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This chapter discusses the concept of non-cooperation, which was the subject of one of Gandhi’s main programmes. It first conveys the astonishment of British officials with regard to the non-cooperation programme, which inevitably led to a decrease in the status of government and government agents. It then looks at Gandhi’s claim that resolutions in Bardoli did not revert to the non-cooperation programme that was approved by the Nagpur Congress, and that only mass civil disobedience had been removed. It reveals Gandhi’s primary aim as the politicization of the masses, and his programme was highly dependent on the response of the middle class. The discussion also looks at the effects of the decline of non-cooperation in India. In conclusion, the chapter says that one of Mahatma Gandhi’s real achievements was his discovery of the truth that no government could completely rule a country without its people’s cooperation.

This chapter discusses the successes of Gandhi’s mass movement, which was aimed at ending the British rule in India. This movement was an open, non-violent rebellion, and was called the non-cooperation movement. Gandhi insisted that his fight was not with the British individuals, but with the ‘system’. The chapter also looks at Jamnalal’s appointment as Congress Treasurer upon the recommendation of Gandhi and the changes the non-cooperation movement brought to Jamnalal’s life. These changes also affected his family businesses, which seized to be his main preoccupation. The chapter includes some of the letters exchanged between Jamnalal and his wife, Jankidevi, when Gandhi sent him on tours or special missions. Gandhi’s campaign for mass civil disobedience is also discussed.

This chapter looks at the events that led to the collapse of the Khilafat movement. The first event was the cessation of mass civil disobedience by Gandhi, and the second was the stopping of the non-cooperation movement after Gandhi’s arrest. However, the most brutal blow to the Khilafat movement was the elimination of the Caliphate in Turkey. This was followed by a number of drastic steps taken by the Kemalist regime in order to hasten the process of westernization and secularization of Turkey. It shows that this event shocked the Indian Muslims and caused disquiet in India, and that it led to the realization that the issue of the Caliphate was actually a question of power politics, not of Islamic doctrine.

This chapter focuses on the time when Martin Luther King, Jr. formally announced SCLC's much-anticipated program of mass civil disobedience for the upcoming election year. The Poor People's Campaign aimed to dramatize poverty in the United States, by leading “waves of the nation's poor and disinherited to Washington, D.C. . . . to secure at least jobs or income for all,” King stated. During the following spring, he continued, “we will be petitioning our government for specific reforms and we intend to build militant nonviolent actions until that government moves against poverty.” At the heart of the plan was King's notion of “militant nonviolence,” illustrated through a series of planned marches, rallies, demonstrations, and sit-ins designed to tie up federal agencies and Congress—all emanating from a central, semipermanent campout of poor people on the Washington Mall.