Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book ...
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Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book propounds a plausible physicalist internalism, called qualia empiricism. Qualia empiricism is the conjunction of a modal structuralist account of perceptual experience, an account of the content contributed to thought by referring terms that deploys rigidified description clusters, and an account of non-epistemic internal resources that can bridge those first two elements. It also argues that externalism is supported by no reasons that withstand close scrutiny. These include case-based arguments and arguments entwined with externalist accounts of perceptual states and language. The book critically considers externalist arguments rooted in work by Putnam, Kripke, Burge, Millikan, Dretske, Papineau, Prinz, Fodor, Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, Tye, Kant, Williamson, disjunctivists, Wittgenstein, Wright, Davidson, and Brandom, among others.Less
Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book propounds a plausible physicalist internalism, called qualia empiricism. Qualia empiricism is the conjunction of a modal structuralist account of perceptual experience, an account of the content contributed to thought by referring terms that deploys rigidified description clusters, and an account of non-epistemic internal resources that can bridge those first two elements. It also argues that externalism is supported by no reasons that withstand close scrutiny. These include case-based arguments and arguments entwined with externalist accounts of perceptual states and language. The book critically considers externalist arguments rooted in work by Putnam, Kripke, Burge, Millikan, Dretske, Papineau, Prinz, Fodor, Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, Tye, Kant, Williamson, disjunctivists, Wittgenstein, Wright, Davidson, and Brandom, among others.
Gyula Klima
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195176223
- eISBN:
- 9780199871957
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
Common representational content allows the Buridanian classification of human concepts discussed in the fourth chapter, which provides the first thoroughgoing, systematic survey of Buridan’s ...
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Common representational content allows the Buridanian classification of human concepts discussed in the fourth chapter, which provides the first thoroughgoing, systematic survey of Buridan’s conception of a mental language. The chapter discusses the divisions of concepts into syncategorematic and categorematic, simple and complex, absolute and connotative, and singular and common concepts. Besides presenting these classifications, the chapter provides a detailed discussion of the idea of conceptual complexity as semantic compositionality, its role in Buridan’s nominalist program of “ontological reduction,” and his precarious positioning of his account of the distinction between the representational contents of universal and singular concepts “somewhere between” those of Ockham and Aquinas. The discussion relates the emerging issues to contemporary concerns in the philosophy of mind and language, such as the possibility of forming genuinely singular concepts and simple substantial concepts that would allow some terms of our language to function as rigid designators; the differences between consciousness and mental content; and the problem of universal representation without real universals.Less
Common representational content allows the Buridanian classification of human concepts discussed in the fourth chapter, which provides the first thoroughgoing, systematic survey of Buridan’s conception of a mental language. The chapter discusses the divisions of concepts into syncategorematic and categorematic, simple and complex, absolute and connotative, and singular and common concepts. Besides presenting these classifications, the chapter provides a detailed discussion of the idea of conceptual complexity as semantic compositionality, its role in Buridan’s nominalist program of “ontological reduction,” and his precarious positioning of his account of the distinction between the representational contents of universal and singular concepts “somewhere between” those of Ockham and Aquinas. The discussion relates the emerging issues to contemporary concerns in the philosophy of mind and language, such as the possibility of forming genuinely singular concepts and simple substantial concepts that would allow some terms of our language to function as rigid designators; the differences between consciousness and mental content; and the problem of universal representation without real universals.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter glosses the terms ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on, in ways that may seem ...
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This chapter glosses the terms ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on, in ways that may seem unorthodox but should not. It points out that dispositions like belief dispositions cannot — metaphysically cannot — be (mentally) contentful entities. It argues dutifully for the existence of things that obviously exist, not only conscious experience, but also, more specifically, cognitive conscious experience as opposed to sensory experience. The chapter presents the case for saying that (1) the only truly intentional entities are conscious experiential episodes. It argues that although one can (with Humpty Dumpty) use words like ‘mental’ and ‘intentional’ as one likes, there is in the end no tenable ground between (1) and (2) full-blown Dennettian behaviourism/instrumentalism/antirealism about the mind; as Dennett himself agrees. To accept (2), however, is to have completely lost touch with reality.Less
This chapter glosses the terms ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on, in ways that may seem unorthodox but should not. It points out that dispositions like belief dispositions cannot — metaphysically cannot — be (mentally) contentful entities. It argues dutifully for the existence of things that obviously exist, not only conscious experience, but also, more specifically, cognitive conscious experience as opposed to sensory experience. The chapter presents the case for saying that (1) the only truly intentional entities are conscious experiential episodes. It argues that although one can (with Humpty Dumpty) use words like ‘mental’ and ‘intentional’ as one likes, there is in the end no tenable ground between (1) and (2) full-blown Dennettian behaviourism/instrumentalism/antirealism about the mind; as Dennett himself agrees. To accept (2), however, is to have completely lost touch with reality.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Content externalism is the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject's environment rather than only on internal ...
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Content externalism is the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject's environment rather than only on internal properties of the subject's mind and brain. This chapter motivates content externalism by discussing Putnam's and Burge's Twin Earth thought experiments. It gives an overview over different versions of externalism and applies externalism to memory contents. There are three different kind of externalism about memory content: pastist, presentist, and futurist externalism. According to the version of pastist externalism argued for here, the content of a memory state is fixed, once and for all, by the environment the subject was in at the time he had the original thought. When some content is stored in memory it is inert to all subsequent environmental changes. Content externalism is compared and contrasted with the hypothesis of the extended mind. The chapter also includes a brief discussion of collective memory.Less
Content externalism is the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject's environment rather than only on internal properties of the subject's mind and brain. This chapter motivates content externalism by discussing Putnam's and Burge's Twin Earth thought experiments. It gives an overview over different versions of externalism and applies externalism to memory contents. There are three different kind of externalism about memory content: pastist, presentist, and futurist externalism. According to the version of pastist externalism argued for here, the content of a memory state is fixed, once and for all, by the environment the subject was in at the time he had the original thought. When some content is stored in memory it is inert to all subsequent environmental changes. Content externalism is compared and contrasted with the hypothesis of the extended mind. The chapter also includes a brief discussion of collective memory.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language and in which history is not crucial. It argues that the asymmetric dependence ...
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This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language and in which history is not crucial. It argues that the asymmetric dependence semantics of Fodor is false, and it critically considers other mind-based accounts of proper semantic causes, including the normality account of Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, and Tye, partly by appeal to facts about color blindness.Less
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language and in which history is not crucial. It argues that the asymmetric dependence semantics of Fodor is false, and it critically considers other mind-based accounts of proper semantic causes, including the normality account of Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, and Tye, partly by appeal to facts about color blindness.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics ...
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This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics of Millikan, Dretske, and Papineau is false, and that other etiological accounts proposed by Prinz and Dretske are false. Facts about the color blindness play a key role in these arguments.Less
This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics of Millikan, Dretske, and Papineau is false, and that other etiological accounts proposed by Prinz and Dretske are false. Facts about the color blindness play a key role in these arguments.
Grant Gillett
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239932
- eISBN:
- 9780191680045
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239932.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein alongside many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental ...
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This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein alongside many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental content. Building on an analysis of the nature of concepts and conceptions of objects, the book develops an account of psychological explanation and the subject of experience. It offers a novel perspective on mental representation and linguistic meaning which accommodates the vexed topics of cognitive roles and singular thought. It concludes by outlining certain considerations relevant to sceptical arguments and the nature of perception. The book's analysis produces correlations with current work in cognitive and developmental psychology, and is directly relevant to continuing work in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology.Less
This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein alongside many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental content. Building on an analysis of the nature of concepts and conceptions of objects, the book develops an account of psychological explanation and the subject of experience. It offers a novel perspective on mental representation and linguistic meaning which accommodates the vexed topics of cognitive roles and singular thought. It concludes by outlining certain considerations relevant to sceptical arguments and the nature of perception. The book's analysis produces correlations with current work in cognitive and developmental psychology, and is directly relevant to continuing work in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology.
Paul M. Pietroski
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252763
- eISBN:
- 9780191598234
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical ...
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When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical event. But this token identity thesis is not mandatory and it is implausible. We can instead adopt a non‐Cartesian form of dualism, according to which many mental events are causes distinct from any biochemical events, but persons are spatiotemporal things with physical and mental properties (that supervene on physical properties). Actions are themselves mental events (tryings) that typically cause bodily motions, which also have biochemical causes; and actions are typically caused by other mental events. This does not lead to an objectionable form of overdetermination, given the proposed sufficient condition for causation, which is stated in terms of explanation. An especially relevant form of explanation involves subsuming events under ceteris paribus laws. The overall account avoids objections to standard covering‐law (and regularity) conceptions of causation. An appendix addresses questions about mental content, and how such questions bear on the token identity thesis.Less
When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical event. But this token identity thesis is not mandatory and it is implausible. We can instead adopt a non‐Cartesian form of dualism, according to which many mental events are causes distinct from any biochemical events, but persons are spatiotemporal things with physical and mental properties (that supervene on physical properties). Actions are themselves mental events (tryings) that typically cause bodily motions, which also have biochemical causes; and actions are typically caused by other mental events. This does not lead to an objectionable form of overdetermination, given the proposed sufficient condition for causation, which is stated in terms of explanation. An especially relevant form of explanation involves subsuming events under ceteris paribus laws. The overall account avoids objections to standard covering‐law (and regularity) conceptions of causation. An appendix addresses questions about mental content, and how such questions bear on the token identity thesis.
Brian Leftow
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199263356
- eISBN:
- 9780191741777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263356.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents an account of divine concepts. Ultimately, it argues, there are no such things, but it is useful to speak as if there were. It sketches a causal theory of divine mental content.
This chapter presents an account of divine concepts. Ultimately, it argues, there are no such things, but it is useful to speak as if there were. It sketches a causal theory of divine mental content.
Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides a characterization of internalism and externalism about mental content, introduces standard motivations for both, and sketches the structure of the book. Standard motivations ...
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This chapter provides a characterization of internalism and externalism about mental content, introduces standard motivations for both, and sketches the structure of the book. Standard motivations for internalism include arguments from introspection and explanation. Standard motivations for externalism include intuitions about cases and more theoretical arguments entwined with externalist accounts of word-mediated thoughts and perceptual thoughts. And both externalists and internalist appeal to science. The goal of this book is to develop another internalist argument, by disposing of all standing externalist arguments and propounding an attractive internalism.Less
This chapter provides a characterization of internalism and externalism about mental content, introduces standard motivations for both, and sketches the structure of the book. Standard motivations for internalism include arguments from introspection and explanation. Standard motivations for externalism include intuitions about cases and more theoretical arguments entwined with externalist accounts of word-mediated thoughts and perceptual thoughts. And both externalists and internalist appeal to science. The goal of this book is to develop another internalist argument, by disposing of all standing externalist arguments and propounding an attractive internalism.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272044
- eISBN:
- 9780191699573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272044.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
To a large extent, Immanuel Kant's theoretical philosophy is merely the result of fusing two important pre-existing tendencies in recent Kant scholarship. First, it has been quite convincingly shown ...
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To a large extent, Immanuel Kant's theoretical philosophy is merely the result of fusing two important pre-existing tendencies in recent Kant scholarship. First, it has been quite convincingly shown that Kant can be read as a logico-semantic theorist. (For Kant, ‘logic’ includes not only the classical or Aristotelian/Scholastic theory of deductive entailment, sentential connectives, and monadic quantification, but also much of what we would now regard as semantics — the theory of concepts and their constituents, the theory of judgements or propositions, the theory of truth, and so on.) Secondly, it has been equally convincingly shown that Kant can be read as a philosophical psychologist. Kant's theory of objective mental representation is at once a theory of consciousness, a theory of intentionality, a theory of mental content, a theory of meaning, and a theory of cognition. This last point bears repeating: language is fully included within the explanatory scope of Kant's general theory of objective mental representation — but not all objective mental representation is linguistic. Hence, Kant's cognitive semantics comprehends non-linguistic and linguistic meaning alike.Less
To a large extent, Immanuel Kant's theoretical philosophy is merely the result of fusing two important pre-existing tendencies in recent Kant scholarship. First, it has been quite convincingly shown that Kant can be read as a logico-semantic theorist. (For Kant, ‘logic’ includes not only the classical or Aristotelian/Scholastic theory of deductive entailment, sentential connectives, and monadic quantification, but also much of what we would now regard as semantics — the theory of concepts and their constituents, the theory of judgements or propositions, the theory of truth, and so on.) Secondly, it has been equally convincingly shown that Kant can be read as a philosophical psychologist. Kant's theory of objective mental representation is at once a theory of consciousness, a theory of intentionality, a theory of mental content, a theory of meaning, and a theory of cognition. This last point bears repeating: language is fully included within the explanatory scope of Kant's general theory of objective mental representation — but not all objective mental representation is linguistic. Hence, Kant's cognitive semantics comprehends non-linguistic and linguistic meaning alike.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199579938
- eISBN:
- 9780191731112
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn't just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is ...
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Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn't just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, but cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning‐experience, e.g. occurrent experience of linguistic representations as meaning something, as this occurs in thinking or reading or hearing others speak.Less
Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn't just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, but cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning‐experience, e.g. occurrent experience of linguistic representations as meaning something, as this occurs in thinking or reading or hearing others speak.
Jennifer Radden (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195149531
- eISBN:
- 9780199870943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195149531.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter outlines the origins of reductionism and its connection to the unity of science and to philosophical naturalism. It explores its motivation for philosophers of mind and of mental ...
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This chapter outlines the origins of reductionism and its connection to the unity of science and to philosophical naturalism. It explores its motivation for philosophers of mind and of mental disorder, and sketches out the backlash against it that emerges from a reappropriation of a prescientific revolution worldview.Less
This chapter outlines the origins of reductionism and its connection to the unity of science and to philosophical naturalism. It explores its motivation for philosophers of mind and of mental disorder, and sketches out the backlash against it that emerges from a reappropriation of a prescientific revolution worldview.
Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter contains four sections. The first argues that what are supposed to be the innovative characteristics of embedded representations do not, in fact, differentiate them from representations ...
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This chapter contains four sections. The first argues that what are supposed to be the innovative characteristics of embedded representations do not, in fact, differentiate them from representations included in orthodox, computational models. The second section argues that the supposedly unhelpful characteristics of orthodox representations are likely to be shared by the representations appearing in embedded models. In Section Three, it is shown how the embedded view can be fruitfully incorporated into standard theories of the fixation of externalist content for mental representations. Section Four applies the lessons of the preceding sections to a common objection to orthodox, computational modeling: that computationalist representations must come prefitted to a prelabeled world. It is argued that the weak sense in which computationalist representations are innate allows them to emerge epigenetically in a world rich with properties some of which come to be represented and some of which do not.Less
This chapter contains four sections. The first argues that what are supposed to be the innovative characteristics of embedded representations do not, in fact, differentiate them from representations included in orthodox, computational models. The second section argues that the supposedly unhelpful characteristics of orthodox representations are likely to be shared by the representations appearing in embedded models. In Section Three, it is shown how the embedded view can be fruitfully incorporated into standard theories of the fixation of externalist content for mental representations. Section Four applies the lessons of the preceding sections to a common objection to orthodox, computational modeling: that computationalist representations must come prefitted to a prelabeled world. It is argued that the weak sense in which computationalist representations are innate allows them to emerge epigenetically in a world rich with properties some of which come to be represented and some of which do not.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251582
- eISBN:
- 9780191598012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251584.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this precursor to his Mental Content (1989), McGinn defends and explores the implications of his dual‐component theory of mental and linguistic content. According to McGinn, our concept of belief ...
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In this precursor to his Mental Content (1989), McGinn defends and explores the implications of his dual‐component theory of mental and linguistic content. According to McGinn, our concept of belief combines two components: the first (apropos of belief's causal‐explanatory role) consists in a mode of representation of things in the world, the second (apropos of belief's truth‐bearing role) involves the semantic relations between such representations and the things represented. The case is analogous for linguistic content, which is also structurally duplex; meaning, for McGinn, consists in both reference and mode of presentation. Having situated his dual‐component theory relative to several standard accounts of meaning, McGinn concludes the essay by considering its implications, notably for the conditions under which mental and linguistic content can be ascribed, and for the nature of radical interpretation.Less
In this precursor to his Mental Content (1989), McGinn defends and explores the implications of his dual‐component theory of mental and linguistic content. According to McGinn, our concept of belief combines two components: the first (apropos of belief's causal‐explanatory role) consists in a mode of representation of things in the world, the second (apropos of belief's truth‐bearing role) involves the semantic relations between such representations and the things represented. The case is analogous for linguistic content, which is also structurally duplex; meaning, for McGinn, consists in both reference and mode of presentation. Having situated his dual‐component theory relative to several standard accounts of meaning, McGinn concludes the essay by considering its implications, notably for the conditions under which mental and linguistic content can be ascribed, and for the nature of radical interpretation.
David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume involves both disciplinary and historical issues, and aims to integrate results and methods of the two disciplines in the interest of philosophy as a whole. There has been a long-standing ...
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This volume involves both disciplinary and historical issues, and aims to integrate results and methods of the two disciplines in the interest of philosophy as a whole. There has been a long-standing assumption that — for historical, methodological, or doctrinal reasons — analytic philosophy of mind has little in common with the tradition of phenomenology that began with Brentano, and which was developed by Husserl and continued through such figures as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau–Ponty. This volume overturns that assumption by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to progress on problems central to both classical phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, the essays gathered here (all written for the volume) bring ideas from classical phenomenology into the recent debates in philosophy of mind, and vice versa, in discussions of consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, holism about mental state contents, and the prospects for ‘explaining’ consciousness.Less
This volume involves both disciplinary and historical issues, and aims to integrate results and methods of the two disciplines in the interest of philosophy as a whole. There has been a long-standing assumption that — for historical, methodological, or doctrinal reasons — analytic philosophy of mind has little in common with the tradition of phenomenology that began with Brentano, and which was developed by Husserl and continued through such figures as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau–Ponty. This volume overturns that assumption by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to progress on problems central to both classical phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, the essays gathered here (all written for the volume) bring ideas from classical phenomenology into the recent debates in philosophy of mind, and vice versa, in discussions of consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, holism about mental state contents, and the prospects for ‘explaining’ consciousness.
Brian Leftow
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199263356
- eISBN:
- 9780191741777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263356.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ...
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Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ways concepts combine. It suggests that God invents His creature-concepts’ modes of combination, rather than finding them innate in Himself. It also argues that God actually makes all possible combinations of His concepts. This helps secure actualism — the metaphysical thesis that all that is is actual — for the book’s overall theory.Less
Because it is useful to speak as if there were divine concepts, this chapter discusses God’s mental content in concept language. It provides an account of concepts simple in content. It then takes up ways concepts combine. It suggests that God invents His creature-concepts’ modes of combination, rather than finding them innate in Himself. It also argues that God actually makes all possible combinations of His concepts. This helps secure actualism — the metaphysical thesis that all that is is actual — for the book’s overall theory.
William Lyons
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198752226
- eISBN:
- 9780191695087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752226.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter starts by discussing Ruth Gerrett Millikan's views on psychology as biology in her book Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, where she demonstrates that intentionality is ...
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This chapter starts by discussing Ruth Gerrett Millikan's views on psychology as biology in her book Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, where she demonstrates that intentionality is an objective natural feature of humans, and not a subjective Cartesian or Brentanian one. She argues that biology is the firm foundation for human knowledge and introduces a concept called ‘biosemantics’ that maps the meaning of a word. In his book Mental Content, Colin McGinn extends and defends the teleological-cum-biological account of intentionality elaborated by Millikan. He proposes that a teleological account of beliefs or desires can be expressed as a variety of a more general viewpoint about mental states, called ‘externalism’. The rest of the chapter examines the objections against the teleological theory of intentionality, particularly those of Jerry Fodor.Less
This chapter starts by discussing Ruth Gerrett Millikan's views on psychology as biology in her book Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, where she demonstrates that intentionality is an objective natural feature of humans, and not a subjective Cartesian or Brentanian one. She argues that biology is the firm foundation for human knowledge and introduces a concept called ‘biosemantics’ that maps the meaning of a word. In his book Mental Content, Colin McGinn extends and defends the teleological-cum-biological account of intentionality elaborated by Millikan. He proposes that a teleological account of beliefs or desires can be expressed as a variety of a more general viewpoint about mental states, called ‘externalism’. The rest of the chapter examines the objections against the teleological theory of intentionality, particularly those of Jerry Fodor.
Grant Gillett
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239932
- eISBN:
- 9780191680045
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239932.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses concepts and gives an account where judgment has an important role in the analysis. The discussion also puts emphasis on judgment and the rules that govern it which raise ...
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This chapter discusses concepts and gives an account where judgment has an important role in the analysis. The discussion also puts emphasis on judgment and the rules that govern it which raise problems for an internal, Cartesian, or ‘narrow’ view of mental content.Less
This chapter discusses concepts and gives an account where judgment has an important role in the analysis. The discussion also puts emphasis on judgment and the rules that govern it which raise problems for an internal, Cartesian, or ‘narrow’ view of mental content.
Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses ...
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This book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses specifically on the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. A systems-based approach is held to provide the only plausible criterion distinguishing what is cognitive from what is not. In most human cases, this system appears within the boundary of the human organism. It is argued that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not and, furthermore, that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong. Additional aspects of the situated program, including the embedded and embodied views, are also examined. The book considers whether plausible incarnations of such views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science, especially with regard to the role of representation and computation. It is argued that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute radical shifts in perspective. For instance, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the nonneural body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science.Less
This book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses specifically on the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. A systems-based approach is held to provide the only plausible criterion distinguishing what is cognitive from what is not. In most human cases, this system appears within the boundary of the human organism. It is argued that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not and, furthermore, that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong. Additional aspects of the situated program, including the embedded and embodied views, are also examined. The book considers whether plausible incarnations of such views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science, especially with regard to the role of representation and computation. It is argued that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute radical shifts in perspective. For instance, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the nonneural body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science.
