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This chapter argues that the mass killings of 1965–66 were neither inevitable nor spontaneous. It shows first how the temporal and geographic variations in the pattern of mass killing corresponded closely to the varied political postures and capacities of army commanders in a given locale, and how the army's logistical assets facilitated the killings. Next, it outlines how the army encouraged and carried out mass killings by mobilizing civilian youth groups and death squads, and encouraging them to identify, detain, and kill members of the PKI and their allies. Third, the chapter describes how the army provoked and legitimized mass killings by launching a sophisticated media and propaganda campaign that blamed the PKI for the kidnap and murder of the generals, and called for the party and its affiliates to be physically annihilated. Fourth, it shows how a variety of religious and political leaders embraced and replicated the army's polarizing and retributive language and propaganda, adding their considerable authority to the campaign of violence. Finally, it draws on this evidence to address the critical question of responsibility.

This chapter provides a rationalization of large-scale atrocities consistent with the main characteristics of the history of the last fifty years. Mass killings or genocides are planned; they are perpetrated by groups in power; they typically happen at the end of civil wars; they sometimes follow from external pressures or constraints on the group in power; the risk of mass killings is highest in polarized countries with low productivity and high dependence on natural resources. The normative implications in terms of third-party intervention have to be carefully considered. Neither a threat of direct intervention (effectively putting a cap on allowed mass killings) nor the imposition of minimum standards to be used for the treatment of defeated minorities can be evaluated in the absence of consideration of the economic structure and social divisions.

This chapter examines the campaign of mass incarceration. This is done with a view to understanding why and how it occurred, how it was related to the mass killings of the same period, and what its consequences were for those detained. It argues that the campaign had three defining features: it was a highly organized program that entailed detailed planning and coordination at the national level; it was initiated and carried out by the army leadership and more specifically Suharto; and it bore striking similarities to campaigns of mass internment in other authoritarian contexts. The chapter also contends that mass incarceration and mass killing were integrally related in two ways: first, in the sense that most of those eventually killed were first detained, and second, that rates of long-term imprisonment were lower where the rates of killing were highest. Finally, it makes the case that in almost every respect, the campaign of mass incarceration was emblematic of the Suharto regime's hypermilitarism and obsession with “order.”

This chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to examine the central principles of or primary influences leading to intense violence between groups, with attention to variations in them in the case of different types of violence, and in particular situations. It is about understanding the forces that lead groups and their individual members to turn against others violently. It is about how we can learn not to yield to these forces, how we can tame them, and find alternative, peaceful ways to deal with them. It is about preventing violence by developing practices, ways of being in the world, and creating cultures, institutions, and societies that enable groups to live in harmony and peace. The chapter then outlines the forms of mass violence addressed in this book, and summarizes key points about the origins and prevention of group violence and reconciliation.

This chapter argues that in the crucial six months after the alleged coup of October 1, 1965, Western powers encouraged the army to move forcefully against the Left, facilitated widespread violence including mass killings, and helped to consolidate the political power of the army. In doing so, they helped to bring about the political and physical destruction of the PKI and its affiliates, the removal of Sukarno and his closest associates from political power, their replacement by an army elite led by General Suharto, and a seismic shift in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the West and the capitalist model it advocated. The concerted campaign by foreign powers had three principal elements. The first was a pattern of secret assurances to the army leadership of political support and noninterference in Indonesia's internal affairs. The second was a sophisticated psychological warfare campaign designed to tarnish the PKI and Sukarno, and stir up opposition to them both inside Indonesia and abroad. The third element of the campaign was a carefully calibrated program of material assistance to the army, thereby facilitating and effectively rewarding the army's campaign against the PKI and Sukarno.

This chapter offers an introduction to the concept of humanitarian intervention (HI) as it developed in the twentieth century. The focus is on the legal arguments put forward to justify the use of force in carrying out an international mission in the name of HI. The evolution of the concept of HI is analyzed in particular within the framework of the United Nations system. Special attention is given to the question of how the concept of HI relates to the efforts of the international community to prevent and combat the crime of genocide. In dealing with this subject, the author has paid special attention to the contributions of African scholars and leaders to the development of the new international law on intervention and prevention.

This chapter discusses the use of training/workshops with varied groups in Rwanda to promote understanding of the origins and impact of mass violence, as well as avenues to healing and reconciliation. The evaluation of this work showed positive effects. As workshop participants applied the approach and concepts to their own experience, they seemed to gain experiential understanding, which may be a significant first step toward reconciliation—to openness to the “other”, resistance to negative influences, and active bystandership. The approach was also used in educational radio programs in Rwanda, then in Burundi and the Congo.

How people are touched, especially as children and in sexual and other intimate relations, affects and is in turn affected by cultural factors. This chapter explores how patterns of touch, intimacy, and sexuality differ at opposite ends of the domination-partnership continuum and why understanding this is important for moving forward. Studies show that we read other’s intentions and emotions by how we are touched and that the confluence of caring with coercion and pain is one of the most effective mechanisms for socializing people to suppress empathy and submit to domination as adults—whether through the painful binding of girls’ feet once traditional in China, or so-called Christian parenting guides that today admonish parents not to “overindulge” children and instead follow “God’s way” by forcing eight-month-old babies to sit with their hands on their trays or laps through threats and violence. Sexuality, too, is distorted in domination systems through the erotization of domination and violence, for example, by inculcating the belief that males are entitled to sex; through the mass shootings of women in the United States and Canada by men who call themselves incel (involuntarily celibate); and by the enslavement of women by Muslim fundamentalist groups like ISIS. The chapter contrasts these unhealthy interactions with healthy ones supported by partnership-oriented cultures.