Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149608
- eISBN:
- 9781400846337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149608.003.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Development
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the emergence of a neuromolecular vision of the brain. This means a new scale at which the brain and nervous system was conceptualized, and a new way ...
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This introductory chapter provides an overview of the emergence of a neuromolecular vision of the brain. This means a new scale at which the brain and nervous system was conceptualized, and a new way in which their activities were understood. At this molecular level, the structure and processes of the brain and central nervous system were made understandable as material processes of interaction among molecules in neurons and the synapses between them. These were conceived in terms of the biophysical, chemical, and electrical properties of their constituent parts. At this scale, in a profoundly reductionist approach, despite the recognition that there was much that could not yet be explained, there seemed nothing mysterious about the operations of the nervous system. Indeed, mental processes—cognition, emotion, volition—could be explained in entirely material ways, as the outcome of biological processes in the brain.Less
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the emergence of a neuromolecular vision of the brain. This means a new scale at which the brain and nervous system was conceptualized, and a new way in which their activities were understood. At this molecular level, the structure and processes of the brain and central nervous system were made understandable as material processes of interaction among molecules in neurons and the synapses between them. These were conceived in terms of the biophysical, chemical, and electrical properties of their constituent parts. At this scale, in a profoundly reductionist approach, despite the recognition that there was much that could not yet be explained, there seemed nothing mysterious about the operations of the nervous system. Indeed, mental processes—cognition, emotion, volition—could be explained in entirely material ways, as the outcome of biological processes in the brain.
Jan De Houwer and Agnes Moors
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199753628
- eISBN:
- 9780199950027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753628.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
Research on implicit processes has become increasingly popular during the past two decades. Nevertheless, relatively little attention has been given to clarifying the meaning of the concept implicit. ...
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Research on implicit processes has become increasingly popular during the past two decades. Nevertheless, relatively little attention has been given to clarifying the meaning of the concept implicit. This chapter proposes that implicit processes are processes that possess features of automaticity. Because different automaticity features do not necessarily co-occur, the chapter recommends specifying the automaticity features one has in mind when using the term “implicit.” An overview is provided of the definitions of the various automaticity features that are used in the cognitive decompositional approach of automaticity. Because it is difficult to diagnose the cognitive automaticity features of mental processes, the chapter explores for the first time a functional decompositional approach to automaticity in which automaticity features are defined in nonmental terms and used to describe effects. The chapter ends with discussion of implications of the analysis for research on the role of implicit processes in scientific behavior.Less
Research on implicit processes has become increasingly popular during the past two decades. Nevertheless, relatively little attention has been given to clarifying the meaning of the concept implicit. This chapter proposes that implicit processes are processes that possess features of automaticity. Because different automaticity features do not necessarily co-occur, the chapter recommends specifying the automaticity features one has in mind when using the term “implicit.” An overview is provided of the definitions of the various automaticity features that are used in the cognitive decompositional approach of automaticity. Because it is difficult to diagnose the cognitive automaticity features of mental processes, the chapter explores for the first time a functional decompositional approach to automaticity in which automaticity features are defined in nonmental terms and used to describe effects. The chapter ends with discussion of implications of the analysis for research on the role of implicit processes in scientific behavior.
Eric T. Olson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176421
- eISBN:
- 9780199872008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers the view that we are literally brains. It argues that the view is best supported by the claim that brains are the primary subjects of mental properties, giving a ...
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This chapter considers the view that we are literally brains. It argues that the view is best supported by the claim that brains are the primary subjects of mental properties, giving a “thinking‐brain problem” analogous to the thinking‐animal problem that supports animalism. The brain view is shown to have implausible consequences about our identity through time, and to presuppose that something is a part of a thinking being if and only if it is directly involved in that being's mental processes. It is then argued that the notion of direct involvement is too interest‐relative to give this principle any useful content, and that the principle is in any case unfounded.Less
This chapter considers the view that we are literally brains. It argues that the view is best supported by the claim that brains are the primary subjects of mental properties, giving a “thinking‐brain problem” analogous to the thinking‐animal problem that supports animalism. The brain view is shown to have implausible consequences about our identity through time, and to presuppose that something is a part of a thinking being if and only if it is directly involved in that being's mental processes. It is then argued that the notion of direct involvement is too interest‐relative to give this principle any useful content, and that the principle is in any case unfounded.
Brian O'Shaughnessy
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256723
- eISBN:
- 9780191598135
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256721.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Are there some mental phenomena for which insight is necessarily inexistent? The Freudian ‘Id’, and Schopenhauerian ‘Will’, have been joined in latter days by certain cerebral phenomena, all of which ...
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Are there some mental phenomena for which insight is necessarily inexistent? The Freudian ‘Id’, and Schopenhauerian ‘Will’, have been joined in latter days by certain cerebral phenomena, all of which have been claimed to be both necessarily inaccessible and mental. General principles of insight are sought whereby we may assess such claims. The main truth emerging is that all known mental phenomenal types are normally immediately insightable in states of proper waking consciousness, and that the only phenomenon that defies the rule is constituted out of insightables. While many mental causal relations are naturally and even necessarily inaccessible, it seems unlikely that any mental phenomenal processes could be. As a test case, the formation of the visual experience is investigated, to discover whether it includes such a mental process. No evidence for such is encountered. All mental processes seem in principle to be accessible to their owner, whether immediately qua experience or inferentially through their constituting state. The conditional‐Cartesian thesis seems intact.Less
Are there some mental phenomena for which insight is necessarily inexistent? The Freudian ‘Id’, and Schopenhauerian ‘Will’, have been joined in latter days by certain cerebral phenomena, all of which have been claimed to be both necessarily inaccessible and mental. General principles of insight are sought whereby we may assess such claims. The main truth emerging is that all known mental phenomenal types are normally immediately insightable in states of proper waking consciousness, and that the only phenomenon that defies the rule is constituted out of insightables. While many mental causal relations are naturally and even necessarily inaccessible, it seems unlikely that any mental phenomenal processes could be. As a test case, the formation of the visual experience is investigated, to discover whether it includes such a mental process. No evidence for such is encountered. All mental processes seem in principle to be accessible to their owner, whether immediately qua experience or inferentially through their constituting state. The conditional‐Cartesian thesis seems intact.
Paull Nunez
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195340716
- eISBN:
- 9780199776269
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340716.003.0003
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Development
This chapter focuses on the interrelated roles of intuition, hunches, common sense, and the unconscious. It presents several examples from both science and folk psychology, some consisting of the ...
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This chapter focuses on the interrelated roles of intuition, hunches, common sense, and the unconscious. It presents several examples from both science and folk psychology, some consisting of the author's personal social experiences and their implied lessons. These experiences also provide metaphors demonstrating challenges to common assumptions, including the perceived unity of consciousness and the widely assumed confinement of consciousness to brain boundaries.Less
This chapter focuses on the interrelated roles of intuition, hunches, common sense, and the unconscious. It presents several examples from both science and folk psychology, some consisting of the author's personal social experiences and their implied lessons. These experiences also provide metaphors demonstrating challenges to common assumptions, including the perceived unity of consciousness and the widely assumed confinement of consciousness to brain boundaries.
Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195377798
- eISBN:
- 9780199864522
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377798.003.0018
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Clinical Psychology
Building on the pioneering work of Bowlby on attachment theory, social psychological researchers have broadened the original focus of the theory to include more of an emphasis on adult relationships. ...
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Building on the pioneering work of Bowlby on attachment theory, social psychological researchers have broadened the original focus of the theory to include more of an emphasis on adult relationships. In this chapter, the authors describe the reciprocal association between mental processes and behavior within attachment theory. Just as mental states of an individual guide behavioral enactment toward others, behaviors often give rise to changes in mental processes. The authors review Bowlby's notion of behavioral system, including its evolutionary roots and biological function. They also describe both normative features of the attachment system and individual differences in the functioning of the system that arise in response to exposure to differing experiences with others. The authors argue that relational experience can be characterized as a chain of mental states and observable behaviors, linked with reciprocal causal arrows. Viewed in this way, behavior can be seen as a vehicle between motivational states.Less
Building on the pioneering work of Bowlby on attachment theory, social psychological researchers have broadened the original focus of the theory to include more of an emphasis on adult relationships. In this chapter, the authors describe the reciprocal association between mental processes and behavior within attachment theory. Just as mental states of an individual guide behavioral enactment toward others, behaviors often give rise to changes in mental processes. The authors review Bowlby's notion of behavioral system, including its evolutionary roots and biological function. They also describe both normative features of the attachment system and individual differences in the functioning of the system that arise in response to exposure to differing experiences with others. The authors argue that relational experience can be characterized as a chain of mental states and observable behaviors, linked with reciprocal causal arrows. Viewed in this way, behavior can be seen as a vehicle between motivational states.
Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198528272
- eISBN:
- 9780191689529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about animal rationality and mental processing in animals. This book discusses the ...
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This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about animal rationality and mental processing in animals. This book discusses the theoretical issues and distinctions that bear on attributions of rationality to animals and draws some contrasts between rationality and certain other traits of animals to determine the relationships between them. It explores the relations between behaviour and the processes that explain behaviour, and the senses in which animal behaviour might be rational in virtue of features other than classical reasoning processes on the human model.Less
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about animal rationality and mental processing in animals. This book discusses the theoretical issues and distinctions that bear on attributions of rationality to animals and draws some contrasts between rationality and certain other traits of animals to determine the relationships between them. It explores the relations between behaviour and the processes that explain behaviour, and the senses in which animal behaviour might be rational in virtue of features other than classical reasoning processes on the human model.
R. Duncan Luce
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195070019
- eISBN:
- 9780199869879
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195070019.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures
This chapter discusses simple reaction times, focusing on one of the main difficulties in these experiments: what one observes is not only the time spent carrying out the mental processes involved in ...
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This chapter discusses simple reaction times, focusing on one of the main difficulties in these experiments: what one observes is not only the time spent carrying out the mental processes involved in apprehending the signal, but also all of the times it takes to provide information about the nervous system and to affect a response. These often constitute a major fraction of the observed time and serve only to mask the decision process, which is the subject of all the models considered. Topics covered include independent, additive latencies; specific assumptions; and manipulation of stages.Less
This chapter discusses simple reaction times, focusing on one of the main difficulties in these experiments: what one observes is not only the time spent carrying out the mental processes involved in apprehending the signal, but also all of the times it takes to provide information about the nervous system and to affect a response. These often constitute a major fraction of the observed time and serve only to mask the decision process, which is the subject of all the models considered. Topics covered include independent, additive latencies; specific assumptions; and manipulation of stages.
Deborah Talmi and Chris D. Frith
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195381641
- eISBN:
- 9780199864911
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter reinterprets Libet's results in light of a distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 mental processing. It uses this framework to explain why we have a conscious experience of our own free ...
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This chapter reinterprets Libet's results in light of a distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 mental processing. It uses this framework to explain why we have a conscious experience of our own free will, and discusses potential moral consequences of seeing apparent free will as an illusion.Less
This chapter reinterprets Libet's results in light of a distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 mental processing. It uses this framework to explain why we have a conscious experience of our own free will, and discusses potential moral consequences of seeing apparent free will as an illusion.
Mark Rowlands
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014557
- eISBN:
- 9780262289733
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014557.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively “in the head.” Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science ...
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There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively “in the head.” Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science of the mind. This book investigates the conceptual foundations of this new science of the mind. The new way of thinking about the mind emphasizes the ways in which mental processes are embodied (made up partly of extraneural bodily structures and processes), embedded (designed to function in tandem with the environment), enacted (constituted in part by action), and extended (located in the environment). The new way of thinking about the mind, the book states, is actually an old way of thinking that has taken on a new form. It describes a conception of mind that had its clearest expression in phenomenology — in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. The book builds on these views; clarifies and renders consistent the ideas of the embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended mind; and develops a unified philosophical treatment of the novel conception of the mind that underlies the new science of the mind.Less
There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively “in the head.” Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science of the mind. This book investigates the conceptual foundations of this new science of the mind. The new way of thinking about the mind emphasizes the ways in which mental processes are embodied (made up partly of extraneural bodily structures and processes), embedded (designed to function in tandem with the environment), enacted (constituted in part by action), and extended (located in the environment). The new way of thinking about the mind, the book states, is actually an old way of thinking that has taken on a new form. It describes a conception of mind that had its clearest expression in phenomenology — in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. The book builds on these views; clarifies and renders consistent the ideas of the embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended mind; and develops a unified philosophical treatment of the novel conception of the mind that underlies the new science of the mind.
Christian Collet and Aymeric Guillot
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199546251
- eISBN:
- 9780191701412
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546251.003.0007
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Sensory and Motor Systems
This chapter explores the experimental studies investigating motor imagery through the recording of autonomic nervous system activity. It ...
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This chapter explores the experimental studies investigating motor imagery through the recording of autonomic nervous system activity. It outlines the goals and methods of such peripheral recordings in studying mental processes. It also discusses how the motor commands sent to the autonomic effectors are facilitated during motor imagery, whereas the direct voluntary commands transmitted through the pyramidal tract are at least partially inhibited.Less
This chapter explores the experimental studies investigating motor imagery through the recording of autonomic nervous system activity. It outlines the goals and methods of such peripheral recordings in studying mental processes. It also discusses how the motor commands sent to the autonomic effectors are facilitated during motor imagery, whereas the direct voluntary commands transmitted through the pyramidal tract are at least partially inhibited.
Ariane Bazan
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199231447
- eISBN:
- 9780191696510
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231447.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter compares the psychoanalytical and sensorimotor control theories of action and the psychodynamic and sensorimotor models of mental functioning. It examines Sigmund Freud's concept of ...
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This chapter compares the psychoanalytical and sensorimotor control theories of action and the psychodynamic and sensorimotor models of mental functioning. It examines Sigmund Freud's concept of ‘indication of reality’, which he used to characterize the function of the secondary process of mental processing, and suggests that this concept parallels the modern notion of ‘efference copy’. This chapter suggests that Freud's model of secondary process functioning has an inhibiting effect on primary processes.Less
This chapter compares the psychoanalytical and sensorimotor control theories of action and the psychodynamic and sensorimotor models of mental functioning. It examines Sigmund Freud's concept of ‘indication of reality’, which he used to characterize the function of the secondary process of mental processing, and suggests that this concept parallels the modern notion of ‘efference copy’. This chapter suggests that Freud's model of secondary process functioning has an inhibiting effect on primary processes.
Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027908
- eISBN:
- 9780262320320
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027908.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the “meaning” of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questions about what concepts are, what form they ...
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In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the “meaning” of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questions about what concepts are, what form they take in mental processes, and how they connect to the world they are about. This book reviews some of the proposals put forward to answer these questions and find that none of them is remotely defensible. The text determines that all of these proposals share a commitment to a two-factor theory of conceptual content, which holds that the content of a concept consists of its sense together with its reference. It argues instead that there is no conclusive case against the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference as their sole semantic property. Such a theory, if correct, would provide for the naturalistic account of content that cognitive science lacks—and badly needs. The book offers a sketch of how this theory might be developed into an account of perceptual reference that is broadly compatible with empirical findings and with the view that the mental processes effecting perceptual reference are largely preconceptual, modular, and encapsulated.Less
In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the “meaning” of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questions about what concepts are, what form they take in mental processes, and how they connect to the world they are about. This book reviews some of the proposals put forward to answer these questions and find that none of them is remotely defensible. The text determines that all of these proposals share a commitment to a two-factor theory of conceptual content, which holds that the content of a concept consists of its sense together with its reference. It argues instead that there is no conclusive case against the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference as their sole semantic property. Such a theory, if correct, would provide for the naturalistic account of content that cognitive science lacks—and badly needs. The book offers a sketch of how this theory might be developed into an account of perceptual reference that is broadly compatible with empirical findings and with the view that the mental processes effecting perceptual reference are largely preconceptual, modular, and encapsulated.
Willem J.M. Levelt
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199653669
- eISBN:
- 9780191742040
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653669.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter studies experimental and speech error approaches to normal adults' production and perception of language. It introduces the concepts of ‘mental chronometry’ and ‘mental processing speed’ ...
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This chapter studies experimental and speech error approaches to normal adults' production and perception of language. It introduces the concepts of ‘mental chronometry’ and ‘mental processing speed’ and studies experimental and phonetic approaches to the production and perception of verbal materials. It then examines the initial experimental studies of verbal memory, association, and analogy. It also explores the first process model of speaking, which is based on the analysis of spontaneous speech errors. This chapter includes a discussion of the nineteenth-century beginnings of experimentation and research into speech error and the psychology of language and speech.Less
This chapter studies experimental and speech error approaches to normal adults' production and perception of language. It introduces the concepts of ‘mental chronometry’ and ‘mental processing speed’ and studies experimental and phonetic approaches to the production and perception of verbal materials. It then examines the initial experimental studies of verbal memory, association, and analogy. It also explores the first process model of speaking, which is based on the analysis of spontaneous speech errors. This chapter includes a discussion of the nineteenth-century beginnings of experimentation and research into speech error and the psychology of language and speech.
Mark Rowlands
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014557
- eISBN:
- 9780262289733
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014557.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses a new way of thinking about the mind that will bring forth a new “science of the mind.” This new way of thinking is not exactly “new;” it is an old way of thinking that has ...
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This chapter discusses a new way of thinking about the mind that will bring forth a new “science of the mind.” This new way of thinking is not exactly “new;” it is an old way of thinking that has evolved and taken on a new form. The steady rise of its credibility is due to the fact that it emerges from a convergence of various disciplines in cognitive science, namely, situated robotics and artificial intelligence, perceptual psychology, dynamical approaches to developmental and cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. The new science of the mind will employ different methods for studying the mind, and will supply explanations of mental processes that are reasonably different from traditional accounts.Less
This chapter discusses a new way of thinking about the mind that will bring forth a new “science of the mind.” This new way of thinking is not exactly “new;” it is an old way of thinking that has evolved and taken on a new form. The steady rise of its credibility is due to the fact that it emerges from a convergence of various disciplines in cognitive science, namely, situated robotics and artificial intelligence, perceptual psychology, dynamical approaches to developmental and cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. The new science of the mind will employ different methods for studying the mind, and will supply explanations of mental processes that are reasonably different from traditional accounts.
John A. Bargh
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195307696
- eISBN:
- 9780199847488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307696.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Action tendencies can be activated and put into motion without the need for the individual's conscious intervention; even complex social behavior can unfold without an act of will or awareness of its ...
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Action tendencies can be activated and put into motion without the need for the individual's conscious intervention; even complex social behavior can unfold without an act of will or awareness of its sources. Behavioral evidence from patients with frontal lobe lesions, behavior and goal-priming studies in social psychology, the dissociated behavior of deeply hypnotized subjects, findings from the study of human brain evolution, cognitive neuroscience studies of the structure and function of the frontal lobes as well as the separate actional and semantic visual pathways, cognitive psychological research on the components of working memory and on the degree of conscious access to motoric behavior—all of these converge on the conclusion that complex behavior and other higher mental processes can proceed independently of the conscious will. Indeed, the brain evolution and neuropsychological evidence suggests that the human brain is designed for such independence. This chapter compares and contrasts lines of research relevant to the nonconscious control of individual social behavior—that is, behavior induced to occur by environmental factors and not by the individual's conscious awareness and intentions.Less
Action tendencies can be activated and put into motion without the need for the individual's conscious intervention; even complex social behavior can unfold without an act of will or awareness of its sources. Behavioral evidence from patients with frontal lobe lesions, behavior and goal-priming studies in social psychology, the dissociated behavior of deeply hypnotized subjects, findings from the study of human brain evolution, cognitive neuroscience studies of the structure and function of the frontal lobes as well as the separate actional and semantic visual pathways, cognitive psychological research on the components of working memory and on the degree of conscious access to motoric behavior—all of these converge on the conclusion that complex behavior and other higher mental processes can proceed independently of the conscious will. Indeed, the brain evolution and neuropsychological evidence suggests that the human brain is designed for such independence. This chapter compares and contrasts lines of research relevant to the nonconscious control of individual social behavior—that is, behavior induced to occur by environmental factors and not by the individual's conscious awareness and intentions.
Eric Ruthruff and Harold Pashler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199563456
- eISBN:
- 9780191701863
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563456.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter evaluates the mental time estimation hypothesis which proposes that timing might be subject to a discrete central attentional bottleneck and timing cannot take place until certain ...
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This chapter evaluates the mental time estimation hypothesis which proposes that timing might be subject to a discrete central attentional bottleneck and timing cannot take place until certain operations have finished. The chapter reviews the evidence for a central attentional bottleneck and discusses its relevance to the study of timing under conditions of divided attention. The findings refute the suggestion that timing is wholly subject to the same discrete central bottleneck as other types of effortful mental processes.Less
This chapter evaluates the mental time estimation hypothesis which proposes that timing might be subject to a discrete central attentional bottleneck and timing cannot take place until certain operations have finished. The chapter reviews the evidence for a central attentional bottleneck and discusses its relevance to the study of timing under conditions of divided attention. The findings refute the suggestion that timing is wholly subject to the same discrete central bottleneck as other types of effortful mental processes.
Daniel M. Wegner (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262534925
- eISBN:
- 9780262344876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262534925.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter talks about how the experience of will could be a result of the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality more generally—this can be referred to as the theory ...
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This chapter talks about how the experience of will could be a result of the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality more generally—this can be referred to as the theory of apparent mental causation. This means that people experience conscious will quite independently of any actual causal connection between their thoughts and their actions. Reductions in the impression that there is a link between thought and action may explain why people get a sense of involuntariness even for actions that are voluntary. Whereas inflated perceptions of the link between thought and action may, in turn, explain why people experience an illusion of conscious will at all.Less
This chapter talks about how the experience of will could be a result of the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality more generally—this can be referred to as the theory of apparent mental causation. This means that people experience conscious will quite independently of any actual causal connection between their thoughts and their actions. Reductions in the impression that there is a link between thought and action may explain why people get a sense of involuntariness even for actions that are voluntary. Whereas inflated perceptions of the link between thought and action may, in turn, explain why people experience an illusion of conscious will at all.
Henry Sidgwick
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250234
- eISBN:
- 9780191598432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250231.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Here Sidgwick examines the nature of unreasonable action, that is, action (or inaction) that is contrary to reason or the subjective practical judgment of the agent. He undertakes his discussion from ...
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Here Sidgwick examines the nature of unreasonable action, that is, action (or inaction) that is contrary to reason or the subjective practical judgment of the agent. He undertakes his discussion from a psychological as opposed to an ethical standpoint, seeking to pin down the nature of the mental process involved in unreasonable action by a sane person in apparently normal conditions. Sidgwick notes that, on the one hand, an action may oppose the individual's moral sentiment without being unreasonable, and, on the other hand, it may be unreasonable and yet align with her moral sentiments about what ought to be done.Less
Here Sidgwick examines the nature of unreasonable action, that is, action (or inaction) that is contrary to reason or the subjective practical judgment of the agent. He undertakes his discussion from a psychological as opposed to an ethical standpoint, seeking to pin down the nature of the mental process involved in unreasonable action by a sane person in apparently normal conditions. Sidgwick notes that, on the one hand, an action may oppose the individual's moral sentiment without being unreasonable, and, on the other hand, it may be unreasonable and yet align with her moral sentiments about what ought to be done.
Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198528272
- eISBN:
- 9780191689529
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today — how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans? It addresses the ...
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This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today — how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans? It addresses the question of whether and to what extent any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. Three key questions recur throughout the book: What kinds of behavioural tasks can animals successfully perform? What, if any, mental processes must be postulated to explain their performance at these tasks? What properties must processes have to count as rational? The book pursues these questions in relation to primates, birds and dolphins. Some chapters focus on a particular species. They describe some of the extraordinary and complex behaviour of these species — using tools to solve foraging problems, for example, or behaving in novel ways to solve complex social problems — and ask whether such behaviour should be explained in rational or merely mechanistic terms. Other chapters address more theoretical issues and ask, for example, what it means for behaviour to be rational, and whether rationality can be understood in the absence of language. The book features empirical work on rationality in primates, dolphins, and birds. The book includes an editors' introduction, which summarizes the philosophical and empirical work presented, and draws together the issues discussed by the contributors.Less
This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today — how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans? It addresses the question of whether and to what extent any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. Three key questions recur throughout the book: What kinds of behavioural tasks can animals successfully perform? What, if any, mental processes must be postulated to explain their performance at these tasks? What properties must processes have to count as rational? The book pursues these questions in relation to primates, birds and dolphins. Some chapters focus on a particular species. They describe some of the extraordinary and complex behaviour of these species — using tools to solve foraging problems, for example, or behaving in novel ways to solve complex social problems — and ask whether such behaviour should be explained in rational or merely mechanistic terms. Other chapters address more theoretical issues and ask, for example, what it means for behaviour to be rational, and whether rationality can be understood in the absence of language. The book features empirical work on rationality in primates, dolphins, and birds. The book includes an editors' introduction, which summarizes the philosophical and empirical work presented, and draws together the issues discussed by the contributors.
