and regulation and the persistence of the cause aspect of the norm. The final section considers the future of the norm against mercenaries.Less
This chapter demonstrates the continued influence of the norm against mercenary use by examining the development of PMCs and PSCs starting in the mid-1990s. It argues that the shift away from the provision of combat services can only be explained by the anti-mercenary norm. It then traces the continued relevance of the anti-mercenary norm to the private security industry, looking at state control and regulation and the persistence of the cause aspect of the norm. The final section considers the future of the norm against mercenaries.
Herfried Münkler
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232024
- eISBN:
- 9780191716133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232024.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The growth of the state in the early modern period was attributable to its monopolization of warfare. In what have been called ‘new wars’, that monopoly has been eroded, but for two different ...
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The growth of the state in the early modern period was attributable to its monopolization of warfare. In what have been called ‘new wars’, that monopoly has been eroded, but for two different reasons. Powerful states have withdrawn from their monopoly of war through the employment of private military companies: they employ asymmetric methods out of choice. Failed states have permitted the privatization of war out of weakness, and non-state actors have adopted asymmetric methods for the same reason. Clausewitz's original definition of war, as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will, still provides an effective means to understand war, enabling us to see terrorism as a strategy.Less
The growth of the state in the early modern period was attributable to its monopolization of warfare. In what have been called ‘new wars’, that monopoly has been eroded, but for two different reasons. Powerful states have withdrawn from their monopoly of war through the employment of private military companies: they employ asymmetric methods out of choice. Failed states have permitted the privatization of war out of weakness, and non-state actors have adopted asymmetric methods for the same reason. Clausewitz's original definition of war, as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will, still provides an effective means to understand war, enabling us to see terrorism as a strategy.
John R. Hale
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143019
- eISBN:
- 9781400846306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143019.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, Ancient History / Archaeology
This chapter argues that neither the leisured class of aristocrats who vied for high social and political status within the polis nor the middling citizen soldiers who defended their farmland ...
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This chapter argues that neither the leisured class of aristocrats who vied for high social and political status within the polis nor the middling citizen soldiers who defended their farmland provides the origins of archaic Greek arms and tactics. Instead, the chapter suggests looking for the first hoplites fighting as mercenaries in the service of Eastern monarchs in areas such as Syria, Egypt, and Babylon. These soldiers of fortune fought in search of gain and glory, not to defend a civic ideology or ethos. Evidence for this thesis can be found in lyric poetry and in inscriptions, pottery, and the remains of hoplite armor discovered outside Greece. Here, the mercenary service is considered the “Main Event” of Greek military history in the seventh century, in contrast to the sporadic battles between poleis.Less
This chapter argues that neither the leisured class of aristocrats who vied for high social and political status within the polis nor the middling citizen soldiers who defended their farmland provides the origins of archaic Greek arms and tactics. Instead, the chapter suggests looking for the first hoplites fighting as mercenaries in the service of Eastern monarchs in areas such as Syria, Egypt, and Babylon. These soldiers of fortune fought in search of gain and glory, not to defend a civic ideology or ethos. Evidence for this thesis can be found in lyric poetry and in inscriptions, pottery, and the remains of hoplite armor discovered outside Greece. Here, the mercenary service is considered the “Main Event” of Greek military history in the seventh century, in contrast to the sporadic battles between poleis.
James D. Tracy
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199209118
- eISBN:
- 9780191706134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199209118.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History
In the forty years between 1520 and 1559, the Habsburg and Valois dynasties were at war for twenty years. This struggle for hegemony in Europe entailed not just recurring warfare along the ...
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In the forty years between 1520 and 1559, the Habsburg and Valois dynasties were at war for twenty years. This struggle for hegemony in Europe entailed not just recurring warfare along the Franco‐Netherlandish frontier, but also a leapfrogging competition in military technology (artillery, and fortresses built to withstand bombardment) and military organization (building mercenary armies from specialized units recruited in different nations). In the 1540s and especially the 1550s, French attacks came by sea as well as by land, forcing the Netherlands government, for the first time, to think about how to control the North Sea. At sea and on land, commanders who acquired up‐to‐date military skills by fighting for the Habsburgs in the 1550s would in the 1570s fight one another.Less
In the forty years between 1520 and 1559, the Habsburg and Valois dynasties were at war for twenty years. This struggle for hegemony in Europe entailed not just recurring warfare along the Franco‐Netherlandish frontier, but also a leapfrogging competition in military technology (artillery, and fortresses built to withstand bombardment) and military organization (building mercenary armies from specialized units recruited in different nations). In the 1540s and especially the 1550s, French attacks came by sea as well as by land, forcing the Netherlands government, for the first time, to think about how to control the North Sea. At sea and on land, commanders who acquired up‐to‐date military skills by fighting for the Habsburgs in the 1550s would in the 1570s fight one another.
James D. Tracy
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199209118
- eISBN:
- 9780191706134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199209118.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History
With Spanish troops now gone, the Lords States could concentrate on “closing off” what they called “Holland's Garden”. This meant subjecting loyalist towns to Orange's authority; Amsterdam, hitherto ...
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With Spanish troops now gone, the Lords States could concentrate on “closing off” what they called “Holland's Garden”. This meant subjecting loyalist towns to Orange's authority; Amsterdam, hitherto a center of loyalism, was reunited with Holland by an internal coup (May 1578). One also had to reduce the war budget, by cutting back the number of mercenary companies; less‐desirable units were sent off to fight for the States General—leaving open the question of how they were to be paid. Finally, Holland itself could not be secure without a chain of fortified positions, not only along the the border, but also upstream at key points along the rivers flowing into Holland. In the Union of Utrecht, Holland agreed to pay for the defense of selected areas in neighboring provinces. The strategic goal, as one deputy put it, was to “fight the war on someone else's ground”.Less
With Spanish troops now gone, the Lords States could concentrate on “closing off” what they called “Holland's Garden”. This meant subjecting loyalist towns to Orange's authority; Amsterdam, hitherto a center of loyalism, was reunited with Holland by an internal coup (May 1578). One also had to reduce the war budget, by cutting back the number of mercenary companies; less‐desirable units were sent off to fight for the States General—leaving open the question of how they were to be paid. Finally, Holland itself could not be secure without a chain of fortified positions, not only along the the border, but also upstream at key points along the rivers flowing into Holland. In the Union of Utrecht, Holland agreed to pay for the defense of selected areas in neighboring provinces. The strategic goal, as one deputy put it, was to “fight the war on someone else's ground”.
Steven Gunn, David Grummitt, and Hans Cools
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199207503
- eISBN:
- 9780191708848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207503.003.002
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History
This chapter analyses the development of military and fiscal institutions in England and the Netherlands. Their armies were composed of different mixtures of noble retinues, militias, garrison and ...
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This chapter analyses the development of military and fiscal institutions in England and the Netherlands. Their armies were composed of different mixtures of noble retinues, militias, garrison and artillery forces, mercenaries, auxiliaries, and standing companies; their navies likewise a blend of converted merchant ships and purpose-built warships. It was England that developed the more permanent navy in this period, the Netherlands the more permanent army. Their arsenals, navies, and logistics showed some signs of increasing bureaucracy. War drove on fiscal expansion and demesne revenues, taxation, coinage debasement, and borrowing were all exploited as rulers sought to construct a tax state. The process involved tense negotiation with their subjects in representative institutions, and rebellions and showed clear limits to the growth of state power.Less
This chapter analyses the development of military and fiscal institutions in England and the Netherlands. Their armies were composed of different mixtures of noble retinues, militias, garrison and artillery forces, mercenaries, auxiliaries, and standing companies; their navies likewise a blend of converted merchant ships and purpose-built warships. It was England that developed the more permanent navy in this period, the Netherlands the more permanent army. Their arsenals, navies, and logistics showed some signs of increasing bureaucracy. War drove on fiscal expansion and demesne revenues, taxation, coinage debasement, and borrowing were all exploited as rulers sought to construct a tax state. The process involved tense negotiation with their subjects in representative institutions, and rebellions and showed clear limits to the growth of state power.
Steven Gunn, David Grummitt, and Hans Cools
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199207503
- eISBN:
- 9780191708848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207503.003.010
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History
This chapter examines the resources deployed by the nobility in their participation in warfare. In England, their recruitment of troops became less important over time as retinues raised from their ...
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This chapter examines the resources deployed by the nobility in their participation in warfare. In England, their recruitment of troops became less important over time as retinues raised from their estate tenants and household servants were superseded by drafts from the county militias. In the Netherlands, great nobles led bandes d'ordonnance, permanently waged by the prince but staffed by the captain's clients and other contingents animated by their local influence. Generals there also cultivated entrepreneurs able to raise mercenaries beyond the borders of the Netherlands. Noblemen's private arsenals were better stocked with artillery in the Netherlands than in England, and their private fortifications better maintained and modernized. The English, however, were more likely to own ships that could be turned to war or privateering.Less
This chapter examines the resources deployed by the nobility in their participation in warfare. In England, their recruitment of troops became less important over time as retinues raised from their estate tenants and household servants were superseded by drafts from the county militias. In the Netherlands, great nobles led bandes d'ordonnance, permanently waged by the prince but staffed by the captain's clients and other contingents animated by their local influence. Generals there also cultivated entrepreneurs able to raise mercenaries beyond the borders of the Netherlands. Noblemen's private arsenals were better stocked with artillery in the Netherlands than in England, and their private fortifications better maintained and modernized. The English, however, were more likely to own ships that could be turned to war or privateering.
Stephen Ruzicka
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199766628
- eISBN:
- 9780199932719
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0011
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Asian and Middle Eastern History: BCE to 500CE, World History: BCE to 500CE
Since the Persian expeditionary army's withdrawal from Egypt in 388/7, Egyptian kings—Acoris and then Nectanebo—had been attending to Egyptian defenses, constructing fortified camps on the eastern ...
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Since the Persian expeditionary army's withdrawal from Egypt in 388/7, Egyptian kings—Acoris and then Nectanebo—had been attending to Egyptian defenses, constructing fortified camps on the eastern and western frontiers, fortifying entries to the various Nile branches, and even adding fortification walls to many temples. They also hired Greek mercenaries in great numbers. Persians secured the middle territory with a Greek force under Athenian condottiere Iphicrates as early as 379, and subsequently Iphicrates directed Persian preparations, doing so thoroughly with simulated attacks and battles. A second Persian campaign, ready to launch by 373, seemed certain to succeed.Less
Since the Persian expeditionary army's withdrawal from Egypt in 388/7, Egyptian kings—Acoris and then Nectanebo—had been attending to Egyptian defenses, constructing fortified camps on the eastern and western frontiers, fortifying entries to the various Nile branches, and even adding fortification walls to many temples. They also hired Greek mercenaries in great numbers. Persians secured the middle territory with a Greek force under Athenian condottiere Iphicrates as early as 379, and subsequently Iphicrates directed Persian preparations, doing so thoroughly with simulated attacks and battles. A second Persian campaign, ready to launch by 373, seemed certain to succeed.
Stephen Ruzicka
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199766628
- eISBN:
- 9780199932719
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0012
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Asian and Middle Eastern History: BCE to 500CE, World History: BCE to 500CE
We have enough information to reconstruct the second fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt. As planned, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates ferried mercenary troops beyond the Pelusiac branch to the mouth of ...
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We have enough information to reconstruct the second fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt. As planned, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates ferried mercenary troops beyond the Pelusiac branch to the mouth of the Mendesian branch and after amphibious landings seized the Egyptian fortress there. Wishing to secure this base and transport the whole of the Persian force to it before advancing, Pharnabazus rejected Iphicrates’ insistent demands that he be allowed to make a quick attack upriver on Memphis. Continuing landings by Persian forces met stiff Egyptian opposition, but it was the Etesian winds in combination with rising floodwaters which made further landings impossible and compelled Pharnabazus and Iphicrates to withdraw back to the initial camp east of Pelusium. Continuing friction between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates prompted Iphicrates to abandon the campaign and flee to Athens. Lacking an effective commander for the all-important Greek mercenaries, Pharnabazus had no choice but to terminate the whole campaign—just a few months after it began.Less
We have enough information to reconstruct the second fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt. As planned, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates ferried mercenary troops beyond the Pelusiac branch to the mouth of the Mendesian branch and after amphibious landings seized the Egyptian fortress there. Wishing to secure this base and transport the whole of the Persian force to it before advancing, Pharnabazus rejected Iphicrates’ insistent demands that he be allowed to make a quick attack upriver on Memphis. Continuing landings by Persian forces met stiff Egyptian opposition, but it was the Etesian winds in combination with rising floodwaters which made further landings impossible and compelled Pharnabazus and Iphicrates to withdraw back to the initial camp east of Pelusium. Continuing friction between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates prompted Iphicrates to abandon the campaign and flee to Athens. Lacking an effective commander for the all-important Greek mercenaries, Pharnabazus had no choice but to terminate the whole campaign—just a few months after it began.
Stephen Ruzicka
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199766628
- eISBN:
- 9780199932719
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766628.003.0017
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Asian and Middle Eastern History: BCE to 500CE, World History: BCE to 500CE
Ochus (as Artaxerxes III) succeeded Artaxerxes II in still disputed circumstances. He sought to exterminate all remaining potential rivals, including many brothers and other relatives, most notably ...
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Ochus (as Artaxerxes III) succeeded Artaxerxes II in still disputed circumstances. He sought to exterminate all remaining potential rivals, including many brothers and other relatives, most notably Artabazus, offspring of Pharnabazus and a daughter of Artaxerxes II and presently satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. It took until 353, when Artabazus fled to Macedonia. Artaxerxes III then prepared and led a new campaign against Egypt. No certain details survive about this campaign beyond its failure. It is possible that the loss of many troops to the quicksand region known as “the Pits,” which Diodorus connects with Artaxerxes’ next campaign, actually took place at this time and contributed to Persian failure.Less
Ochus (as Artaxerxes III) succeeded Artaxerxes II in still disputed circumstances. He sought to exterminate all remaining potential rivals, including many brothers and other relatives, most notably Artabazus, offspring of Pharnabazus and a daughter of Artaxerxes II and presently satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. It took until 353, when Artabazus fled to Macedonia. Artaxerxes III then prepared and led a new campaign against Egypt. No certain details survive about this campaign beyond its failure. It is possible that the loss of many troops to the quicksand region known as “the Pits,” which Diodorus connects with Artaxerxes’ next campaign, actually took place at this time and contributed to Persian failure.
Simpson Erik
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748636440
- eISBN:
- 9780748651603
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748636440.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
This introductory chapter discusses the mercenary, who is described as a foreign fighter. It presents an alternative central point for Atlantic studies on the mercenary and defines mercenary action. ...
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This introductory chapter discusses the mercenary, who is described as a foreign fighter. It presents an alternative central point for Atlantic studies on the mercenary and defines mercenary action. The chapter studies mercenary marriages and their consequences, which became standard themes of dramas and novels during the eighteenth century. It ends with a discussion of mercenary writing, which includes a violation of independent security.Less
This introductory chapter discusses the mercenary, who is described as a foreign fighter. It presents an alternative central point for Atlantic studies on the mercenary and defines mercenary action. The chapter studies mercenary marriages and their consequences, which became standard themes of dramas and novels during the eighteenth century. It ends with a discussion of mercenary writing, which includes a violation of independent security.
