Emmanuel Falque
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780823281961
- eISBN:
- 9780823284917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823281961.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
It is not satisfactory for us simply to affirm a denial of meaning in life. Such affirmation still entails giving some meaning to the denial. The suspension of meaning is more significant than an ...
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It is not satisfactory for us simply to affirm a denial of meaning in life. Such affirmation still entails giving some meaning to the denial. The suspension of meaning is more significant than an affirmation of meaning or meaninglessness. It is in this sense that the believer is first of all a philosopher, and not a theologian. Anxiety over death reveals the “existential” aspects humankind, that is, “Dasein’s existence structure.”Less
It is not satisfactory for us simply to affirm a denial of meaning in life. Such affirmation still entails giving some meaning to the denial. The suspension of meaning is more significant than an affirmation of meaning or meaninglessness. It is in this sense that the believer is first of all a philosopher, and not a theologian. Anxiety over death reveals the “existential” aspects humankind, that is, “Dasein’s existence structure.”
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Since it has been found that the biases towards the near and the future are irrational, it follows that people who are rationalists, in the sense that their dominant aim is to lead a life in which ...
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Since it has been found that the biases towards the near and the future are irrational, it follows that people who are rationalists, in the sense that their dominant aim is to lead a life in which they have only rational attitudes, must rid themselves of these biases. But since it has also been found in these chapters that these biases involve the bias towards the perceived and the mechanism of spontaneous induction, this amounts to getting rid of the latter two as well. This chapter argues that getting rid of the bias towards the perceived exposes one to a sense of the meaninglessness of life, in which local matters dwindle into insignificance in a cosmic perspective, and that getting rid of the mechanism of spontaneous induction exposes one to a sense of the precariousness of life, a pervasive sense of insecurity. Therefore, this aim is at odds with the satisfactionalist aim of maximizing the desire-fulfilment of one’s life. Hence, the first of three dilemmas or conflicts between two fundamental aims are encountered: the rationalist and the satisfactionalist aims.Less
Since it has been found that the biases towards the near and the future are irrational, it follows that people who are rationalists, in the sense that their dominant aim is to lead a life in which they have only rational attitudes, must rid themselves of these biases. But since it has also been found in these chapters that these biases involve the bias towards the perceived and the mechanism of spontaneous induction, this amounts to getting rid of the latter two as well. This chapter argues that getting rid of the bias towards the perceived exposes one to a sense of the meaninglessness of life, in which local matters dwindle into insignificance in a cosmic perspective, and that getting rid of the mechanism of spontaneous induction exposes one to a sense of the precariousness of life, a pervasive sense of insecurity. Therefore, this aim is at odds with the satisfactionalist aim of maximizing the desire-fulfilment of one’s life. Hence, the first of three dilemmas or conflicts between two fundamental aims are encountered: the rationalist and the satisfactionalist aims.
Cicely Saunders
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- November 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198570530
- eISBN:
- 9780191730412
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198570530.003.0032
- Subject:
- Palliative Care, Palliative Medicine Research
In 1988, Cicely Saunders published a journal article on spiritual pain, reproduced here. She examines how in the care of the individual in pain, there must be attention to the body, to the family, ...
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In 1988, Cicely Saunders published a journal article on spiritual pain, reproduced here. She examines how in the care of the individual in pain, there must be attention to the body, to the family, and to the patient's inner life. For this, expertise in symptom control is required, as well as group understanding, together with an ability to make sense of the inner concerns and values of the person. Above all, there is a need to engage with ‘the whole area of thought concerning moral values throughout life’ — this she defines as ‘the spiritual’. Where a desolate sense of meaninglessness is encountered by the person at the end of life, here, she declares, one finds the essence of ‘spiritual pain’.Less
In 1988, Cicely Saunders published a journal article on spiritual pain, reproduced here. She examines how in the care of the individual in pain, there must be attention to the body, to the family, and to the patient's inner life. For this, expertise in symptom control is required, as well as group understanding, together with an ability to make sense of the inner concerns and values of the person. Above all, there is a need to engage with ‘the whole area of thought concerning moral values throughout life’ — this she defines as ‘the spiritual’. Where a desolate sense of meaninglessness is encountered by the person at the end of life, here, she declares, one finds the essence of ‘spiritual pain’.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 1984
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247616
- eISBN:
- 9780191598494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247613.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 5 considers the challenge to scepticism that both the sceptical conclusion and the problem about our knowledge of the external world to which it is a response are equally meaningless.This ...
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Chapter 5 considers the challenge to scepticism that both the sceptical conclusion and the problem about our knowledge of the external world to which it is a response are equally meaningless.This line of criticism, which has been presented forcefully by Rudolf Carnap in his papers ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ and ‘Pseudoproblems in Philosophy’, is inspired by verificationism in the philosophy of language: the view that a sentence that is not rendered at least more likely to be true by one possible course of sensory experience than another has no meaning, and thus cannot be considered either true or false. On the basis of the verifiability principle, Carnap argues that only ‘internal’ questions about knowledge – questions that pertain to some empirically verifiable matter of fact – can be meaningfully asked; by contrast, the question whether there are any material objects at all, taken as an ‘external’ question by the sceptic, is literally meaningless, and should instead be understood as a merely ‘practical’ question about which ‘linguistic framework’ to adopt.Stroud observes, first, that this strategy not only appreciates the force of philosophical scepticism but is in fact in complete agreement with it: it denies that there is any theoretical justification for adopting one linguistic framework, such as that of a world of material objects, rather than another, which is precisely the point the sceptic wants to make; and it accepts a version of the ‘conditional correctness of scepticism’. The view that, if the traditional philosopher did manage to raise a meaningful question about our knowledge of the world, then his sceptical answer to it would be correct. Second, Stroud argues that neither the ‘internal’–‘external’ distinction used in the argument against scepticism nor the status of the verifiability principle itself on which it rests are made sufficiently clear to render them efficient and acceptable; moreover, as long as the verifiability principle is not independently shown to be a condition of meaningfulness, philosophical scepticism will itself provide a powerful objection to it.Less
Chapter 5 considers the challenge to scepticism that both the sceptical conclusion and the problem about our knowledge of the external world to which it is a response are equally meaningless.
This line of criticism, which has been presented forcefully by Rudolf Carnap in his papers ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ and ‘Pseudoproblems in Philosophy’, is inspired by verificationism in the philosophy of language: the view that a sentence that is not rendered at least more likely to be true by one possible course of sensory experience than another has no meaning, and thus cannot be considered either true or false. On the basis of the verifiability principle, Carnap argues that only ‘internal’ questions about knowledge – questions that pertain to some empirically verifiable matter of fact – can be meaningfully asked; by contrast, the question whether there are any material objects at all, taken as an ‘external’ question by the sceptic, is literally meaningless, and should instead be understood as a merely ‘practical’ question about which ‘linguistic framework’ to adopt.
Stroud observes, first, that this strategy not only appreciates the force of philosophical scepticism but is in fact in complete agreement with it: it denies that there is any theoretical justification for adopting one linguistic framework, such as that of a world of material objects, rather than another, which is precisely the point the sceptic wants to make; and it accepts a version of the ‘conditional correctness of scepticism’. The view that, if the traditional philosopher did manage to raise a meaningful question about our knowledge of the world, then his sceptical answer to it would be correct. Second, Stroud argues that neither the ‘internal’–‘external’ distinction used in the argument against scepticism nor the status of the verifiability principle itself on which it rests are made sufficiently clear to render them efficient and acceptable; moreover, as long as the verifiability principle is not independently shown to be a condition of meaningfulness, philosophical scepticism will itself provide a powerful objection to it.
Herman Philipse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697533
- eISBN:
- 9780191738470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Theism can be an existential hypothesis confirmable by empirical evidence only if the reference of the proper name ‘God’ can be spelled out in words that are mostly used literally. However, it is ...
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Theism can be an existential hypothesis confirmable by empirical evidence only if the reference of the proper name ‘God’ can be spelled out in words that are mostly used literally. However, it is argued in Chapter 7 that all psychological terms characterizing God are used in an irreducibly analogical manner, because by claiming that God is bodiless, theists annul the very conditions for applying psychological predicates to another entity literally. The term ‘person’ as applied to God cannot be used literally either. But if theism can only be formulated in terms that are used in irreducibly analogical ways, it conveys virtually nothing by what it says, so that it cannot be an existential hypothesis that is confirmable by empirical evidence. Richard Swinburne’s attempts to show that theism can be stated in words, most of which are used literally, are criticized, as are his philosophical arguments for substance dualism, which are meant to show that even human identity consists in the continuing life of a spirit, which can exist without a body.Less
Theism can be an existential hypothesis confirmable by empirical evidence only if the reference of the proper name ‘God’ can be spelled out in words that are mostly used literally. However, it is argued in Chapter 7 that all psychological terms characterizing God are used in an irreducibly analogical manner, because by claiming that God is bodiless, theists annul the very conditions for applying psychological predicates to another entity literally. The term ‘person’ as applied to God cannot be used literally either. But if theism can only be formulated in terms that are used in irreducibly analogical ways, it conveys virtually nothing by what it says, so that it cannot be an existential hypothesis that is confirmable by empirical evidence. Richard Swinburne’s attempts to show that theism can be stated in words, most of which are used literally, are criticized, as are his philosophical arguments for substance dualism, which are meant to show that even human identity consists in the continuing life of a spirit, which can exist without a body.
Emmanuel Falque
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780823281961
- eISBN:
- 9780823284917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823281961.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
It is not enough just to remain fearful in the face of death, or to draw back before “the cup.” Christ, like all humankind, passed from fear to anxiety. From a recoil before what is imminent (fear), ...
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It is not enough just to remain fearful in the face of death, or to draw back before “the cup.” Christ, like all humankind, passed from fear to anxiety. From a recoil before what is imminent (fear), he goes on to pose the question of nothingness and of the possibility of meaning (anxiety). But he does not remain simply in this position of taking what is human in charge. Far from simply shutting himself up in his anxiety, he addresses the Father in a cry of dereliction. The Son is he who suffers from anxiety and passes it to the Father.Less
It is not enough just to remain fearful in the face of death, or to draw back before “the cup.” Christ, like all humankind, passed from fear to anxiety. From a recoil before what is imminent (fear), he goes on to pose the question of nothingness and of the possibility of meaning (anxiety). But he does not remain simply in this position of taking what is human in charge. Far from simply shutting himself up in his anxiety, he addresses the Father in a cry of dereliction. The Son is he who suffers from anxiety and passes it to the Father.
Iddo Landau
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190657666
- eISBN:
- 9780190657697
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190657666.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
After explaining what meaning in life is, the book moves to criticizing certain presuppositions about the meaning of life that unnecessarily lead many people to believe that their lives are ...
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After explaining what meaning in life is, the book moves to criticizing certain presuppositions about the meaning of life that unnecessarily lead many people to believe that their lives are meaningless. Among others, it criticizes perfectionism about meaning in life, namely, the assumption that meaningful lives must include some perfection or some rare and difficult achievements. It then responds to recurring arguments made by people who take their lives to be meaningless, such as the arguments claiming that life is meaningless because death eventually annihilates us and everything we do; whatever we do is negligible when examined in the context of the whole universe; we have no free will and, thus, deserve no praise for what we achieve; everything, including meaning, is completely relative; we do not know what the purpose of life is; whenever we achieve something we stop sensing it as valuable; and there is so much suffering and evil in the world. The book also offers strategies that may help people identify what is meaningful in life and increase its meaningfulness. The final chapters consider questions such as whether only religious people can have meaningful lives; whether meaning of life should be discussed only by psychologists; and whether existentialism is a good source of guidance on the meaning of life.Less
After explaining what meaning in life is, the book moves to criticizing certain presuppositions about the meaning of life that unnecessarily lead many people to believe that their lives are meaningless. Among others, it criticizes perfectionism about meaning in life, namely, the assumption that meaningful lives must include some perfection or some rare and difficult achievements. It then responds to recurring arguments made by people who take their lives to be meaningless, such as the arguments claiming that life is meaningless because death eventually annihilates us and everything we do; whatever we do is negligible when examined in the context of the whole universe; we have no free will and, thus, deserve no praise for what we achieve; everything, including meaning, is completely relative; we do not know what the purpose of life is; whenever we achieve something we stop sensing it as valuable; and there is so much suffering and evil in the world. The book also offers strategies that may help people identify what is meaningful in life and increase its meaningfulness. The final chapters consider questions such as whether only religious people can have meaningful lives; whether meaning of life should be discussed only by psychologists; and whether existentialism is a good source of guidance on the meaning of life.
Iddo Landau
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190657666
- eISBN:
- 9780190657697
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190657666.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The chapter considers the argument that, when taken in the context of the cosmos at large, we emerge as tiny, ineffectual, and, hence, insufficient. On the background of the whole universe, whatever ...
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The chapter considers the argument that, when taken in the context of the cosmos at large, we emerge as tiny, ineffectual, and, hence, insufficient. On the background of the whole universe, whatever we do is negligible and, therefore, meaningless. But this argument supposes that only a life that affects the whole universe can be considered meaningful. The chapter argues that there is no reason to accept this highly perfectionist supposition. The discussion distinguishes between perspectives, on the one hand, and standards, on the other, and claims that we can have a wide perspective that considers a life in the context of the cosmos while holding standards that do not require that life to affect the whole cosmos.Less
The chapter considers the argument that, when taken in the context of the cosmos at large, we emerge as tiny, ineffectual, and, hence, insufficient. On the background of the whole universe, whatever we do is negligible and, therefore, meaningless. But this argument supposes that only a life that affects the whole universe can be considered meaningful. The chapter argues that there is no reason to accept this highly perfectionist supposition. The discussion distinguishes between perspectives, on the one hand, and standards, on the other, and claims that we can have a wide perspective that considers a life in the context of the cosmos while holding standards that do not require that life to affect the whole cosmos.
Rahel Jaeggi
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231151986
- eISBN:
- 9780231537599
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231151986.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book reconceives alienation as the absence of a meaningful relationship to oneself and others, something that manifests itself in feelings of helplessness and the despondent acceptance of ...
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This book reconceives alienation as the absence of a meaningful relationship to oneself and others, something that manifests itself in feelings of helplessness and the despondent acceptance of ossified social roles and expectations. It draws on the Hegelian philosophical tradition, phenomenological analyses grounded in modern conceptions of agency and recent work in the analytical tradition. It notes that the Hegelian–Marxist idea of alienation fell out of favor after the post-metaphysical rejection of humanism and essentialist views of human nature. It shows how a revived approach to alienation helps critical social theory engage with phenomena such as meaninglessness, isolation, and indifference. By severing alienation's link to a problematic conception of human essence while retaining its social-philosophical content, the book provides resources for a renewed critique of social pathologies, which is a much-neglected concern in contemporary liberal political philosophy. The work revisits the arguments of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Søren Kierkegaard, and Martin Heidegger, placing them in dialogue with Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, and Charles Taylor.Less
This book reconceives alienation as the absence of a meaningful relationship to oneself and others, something that manifests itself in feelings of helplessness and the despondent acceptance of ossified social roles and expectations. It draws on the Hegelian philosophical tradition, phenomenological analyses grounded in modern conceptions of agency and recent work in the analytical tradition. It notes that the Hegelian–Marxist idea of alienation fell out of favor after the post-metaphysical rejection of humanism and essentialist views of human nature. It shows how a revived approach to alienation helps critical social theory engage with phenomena such as meaninglessness, isolation, and indifference. By severing alienation's link to a problematic conception of human essence while retaining its social-philosophical content, the book provides resources for a renewed critique of social pathologies, which is a much-neglected concern in contemporary liberal political philosophy. The work revisits the arguments of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Søren Kierkegaard, and Martin Heidegger, placing them in dialogue with Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, and Charles Taylor.
Ofra Magidor
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199572977
- eISBN:
- 9780191758942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572977.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter discusses a particularly popular approach to category mistakes: the meaninglessness view, according to which category mistakes are infelicitous because they are meaningless. A range of ...
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The chapter discusses a particularly popular approach to category mistakes: the meaninglessness view, according to which category mistakes are infelicitous because they are meaningless. A range of arguments are presented against the view. One central argument concerns principles of compositionality, and it is argued that while adopting a certain version of type-theoretic semantics provides the most promising avenue for defenders of the view to handle compositionality, this approach does not succeed in supporting the view. Other arguments raised against the view concern synonymy facts; embeddings of category mistakes in propositional attitude ascriptions; and uses of category mistakes in metaphors. Finally, some positive motivations in favour of the view are presented but dismissed, and the meaninglessness view as a whole is rejected.Less
The chapter discusses a particularly popular approach to category mistakes: the meaninglessness view, according to which category mistakes are infelicitous because they are meaningless. A range of arguments are presented against the view. One central argument concerns principles of compositionality, and it is argued that while adopting a certain version of type-theoretic semantics provides the most promising avenue for defenders of the view to handle compositionality, this approach does not succeed in supporting the view. Other arguments raised against the view concern synonymy facts; embeddings of category mistakes in propositional attitude ascriptions; and uses of category mistakes in metaphors. Finally, some positive motivations in favour of the view are presented but dismissed, and the meaninglessness view as a whole is rejected.
Gordon C. F. Bearn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823244805
- eISBN:
- 9780823250714
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823244805.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This book explores an aesthetics of existence inspired by Gilles Deleuze and his 1980 book A Thousand Plateaus, co-authored with Félix Guattari. “Existentialism” has come to refer to a certain ...
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This book explores an aesthetics of existence inspired by Gilles Deleuze and his 1980 book A Thousand Plateaus, co-authored with Félix Guattari. “Existentialism” has come to refer to a certain voluntaristic way of responding to the threat of nihilism. The book equates the threat of nihilism with the threat of pointlessness and suggests that any philosopher who writes in response to the threat of irredeemable pointlessness is an existentialist. Ludwig Wittgenstein was an existential philosopher. Conceived as a response to the threat of pointlessness and meaninglessness, existentialism opens its doors to Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud.Less
This book explores an aesthetics of existence inspired by Gilles Deleuze and his 1980 book A Thousand Plateaus, co-authored with Félix Guattari. “Existentialism” has come to refer to a certain voluntaristic way of responding to the threat of nihilism. The book equates the threat of nihilism with the threat of pointlessness and suggests that any philosopher who writes in response to the threat of irredeemable pointlessness is an existentialist. Ludwig Wittgenstein was an existential philosopher. Conceived as a response to the threat of pointlessness and meaninglessness, existentialism opens its doors to Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud.
Rahel Jaeggi
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231151986
- eISBN:
- 9780231537599
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231151986.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the structure of the concept of alienation as well as the problems associated with its critique. Three important points are discussed. First, alienation is tied to the problem ...
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This chapter examines the structure of the concept of alienation as well as the problems associated with its critique. Three important points are discussed. First, alienation is tied to the problem of a loss of meaning; an alienated life is one that has become impoverished or meaningless, but it is a meaninglessness that is intertwined with powerlessness and impotence. Second, alienation is (therefore) a relation of domination, but of a kind that is not captured by standard descriptions of unfreedom and heteronomy. Third, alienation means disconnectedness or alienness, but an alienness that differs from simple relationlessness. The chapter also considers alienation as a diagnostic concept and some problems to which the theory of alienation is vulnerable. In particular, it explores alienation in relation to objectivism, perfectionism, and paternalism, along with poststructuralism and its critique of the subject. Finally, it analyzes Michel Foucault's rejection of essentialist appeals to human nature and the very idea of subjectivity that appears to underlie the critique of alienation.Less
This chapter examines the structure of the concept of alienation as well as the problems associated with its critique. Three important points are discussed. First, alienation is tied to the problem of a loss of meaning; an alienated life is one that has become impoverished or meaningless, but it is a meaninglessness that is intertwined with powerlessness and impotence. Second, alienation is (therefore) a relation of domination, but of a kind that is not captured by standard descriptions of unfreedom and heteronomy. Third, alienation means disconnectedness or alienness, but an alienness that differs from simple relationlessness. The chapter also considers alienation as a diagnostic concept and some problems to which the theory of alienation is vulnerable. In particular, it explores alienation in relation to objectivism, perfectionism, and paternalism, along with poststructuralism and its critique of the subject. Finally, it analyzes Michel Foucault's rejection of essentialist appeals to human nature and the very idea of subjectivity that appears to underlie the critique of alienation.
Rob Stone
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231165532
- eISBN:
- 9780231850407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231165532.003.0002
- Subject:
- Film, Television and Radio, Film
This chapter argues that it would be wisest to posit the cinema of Richard Linklater as the cinematic bridge between European Modernism and American Postmodernism—the “little space in between” Godard ...
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This chapter argues that it would be wisest to posit the cinema of Richard Linklater as the cinematic bridge between European Modernism and American Postmodernism—the “little space in between” Godard and Tarantino. Yet the collaborative, cooperative working practice that renders communities and couples onscreen is rather particular to Linklater, whose way of exploring limited time-frames by limited means results in films in which “somehow it all feels true and accurate in a composite sort of way”. Because Linklater is prompted to make his financial and creative limitations as part of his craft, his cinema often reflects the experience of a specific time from all sides. Although none of them are nostalgic, they are all fleeting, immanent, transient, and ephemeral. Any leaning towards nostalgia is curtailed by meaninglessness in Waking Life (2001), and by madness in A Scanner Darkly (2006).Less
This chapter argues that it would be wisest to posit the cinema of Richard Linklater as the cinematic bridge between European Modernism and American Postmodernism—the “little space in between” Godard and Tarantino. Yet the collaborative, cooperative working practice that renders communities and couples onscreen is rather particular to Linklater, whose way of exploring limited time-frames by limited means results in films in which “somehow it all feels true and accurate in a composite sort of way”. Because Linklater is prompted to make his financial and creative limitations as part of his craft, his cinema often reflects the experience of a specific time from all sides. Although none of them are nostalgic, they are all fleeting, immanent, transient, and ephemeral. Any leaning towards nostalgia is curtailed by meaninglessness in Waking Life (2001), and by madness in A Scanner Darkly (2006).
Mats Alvesson, Yiannis Gabriel, and Roland Paulsen
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198787099
- eISBN:
- 9780191829161
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198787099.003.0003
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies
The rise of mass education has led to mass research—quantity dominates quality. A ruthless institutional competition for status, plus academics pushing to get published in the ‘right’, ...
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The rise of mass education has led to mass research—quantity dominates quality. A ruthless institutional competition for status, plus academics pushing to get published in the ‘right’, career-enhancing journals, has led to the fetishization of journal outputs even when they are of little meaning or value to society. This situation is now endemic within the system of academic research and publication, and is strongly driven and sustained by academics themselves, even when they are unwilling to admit it. Academics, both individually and collectively, exercise considerable control over the content and nature of social science research, its scrutiny, assessment, and dissemination. They also have considerable control over the practices of various scientific institutions, including universities and their departments, funding bodies, conferences, and publications. Social science researchers underestimate and diminish their own responsibility for this state of affairs and sometimes prematurely adopt a victim position, blaming an impersonal system.Less
The rise of mass education has led to mass research—quantity dominates quality. A ruthless institutional competition for status, plus academics pushing to get published in the ‘right’, career-enhancing journals, has led to the fetishization of journal outputs even when they are of little meaning or value to society. This situation is now endemic within the system of academic research and publication, and is strongly driven and sustained by academics themselves, even when they are unwilling to admit it. Academics, both individually and collectively, exercise considerable control over the content and nature of social science research, its scrutiny, assessment, and dissemination. They also have considerable control over the practices of various scientific institutions, including universities and their departments, funding bodies, conferences, and publications. Social science researchers underestimate and diminish their own responsibility for this state of affairs and sometimes prematurely adopt a victim position, blaming an impersonal system.
Jon Stewart
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198747703
- eISBN:
- 9780191810657
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747703.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This book is an introductory text that attempts to introduce the thought of Søren Kierkegaard to first-time readers. But unlike most introductions to the Danish thinker that rehearse clichés about ...
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This book is an introductory text that attempts to introduce the thought of Søren Kierkegaard to first-time readers. But unlike most introductions to the Danish thinker that rehearse clichés about the stage theory, this book takes a new approach. At the end of his life Kierkegaard says that the only model that he ever had for his work was the Greek philosopher Socrates. This book takes this statement by Kierkegaard as its point of departure. It tries to explore what Kierkegaard meant by this and to show how different aspects of his writing and argumentative strategy can be traced back to Socrates. The main focus is The Concept of Irony, which is a key text at the beginning of Kierkegaard’s literary career. Although it was an early work, it nevertheless played a determining role in his later development and writings. Indeed, it can be said that in it Kierkegaard laid the groundwork for much of what would appear in his later famous books such as Either/Or and Fear and Trembling. Another important goal of the book is to try to determine the modern relevance of Kierkegaard’s thought. As the title indicates, he can be seen as offering important insight into the modern issues of freedom, relativism, subjectivism, nihilism, meaninglessness, and alienation.Less
This book is an introductory text that attempts to introduce the thought of Søren Kierkegaard to first-time readers. But unlike most introductions to the Danish thinker that rehearse clichés about the stage theory, this book takes a new approach. At the end of his life Kierkegaard says that the only model that he ever had for his work was the Greek philosopher Socrates. This book takes this statement by Kierkegaard as its point of departure. It tries to explore what Kierkegaard meant by this and to show how different aspects of his writing and argumentative strategy can be traced back to Socrates. The main focus is The Concept of Irony, which is a key text at the beginning of Kierkegaard’s literary career. Although it was an early work, it nevertheless played a determining role in his later development and writings. Indeed, it can be said that in it Kierkegaard laid the groundwork for much of what would appear in his later famous books such as Either/Or and Fear and Trembling. Another important goal of the book is to try to determine the modern relevance of Kierkegaard’s thought. As the title indicates, he can be seen as offering important insight into the modern issues of freedom, relativism, subjectivism, nihilism, meaninglessness, and alienation.
David Benatar
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190633813
- eISBN:
- 9780190633844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633813.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This chapter is the first of two chapters concerned with whether life is meaningless. Many people fear that it is. They fear that we are like Sisyphus, who was condemned to pointlessness. The basis ...
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This chapter is the first of two chapters concerned with whether life is meaningless. Many people fear that it is. They fear that we are like Sisyphus, who was condemned to pointlessness. The basis for these fears is discussed. The chapter then clarifies the question “Does life have meaning?” It is noted that there are different perspectives from which one can ask whether a life is meaningful. It is then argued that life can have meaning from various terrestrial perspectives (that is, it can have a purpose or point from such perspectives). Thus, a total nihilism about meaning is not warranted. This is the somewhat good news about meaning.Less
This chapter is the first of two chapters concerned with whether life is meaningless. Many people fear that it is. They fear that we are like Sisyphus, who was condemned to pointlessness. The basis for these fears is discussed. The chapter then clarifies the question “Does life have meaning?” It is noted that there are different perspectives from which one can ask whether a life is meaningful. It is then argued that life can have meaning from various terrestrial perspectives (that is, it can have a purpose or point from such perspectives). Thus, a total nihilism about meaning is not warranted. This is the somewhat good news about meaning.
David Benatar
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190633813
- eISBN:
- 9780190633844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633813.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This chapter is the second of two chapters concerned with whether life is meaningless. In this chapter, it is argued that life has no meaning sub specie aeternitatis (that is, no purpose or point ...
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This chapter is the second of two chapters concerned with whether life is meaningless. In this chapter, it is argued that life has no meaning sub specie aeternitatis (that is, no purpose or point from a cosmic perspective). Nihilism about cosmic meaning is the bad news. Some people deny that life lacks cosmic meaning while others argue that it does not matter that life lacks such meaning. The chapter responds to such arguments, some of which are theistic and some of which are secular. For example, it is argued that cosmic meaning is not to be found in God’s or nature’s purposes, or in the possibility that life on earth is the only life there is.Less
This chapter is the second of two chapters concerned with whether life is meaningless. In this chapter, it is argued that life has no meaning sub specie aeternitatis (that is, no purpose or point from a cosmic perspective). Nihilism about cosmic meaning is the bad news. Some people deny that life lacks cosmic meaning while others argue that it does not matter that life lacks such meaning. The chapter responds to such arguments, some of which are theistic and some of which are secular. For example, it is argued that cosmic meaning is not to be found in God’s or nature’s purposes, or in the possibility that life on earth is the only life there is.
David Benatar
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190633813
- eISBN:
- 9780190633844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633813.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines suicide as one response to the human predicament. It is argued that while suicide can bring relief from appalling quality of life, it is not a cost-free exit from the human ...
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This chapter examines suicide as one response to the human predicament. It is argued that while suicide can bring relief from appalling quality of life, it is not a cost-free exit from the human predicament. Even when it is the least bad option, it nonetheless involves annihilation. Moreover, it fails to address the problem of meaninglessness at any level. Indeed, it often (even though not always) exacerbates that problem by limiting the sorts of meaning that are sometimes attainable. Various arguments supporting a categorical opposition to suicide are examined and rejected. These include arguments that suicide amounts to murder, that it is irrational, unnatural, and cowardly. The interests of others sometimes do but sometimes do not render suicide wrong. The finality of death makes suicide a momentous decision, but it does not always make suicide wrong. The conditions under which suicide is and is not a reasonable option are discussed.Less
This chapter examines suicide as one response to the human predicament. It is argued that while suicide can bring relief from appalling quality of life, it is not a cost-free exit from the human predicament. Even when it is the least bad option, it nonetheless involves annihilation. Moreover, it fails to address the problem of meaninglessness at any level. Indeed, it often (even though not always) exacerbates that problem by limiting the sorts of meaning that are sometimes attainable. Various arguments supporting a categorical opposition to suicide are examined and rejected. These include arguments that suicide amounts to murder, that it is irrational, unnatural, and cowardly. The interests of others sometimes do but sometimes do not render suicide wrong. The finality of death makes suicide a momentous decision, but it does not always make suicide wrong. The conditions under which suicide is and is not a reasonable option are discussed.
Jon Stewart
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198747703
- eISBN:
- 9780191810657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747703.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
Kierkegaard is interested in the problem of the meaninglessness of life. He regards this as an important modern phenomenon that must be taken seriously. This chapter begins a treatment of the second ...
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Kierkegaard is interested in the problem of the meaninglessness of life. He regards this as an important modern phenomenon that must be taken seriously. This chapter begins a treatment of the second part of The Concept of Irony, where Kierkegaard examines different forms of what he calls “modern irony.” The positions that he looks at are very similar to that of the modern nihilist. We examine this analysis to see what insights it might hold for the modern problem of the absence of meaning in the twenty-first-century world. This chapter introduces Kierkegaard’s contemporary Johan Ludvig Heiberg, who tried to alert his age to the crisis of nihilism and subjectivism in a way that anticipates some of Kierkegaard’s considerations. This chapter goes through Kierkegaard’s critical assessment of Hegel’s understanding of Socrates and history to see where Kierkegaard follows Hegel and where he strikes out on his own.Less
Kierkegaard is interested in the problem of the meaninglessness of life. He regards this as an important modern phenomenon that must be taken seriously. This chapter begins a treatment of the second part of The Concept of Irony, where Kierkegaard examines different forms of what he calls “modern irony.” The positions that he looks at are very similar to that of the modern nihilist. We examine this analysis to see what insights it might hold for the modern problem of the absence of meaning in the twenty-first-century world. This chapter introduces Kierkegaard’s contemporary Johan Ludvig Heiberg, who tried to alert his age to the crisis of nihilism and subjectivism in a way that anticipates some of Kierkegaard’s considerations. This chapter goes through Kierkegaard’s critical assessment of Hegel’s understanding of Socrates and history to see where Kierkegaard follows Hegel and where he strikes out on his own.
Iddo Landau
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190657666
- eISBN:
- 9780190657697
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190657666.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Many associate the meaning of life with the goal, aim, or end of life, asking themselves what they are living for. When they cannot answer this question, they suspect that their lives are ...
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Many associate the meaning of life with the goal, aim, or end of life, asking themselves what they are living for. When they cannot answer this question, they suspect that their lives are meaningless. Some also believe that all things must have goals in order to be meaningful. But this means that goals must also have goals, ad infinitum, with no final goal that gives meaning to the entire chain. This chapter responds to these concerns by distinguishing between instrumental and terminal value, and arguing that it is incorrect that meaningful lives must have ends to which they are means. A life may be of much worth even if it serves no ulterior purpose.Less
Many associate the meaning of life with the goal, aim, or end of life, asking themselves what they are living for. When they cannot answer this question, they suspect that their lives are meaningless. Some also believe that all things must have goals in order to be meaningful. But this means that goals must also have goals, ad infinitum, with no final goal that gives meaning to the entire chain. This chapter responds to these concerns by distinguishing between instrumental and terminal value, and arguing that it is incorrect that meaningful lives must have ends to which they are means. A life may be of much worth even if it serves no ulterior purpose.
