Henrik Glimstedt
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269044
- eISBN:
- 9780191717123
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269044.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business
By emphasizing the rigid character of centralized bargaining, many students of Sweden's political economy end up by wrongly characterizing its national industry as ‘Fordist’. By contrast, this ...
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By emphasizing the rigid character of centralized bargaining, many students of Sweden's political economy end up by wrongly characterizing its national industry as ‘Fordist’. By contrast, this chapter argues that the strategic responses to increased competitiveness actually varied across sectors. In motor vehicles and electrical engineering, the experience of diversity of market realities, heterogeneous institutions, and conflicting political goals forced enthusiastic proponents of Americanization to modify or abandon their view on the fundamentals of industrial efficiency. Pressure from customers for innovation, small batch production, adaptation, and successive upgrading of existing products created obstacles to standardization. It was not until increased liberalization of world trade and competitive pressures began to make themselves felt in export as well as domestic markets that the ambiguities of Swedish industrial practices became manifest, spurring national industry to redefine its identity through a process of strategic debate and selective adaptation.Less
By emphasizing the rigid character of centralized bargaining, many students of Sweden's political economy end up by wrongly characterizing its national industry as ‘Fordist’. By contrast, this chapter argues that the strategic responses to increased competitiveness actually varied across sectors. In motor vehicles and electrical engineering, the experience of diversity of market realities, heterogeneous institutions, and conflicting political goals forced enthusiastic proponents of Americanization to modify or abandon their view on the fundamentals of industrial efficiency. Pressure from customers for innovation, small batch production, adaptation, and successive upgrading of existing products created obstacles to standardization. It was not until increased liberalization of world trade and competitive pressures began to make themselves felt in export as well as domestic markets that the ambiguities of Swedish industrial practices became manifest, spurring national industry to redefine its identity through a process of strategic debate and selective adaptation.
Michael J. Piore
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269761
- eISBN:
- 9780191710087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.003.0007
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This chapter offers a historical reconstruction of the evolution of governance structures in the modern history of the US; seen through the lenses of Polanyi's thesis, the main problem of ...
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This chapter offers a historical reconstruction of the evolution of governance structures in the modern history of the US; seen through the lenses of Polanyi's thesis, the main problem of contemporary economic organization is the clash between the competitive market and the social nature of human beings. This chapter analyses how this clash was resolved in different historical phases: by the adjustment of the social system to the requirement of production under the old regime of mass production, by negotiation and unionization under the New Deal. It characterizes the current phase as one of ‘disarticulation’ of the relationship between the economic and the social structures, where they are neither separate nor related in any clear way, to which a solution is yet to be found.Less
This chapter offers a historical reconstruction of the evolution of governance structures in the modern history of the US; seen through the lenses of Polanyi's thesis, the main problem of contemporary economic organization is the clash between the competitive market and the social nature of human beings. This chapter analyses how this clash was resolved in different historical phases: by the adjustment of the social system to the requirement of production under the old regime of mass production, by negotiation and unionization under the New Deal. It characterizes the current phase as one of ‘disarticulation’ of the relationship between the economic and the social structures, where they are neither separate nor related in any clear way, to which a solution is yet to be found.
Chris Freeman and Francisco Louçã
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251056
- eISBN:
- 9780191596278
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251053.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
The key inventions that led to the internal combustion engine, to the automobile, the truck, the tractor, and the tank, were made in Europe, but the innovations that led to the assembly line, to mass ...
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The key inventions that led to the internal combustion engine, to the automobile, the truck, the tractor, and the tank, were made in Europe, but the innovations that led to the assembly line, to mass production and consumption, were made at the Ford plant in Detroit in the early years of the twentieth century.These technical and organizational innovations gave such an impetus to productivity, profitability, output, and exports of the US automobile industry that the plant became a Mecca for visitors from all over the world and ‘Fordism’ became a dominant management philosophy as well as an economic and cultural ideology, believed to herald the dawn of a ‘new economy’.The chapter devotes considerable attention to possible explanations for the collapse of this boom and the advent of the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930s, concluding that, as with previous clusters of innovations, the assimilation of a major new technology into the social system gave rise to enormous political and social tensions and to structural crises of adjustment, both at national and international levels.These tensions and conflicts led ultimately to a Second World War, a motorized war in which tanks and aircraft proved decisive weapons and oil was the essential fuel for the motorized armed forces.The world economy after the war was no less dependent on abundant cheap oil, and became a system dominated by the mass production of cars and consumer durables, as well as motor highways, the mass media, mass tourism, mass education, mass culture, and the political and military supremacy of the US.Less
The key inventions that led to the internal combustion engine, to the automobile, the truck, the tractor, and the tank, were made in Europe, but the innovations that led to the assembly line, to mass production and consumption, were made at the Ford plant in Detroit in the early years of the twentieth century.
These technical and organizational innovations gave such an impetus to productivity, profitability, output, and exports of the US automobile industry that the plant became a Mecca for visitors from all over the world and ‘Fordism’ became a dominant management philosophy as well as an economic and cultural ideology, believed to herald the dawn of a ‘new economy’.
The chapter devotes considerable attention to possible explanations for the collapse of this boom and the advent of the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930s, concluding that, as with previous clusters of innovations, the assimilation of a major new technology into the social system gave rise to enormous political and social tensions and to structural crises of adjustment, both at national and international levels.
These tensions and conflicts led ultimately to a Second World War, a motorized war in which tanks and aircraft proved decisive weapons and oil was the essential fuel for the motorized armed forces.
The world economy after the war was no less dependent on abundant cheap oil, and became a system dominated by the mass production of cars and consumer durables, as well as motor highways, the mass media, mass tourism, mass education, mass culture, and the political and military supremacy of the US.
Simon Head
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195179835
- eISBN:
- 9780199850211
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179835.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter examines the history of the mass production system in the manufacturing and service industries in the U.S. The mass production model's triumph first came with its application in the ...
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This chapter examines the history of the mass production system in the manufacturing and service industries in the U.S. The mass production model's triumph first came with its application in the armaments industry during World War 2, this was followed by its application in the consumer economy in the late 1940s and the 1950s and the renewal of the mass production model by Japanese manufacturers in the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter contends that the roots of mass production run deep in American history and the early wave of mass production was not confined to the commanding heights of the American industry.Less
This chapter examines the history of the mass production system in the manufacturing and service industries in the U.S. The mass production model's triumph first came with its application in the armaments industry during World War 2, this was followed by its application in the consumer economy in the late 1940s and the 1950s and the renewal of the mass production model by Japanese manufacturers in the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter contends that the roots of mass production run deep in American history and the early wave of mass production was not confined to the commanding heights of the American industry.
Michael H. Best
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297451
- eISBN:
- 9780191595967
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297459.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
Explores the links between a firm, region, or nation's production capabilities and productivity. Productivity is explained in terms of fundamental principles of production that underlie the ...
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Explores the links between a firm, region, or nation's production capabilities and productivity. Productivity is explained in terms of fundamental principles of production that underlie the organizational design of business enterprises and production systems. Industrial development, and enhanced competitiveness, is about making the transition to more advanced principles of production and associated levels of production capabilities. A ten‐scale production capabilities spectrum is presented to identify both where a firm or a region's firms fit in the world economy and the specific and critical challenges and opportunities to increased industrial productivity. The evolution of production principles and capabilities is illustrated with five examples of enterprises that established industrial leadership by the application of an enduring production principle: the American System of Manufacture and the principle of interchangeability; Ford and the principle of single‐product flow or mass production; Toyota and multi‐product flow or JIT; Canon and multi‐product flow applied to new product development; and Intel and systems integration.Less
Explores the links between a firm, region, or nation's production capabilities and productivity. Productivity is explained in terms of fundamental principles of production that underlie the organizational design of business enterprises and production systems. Industrial development, and enhanced competitiveness, is about making the transition to more advanced principles of production and associated levels of production capabilities. A ten‐scale production capabilities spectrum is presented to identify both where a firm or a region's firms fit in the world economy and the specific and critical challenges and opportunities to increased industrial productivity. The evolution of production principles and capabilities is illustrated with five examples of enterprises that established industrial leadership by the application of an enduring production principle: the American System of Manufacture and the principle of interchangeability; Ford and the principle of single‐product flow or mass production; Toyota and multi‐product flow or JIT; Canon and multi‐product flow applied to new product development; and Intel and systems integration.
Vernon W. Ruttan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195188042
- eISBN:
- 9780199783410
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195188047.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Economic historians have characterized the American system of manufacturing, or more appropriately the New England armory system, as the assembly of complex products produced from individual ...
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Economic historians have characterized the American system of manufacturing, or more appropriately the New England armory system, as the assembly of complex products produced from individual interchangeable parts. Its first important application was the manufacture of firearms at the U.S. army armories in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and Springfield, Massachusetts. During the second half of the 19th century, “armory practice” spread to other branches of manufacturing, such as sewing machine and bicycle manufacture and, in the early twentieth century, to the “Fordist system” of mass production of automobiles.Less
Economic historians have characterized the American system of manufacturing, or more appropriately the New England armory system, as the assembly of complex products produced from individual interchangeable parts. Its first important application was the manufacture of firearms at the U.S. army armories in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and Springfield, Massachusetts. During the second half of the 19th century, “armory practice” spread to other branches of manufacturing, such as sewing machine and bicycle manufacture and, in the early twentieth century, to the “Fordist system” of mass production of automobiles.
Volker R. Berghahn
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161099
- eISBN:
- 9781400850297
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161099.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter deals with the period between the 1923 economic crisis and an even more severe economic breakdown in 1929. This period saw an engagement of the United States in Europe that had not been ...
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This chapter deals with the period between the 1923 economic crisis and an even more severe economic breakdown in 1929. This period saw an engagement of the United States in Europe that had not been possible in the immediate postwar years, generating a few years of relative stability and prosperity in which American manufacturing companies and banks played a major role. It was the phase in which the United States succeeded in deploying its superior industrial and financial power in an attempt to uplift the economies of Europe. During those five years it was not only American ideas and practices of rationalized mass production that came to Europe through massive foreign direct investments; rather Europe, again for the first time, got a taste of mass consumption, even if it was still quite limited in terms of affordable consumer durables.Less
This chapter deals with the period between the 1923 economic crisis and an even more severe economic breakdown in 1929. This period saw an engagement of the United States in Europe that had not been possible in the immediate postwar years, generating a few years of relative stability and prosperity in which American manufacturing companies and banks played a major role. It was the phase in which the United States succeeded in deploying its superior industrial and financial power in an attempt to uplift the economies of Europe. During those five years it was not only American ideas and practices of rationalized mass production that came to Europe through massive foreign direct investments; rather Europe, again for the first time, got a taste of mass consumption, even if it was still quite limited in terms of affordable consumer durables.
R. J. Overy
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198202905
- eISBN:
- 9780191675584
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202905.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History, Economic History
The rationalisation of industrial production played a significant part in transforming the productive performance of all the major warring states between 1939 and 1945. Wartime economic pressure, ...
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The rationalisation of industrial production played a significant part in transforming the productive performance of all the major warring states between 1939 and 1945. Wartime economic pressure, brought about as a result of the high demand for industrial products and the limited resources available, compelled efforts to use industrial capacity more efficiently. Rationalisation in the context of war production meant the systematic saving of materials and manpower in order to achieve the highest possible quantities of output. This involved the application of modern mass-production techniques and the scientific management of labour and material resources, not with the profit motive in mind, but in order to approach as far as possible the optimum use of national resources for Germany's war effort.Less
The rationalisation of industrial production played a significant part in transforming the productive performance of all the major warring states between 1939 and 1945. Wartime economic pressure, brought about as a result of the high demand for industrial products and the limited resources available, compelled efforts to use industrial capacity more efficiently. Rationalisation in the context of war production meant the systematic saving of materials and manpower in order to achieve the highest possible quantities of output. This involved the application of modern mass-production techniques and the scientific management of labour and material resources, not with the profit motive in mind, but in order to approach as far as possible the optimum use of national resources for Germany's war effort.
Mary O'Sullivan
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244867
- eISBN:
- 9780191596735
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244863.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter has two main sections, which contrast the post‐war development of managerial control in the USA in the mass production industries, and the high‐technology industries––as exemplified by ...
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This chapter has two main sections, which contrast the post‐war development of managerial control in the USA in the mass production industries, and the high‐technology industries––as exemplified by the electronics industry. The first, Sect. 4.2, The post‐war governance of mass‐production enterprises, discusses the trend towards strategic segmentation––the emergence of conglomerations and resulting impact on performance, and the emergence of core corporate enterprises. The second, Sect. 4.3, The electronics complex and the governance of innovation, discusses the roles of the federal government and of venture capital, and the abiding importance of the innovative corporation.Less
This chapter has two main sections, which contrast the post‐war development of managerial control in the USA in the mass production industries, and the high‐technology industries––as exemplified by the electronics industry. The first, Sect. 4.2, The post‐war governance of mass‐production enterprises, discusses the trend towards strategic segmentation––the emergence of conglomerations and resulting impact on performance, and the emergence of core corporate enterprises. The second, Sect. 4.3, The electronics complex and the governance of innovation, discusses the roles of the federal government and of venture capital, and the abiding importance of the innovative corporation.
Stefan J. Link
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691177540
- eISBN:
- 9780691207988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691177540.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter traces mass production to its beginnings in the United States, where it emerged from the distinctive ideology of Midwestern populism. Why did Detroit, of all places, pioneer the industry ...
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This chapter traces mass production to its beginnings in the United States, where it emerged from the distinctive ideology of Midwestern populism. Why did Detroit, of all places, pioneer the industry that would shape the twentieth century like no other? Was Detroit simply lucky, as it were, to count a Henry Ford and a Ransom Olds among its citizens — incarnations of the American genius for innovation and entrepreneurship? Figures like Ford and Olds acted within the political economy of the Midwest and shared the characteristic populist commitments that suffused the region. These two factors — political economy and political ideology — go a long way toward explaining why, at the turn of the twentieth century, southeastern Michigan was in an auspicious position to get ahead of rapid technological developments and to spread its fruits widely. Experts with machines and metal, Midwestern mechanics gave their producerism a characteristic technological spin. This kind of producer populism permeated Detroit politics. The chapter then looks at a series of very different conflicts which honed Henry Ford's conviction that automotive mass production should reflect a producer-populist orientation.Less
This chapter traces mass production to its beginnings in the United States, where it emerged from the distinctive ideology of Midwestern populism. Why did Detroit, of all places, pioneer the industry that would shape the twentieth century like no other? Was Detroit simply lucky, as it were, to count a Henry Ford and a Ransom Olds among its citizens — incarnations of the American genius for innovation and entrepreneurship? Figures like Ford and Olds acted within the political economy of the Midwest and shared the characteristic populist commitments that suffused the region. These two factors — political economy and political ideology — go a long way toward explaining why, at the turn of the twentieth century, southeastern Michigan was in an auspicious position to get ahead of rapid technological developments and to spread its fruits widely. Experts with machines and metal, Midwestern mechanics gave their producerism a characteristic technological spin. This kind of producer populism permeated Detroit politics. The chapter then looks at a series of very different conflicts which honed Henry Ford's conviction that automotive mass production should reflect a producer-populist orientation.
Vaclav Smil
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195168747
- eISBN:
- 9780199835522
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195168747.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
Pre-WWI technical advances have created economies and societies whose abundance of material possessions, rates of energy consumption, and overall tempo of life were entirely unprecedented. Both the ...
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Pre-WWI technical advances have created economies and societies whose abundance of material possessions, rates of energy consumption, and overall tempo of life were entirely unprecedented. Both the fundamental infrastructures of modern life and countless everyday actions rest on enduring artifacts and ubiquitous innovations of the Age of Synergy. Mechanization of virtually all productive tasks led to mass production and both were made possible by steadily rising combustion of fossil fuels and generation of electricity. They brought new economic arrangements (including powerful multinational companies) as well as new forms of leisure.Less
Pre-WWI technical advances have created economies and societies whose abundance of material possessions, rates of energy consumption, and overall tempo of life were entirely unprecedented. Both the fundamental infrastructures of modern life and countless everyday actions rest on enduring artifacts and ubiquitous innovations of the Age of Synergy. Mechanization of virtually all productive tasks led to mass production and both were made possible by steadily rising combustion of fossil fuels and generation of electricity. They brought new economic arrangements (including powerful multinational companies) as well as new forms of leisure.
Alice H. Amsden
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139693
- eISBN:
- 9780199832897
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195139690.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History, International
The fierce competition triggered after 1815 by Britain's technological revolution in textiles created havoc, and ultimately four defensive strategies among textile‐producing countries: at the high ...
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The fierce competition triggered after 1815 by Britain's technological revolution in textiles created havoc, and ultimately four defensive strategies among textile‐producing countries: at the high end of the capabilities scale, France exploited its traditional artisanship in hand spinning and hand weaving, and the USA adopted a mass production system similar to that of England, but produced coarse rather than line fabrics; at the low end of the capabilities scale, Mexico followed the USA into mass production. China, India and the Ottoman Empire tried to imitate France while simultaneously struggling to produce industrial yarn and cloth for mass consumption. Despite superficial similarities, the history of the rest's pre‐war textile industries could not have been more different from those of France, the USA, or Japan: the latter innovated their way out of trouble whereas the former did not. Whatever the strategy—mass production or artisan—and whatever the degree of economic openness—protectionist (as in Mexico and Brazil) or free trade (as in China, India and the Ottoman Empire)—the textile industries of the rest failed to become dynamic world players until after the Second World War. This chapter begins to explore the reasons behind the failure of the rest, and, to convey the extent of their skill deficit, the capabilities of France, the USA, and Japan are examined to the extent necessary to establish a benchmark.Less
The fierce competition triggered after 1815 by Britain's technological revolution in textiles created havoc, and ultimately four defensive strategies among textile‐producing countries: at the high end of the capabilities scale, France exploited its traditional artisanship in hand spinning and hand weaving, and the USA adopted a mass production system similar to that of England, but produced coarse rather than line fabrics; at the low end of the capabilities scale, Mexico followed the USA into mass production. China, India and the Ottoman Empire tried to imitate France while simultaneously struggling to produce industrial yarn and cloth for mass consumption. Despite superficial similarities, the history of the rest's pre‐war textile industries could not have been more different from those of France, the USA, or Japan: the latter innovated their way out of trouble whereas the former did not. Whatever the strategy—mass production or artisan—and whatever the degree of economic openness—protectionist (as in Mexico and Brazil) or free trade (as in China, India and the Ottoman Empire)—the textile industries of the rest failed to become dynamic world players until after the Second World War. This chapter begins to explore the reasons behind the failure of the rest, and, to convey the extent of their skill deficit, the capabilities of France, the USA, and Japan are examined to the extent necessary to establish a benchmark.
KEITH KEITH
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199244898
- eISBN:
- 9780191697401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244898.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies, HRM / IR
This chapter returns to the business world to look at Henry Ford, whose leadership inaugurated a qualitative leap from craft to mass production and gave rise to the term ‘Fordism’. It discusses how ...
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This chapter returns to the business world to look at Henry Ford, whose leadership inaugurated a qualitative leap from craft to mass production and gave rise to the term ‘Fordism’. It discusses how Ford enabled vast numbers of Americans to own cars because his prices were so low, but he persisted in assuming that price was critical long after many of his former customers had drifted away to the cars of General Motors and Chrysler, where the competitive edge was in novelty and product enhancements not simply price. It notes that Ford was a pacifist who spent a vast personal fortune leasing a ‘peace ship’ to sail to Europe and stop the First World War—but he simultaneously made an even bigger fortune with his production of munitions, boats, tanks, planes, and jeeps in both wars.Less
This chapter returns to the business world to look at Henry Ford, whose leadership inaugurated a qualitative leap from craft to mass production and gave rise to the term ‘Fordism’. It discusses how Ford enabled vast numbers of Americans to own cars because his prices were so low, but he persisted in assuming that price was critical long after many of his former customers had drifted away to the cars of General Motors and Chrysler, where the competitive edge was in novelty and product enhancements not simply price. It notes that Ford was a pacifist who spent a vast personal fortune leasing a ‘peace ship’ to sail to Europe and stop the First World War—but he simultaneously made an even bigger fortune with his production of munitions, boats, tanks, planes, and jeeps in both wars.
Simon Head
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195179835
- eISBN:
- 9780199850211
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179835.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter examines the role of the Japanese automobile industry on the relationship between technology and work in factories and offices in the U.S. It explains that many concepts used to define ...
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This chapter examines the role of the Japanese automobile industry on the relationship between technology and work in factories and offices in the U.S. It explains that many concepts used to define the role of employees in the new economy like multiskilling, flexible specialization, worker empowerment and worker autonomy had their origins in the methods of Japanese automobile companies. These companies did not abandon the mass production model, but instead strengthened and renewed it.Less
This chapter examines the role of the Japanese automobile industry on the relationship between technology and work in factories and offices in the U.S. It explains that many concepts used to define the role of employees in the new economy like multiskilling, flexible specialization, worker empowerment and worker autonomy had their origins in the methods of Japanese automobile companies. These companies did not abandon the mass production model, but instead strengthened and renewed it.
Stefan J. Link
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691177540
- eISBN:
- 9780691207988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691177540.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter evaluates how both regimes of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany put Fordism to use during World War II. William Werner's ascent to the commanding heights of Nazi Germany's wartime ...
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This chapter evaluates how both regimes of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany put Fordism to use during World War II. William Werner's ascent to the commanding heights of Nazi Germany's wartime industrial complex illustrates how the state-led pursuit of mass production that began in the 1930s intensified under the conditions of total war. With greater force than before, the Nazi regime sought to bind industry to the war economy. The bureaucracy of the armaments began telling firms what to produce, how to produce, and whom to hire. Werner's career, then, sheds light on a crucial but little-explored realm of the Nazi war economy: the institutional interface that bridged the ministries and the shop floors. Like the Nazi war machine, the Soviet armaments industry had to find ways to achieve, in the words of William Werner, “higher output with fewer skilled workers.” How this worked can be illustrated by looking, once more, at Gaz.Less
This chapter evaluates how both regimes of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany put Fordism to use during World War II. William Werner's ascent to the commanding heights of Nazi Germany's wartime industrial complex illustrates how the state-led pursuit of mass production that began in the 1930s intensified under the conditions of total war. With greater force than before, the Nazi regime sought to bind industry to the war economy. The bureaucracy of the armaments began telling firms what to produce, how to produce, and whom to hire. Werner's career, then, sheds light on a crucial but little-explored realm of the Nazi war economy: the institutional interface that bridged the ministries and the shop floors. Like the Nazi war machine, the Soviet armaments industry had to find ways to achieve, in the words of William Werner, “higher output with fewer skilled workers.” How this worked can be illustrated by looking, once more, at Gaz.
Geoffrey Tweedale
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198288664
- eISBN:
- 9780191684623
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198288664.003.0080
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
Although the 1920s and the 1930s are often presented as black decades for the cutlery and tool trades of the Sheffield steel industries, increased international competition, trade depressions, ...
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Although the 1920s and the 1930s are often presented as black decades for the cutlery and tool trades of the Sheffield steel industries, increased international competition, trade depressions, changing consumer preferences and demand, the erosion of craft skills, and other such negative trends for the industry were compensated with various developments that brought about new opportunities. Aside from how the inter-war period marked a significant period in the history of the cutlery industry, it was in this period in which the modern knife — which was machine-produced, stainless, and heavily advertised and distributed on a massive scale — was introduced. This chapter attempts to look into how Sheffield was able to respond to such trends, particularly to how they were able to incorporate individualism in spite of the mass production of tools and cutlery.Less
Although the 1920s and the 1930s are often presented as black decades for the cutlery and tool trades of the Sheffield steel industries, increased international competition, trade depressions, changing consumer preferences and demand, the erosion of craft skills, and other such negative trends for the industry were compensated with various developments that brought about new opportunities. Aside from how the inter-war period marked a significant period in the history of the cutlery industry, it was in this period in which the modern knife — which was machine-produced, stainless, and heavily advertised and distributed on a massive scale — was introduced. This chapter attempts to look into how Sheffield was able to respond to such trends, particularly to how they were able to incorporate individualism in spite of the mass production of tools and cutlery.
Stefan J. Link
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691177540
- eISBN:
- 9780691207988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691177540.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter discusses how European postliberals on both the left and the right grasped Fordism as a compass by which to navigate the economic and ideological confusions of the 1920s. It studies ...
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This chapter discusses how European postliberals on both the left and the right grasped Fordism as a compass by which to navigate the economic and ideological confusions of the 1920s. It studies Henry Ford's My Life and Work (1922). What accounts for this book's astonishing impact? Part of the answer lies, as historians have long recognized, in the fascination that all things American exerted upon the world after the Great War. Dazed and diminished by the war, Europeans squinted across the Atlantic and saw an image of the future: a new type of civilization, characterized by mass production and mass-consumption, skyscrapers and Hollywood, assembly lines and flapper dresses. Like no other phenomenon, Henry Ford's factories seemed to exemplify this new American modernity: here the machine-like uniformity of modern industrial production begot a high standard of living and new possibilities for extravagant consumption and cultural expression. Ford's book went straight to the heart of the fierce Soviet debates about socialist industrial development. In essence, My Life and Work and its successor volumes elaborated a producerist agenda for the twentieth century.Less
This chapter discusses how European postliberals on both the left and the right grasped Fordism as a compass by which to navigate the economic and ideological confusions of the 1920s. It studies Henry Ford's My Life and Work (1922). What accounts for this book's astonishing impact? Part of the answer lies, as historians have long recognized, in the fascination that all things American exerted upon the world after the Great War. Dazed and diminished by the war, Europeans squinted across the Atlantic and saw an image of the future: a new type of civilization, characterized by mass production and mass-consumption, skyscrapers and Hollywood, assembly lines and flapper dresses. Like no other phenomenon, Henry Ford's factories seemed to exemplify this new American modernity: here the machine-like uniformity of modern industrial production begot a high standard of living and new possibilities for extravagant consumption and cultural expression. Ford's book went straight to the heart of the fierce Soviet debates about socialist industrial development. In essence, My Life and Work and its successor volumes elaborated a producerist agenda for the twentieth century.
Stefan J. Link
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691177540
- eISBN:
- 9780691207988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691177540.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter investigates Nazi Germany's efforts to acquire American mass production technology in order to create their own version of Fordism in the Thirties. Unlike the Soviet Union, Germany ...
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This chapter investigates Nazi Germany's efforts to acquire American mass production technology in order to create their own version of Fordism in the Thirties. Unlike the Soviet Union, Germany boasted a highly developed industrial base in its own right, centered around classic producer goods, such as coal, steel, machine tools, and instruments. Though Germany's machine tool builders were a proud and venerable branch with considerable export clout, they were unequipped to supply mass production factories. Acquiring automotive mass production was of neuralgic significance: it not only harbored the potential of a growth-generating consumer and export sector, but it was also — more immediately urgent to the Nazi regime — of primary military-strategic significance. Accordingly, the Nazi regime did not purchase bulk machinery and entire technological systems wholesale, Soviet-style. Instead, it resorted to targeted industrial reconnaissance and the recruitment of American specialists — that is, to Detroit missions such as those of Ferdinand Porsche, Otto Dyckhoff, and William Werner. The Nazi regime ensnared the American multinationals operating in Germany in a web of political pressure and economic incentives, and in doing so found ways to appropriate the Americans' technology without spending significant amounts of US dollars.Less
This chapter investigates Nazi Germany's efforts to acquire American mass production technology in order to create their own version of Fordism in the Thirties. Unlike the Soviet Union, Germany boasted a highly developed industrial base in its own right, centered around classic producer goods, such as coal, steel, machine tools, and instruments. Though Germany's machine tool builders were a proud and venerable branch with considerable export clout, they were unequipped to supply mass production factories. Acquiring automotive mass production was of neuralgic significance: it not only harbored the potential of a growth-generating consumer and export sector, but it was also — more immediately urgent to the Nazi regime — of primary military-strategic significance. Accordingly, the Nazi regime did not purchase bulk machinery and entire technological systems wholesale, Soviet-style. Instead, it resorted to targeted industrial reconnaissance and the recruitment of American specialists — that is, to Detroit missions such as those of Ferdinand Porsche, Otto Dyckhoff, and William Werner. The Nazi regime ensnared the American multinationals operating in Germany in a web of political pressure and economic incentives, and in doing so found ways to appropriate the Americans' technology without spending significant amounts of US dollars.
Mary O'Sullivan
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244867
- eISBN:
- 9780191596735
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244863.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Beginning in the 1970s, the previously dominant US corporate enterprises faced an intensification of competition in both the mass‐production and high‐technology industries. The nature and gravity of ...
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Beginning in the 1970s, the previously dominant US corporate enterprises faced an intensification of competition in both the mass‐production and high‐technology industries. The nature and gravity of the competitive threat varied, partly because of differences in resource allocation governance, yet in both types of industry, fundamental challenges to the technological and economic supremacy of the USA were posed by enterprises in different social environments that developed and utilized broader and deeper skill bases to generate higher‐quality, lower‐cost products. In the case of the Japanese especially, the challenges came from enterprises that integrated into processes of organizational learning not only managerial employees (as the Americans had done), but also shop‐floor employees and employees of subsidiary enterprises that functioned as suppliers and distributors. These competitive challenges demanded a response from US corporate enterprises, but as they struggled with what was going on in the productive sphere, the ground had also shifted in the financial sphere: in particular, with the rise of institutional investors, and the increasing pressures that they placed on corporate enterprises to deliver higher returns on their corporate stocks, the commitment of financial resources to corporate strategies came under considerable pressure. The two main sections of this chapter address these issues: Sect. 5.2 discusses the productive challenges and the rise of the new competition, and Sect. 5.3 discusses the growing pressures for financial liquidity, which manifested themselves in a particularly aggressive form in the 1980s with the rise of a market for corporate control, and when that market collapsed in the late 1980s, in leading institutional investors seeking other levers for influencing corporate resource allocation in a movement that has been characterized as the rise of institutional investor activism.Less
Beginning in the 1970s, the previously dominant US corporate enterprises faced an intensification of competition in both the mass‐production and high‐technology industries. The nature and gravity of the competitive threat varied, partly because of differences in resource allocation governance, yet in both types of industry, fundamental challenges to the technological and economic supremacy of the USA were posed by enterprises in different social environments that developed and utilized broader and deeper skill bases to generate higher‐quality, lower‐cost products. In the case of the Japanese especially, the challenges came from enterprises that integrated into processes of organizational learning not only managerial employees (as the Americans had done), but also shop‐floor employees and employees of subsidiary enterprises that functioned as suppliers and distributors. These competitive challenges demanded a response from US corporate enterprises, but as they struggled with what was going on in the productive sphere, the ground had also shifted in the financial sphere: in particular, with the rise of institutional investors, and the increasing pressures that they placed on corporate enterprises to deliver higher returns on their corporate stocks, the commitment of financial resources to corporate strategies came under considerable pressure. The two main sections of this chapter address these issues: Sect. 5.2 discusses the productive challenges and the rise of the new competition, and Sect. 5.3 discusses the growing pressures for financial liquidity, which manifested themselves in a particularly aggressive form in the 1980s with the rise of a market for corporate control, and when that market collapsed in the late 1980s, in leading institutional investors seeking other levers for influencing corporate resource allocation in a movement that has been characterized as the rise of institutional investor activism.
Stefan J. Link
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691177540
- eISBN:
- 9780691207988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691177540.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This introductory chapter provides an overview of Fordism. Fordism, in its most common usage, was a term that first originated in the 1970s and then boomed in the 1980s, when social scientists sought ...
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This introductory chapter provides an overview of Fordism. Fordism, in its most common usage, was a term that first originated in the 1970s and then boomed in the 1980s, when social scientists sought ways to theorize the structural crises of the industrialized West. Henry Ford in fact never used the term — his global admirers created it. Fordism enjoys a second popular usage: as a shorthand for a distinctively American modernity that is said to have spread across the world in the twentieth century, in a process that historians of Europe have called “Americanization.” Finally, Fordism is used in a third way that focuses more narrowly on what goes on inside firms and on shop floors. To labor historians, Fordism means the shop regime associated with mass production: a focus on unskilled laborers working monotonous tasks on assembly lines. The chapter then details how the spread of Fordism during the interwar years arose from an antagonistic development competition that was initially triggered by the rise of the United States and then accelerated by the Great Depression. It looks at how Detroit became the destination of engineering delegations bent on wholesale technology transfer.Less
This introductory chapter provides an overview of Fordism. Fordism, in its most common usage, was a term that first originated in the 1970s and then boomed in the 1980s, when social scientists sought ways to theorize the structural crises of the industrialized West. Henry Ford in fact never used the term — his global admirers created it. Fordism enjoys a second popular usage: as a shorthand for a distinctively American modernity that is said to have spread across the world in the twentieth century, in a process that historians of Europe have called “Americanization.” Finally, Fordism is used in a third way that focuses more narrowly on what goes on inside firms and on shop floors. To labor historians, Fordism means the shop regime associated with mass production: a focus on unskilled laborers working monotonous tasks on assembly lines. The chapter then details how the spread of Fordism during the interwar years arose from an antagonistic development competition that was initially triggered by the rise of the United States and then accelerated by the Great Depression. It looks at how Detroit became the destination of engineering delegations bent on wholesale technology transfer.
