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Aristotle considers nature, art, spontaneity, luck, necessity, and intelligence to be causes, and they fit into the four kinds of cause that he distinguishes throughout works on natural philosophy. The four kinds of cause, e.g. matter, mover, form, end, are not themselves causes, but are classes of causes. The causes can be combined in various ways, and the same thing can be classified as several kinds of cause. Causes play a crucial role in scientific demonstration: the middle term in a syllogism of natural science. But only intrinsic (as opposed to incidental) causes can play this role, and so it is important to distinguish between things that happen to be predicated of a cause (such as paleness of a the sculptor), and things essential to a cause (such as the art of sculpture). Due attention to these distinctions can show how Aristotle thinks that various causes can be integrated (such as ends and movers) in a way that is still explanatory, and how causation does not violate temporal sequence, requiring “backwards causation”.

Focuses on the investigation of the question—why would an absolutely perfect being create anything at all? Aquinas's account of a non‐necessitated choice in the act of creating involves a return to the topic of God's power and omnipotence, opposing the single‐effect account of creation, and considering the modalities of intellection and volition. Aquinas denies any necessitation of creation stemming out of an obligation of justice or from God's perfect goodness. He then undertakes to show how not merely conditional but even absolute necessity characterizes certain aspects of the created world, despite his conviction that its original production is entirely free. Aquinas concludes his full survey of creation's modalities by showing how each kind of cause—material, formal, efficient, and final—gives rise to absolute necessity in nature.

This chapter examines the way Aristotle describes in A 3–4 (984b8–985a29) the reasons and motivations, which, on his interpretation, lead his predecessors to introduce a new type of principle that could function as the efficient cause. By bringing in parallel texts from Physics I and On the Parts of Animals I, it is argued that, for Aristotle, the trajectory of the discovery of the truth is after all less deterministic than what the language of Metaphysics A 3 might suggest. The paper aims to show, moreover, that what is discovered is not so much new types of Aristotelian causes but rather distinctions among types of principle.

In his discussion of the four causes, Aristotle claims that ‘the hypotheses are material causes of the conclusion’ (Physics 2. 3, MetaphysicsΔ‎ 2). This claim has puzzled commentators since antiquity. It is usually taken to mean that the premisses of any deduction are material causes of the conclusion. By contrast, I argue that the claim does not apply to deductions in general but only to scientific demonstrations. For Aristotle, the theorems of a given science are composites consisting of the indemonstrable premisses from which they are demonstrated. Accordingly, these premisses are elements, and hence material causes, of the theorems. In this way, Aristotle’s claim can be shown to be well motivated and illuminating.

In this Class, Ibn Sina discusses existence and its causes. Ibn Sina argues that there is an uncaused being that causes the existence of all other things. He first asserts that existence in an absolute sense, the sense beyond the existence of this or that thing, is predicable of the caused and the uncaused existence, as well as the universals, quiddities, or primary realities of things that are intelligible and beyond the sensible. He then differentiates between quiddities and existence and between their causes, taking triangularity as an example of quiddities and considering its surface and lines as if they are its material cause (what makes a thing in potentiality) and formal cause (what makes a thing in actuality). He also elaborates the nature and function of the efficient and final causes, their relationship to other causes (whether or not embodying form and matter), and to each other.

This chapter discusses, principally, Aristotle’s biological works on animals, De anima and the Metaphysics. Its intent is to lay out the texts with which Aquinas would substantiate his view that individuality has its origins in matter, and not the soul. Aristotle’s thought on heredity and the embryo and his (problematic) account of the relationship between universals (or common natures) and individuals are discussed. The distinctive sophistication of the human body vis-à-vis other animals is another theme. Two related Aristotelian principles emerge as crucial: that matter and form should bear a proportion to one another, such that each form has its differentiated ‘proper matter’, and that matter’s ability to receive form depends upon its having developed the appropriate qualities (i.e. in its capacity as the ‘material cause’). The chapter concludes by schematically illustrating how Aquinas adapted Aristotle’s thought on individuality for his own purposes.