François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567881
- eISBN:
- 9780191722783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter argues that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ...
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This chapter argues that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation are analysed as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. The paper shows that the mental‐file approach provides an answer to the objection from ‘acquaintanceless de re thought’ (to the effect that tokening a singular thought does not require being actually acquainted with the object the thought is about), as well as a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts: if singular thoughts depend upon contextual relations to the objects of thought, how can they be communicated across contexts ? What makes communication possible when the speaker and the addressee do not stand in the same contextual relations to the objects the speaker's thought is about?Less
This chapter argues that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation are analysed as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. The paper shows that the mental‐file approach provides an answer to the objection from ‘acquaintanceless de re thought’ (to the effect that tokening a singular thought does not require being actually acquainted with the object the thought is about), as well as a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts: if singular thoughts depend upon contextual relations to the objects of thought, how can they be communicated across contexts ? What makes communication possible when the speaker and the addressee do not stand in the same contextual relations to the objects the speaker's thought is about?
Robin Jeshion
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567881
- eISBN:
- 9780191722783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
What are the conditions on singular thought and what are the mechanisms of singular thought generation? The reigning view is that singular thinking is limited to objects of acquaintance. The ...
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What are the conditions on singular thought and what are the mechanisms of singular thought generation? The reigning view is that singular thinking is limited to objects of acquaintance. The alternative position, Semantic Instrumentalism, is that singular thoughts can be manufactured at will by manipulating semantics, that is, by introducing, and fixing the reference of a referential term with a description that the object uniquely satisfies. This chapter presents arguements that neither account will do, and offers a new theory, Cognitivism, that remedies certain problems. Like acquaintance views, Cognitivism limits singular thought, but the limitations are not strictly epistemic, but rather, cognitive, associated with the goals, interests, plans, and affective states of the thinker. Like Semantic Instrumentalism, it accounts for how semantics affects the origination of singular thought, while denying that agents control singular thought production. This chapter draws on findings in vision science and object perception to explain how Cognitvism supports a mental file analysis of singular thought, one that is rooted in the interplay between our evolutionarily develped cognitive goals, object perception, and the liguistic and cognitive functions of directly referential terms.Less
What are the conditions on singular thought and what are the mechanisms of singular thought generation? The reigning view is that singular thinking is limited to objects of acquaintance. The alternative position, Semantic Instrumentalism, is that singular thoughts can be manufactured at will by manipulating semantics, that is, by introducing, and fixing the reference of a referential term with a description that the object uniquely satisfies. This chapter presents arguements that neither account will do, and offers a new theory, Cognitivism, that remedies certain problems. Like acquaintance views, Cognitivism limits singular thought, but the limitations are not strictly epistemic, but rather, cognitive, associated with the goals, interests, plans, and affective states of the thinker. Like Semantic Instrumentalism, it accounts for how semantics affects the origination of singular thought, while denying that agents control singular thought production. This chapter draws on findings in vision science and object perception to explain how Cognitvism supports a mental file analysis of singular thought, one that is rooted in the interplay between our evolutionarily develped cognitive goals, object perception, and the liguistic and cognitive functions of directly referential terms.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199590650
- eISBN:
- 9780191741043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
The first part of the paper proposes a positive account of de se intentional content. De se content is individuated by the condition that it refers de jure to the owner of the mental state or event ...
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The first part of the paper proposes a positive account of de se intentional content. De se content is individuated by the condition that it refers de jure to the owner of the mental state or event in whose content it features. There is a corresponding account of the distinctive way in which de se information is updated as time passes. Three degrees of involvement of self-representation in a subject’s conception of the world are distinguished. The second part gives an account of the ontology of subjects, as metaphysically interdependent with conscious mental states and events. Subjects of consciousness are individuated by the identity of the apparatus that integrates information to produce unified conscious states. The theory is applied in critical discussion of the classical views of Hume, Kant, and the early Wittgenstein on the self.Less
The first part of the paper proposes a positive account of de se intentional content. De se content is individuated by the condition that it refers de jure to the owner of the mental state or event in whose content it features. There is a corresponding account of the distinctive way in which de se information is updated as time passes. Three degrees of involvement of self-representation in a subject’s conception of the world are distinguished. The second part gives an account of the ontology of subjects, as metaphysically interdependent with conscious mental states and events. Subjects of consciousness are individuated by the identity of the apparatus that integrates information to produce unified conscious states. The theory is applied in critical discussion of the classical views of Hume, Kant, and the early Wittgenstein on the self.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659982
- eISBN:
- 9780191745409
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
The communication of singular thoughts is said to proceed through a general mechanism: the linguistic evocation of mental files via elements of their content. The issue arises whether that mechanism ...
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The communication of singular thoughts is said to proceed through a general mechanism: the linguistic evocation of mental files via elements of their content. The issue arises whether that mechanism is semantic or pragmatic. In dealing with this issue, the two standard approaches to the referential use of definite descriptions are discussed, and a new, Millian approach put forward.Less
The communication of singular thoughts is said to proceed through a general mechanism: the linguistic evocation of mental files via elements of their content. The issue arises whether that mechanism is semantic or pragmatic. In dealing with this issue, the two standard approaches to the referential use of definite descriptions are discussed, and a new, Millian approach put forward.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659982
- eISBN:
- 9780191745409
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Modes of presentation are needed to deal with ‘Frege cases’. A descriptivist construal of modes of presentation is known to be unsatisfactory in three types of case: cases of reference through ...
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Modes of presentation are needed to deal with ‘Frege cases’. A descriptivist construal of modes of presentation is known to be unsatisfactory in three types of case: cases of reference through perception, through communicative chains, and through indexicals. In all such cases, what is needed are non-descriptive ways of thinking of an object, resting on contextual relations to the object. Such modes of presentation can be construed as mental files in which the subject stores information gained through the contextual relations in question. The reference of the file is the entity which stands in the appropriate contextual relation to the thought (or to the thinker), and the nature of the contextual relation determines the type of file it is.Less
Modes of presentation are needed to deal with ‘Frege cases’. A descriptivist construal of modes of presentation is known to be unsatisfactory in three types of case: cases of reference through perception, through communicative chains, and through indexicals. In all such cases, what is needed are non-descriptive ways of thinking of an object, resting on contextual relations to the object. Such modes of presentation can be construed as mental files in which the subject stores information gained through the contextual relations in question. The reference of the file is the entity which stands in the appropriate contextual relation to the thought (or to the thinker), and the nature of the contextual relation determines the type of file it is.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659982
- eISBN:
- 9780191745409
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to ...
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This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to this book, we refer through mental files, which play the role of so-called ‘modes of presentation’. The reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally; so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis-)information it contains. Files are like singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist semantics. In contrast to other authors, this book offers an indexical model according to which files are typed by their function, which is to store information derived through certain types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits. Even detached files or ‘encyclopedia entries’ are based on epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on this account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are: acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of indexical concepts; co-reference de jureand judgments of identity; cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation; descriptive names and ‘acquaintanceless’ singular thought; the communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and the ‘vicarious’ use of mental files; first-person thinking; token-reflexivity in language and thought.Less
This book attempts to recast the ‘nondescriptivist’ approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth-century in terms of mental files. According to this book, we refer through mental files, which play the role of so-called ‘modes of presentation’. The reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally; so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis-)information it contains. Files are like singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist semantics. In contrast to other authors, this book offers an indexical model according to which files are typed by their function, which is to store information derived through certain types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits. Even detached files or ‘encyclopedia entries’ are based on epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on this account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are: acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of indexical concepts; co-reference de jureand judgments of identity; cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation; descriptive names and ‘acquaintanceless’ singular thought; the communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and the ‘vicarious’ use of mental files; first-person thinking; token-reflexivity in language and thought.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659982
- eISBN:
- 9780191745409
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Objections to the account of slow switching presented in Chapter 10 are discussed. It is conceded that, in certain cases, reference shifts are possible even though a single file is deployed twice. ...
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Objections to the account of slow switching presented in Chapter 10 are discussed. It is conceded that, in certain cases, reference shifts are possible even though a single file is deployed twice. But, it is argued, such failures of epistemic transparency do not threaten the subject's rationality.Less
Objections to the account of slow switching presented in Chapter 10 are discussed. It is conceded that, in certain cases, reference shifts are possible even though a single file is deployed twice. But, it is argued, such failures of epistemic transparency do not threaten the subject's rationality.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659982
- eISBN:
- 9780191745409
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
The chapter is devoted to discussing an objection which Angel Pinillos raised to the mental file account of de jure co-reference. According to the objection, it is possible for A and B, and for B and ...
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The chapter is devoted to discussing an objection which Angel Pinillos raised to the mental file account of de jure co-reference. According to the objection, it is possible for A and B, and for B and C, to be co-referential de jure, even though A and C are not. But if the relation of de jure co-reference rested on the identity of the mental files respectively associated with each of the terms, it should be transitive, since identity is a transitive relation.Less
The chapter is devoted to discussing an objection which Angel Pinillos raised to the mental file account of de jure co-reference. According to the objection, it is possible for A and B, and for B and C, to be co-referential de jure, even though A and C are not. But if the relation of de jure co-reference rested on the identity of the mental files respectively associated with each of the terms, it should be transitive, since identity is a transitive relation.
Manuel García‐Carpintero
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567881
- eISBN:
- 9780191722783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion has developed an ‘acquaintanceless' account of singular thoughts. Her account of singular thoughts is a psychological one, rejecting any epistemic constraint. ...
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In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion has developed an ‘acquaintanceless' account of singular thoughts. Her account of singular thoughts is a psychological one, rejecting any epistemic constraint. Having singular thoughts is a matter of deploying ‘mental files' or ‘dossiers' that play a significant role in the cognitive life of the individual. This chapter elaborates an alternative account that preserves acquaintance, and focuses on aspects of the semantics of fictional reference and discourse. It addresses the behaviour of intuitively empty referential expressions, proper names, indexicals, and referentially used descriptions, mostly in two specific and related sorts of cases: the use of those expressions in speech acts by the creator of the fiction and critical discourse of fictions aimed at getting its content right. The chapter concludes that a certain epistemic, acquaintance‐based account of singular thoughts provides an intuitively satisfactory analysis of those two types of cases.Less
In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion has developed an ‘acquaintanceless' account of singular thoughts. Her account of singular thoughts is a psychological one, rejecting any epistemic constraint. Having singular thoughts is a matter of deploying ‘mental files' or ‘dossiers' that play a significant role in the cognitive life of the individual. This chapter elaborates an alternative account that preserves acquaintance, and focuses on aspects of the semantics of fictional reference and discourse. It addresses the behaviour of intuitively empty referential expressions, proper names, indexicals, and referentially used descriptions, mostly in two specific and related sorts of cases: the use of those expressions in speech acts by the creator of the fiction and critical discourse of fictions aimed at getting its content right. The chapter concludes that a certain epistemic, acquaintance‐based account of singular thoughts provides an intuitively satisfactory analysis of those two types of cases.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199699568
- eISBN:
- 9780191760730
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
First person or de se content features in the nonconceptual content of perception, memory and action-awareness. This de se component is individuated by the rule that it refers, de jure, to the ...
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First person or de se content features in the nonconceptual content of perception, memory and action-awareness. This de se component is individuated by the rule that it refers, de jure, to the subject of any mental event or state in which it occurs. Possession of de se content involves the possession of a subject’s mental file on itself, and an integrating apparatus that operates to generate representations in the subject’s file on itself. The subject’s file on itself has a distinctive updating mechanism as time passes. Three degrees of self-representation are distinguished: subjects who do not self-represent at all; those that employ only the nonconceptual de se; and those that employ the first person concept.Less
First person or de se content features in the nonconceptual content of perception, memory and action-awareness. This de se component is individuated by the rule that it refers, de jure, to the subject of any mental event or state in which it occurs. Possession of de se content involves the possession of a subject’s mental file on itself, and an integrating apparatus that operates to generate representations in the subject’s file on itself. The subject’s file on itself has a distinctive updating mechanism as time passes. Three degrees of self-representation are distinguished: subjects who do not self-represent at all; those that employ only the nonconceptual de se; and those that employ the first person concept.
Emar Maier
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198713265
- eISBN:
- 9780191781711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant-neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me ...
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The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant-neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. When we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. This chapter proposes a concrete model of communication as the transmission of information from the speaker’s mental state to the hearer’s. The analysis is couched in Discourse Representation Theory, a formal semantic framework that linguists use for modeling conversational common ground updates, but that can also be applied to describe the individual speech participants’ dynamically changing mental states.Less
The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant-neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. When we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. This chapter proposes a concrete model of communication as the transmission of information from the speaker’s mental state to the hearer’s. The analysis is couched in Discourse Representation Theory, a formal semantic framework that linguists use for modeling conversational common ground updates, but that can also be applied to describe the individual speech participants’ dynamically changing mental states.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198714217
- eISBN:
- 9780191782626
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0011
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This chapter offers an elaboration and defense of the mental-file approach to singular thought. Mental files are supposed to account for both cognitive significance and coreference de jure. But these ...
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This chapter offers an elaboration and defense of the mental-file approach to singular thought. Mental files are supposed to account for both cognitive significance and coreference de jure. But these two roles generate conflicting constraints: files must be fine-grained to play the first role and coarse-grained to play the second role. To reconcile the constraints, we need to distinguish two sorts of file (static files and dynamic files), and two forms of coreference de jure (strong and weak). Dynamic files are sequences of file-stages united by the weak coreference de jure relation. It is at the synchronic level, that of file-stages, that the stronger coreference de jure is to be found. The resulting view is compared to that of Papineau, according to whom only dynamic files are needed, and to that of Ninan, according to whom there are proper dynamic files that exhibit strong coreference de jure.Less
This chapter offers an elaboration and defense of the mental-file approach to singular thought. Mental files are supposed to account for both cognitive significance and coreference de jure. But these two roles generate conflicting constraints: files must be fine-grained to play the first role and coarse-grained to play the second role. To reconcile the constraints, we need to distinguish two sorts of file (static files and dynamic files), and two forms of coreference de jure (strong and weak). Dynamic files are sequences of file-stages united by the weak coreference de jure relation. It is at the synchronic level, that of file-stages, that the stronger coreference de jure is to be found. The resulting view is compared to that of Papineau, according to whom only dynamic files are needed, and to that of Ninan, according to whom there are proper dynamic files that exhibit strong coreference de jure.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198713265
- eISBN:
- 9780191781711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter builds on insights derived from the work of Perry, Lewis, and Stalnaker. It offers a characterization of indexical or ‘de se’ thoughts, focusing on their limited accessibility and ...
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This chapter builds on insights derived from the work of Perry, Lewis, and Stalnaker. It offers a characterization of indexical or ‘de se’ thoughts, focusing on their limited accessibility and positing two levels of content for them. Limited accessibility means that indexical thoughts can only be entertained by thinkers who are located in the right context and bear the right relations to the entities talked about. This raises the communication problem: how do we communicate such thoughts across contexts? A solution is offered, in the mental file framework. In the second part of the chapter, the solution is compared to those recently offered in the centred content literature.Less
This chapter builds on insights derived from the work of Perry, Lewis, and Stalnaker. It offers a characterization of indexical or ‘de se’ thoughts, focusing on their limited accessibility and positing two levels of content for them. Limited accessibility means that indexical thoughts can only be entertained by thinkers who are located in the right context and bear the right relations to the entities talked about. This raises the communication problem: how do we communicate such thoughts across contexts? A solution is offered, in the mental file framework. In the second part of the chapter, the solution is compared to those recently offered in the centred content literature.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198790358
- eISBN:
- 9780191837029
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790358.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on ...
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This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on 'epistemically rewarding' relations to objects in the environment. Standing in such relations to objects puts the subject in a position to gain information regarding them—information which goes into the file based on the relevant relation. Files do not merely store information about objects, however. They refer to them and serve as singular terms in the language of thought, with a relational (nondescriptivist) semantics. Crucially, files also play the role of ‘modes of presentation’. They are used to account for cognitive significance phenomena illustrated by so-called ‘Frege cases’. This book considers what happens to mental files in a dynamic setting. Mental files are construed as both continuants (dynamic files) and as time-slices thereof (static files). Dynamic files are needed to account for confusion, recognition and tracking. The book considers what happens to the relation of coreference de jure, central to the functional characterization of files, when one adopts a dynamic perspective. Only a weak form of coreference de jure is said to hold between stages of the same dynamic file. The second part of the book argues that communication involves interpersonal dynamic files. Special attention is paid to the communication of indexical thoughts (de se contents), and to communication using proper names.Less
This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on 'epistemically rewarding' relations to objects in the environment. Standing in such relations to objects puts the subject in a position to gain information regarding them—information which goes into the file based on the relevant relation. Files do not merely store information about objects, however. They refer to them and serve as singular terms in the language of thought, with a relational (nondescriptivist) semantics. Crucially, files also play the role of ‘modes of presentation’. They are used to account for cognitive significance phenomena illustrated by so-called ‘Frege cases’. This book considers what happens to mental files in a dynamic setting. Mental files are construed as both continuants (dynamic files) and as time-slices thereof (static files). Dynamic files are needed to account for confusion, recognition and tracking. The book considers what happens to the relation of coreference de jure, central to the functional characterization of files, when one adopts a dynamic perspective. Only a weak form of coreference de jure is said to hold between stages of the same dynamic file. The second part of the book argues that communication involves interpersonal dynamic files. Special attention is paid to the communication of indexical thoughts (de se contents), and to communication using proper names.
Gregory Currie
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198717881
- eISBN:
- 9780191787355
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There is a kind of perceptual-imaginative experience we have when we watch screen-based fictions. In such situations it is natural to think of ourselves as “watching Robin Hood” rather than as ...
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There is a kind of perceptual-imaginative experience we have when we watch screen-based fictions. In such situations it is natural to think of ourselves as “watching Robin Hood” rather than as watching Errol Flynn dressed as Robin Hood. Screen-based fictions are not the only fictions that allow this kind of experience but they encourage it in ways that theatrical dramas cannot quite match, while still photographs do a poor job in this regard. This chapter offers an explanation of this kind of experience, partly by reference to features of the screen medium and partly by reference to aspects of human perceptual-cognitive architecture. The architectural story will tell us something about imagination that reflection on the phenomenology of imaginative experience fails to disclose. The resulting picture may also help us to understand certain kinds of delusions.Less
There is a kind of perceptual-imaginative experience we have when we watch screen-based fictions. In such situations it is natural to think of ourselves as “watching Robin Hood” rather than as watching Errol Flynn dressed as Robin Hood. Screen-based fictions are not the only fictions that allow this kind of experience but they encourage it in ways that theatrical dramas cannot quite match, while still photographs do a poor job in this regard. This chapter offers an explanation of this kind of experience, partly by reference to features of the screen medium and partly by reference to aspects of human perceptual-cognitive architecture. The architectural story will tell us something about imagination that reflection on the phenomenology of imaginative experience fails to disclose. The resulting picture may also help us to understand certain kinds of delusions.
Stacie Friend
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199647057
- eISBN:
- 9780191761041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647057.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Just as we can use ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ to co-refer, we can use ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Ulysses’ to co-identify—where ‘identification’ carries no ontological commitment. How is this possible if ...
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Just as we can use ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ to co-refer, we can use ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Ulysses’ to co-identify—where ‘identification’ carries no ontological commitment. How is this possible if neither name picks out an individual, let alone the same one? The main claim of this chapter is that we can explain co-identification by appeal to the ways uses of names are linked together in communicative practices. Two ways of conceptualizing our communicative practices of using names are distinguished and compared: a name-centric approach, inspired by Kripke’s account of reference-fixing, and an alternative information-centric approach, inspired by Evans’s critique of Kripke. It is argued that only an approach that takes information to be central to the practices that underpin our uses of names has the resources to explain co-identification.Less
Just as we can use ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ to co-refer, we can use ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Ulysses’ to co-identify—where ‘identification’ carries no ontological commitment. How is this possible if neither name picks out an individual, let alone the same one? The main claim of this chapter is that we can explain co-identification by appeal to the ways uses of names are linked together in communicative practices. Two ways of conceptualizing our communicative practices of using names are distinguished and compared: a name-centric approach, inspired by Kripke’s account of reference-fixing, and an alternative information-centric approach, inspired by Evans’s critique of Kripke. It is argued that only an approach that takes information to be central to the practices that underpin our uses of names has the resources to explain co-identification.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198790358
- eISBN:
- 9780191837029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790358.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
Because indexical thoughts are context-bound, they cannot be communicated to those in suitably different contexts. This suggests giving up the Naïve View of Communication according to which it ...
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Because indexical thoughts are context-bound, they cannot be communicated to those in suitably different contexts. This suggests giving up the Naïve View of Communication according to which it involves replication of the speaker’s thought by the hearer—content sharing. In this chapter an alternative model is offered which sees communication as the coordination of mental files, constrained by the linguistic meaning of the referential expression. The model gives up the main tenets, and even the central presupposition, of the Naïve Conception of Communication. (Various authors have tried to amend and elaborate the Naïve Conception so as to make it consistent with the centred worlds approach to mental indexicality championed by Lewis. In the Appendix to Part II, the model presented in this chapter is compared to alternative analyses of communication using centred contents.)Less
Because indexical thoughts are context-bound, they cannot be communicated to those in suitably different contexts. This suggests giving up the Naïve View of Communication according to which it involves replication of the speaker’s thought by the hearer—content sharing. In this chapter an alternative model is offered which sees communication as the coordination of mental files, constrained by the linguistic meaning of the referential expression. The model gives up the main tenets, and even the central presupposition, of the Naïve Conception of Communication. (Various authors have tried to amend and elaborate the Naïve Conception so as to make it consistent with the centred worlds approach to mental indexicality championed by Lewis. In the Appendix to Part II, the model presented in this chapter is compared to alternative analyses of communication using centred contents.)
María de Ponte and Kepa Korta (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198714217
- eISBN:
- 9780191782626
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198714217.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
The chapters in this volume deal with our devices for singular reference and singular representation, taking them in different ways. The precise relation between using a linguistic expression to ...
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The chapters in this volume deal with our devices for singular reference and singular representation, taking them in different ways. The precise relation between using a linguistic expression to refer to an object and our mental representation of it has always been, and still is, one of the key topics of debate in philosophy of language, linguistics, and the cognitive sciences. Most essays focus specifically on singular terms, that is, linguistic expressions that, at least prima facie, are used to refer to particular objects, persons, places, and so on. They include proper names (“Mary,” “John”), indexicals (“I,” “tomorrow”), demonstrative pronouns (“this,” “that”) and perhaps (some uses of) definite and indefinite descriptions (“the queen of England,” “a medical doctor”), as well as complex demonstratives (“that woman”). Some of the essays do not directly deal with reference but with representation: the ways we represent objects in thought, especially the first-person perspective and a particular object of representation—the self. And there is also an essay that explores a notion common to reference and representation: salience. Salience is a pervasive notion in language and thought, and it is approached here from an intercultural perspective. The volume includes the latest views on these complex topics, expounded by some of the most prominent authors in linguistics and philosophy of language.Less
The chapters in this volume deal with our devices for singular reference and singular representation, taking them in different ways. The precise relation between using a linguistic expression to refer to an object and our mental representation of it has always been, and still is, one of the key topics of debate in philosophy of language, linguistics, and the cognitive sciences. Most essays focus specifically on singular terms, that is, linguistic expressions that, at least prima facie, are used to refer to particular objects, persons, places, and so on. They include proper names (“Mary,” “John”), indexicals (“I,” “tomorrow”), demonstrative pronouns (“this,” “that”) and perhaps (some uses of) definite and indefinite descriptions (“the queen of England,” “a medical doctor”), as well as complex demonstratives (“that woman”). Some of the essays do not directly deal with reference but with representation: the ways we represent objects in thought, especially the first-person perspective and a particular object of representation—the self. And there is also an essay that explores a notion common to reference and representation: salience. Salience is a pervasive notion in language and thought, and it is approached here from an intercultural perspective. The volume includes the latest views on these complex topics, expounded by some of the most prominent authors in linguistics and philosophy of language.
Ruth Garrett Millikan
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198717195
- eISBN:
- 9780191785948
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198717195.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Some ways that identity of the referents of two signs may be marked is by recurrence of the same sign design (“duplicates markers”), by use of the same sign token over again (“Strawson markers”), and ...
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Some ways that identity of the referents of two signs may be marked is by recurrence of the same sign design (“duplicates markers”), by use of the same sign token over again (“Strawson markers”), and by various anaphorical relations (anaphors). Strawson markers, of which “mental files” are an example, are of particular interest, their occurrence or use very significantly reducing the number of separate signs needed to represent complex states of affairs, hence, the number of inferences that must be drawn to extract the consequences of a set of premises. What a sign gives information about, however, is sometimes shown not just in elements of its sign design but in an external relation of the sign to its signified. Thus, a volt meter shows the voltage between the terminals to which its leads are connected.Less
Some ways that identity of the referents of two signs may be marked is by recurrence of the same sign design (“duplicates markers”), by use of the same sign token over again (“Strawson markers”), and by various anaphorical relations (anaphors). Strawson markers, of which “mental files” are an example, are of particular interest, their occurrence or use very significantly reducing the number of separate signs needed to represent complex states of affairs, hence, the number of inferences that must be drawn to extract the consequences of a set of premises. What a sign gives information about, however, is sometimes shown not just in elements of its sign design but in an external relation of the sign to its signified. Thus, a volt meter shows the voltage between the terminals to which its leads are connected.
