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This chapter discusses the definition of maritime security and assesses the ongoing relevance of the concept of mare liberum (freedom of the seas). Maritime security covers the protection of a state's land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment, and society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea. These harmful acts include: piracy, terrorism, illicit trafficking in drugs and weapons, people smuggling, illegal fishing, and intentional and unlawful environmental damage. The chapter also introduces the overall analysis, which draws on the seminal work of McDougal and Bourke's Public Order of the Oceans in examining how a common interest in protecting maritime security may be achieved through a balance of inclusive and exclusive interests. It is argued that maritime security can and should be viewed as an inclusive interest given the common interest in combating an array of maritime security threats.

The first part of this chapter brings together the range of laws applicable to different maritime security threats. In doing so, it is possible to highlight the varying sources of international law on which law enforcement officials, naval officers, other government officials, shipping operators, and other members of the maritime industry will draw in responding to or seeking to prevent these maritime security threats. This part of the chapter concludes by highlighting what future maritime security threats may yet challenge existing legal structures. The chapter also recalls how military interests that largely pertain to national security remain a fundamental dimension to efforts to improve maritime security. Finally, it examines how maritime security has influenced the law of the sea as a general matter. It argues that further incremental change in the law of the sea is warranted and is consistent with a common interest in enhancing maritime security.

This chapter reviews China's broad security interests in the South China Sea (SCS). It covers concerns over territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction and growing appeal for overall strategic stability, homeland security, and sea routes safety. It also contends that China seeks to create and maintain a stable regional security order that is conducive to managing disputes and build cooperation to better deal with non-traditional maritime security threats. The chapter analyses China's official statements, which reveals that China's perceptions of its security interests in the SCS are multi-faceted. It explains how issues on territorial sovereignty and maritime rights always possess a domestic sensitivity, the mishandling of which might lead to political and social instability, which triggers the security concerns of the country.

This chapter examines the South China Sea (SCS) dispute from the point of view of South Korea. It argues that while South Korea is far from the immediate region under analysis and in which tensions continue to rise, the implications of rivalry between China, the United States, and other SCS claimant and non-claimant states have dangerous consequences on the peace and order of the broader area. It also illustrates South Korea's position as a regional middle power interested in balanced and constructive policies with the ultimate aim of de-escalating tension between those states that have brought all others closer to physical conflict. The chapter elaborates how the problems of the SCS have a wider destabilizing effect upon East Asian maritime security, posing strategic issues for other regional states, such as South Korea. It characterizes the SCS situation as a “grey zone” conflict or as “hybrid competition” between the parties involved.

Chapter four demonstrates that the political economy approach proposed in this book provides a useful lens for exploring and evaluating how social, technological, economic and political forces will continue to shape port security in the future. It begins by discussing the ‘long shadow’ of the ISPS Code and its treatment – or lack thereof – of organised crime as a port security priority. Here, it engages with critiques of the politicisation of the international port security regime, its failure to address local priorities and what this means for maritime-focussed capacity building initiatives moving forward. It then turns to technology, digitisation and automation as a challenge and opportunity for port security, including cybersecurity as an emergent threat, the changing nature of corruption vulnerabilities and the displacement of organised crime activities into the wider logistics supply chain and port-city hinterland area.

This chapter examines the US strategy of formal sponsorship in the multilateral anti-piracy campaign off the Somalian coast and in the Gulf of the Aden. It begins with a famous vignette – the rescue of Captain Phillips from pirates depicted in the movie of the same name. The objective of the chapter is to describe and explain why successive American presidents have pursued a bipartisan policy of supporting multilateral naval operations in the region without assuming a leadership position. It discusses the American operational role in the provision of communications platforms, logistics and patrolling vessels – and the US’ contribution to a very successful campaign on the high seas with a variety of EU, NATO and “independent” partners.

The phrase ‘creeping jurisdiction’ has been applied by a number of publicists to the gradual extension of state jurisdiction offshore in the law of the sea through the course of the 20th century. Under the current United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), and confirmed by international practice, the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles wide. It might have been thought that jurisdictional creep had ended with the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) in 1982. This chapter examines whether contemporary practice may lead to a further creeping of jurisdiction, not in a further grab for resources, but in an effort by states to provide themselves with greater security from threats from the sea. It examines contemporary and emerging practice in respect of maritime security, and discusses whether seeking greater control over security — which covers military security and environmental security — is the next generation of jurisdictional creep. Beyond the territorial sea, the LOSC also confirms that there is freedom of navigation for all vessels. This is essentially applicable for the exclusive economic zone and high seas areas beyond it.

The ‘law of maritime security’ is an instance of ‘securitization’ applied across various aspects of the law of the sea. The list of activities encompassed by the term is inherently non-exhaustive and lacks any common method of risk assessment. In addition, maritime security law has evolved in response to projected catastrophic or existential threats detached from any meaningful assessment of their probability. The distribution of risk in this area is driven by a combination of a projected future and the securitization of certain real, present concerns. Thus, maritime security and its effects are best understood in the context of what will be called the ‘transnational security State’ and the distortions that such a sState-centred approach imposes. Through is chapter utilises select case studies this chapter o demonstrates the manner in which maritime security has shifted the burden of risk from sStates and onto humans, especially onto people in transnational or liminal spaces.

Indian naval analyst, Abhijit Singh examines the reasons behind India’s naval engagement in Southeast Asia and Indian perspectives of China’s activities in the South China Sea. Singh argues that in recent years, there has been a discernable shift in India’s maritime posture in the Pacific. While the Indian Navy still identifies the Western Pacific as a secondary area of interest, its operational deployments to Southeast Asia have been gradually rising, signalling an enhanced appreciation of Indian strategic stakes in the region. In many ways, India’s principal drivers for security operations in the Pacific have their origins in the Indian Ocean where New Delhi has for long harboured geopolitical ambitions.

This chapter examines Indian and Chinese perspectives of each other as major powers and their respective roles in the Indian Ocean. It focuses on the following elements: (a) China’s strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean Region, (b) India’s views on its special role in the Indian Ocean and the legitimacy of the presence of other powers, (c) China’s strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean and India’s wish to leverage those vulnerabilities, (d) the asymmetry in Indian and Chinese threat perceptions, and (d) Chinese perspectives of the status of India in the international system and India’s claims to a special role in the Indian Ocean. The chapter concludes that even if China were to take a more transparent approach to its activities, significant differences in perceptions of threat and over status and legitimacy will produce a highly competitive dynamic between them in the maritime domain.

Darshana Baruah, an emerging Indian maritime security analyst, examines India’s heightened focus on improving maritime domain awareness in the coastal domain, EEZ and far seas. This is increasingly being driven by growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Of particular concern is India’s ability to monitor the passage of PLA Navy submarine passages to Pakistan and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. Despite improved maritime situational awareness in coastal waters, India still has difficulty in tracking surface and subsurface vessels transiting its EEZ or neighbouring waters. This will likely require coordination and collaboration with friendly states. Baruah concludes that despite India’s traditional attachment to strategic autonomy, the difficulties in any one country developing maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean will be a key driver in greater defence cooperation with the United States and its allies.

The chapter presents the factual and legal background to the discussion of people at sea. Firstly, it provides some background discussion concerning the presence of people at sea and the risks these people face. Secondly, it briefly presents the legal rules that have been adopted specifically to protect some of the categories of people who are at sea and concludes that they provide only a partial and uneven protection. Current efforts to address the specific challenges faced by people at sea are not effective, since legal analysis is based upon the identification of a discrete field, often in conjunction with a specific forum, within which the particular problem is addressed. This approach results in piece-meal solutions that do not devote sufficient attention to the human nature of all people who are at sea, resulting in different levels of protection and, sometimes, an unjustified difference in treatment.

This chapter provides a perspective on China’s growing security presence in the Indian Ocean and the strategic imperatives behind it and then India’s responses to these initiatives. The author argues that despite the apparent threats this presence presents to India, there are approaches that India and China can explore to reduce the risk of conflict. Jingdong Yuan also reviews China’s growing security presence in the Indian Ocean and the strategic imperatives behind it and India’s responses to these initiatives. Yuan argues that it is imperative that policymakers in both New Delhi and Beijing make concerted efforts to ensure that these two emerging powers can manage, if not completely avoid, their overlapping interests and ever-closer encounters in the Indian Ocean.

China uses coexistence as a strategy for managing international order to avoid great power conflict that might jeopardize international peace and stability. Coexistence is applied as a defensive strategy designed to change the status quo in China’s favor. China pursues coexistence by attempting to position Beijing as a mediator rather than a leader, to insist on regime consent as a basis for interference in domestic policies, to pursue the non-use of force for purposes of conflict resolution, and to embed its policies in the UN system. The chapter investigates the cases of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan and China’s contribution to antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The chapter concludes that China’s coexistence strategy has not obtained reciprocal legitimacy in its near abroad in the sense of a recognition from neighboring states that China takes into account the common interests of states when pursuing its national interests.

Iskander Rehman describes the subsurface capabilities and interactions of the Indian and Chinese navies, where China enjoys a clear quantitative superiority over India in all three components of the submarine fleet—conventional, nuclear attack, and nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Whereas the PLAN has long privileged subsurface warfare as part of an offensive sea denial strategy, the Indian Navy has traditionally focused on sea control. However, this may be changing. Beijing’s growing interest in ‘open seas protection’ may divert resources away from offensively minded operations towards defensive escort missions for PLAN surface task forces. The Indian Navy’s growing interest in standoff strike is also giving new emphasis on subsurface land attack capabilities. In reality, Sino-Indian rivalry to the maritime domain is still very much in its opening phases. Sino-Indian naval rivalry is set to unfold over the course of many decades, and submarines will be at the forefront of this competition.

This chapter looks at India’s interests, record, and achievements vis-à-vis global governance and international institutions to outline possible areas of cooperation with Japan to further their mutual interests. It argues that India has extensive economic, normative, and security interests across the global governance landscape but has not had a stellar record in achieving them. Despite this state of affairs, there exist opportunities for Japan and India to enhance their cooperation in areas such as international development, maritime security, civil nuclear issues, United Nations Peacekeeping, and reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). To deepen cooperation, however, both countries have to contend with certain institutional, normative, and political constraints on the issues being considered. Nonetheless, opportunities exist, with the leadership in both countries infusing new vigour into the bilateral relationship. The chapter concludes with some policy recommendations for the Indian government on the issue areas examined.

Rory Medcalf is Australia’s most prominent commentator on the Indo-Pacific region, and has played an important role in popularizing the concept throughout the region. In this chapter, he explores the forces that are leading to a greater Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and India’s options in responding to that presence. Medcalf argues that for India, and for other resident powers of the Indian Ocean, the accelerated arrival of China as a security player should be cause neither for panic nor complacency. There is still scope to ensure that China in the Indian Ocean becomes neither destabilizingly defensive nor dangerously dominant. In particular, India needs to take the initiative in building maritime security cooperation with a range of capable Indian Ocean-going powers that are well-disposed to its rise in order to create a stable strategic environment in which China will play an important role.

This chapter explores the evolution of top Indian foreign policy-makers towards China’s role in the Indian Ocean. Chaudhuri gives a New Delhi insider’s view on the efforts by Indian leaders to engage with China on these issues under the previous Congress government. He argues that by the end of the Singh administration, Indian policy makers had concluded that China was an ‘autistic power’ and that their approach of engagement had failed. Chaudhuri tracks the further changes in India’s approach under Narendra Modi, including India’s decision to align with the United States and Japan. He argues that Modi’s major challenge in the Indian Ocean is now primarily one of implementation of India’s announced policies.