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Defending the Means Principle

Victor Tadros

in The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199554423
eISBN:
9780191731341
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199554423.003.0006
Subject:
Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, Philosophy of Law

One central objection to general deterrence as a justification of punishment is that it is wrong to harm offenders as a means to the greater good. This requires us to evaluate the principle that it ... More


Internal and External: Meaningful and Meaningless

Barry Stroud

in The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism

Published in print:
1984
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198247616
eISBN:
9780191598494
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198247613.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 5 considers the challenge to scepticism that both the sceptical conclusion and the problem about our knowledge of the external world to which it is a response are equally meaningless.This ... More


Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1

Mark Timmons (ed.)

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199693269
eISBN:
9780191732058
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that ... More


Responsibility and Self-Defence

Victor Tadros

in The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199554423
eISBN:
9780191731341
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199554423.003.0011
Subject:
Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, Philosophy of Law

Earlier chapters began to explore the view that responsibility for an unjust threat renders a person liable to be harmed in self-defence. This view has the revisionist implication that it is wrong to ... More


Treating consenting adults merely as means

Samuel Kerstein

in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199693269
eISBN:
9780191732058
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy

According to the Mere Means Principle, suggested by Immanuel Kant, it is wrong to treat others merely as means. This paper explores sufficient conditions for an agent’s using another, but not merely ... More


The Means Principle

Jonathan Quong

in The Morality of Defensive Force

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780198851103
eISBN:
9780191885846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 7 develops and defends a novel conception of the means principle. The chapter argues that there is an absolute prohibition on the harmful use of another person’s body or other rightful ... More


It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Climate Ethics: Essential Readings

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
November 2020
ISBN:
9780195399622
eISBN:
9780197562840
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780195399622.003.0029
Subject:
Environmental Science, Environmentalist Thought and Ideology

To make the issue stark, let us begin with a few assumptions. I believe that these assumptions are probably roughly accurate, but none is certain, and I will not try to justify them here. Instead, ... More


Merely as a Means

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume One

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199572809
eISBN:
9780191809873
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572809.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents a philosophical discussion of the mere means principle, which says it is wrong to treat anyone merely as a means. It first explains how we can use people without merely using ... More


A Theory of Rights

Alec D. Walen

in The Mechanics of Claims and Permissible Killing in War

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
April 2019
ISBN:
9780190872045
eISBN:
9780190872076
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190872045.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy

This chapter covers the theory of rights that sits at the core of this book. It starts with an account of the purpose of rights, the three principles that ground the space of rights, and the basic ... More


Deontological Principles

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0021
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter considers the harm principle. According to this principle, our negative duties not to harm people are much stronger than our positive duties to make things go better by saving people ... More


Liberating Just War Theory from Double Effect

Kai Draper

in War and Individual Rights: The Foundations of Just War Theory

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780199388899
eISBN:
9780199388912
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199388899.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In traditional just war theory, the principle of double effect plays a key role in providing a potential justification for killing innocent bystanders. Under that principle, deliberately killing an ... More


Agent-Relative Prerogatives

Jonathan Quong

in The Morality of Defensive Force

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780198851103
eISBN:
9780191885846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 3 defends the view that we each possess a limited agent-relative prerogative to impose harm on people who are not liable to this harm in defence of things over which we have rightful claims. ... More


The Means Principle

Larry Alexander

in Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
June 2016
ISBN:
9780198703242
eISBN:
9780191773068
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198703242.003.0017
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology

Michael Moore believes there are deontological constraints on actors’ pursuit of good consequences that are best conceived of as agent-relative prohibitions such as “you must not intentionally kill, ... More


Introduction

Jonathan Quong

in The Morality of Defensive Force

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780198851103
eISBN:
9780191885846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198851103.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the book’s main arguments and ideas, and situates the morality of defensive force in the wider literature. The chapter contains a discussion of the book’s scope and ... More


The Morality of Defensive Force

Jonathan Quong

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780198851103
eISBN:
9780191885846
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198851103.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This book provides an account of the central moral principles that regulate the permissible use of defensive force. The book argues that we cannot understand the morality of defensive force until we ... More


Double Effect and the Laws of War

Kai Draper

in The Ethics of War: Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780199376148
eISBN:
9780199376162
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199376148.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

In the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), a distinction is drawn between harming noncombatants directly (that is, as a foreseen consequence of attacking them), and harming them indirectly (that is, as a ... More


Duress and Duty

Victor Tadros

in The Ethics of War: Essays

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780199376148
eISBN:
9780199376162
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199376148.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This essay examines when duress justifies pro tanto wrongful killing. It argues that the defense is available in at least some cases—in some cases where the killing occurs as a side effect and in ... More


Omissions, Acts, and the Duty to Rescue

Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

in The Ethics and Law of Omissions

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780190683450
eISBN:
9780190683481
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190683450.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In criminal law, if the defendant omits to perform an action, he will typically not be liable unless he is under a duty to act. This chapter argues that the reason that individuals do not generally ... More


Personal Practical Responsibility

Victor Tadros

in Wrongs and Crimes

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780199571376
eISBN:
9780191837999
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571376.003.0005
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology

Free will sceptics provide a challenge to standard retributivist accounts of punishment. They aim to show that it is not plausible that blame or suffering could be deserved in the light of the kind ... More


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