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Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

Fabian Dorsch

in Mental Actions

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199225989
eISBN:
9780191710339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our ability to form ... More


Introduction

Matthew Soteriou

in Mental Actions

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199225989
eISBN:
9780191710339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces some of the main issues and themes addressed by the contributors to this book. It provides an overview of debates concerning the scope of our mental agency — i.e. which ... More


Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking, and Phenomenal Character

Matthew Soteriou

in Mental Actions

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199225989
eISBN:
9780191710339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of mental agency by addressing the question of the ontological category of the conscious mental acts an agent is aware of when engaged in such directed ... More


Two Kinds of Agency

Pamela Hieronymi

in Mental Actions

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199225989
eISBN:
9780191710339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces a novel account of our agency over certain attitudes (most centrally, belief and intention). The account assumes that these attitudes embody our answer to a question. Thus, we ... More


Monopolies Don’t Work

Timothy A. Kelly

in Healing the Broken Mind: Transforming America's Failed Mental Health System

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780814748121
eISBN:
9780814749104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
NYU Press
DOI:
10.18574/nyu/9780814748121.003.0003
Subject:
Psychology, Social Psychology

This chapter argues that transforming America's mental health service system requires breaking the inherent monopoly of state and federal mental health agencies. The public-sector mental health ... More


Mental Action, Autonomy, and the Perspective of Practical Reason

Soteriou Matthew

in The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199678457
eISBN:
9780191757952
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678457.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter investigates the place and role of mental agency in suppositional reasoning and self-critical reflection. It considers Descartes’ suggestion that when one is engaged in these activities, ... More


Managerial Control and Free Mental Agency

Tillmann Vierkant

in Decomposing the Will

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199746996
eISBN:
9780199332502
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Recent developments in the literature on mental agency have suggested that there are two quite different forms of mental agency. So-called managerial control can be understood simply along the lines ... More


Mental Action and the Threat of Automaticity

Wayne Wu

in Decomposing the Will

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199746996
eISBN:
9780199332502
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers the connection between automaticity, control, and agency. Indeed, recent philosophical and psychological works play up the incompatibility of automaticity and agency. ... More


The Ontology of Conscious Thinking

Soteriou Matthew

in The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199678457
eISBN:
9780191757952
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678457.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter starts by discussing the idea that the activity of consciously thinking is, in some sense, private to its subject. The chapter then reconsiders Geach's argument for the claim that there ... More


What’s the Use of Consciousness?: How the Stab of Conscience Made Us Really Conscious

Chris D. Frith and Thomas Metzinger

in The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780262034326
eISBN:
9780262333290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262034326.003.0012
Subject:
Neuroscience, History of Neuroscience

The starting assumption is that consciousness (subjective experience), rather than being an epiphenomenon, has a causal role in the optimization of certain human behaviors. This chapter reviews ... More


Mental Agency in Authoritative Self-Knowledge: Reply to Kobes

Tyler Burge

in Cognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199672028
eISBN:
9780191751929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

‘Mental Agency in Authoritative Self‐knowledge: Reply to Kobes’ (2003) distinguishes between certain types of self‐knowledge of one’s mental states and all types of self‐knowledge of one’s actions. ... More


Uses of ‘I’

Béatrice Longuenesse

in I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2017
ISBN:
9780199665761
eISBN:
9780191837784
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665761.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Any use of ‘I’ depends at least in part on the particular kind of information that, if expressed in a judgment, would ground a use of ‘I’ as subject. Kant’s ‘I think’ is only one case of such use, ... More


Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life

Richard Moran

in The Philosophical Imagination: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
June 2017
ISBN:
9780190633776
eISBN:
9780190633806
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633776.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind

In Harry Frankfurt’s work on freedom and the concept of a person, the idea of “identifying” with one desire rather than another plays an important role, and the difference between being “active” ... More


The Philosophical Imagination: Selected Essays

Richard Moran

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
June 2017
ISBN:
9780190633776
eISBN:
9780190633806
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633776.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind

A collection of philosophical articles on subjects ranging from aesthetics, the philosophy of mind and action, the first person, to engagements with various contemporary philosophers.


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