Michael Mehling
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199565931
- eISBN:
- 9780191722028
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565931.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Environmental and Energy Law, Private International Law
The integration of carbon markets will require a careful assessment of its political and economic viability, which, in turn, largely depends on the respective compatibility of the underlying ...
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The integration of carbon markets will require a careful assessment of its political and economic viability, which, in turn, largely depends on the respective compatibility of the underlying emissions trading schemes. Because design features in each scheme can extend to all other linked schemes, and differences — if too pronounced — can affect the integrity of the overall market as well as the direction of trade flows, a certain degree of harmonization is essential for linking. Legal and normative considerations have featured only marginally in existing research on the conditions and implications of a trading link. This chapter provides a systematic overview of such considerations. It starts by drawing a conceptual background for the subsequent analysis, defining central characteristics and different forms of linking in the second section. It then proceeds to explore the specifically normative and jurisprudential implications of linking in the third section, and distinguishes these from broader questions of political expedience and economic rationality.Less
The integration of carbon markets will require a careful assessment of its political and economic viability, which, in turn, largely depends on the respective compatibility of the underlying emissions trading schemes. Because design features in each scheme can extend to all other linked schemes, and differences — if too pronounced — can affect the integrity of the overall market as well as the direction of trade flows, a certain degree of harmonization is essential for linking. Legal and normative considerations have featured only marginally in existing research on the conditions and implications of a trading link. This chapter provides a systematic overview of such considerations. It starts by drawing a conceptual background for the subsequent analysis, defining central characteristics and different forms of linking in the second section. It then proceeds to explore the specifically normative and jurisprudential implications of linking in the third section, and distinguishes these from broader questions of political expedience and economic rationality.
Eric von Hippel
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262035217
- eISBN:
- 9780262335461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035217.003.0005
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Innovation
This chapter identifies an important inbuilt difference between the two paradigms with respect to innovation diffusion. The difference springs from the fact that, unlike producers, free innovators do ...
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This chapter identifies an important inbuilt difference between the two paradigms with respect to innovation diffusion. The difference springs from the fact that, unlike producers, free innovators do not protect their innovations from free adoption, and they do not sell them. As a result, benefits that free-riding adopters may gain are not systematically shared with free innovators—there is no market link between these parties. This chapter thus presents evidence for the systematic shortfall in free innovators' incentives to invest in the diffusion of free innovations, and then argues that it is caused by the absence of a market link between free innovators and free-riding adopters. The chapter then concludes with suggested ways for addressing this situation.Less
This chapter identifies an important inbuilt difference between the two paradigms with respect to innovation diffusion. The difference springs from the fact that, unlike producers, free innovators do not protect their innovations from free adoption, and they do not sell them. As a result, benefits that free-riding adopters may gain are not systematically shared with free innovators—there is no market link between these parties. This chapter thus presents evidence for the systematic shortfall in free innovators' incentives to invest in the diffusion of free innovations, and then argues that it is caused by the absence of a market link between free innovators and free-riding adopters. The chapter then concludes with suggested ways for addressing this situation.
