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This chapter delves into a specific and particularly important species of a liberal commons: marital property. It endorses a vision of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community, and takes this as the regulative principle of marital property law. This vision endorses commitment to a marital community where spouses share without reference to individual desert, together with a concern for nonsubordination and for the protection of individual autonomy, primarily through free exit. It argues that, contrary to the common assumption, not only are these goals not incompatible but they can also be accommodated to a remarkable degree. It then traces the implications of this vision of marriage for marital property law, relying on it to defend the equal division rule for existing marital property, which is broadly defined to include increases and decreases in the spouses' earning capacity during the pendency of their marriage. The chapter also discusses alimony, generally endorsing the practice of rehabilitative alimony and property governance during marriage, arguing in favor of management rules currently applied in many community property states.

This chapter develops, demonstrates, and defends the conception of property as institutions—namely, as important default frameworks of various categories of interpersonal interaction. In line with the legal realist commitments underlying this conception of property, much of the discussion is situated in the context of one particular property institution: marital property. The test case considered for the discussion is United States v. Craft. In Craft, the Supreme Court discussed the vulnerability of one form of marital property—the tenancy by the entirety—to a federal tax lien resulting from the tax liability of one spouse only.

This chapter investigates the circumstances that led Californian women in the mid-nineteenth century to become involved in law reform, and their persistent fight over the following twenty years for equal political, property, and occupational rights, waged of necessity within the masculine arenas of law and politics. Spiritualism played a crucial role in the development of the leadership of the women's movement in California. The campaign for political rights of women in California is discussed. Over the course of twenty years of agitation, reformers were most successful in achieving occupational rights for women; they scored one victory in securing political rights and were thoroughly disappointed in their efforts to correct marital property law. Reforming California's marital property system so as to give real force to the notion of joint property rights threatened to reach beyond the public and symbolic sphere into the private lives of husbands and wives.

This chapter traces Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s earliest legal advocacy for marital property rights. It discusses Stanton’s deconstruction and critique of coverture, the law of legal disability and loss of rights for married women. It begins by outlining the women’s rights Declaration of Sentiments and Stanton’s work for reform of married women’s property acts and dower. Then, by exploring property as citizenship right, it identifies Stanton’s constitutional thought on the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This chapter is divided into three parts covering, respectively, conflicts in the fields of property, marital property, and successions. The part on property begins with a discussion of the distinction between immovables and movables and the dominance of the situs rule in cases involving immovables. It concludes with an extensive discussion of conflicts involving cultural property, such as stolen antiquities and artwork. The marital property part covers problems arising when spouses domiciled in a separate property state move to a community property state, or vice versa, or when they live in one state and acquire immovable property in the other state. The part on successions covers both testate and intestate succession.

The economic aspect of the marriage is the focus of Chapter Three, looking specifically at the amount and type of property given as dowry and how this varied according to economic, familial and marital background. Women of labouring-status largely had dowries that were valued at twenty to forty pounds, consisting primarily of cash, household goods and jewellery; however, widowhood and the loss of a father could affect these patterns, in both a negative and positive manner. Legally, Valencian wives had no control of this property while married, as their husbands held administrative rights. Husbands also controlled the creix, given to women in exchange for their virginity. Unlike the dowry, marriage contracts rarely discussed the type of assets donated as counter-gift, largely because it was not conferred until the dissolution of the marriage. This evidence demonstrates that the type of property women received as marital assets was similar across socio-economic status in many ways as it consisted largely of moveable goods but elite women tended to bring more investments as part of their dowries while labouring-status women’s assets were primarily cash, household goods and jewellery.

This chapter focuses on a lawyer's advice to a couple in response to their query submitted to a major Swedish newspaper in 2007. The lawyer advised the couple to write a will to the effect that when they were both dead, their property would become their child's separate property. The ultimate aim of the proposed will was unmistakable: to make sure that their child's spouse would not become part owner of the property. This small and inconspicuous feature succinctly sums up some of the continuities and ruptures in the story of marital property law in Sweden. On the one hand, it shows that today, just as in the Middle Ages, legal experts take for granted that parents are hesitant about letting their property come into the hands of sons-in-law and daughters-in-law. On the other hand, the response also makes very clear that modern marital property law differs radically from the law that existed in the medieval and early modern periods.

This chapter focuses on marriage in Deir al-Medina. It begins with an overview of the marriage procedure or ceremony in the village, and cites indications that a formal divorce (at least in some instances) required an official statement made in court to dissolve a marriage. It then considers several ostraca describing how the future son-in-law carries some gift to the house of his prospective father-in-law, hoping to marry the latter's daughter, including one that summarizes various marital property arrangements from the ninth century BCE. It also examines an undated text that may contain the remains of an oath on the occasion of a marriage (O. Varille 30) and concludes with a discussion of the marriage between Naunakhte (twelve or slightly older) and Qenhirkhopshef (fifty-something).

This chapter situates enquiries about witnesses’ worth within a context of social evaluation in order to show their links to a pervasive culture of appraisal, and outlines the principal ways in which witnesses responded to the question of their worth, ranging from cash estimates of net moveable estate and expressions of relative poverty to direct refusals to answer the question or professions of ignorance. The incidence of responses is charted according to gender, social status, age, and over time, and the impact of marital status on women’s entitlement to moveable property is reappraised, not least in relation to wives’ widely acknowledged role as ‘savers’ (if not ‘getters’) of household assets. Finally the monetary values that witnesses attached to their goods are discussed. Witnesses’ appraisals of their worth are used to chart a profound redistribution of wealth in the century after 1550 far in excess of estimates from other sources.

Papyrus BM EA 10113 was sold in March 1837 during an auction of the collection of Giovanni d'Athanasi by LeighSotheby. This papyrus was only kept in the archive of Djekhy & Son for the short duration of the loan. After the loan was repaid, it would be returned to the debtor as proof of payment.

These saga chapters look something like a casebook on the law of marriage and divorce. Seven marriages are established and four terminated, each raising slightly different legal issues. Some are first marriages, some second and thirds. Two terminate with the violent deaths of the husband, two end in divorce: one of husband by wife, the other of wife by husband. A certain type of first marriage meant to strip a husband of his wealth to fund future marriages for his ex-wife is discussed in detail, with considerations of risks of fertility and mortality. Types of marital property and their benefits and risks are discussed, as well as a look at a certain kind of fosterage or protection provided for young girls.

This chapter deals with marriage eligibility and marital rules, with particular emphasis on the complications of interjurisdictional enforcement of family law marriage and divorce rules. It begins with a historical overview of marriage laws before proceeding with a discussion of marital property and the right to marry. It then considers common law marriage, same-sex marriage, the so-called heartbalm actions, and the required formalities required for entry into marriage. Finally, it examines the conflict of laws principles that determine recognition of a marriage celebrated in another state or country.

In 1855, Sarah Black, wife of planter and slave owner James E. Black, filed suit in the First District Court for a divorce, alimony, child custody, and a portion of the marital community property. She charged her husband with adultery, having caught him in the act of illicit intercourse with one of his slaves. This chapter analyzes the interracial sexual relations that caused the dissolution of marriages. Narratives of divorce and separation such as the case of Sarah Black offer a unique and surprising profile of adultery in a slaveholding society during the antebellum era. In addition to the study of adultery committed by white men with black women, the chapter also examines illicit relations between white women and black men, and the punishments for black men involved in such cases.

This chapter surveys the local system of Switzerland. It explains that Switzerland is a federal state divided into 26 cantons and the law of inheritance is part of Swiss civil law and thus unified in Switzerland. The chapter then looks at the forms of wills under Swiss law. It argues that Swiss law basically provides for two instruments to dispose of assets upon death: wills and inheritance contracts. Any other way in which a testator/trix might seek to dispose of his or her assets on death (e.g., mutual will) is not sanctioned under Swiss law. This chapter also provides detailed rules to be applied in cases of intestate succession. It argues that absent a valid disposition on death, the estate of a deceased passes to the statutory heirs. Ultimately, the chapter notes that a testator/trix is only free to dispose of his or her estate up to the so-called ‘devisable portion’, as Swiss forced heirship law gives certain individuals closely related to the testator/trix an entitlement to a share in the estate, the so-called ‘compulsory portion’. It then reviews the three different marital property regimes from which the spouses may choose and the doctrine of joint tenancy.