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Emergence in Mind

Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (eds)

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199583621
eISBN:
9780191723483
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

There have long been controversies about how it is that minds can fit into a physical universe. Emergence in Mind presents new essays by a group of philosophers investigating whether mental ... More


Descartes' Revenge Part II: The Supervenience Argument Strikes Back

Neal Judisch

in The Waning of Materialism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199556182
eISBN:
9780191721014
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The most compelling reason to accept materialism in the philosophy of mind derives from our common commitment to mental causation: inasmuch as mental phenomena are causally efficacious, and inasmuch ... More


Brains

Eric T. Olson

in What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780195176421
eISBN:
9780199872008
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers the view that we are literally brains. It argues that the view is best supported by the claim that brains are the primary subjects of mental properties, giving a ... More


The Self‐Consciousness Argument: Functionalism and the Corruption of Content

George Bealer

in The Waning of Materialism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199556182
eISBN:
9780191721014
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter targets functionalism as the most cogent form of contemporary materialism. In particular, it takes aim at ‘ontic’ or reductive functionalism: a theory that attempts to specify the ... More


Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism? The Argument from Mental Causation

Timothy O'Connor and John Ross Churchill

in The Waning of Materialism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199556182
eISBN:
9780191721014
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents a version of the causal exclusion challenge to non-reductive physicalism, one that is explicitly directed at non-reductive physicalists who adopt an ontology of causal powers. ... More


Dualizing Materialism

Michael Jubien

in The Waning of Materialism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199556182
eISBN:
9780191721014
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter suggests that if we take materialism simply to be the doctrine that human beings are entirely material entities, then a certain version of ‘property dualism’ is fully compatible with ... More


HOW THE EXISTENCE OF GOD EXPLAINS THE EXISTENCE OF HUMANS

Richard Swinburne

in Is There a God?

Published in print:
1996
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780198235446
eISBN:
9780191705618
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Each human being consists of two parts: an immaterial soul (the essential part) and a body. Souls have mental properties (sensations, thoughts, purposes, etc.) while bodies have physical properties ... More


The Psychophysical Nexus

Thomas Nagel

in New Essays on the A Priori

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241279
eISBN:
9780191597107
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241279.003.0018
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Thomas Nagel investigates the status of a priori knowledge in the context of the mind‐body problem. A priori reflection on the concepts of mental and physical properties seems to show that mental ... More


Personal Dualism

Paul M. Pietroski

in Causing Actions

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199252763
eISBN:
9780191598234
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199252769.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We can and should preserve certain Cartesian intuitions—e.g. that people are distinct from their bodies, and that at least many of our mental events are distinct from any biochemical events—while ... More


Substances

Richard Swinburne

in The Christian God

Published in print:
1994
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198235125
eISBN:
9780191598579
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198235127.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

A substance is a concrete individual thing that exists all at once. Although the world can be cut up into substances in different ways, any full description of the world will include both material ... More


Introduction

Richard Swinburne

in The Evolution of the Soul

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198236986
eISBN:
9780191598593
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198236980.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Technical terms to be used in this book are introduced – substance, property, event, material object, mental property, physical property. Three views on the mind/body problem are distinguished – hard ... More


Sensations

Richard Swinburne

in The Evolution of the Soul

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198236986
eISBN:
9780191598593
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198236980.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Mental events consist in the instantiation of mental properties. Part 1 of this book (Chs. 2–7) analyses the different kinds of mental event that occur in humans and animals. This chapter analyses ... More


The Nonreductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation

Jaegwon Kim

in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262026215
eISBN:
9780262268011
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262026215.003.0028
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

This chapter describes the theory of a bifurcated world that consists of two metaphysically independent spheres existing side by side. Associated with each domain is a distinct family of properties, ... More


Power for the Mental as Such

David Robb

in Causal Powers

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
May 2017
ISBN:
9780198796572
eISBN:
9780191837838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198796572.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

An adequate solution to the problem of mental causation should deliver not just the efficacy of mental properties, but the efficacy of mental properties as such, of mentality in its own right. But ... More


Must Functionalists Be Aristotelians?

Robert C. Koons and Alexander Pruss

in Causal Powers

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
May 2017
ISBN:
9780198796572
eISBN:
9780191837838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198796572.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Functionalism in the theory of mind requires an account of function that has a normative component—mere conditional connection (whether indicative or sub-junctive) is not enough. For instance, a ... More


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