David A. Teegarden
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691156903
- eISBN:
- 9781400848539
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691156903.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Ancient History / Archaeology
This is the first comprehensive study of ancient Greek tyrant-killing legislation—laws that explicitly gave individuals incentives to “kill a tyrant.” The book demonstrates that the ancient Greeks ...
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This is the first comprehensive study of ancient Greek tyrant-killing legislation—laws that explicitly gave individuals incentives to “kill a tyrant.” The book demonstrates that the ancient Greeks promulgated these laws to harness the dynamics of mass uprisings and preserve popular democratic rule in the face of anti-democratic threats. It presents detailed historical and sociopolitical analyses of each law and considers a variety of issues: What is the nature of an anti-democratic threat? How would various provisions of the laws help pro-democrats counter those threats? And did the laws work? The book argues that tyrant-killing legislation facilitated pro-democracy mobilization both by encouraging brave individuals to strike the first blow against a nondemocratic regime and by convincing others that it was safe to follow the tyrant killer's lead. Such legislation thus deterred anti-democrats from staging a coup by ensuring that they would be overwhelmed by their numerically superior opponents. Drawing on modern social science models, the book looks at how the institution of public law affects the behavior of individuals and groups, thereby exploring the foundation of democracy's persistence in the ancient Greek world. It also provides the first English translation of the tyrant-killing laws from Eretria and Ilion. By analyzing crucial ancient Greek tyrant-killing legislation, the book explains how certain laws enabled citizens to draw on collective strength in order to defend and preserve their democracy in the face of motivated opposition.Less
This is the first comprehensive study of ancient Greek tyrant-killing legislation—laws that explicitly gave individuals incentives to “kill a tyrant.” The book demonstrates that the ancient Greeks promulgated these laws to harness the dynamics of mass uprisings and preserve popular democratic rule in the face of anti-democratic threats. It presents detailed historical and sociopolitical analyses of each law and considers a variety of issues: What is the nature of an anti-democratic threat? How would various provisions of the laws help pro-democrats counter those threats? And did the laws work? The book argues that tyrant-killing legislation facilitated pro-democracy mobilization both by encouraging brave individuals to strike the first blow against a nondemocratic regime and by convincing others that it was safe to follow the tyrant killer's lead. Such legislation thus deterred anti-democrats from staging a coup by ensuring that they would be overwhelmed by their numerically superior opponents. Drawing on modern social science models, the book looks at how the institution of public law affects the behavior of individuals and groups, thereby exploring the foundation of democracy's persistence in the ancient Greek world. It also provides the first English translation of the tyrant-killing laws from Eretria and Ilion. By analyzing crucial ancient Greek tyrant-killing legislation, the book explains how certain laws enabled citizens to draw on collective strength in order to defend and preserve their democracy in the face of motivated opposition.
Anthony James Joes
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124377
- eISBN:
- 9780813134833
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124377.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History
Amid heavy losses in personnel and morale, the Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi planned for a surprise offensive against American and allied forces during the Tet holidays of 1968. What was ...
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Amid heavy losses in personnel and morale, the Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi planned for a surprise offensive against American and allied forces during the Tet holidays of 1968. What was surprising about the Tet Offensive was that it called for the communists to abandon their guerrilla tactics and expose themselves to overwhelming American and allied firepower, particularly in Saigon. When none of their plans worked and no popular uprising came to support them, the Viet Congs were soundly defeated. Although the loss proved to be a turning point for the North Vietnamese, who have since favored the use of conventional warfare, the American public grew even more disillusioned with the war mainly as a consequence of how it was portrayed in the media. With the antiwar sentiment growing in the US, President Lyndon Johnson agreed to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. Without the help of its allies, South Vietnam continued to fight the North Vietnamese army for another two and a half years before Saigon fell in 1975.Less
Amid heavy losses in personnel and morale, the Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi planned for a surprise offensive against American and allied forces during the Tet holidays of 1968. What was surprising about the Tet Offensive was that it called for the communists to abandon their guerrilla tactics and expose themselves to overwhelming American and allied firepower, particularly in Saigon. When none of their plans worked and no popular uprising came to support them, the Viet Congs were soundly defeated. Although the loss proved to be a turning point for the North Vietnamese, who have since favored the use of conventional warfare, the American public grew even more disillusioned with the war mainly as a consequence of how it was portrayed in the media. With the antiwar sentiment growing in the US, President Lyndon Johnson agreed to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. Without the help of its allies, South Vietnam continued to fight the North Vietnamese army for another two and a half years before Saigon fell in 1975.
