Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199258871
- eISBN:
- 9780191597046
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258872.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Conditionals are of two basic kinds, often called ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’. This book expounds and evaluates the main literature about each kind. It eventually defends the view of Adams and ...
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Conditionals are of two basic kinds, often called ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’. This book expounds and evaluates the main literature about each kind. It eventually defends the view of Adams and Edgington that indicatives are devices for expressing subjective probabilities, and the view of Stalnaker and Lewis that subjunctives are statements about close possible worlds. But it also discusses other views, e.g. that indicatives are really material conditionals, and Goodman's approach to subjunctives.Less
Conditionals are of two basic kinds, often called ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’. This book expounds and evaluates the main literature about each kind. It eventually defends the view of Adams and Edgington that indicatives are devices for expressing subjective probabilities, and the view of Stalnaker and Lewis that subjunctives are statements about close possible worlds. But it also discusses other views, e.g. that indicatives are really material conditionals, and Goodman's approach to subjunctives.
Peter Langland-Hassan
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198815068
- eISBN:
- 9780191852886
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198815068.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Three types of conditional are distinguished: the material conditional, indicative conditional, and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. The apparent difference in truth conditions of each is ...
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Three types of conditional are distinguished: the material conditional, indicative conditional, and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. The apparent difference in truth conditions of each is suggestive of different psychological procedures used in the evaluation of each. The psychology of the material conditional is then examined. Despite procedures in formal logic that are suggestive of sui generis imaginative states (e.g., “assuming” a proposition for conditional proof, or for reductio), we need not countenance the use of such states within the psychological procedures used to carry out the inferences. Further, work in psychology has long suggested that humans do not, as a rule, reason in accordance with normative standards appropriate to the material conditional. A popular alternative proposal in psychology is that conditional reasoning involves the use of mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The use of mental models is shown to be consistent with conditional reasoning involving only sequences of beliefs.Less
Three types of conditional are distinguished: the material conditional, indicative conditional, and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional. The apparent difference in truth conditions of each is suggestive of different psychological procedures used in the evaluation of each. The psychology of the material conditional is then examined. Despite procedures in formal logic that are suggestive of sui generis imaginative states (e.g., “assuming” a proposition for conditional proof, or for reductio), we need not countenance the use of such states within the psychological procedures used to carry out the inferences. Further, work in psychology has long suggested that humans do not, as a rule, reason in accordance with normative standards appropriate to the material conditional. A popular alternative proposal in psychology is that conditional reasoning involves the use of mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The use of mental models is shown to be consistent with conditional reasoning involving only sequences of beliefs.
Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199258871
- eISBN:
- 9780191597046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258872.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Discussion of Grice's view that indicative conditionals are material conditionals, and his attempt to explain away apparent counter‐evidence by appeal to his excellent theory of conversational ...
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Discussion of Grice's view that indicative conditionals are material conditionals, and his attempt to explain away apparent counter‐evidence by appeal to his excellent theory of conversational implicature. Discusses failure of this attempt: indicatives obey the so‐called ‘Ramsey test’, and Grice's theory cannot explain this.Less
Discussion of Grice's view that indicative conditionals are material conditionals, and his attempt to explain away apparent counter‐evidence by appeal to his excellent theory of conversational implicature. Discusses failure of this attempt: indicatives obey the so‐called ‘Ramsey test’, and Grice's theory cannot explain this.
Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199258871
- eISBN:
- 9780191597046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258872.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Discussion of Jackson's view that indicative conditionals are material conditionals, and his attempt to explain away apparent counter‐evidence by appeal to the notion of conventional implicature. His ...
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Discussion of Jackson's view that indicative conditionals are material conditionals, and his attempt to explain away apparent counter‐evidence by appeal to the notion of conventional implicature. His good explanation of the latter as a general phenomenon shows many respects in which it is not applicable to indicative conditionals.Less
Discussion of Jackson's view that indicative conditionals are material conditionals, and his attempt to explain away apparent counter‐evidence by appeal to the notion of conventional implicature. His good explanation of the latter as a general phenomenon shows many respects in which it is not applicable to indicative conditionals.
Roy T Cook
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199669608
- eISBN:
- 9780191760600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This short concluding chapter examines the connections between the Yablo paradox, the Liar paradox involving negation, and the Curry paradox involving the material conditional. A Yablo–Curry hybrid ...
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This short concluding chapter examines the connections between the Yablo paradox, the Liar paradox involving negation, and the Curry paradox involving the material conditional. A Yablo–Curry hybrid is presented that incorporates the interesting and problematic aspects of the Yablo and Curry paradoxes into a single construction. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the difficulties facing any detailed examination similar to the one undertaken in previous chapters using graph theory and related techniques, of this more general Curry–Yablo construction (and variants and generalizations of it).Less
This short concluding chapter examines the connections between the Yablo paradox, the Liar paradox involving negation, and the Curry paradox involving the material conditional. A Yablo–Curry hybrid is presented that incorporates the interesting and problematic aspects of the Yablo and Curry paradoxes into a single construction. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the difficulties facing any detailed examination similar to the one undertaken in previous chapters using graph theory and related techniques, of this more general Curry–Yablo construction (and variants and generalizations of it).
