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Introduction

Jeffery A. Jenkins and Charles Stewart III

in Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government

This book investigates the history of organizational politics in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1789 to the present. It argues that the history of how speakership elections developed was ... More

This book investigates the history of organizational politics in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1789 to the present. It argues that the history of how speakership elections developed was driven by a desire to establish an organizational cartel in the House. It examines the centrality of the party caucus for the organization of the House, and more specifically how the majority party came to own the chief House officers, especially the Speaker. It also discusses two themes about Congress and its role in the American political system: the construction of mass political parties in the early nineteenth century and the role that political parties play in guiding the agenda of Congress today. This chapter provides an overview of the data and methods used by the book as well as the chapters that follow.Less

Caucus Governance and the Emergence of the Organizational Cartel, 1861–1891

Jeffery A. Jenkins and Charles Stewart III

in Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government

This chapter examines the emergence of the organizational cartel based on caucus decision making during the period 1861–1891. It considers how the caucus-induced, organizational arrangement solved ... More

This chapter examines the emergence of the organizational cartel based on caucus decision making during the period 1861–1891. It considers how the caucus-induced, organizational arrangement solved the lingering instability that had often plagued speakership decisions during the antebellum era. It also shows how the binding party caucus on organizational matters institutionalized and evolved into an equilibrium institution, with both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party embracing the practice of keeping the organization of the House of Representatives “in the family” rather than risking potential complications on the floor. In short, the majority party had finally become an organizational cartel. The chapter explains how the organizational cartel allowed the majority party to control the election of the Speaker and other House officers, as well as the more general makeup of the chamber.Less

Conclusion

Jeffery A. Jenkins and Charles Stewart III

in Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government

This chapter summarizes the key points raised by the book, with particular emphasis on questions of organizational control, party-building, and party strength in Congress. It begins with a discussion ... More

This chapter summarizes the key points raised by the book, with particular emphasis on questions of organizational control, party-building, and party strength in Congress. It begins with a discussion of the role that the party caucus has played in hastening a consistent House organization by the majority party. It then considers the organizational cartel's relationship with the procedural cartel and the applicability of the organizational cartel mechanism in other legislatures, including the U.S. Senate, American state legislatures, and parliaments around the world. The chapter also examines Martin van Buren's legacy, focusing on his role in developing the organizational capacity of the Democratic Party and his efforts in building the American party system, before concluding with some final thoughts on political parties and congressional organization.Less

Institutional Partisanship and Roll Call Voting

Tracy L. Osborn

in How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender and Representation in the State Legislatures

Chapter 6 offers the final empirical test of party identity and institutional partisanship using roll call votes in the state legislative chambers. Party identity pervades roll call voting, in that ... More

Chapter 6 offers the final empirical test of party identity and institutional partisanship using roll call votes in the state legislative chambers. Party identity pervades roll call voting, in that votes on women’s issues legislation typically divide women and men legislators along party lines or pass with near unanimity between partisans. Rarely do partisan women step outside of their party identity to cross lines and support a women’s issue position with women of the other party. The strength of institutional partisanship determines women legislators’ voting to some degree; on several women’s issues votes it appears even more difficult for women legislators to abandon a party position on a vote because of a closely held party majority. However, because the underlying effect of party identity splits women’s votes along party lines on women’s issues even in weak institutional party chambers, it remains somewhat difficult to separate the effect of party identity from that of institutional partisanship on roll call voting.Less

Party Identity and Institutional Partisanship in Agenda-Setting

Tracy L. Osborn

in How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender and Representation in the State Legislatures

Chapter 5 examines the bills that women legislators introduce to the legislative agenda using the subsample of 10 state houses. Though women legislators introduce significantly more women’s issues ... More

Chapter 5 examines the bills that women legislators introduce to the legislative agenda using the subsample of 10 state houses. Though women legislators introduce significantly more women’s issues bills in seven of the ten chambers, the alternatives they offer in these bills reflect the divides in their party identities. Democratic women concentrate on providing issue alternatives for women’s health and equality; Republican women, though they also address women’s health, focus on childcare and morality policies. Men of both parties also introduce many women’s issues items. Republican men, in fact, typically introduce more women’s issues bills than Republican women, including bills concerning reproduction, marriage and divorce, and punitive consequences for sex offenders and other crimes affecting women. This chapter demonstrates institutional partisanship is important to bill sponsorship as well, because the majority party controls which bills that Democrats and Republicans introduce continue through the legislative process and ultimately become law.Less

Agenda Influence and Tabling Motions in the U.S. Senate

Chris Den Hartog and Nathan W. Monroe

in Why Not Parties?: Party Effects in the United States Senate

This chapter examines the majority party's use of motions to table as a means of killing unwanted amendments. It does so as part of a larger project in which a new theoretical framework is proposed ... More

This chapter examines the majority party's use of motions to table as a means of killing unwanted amendments. It does so as part of a larger project in which a new theoretical framework is proposed for thinking about legislative parties' influence over legislative decisions generally—one that is particularly well suited to the Senate, inasmuch as it leads to important modifications of the conventional wisdom. This framework revolves around the premise that the majority and minority parties face costs in getting measures onto the legislative agenda (i.e., getting a final-passage vote) and that these costs are higher for the minority party than for the majority party.Less

Scoring the Senate: Scorecards, Parties, and Roll-Call Votes

Jason M. Roberts and Lauren Cohen Bell

in Why Not Parties?: Party Effects in the United States Senate

This chapter compares the relative success of the majority party in the House and the Senate. After first discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the study, it analyzes the effects of legislative ... More

This chapter compares the relative success of the majority party in the House and the Senate. After first discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the study, it analyzes the effects of legislative parties, electoral considerations, and interest groups on roll-call voting behaviors. The results indicate that party leaders in the Senate generally are able to secure their preferred outcomes on roll-call votes, but that some senators are willing to defect from their parties' preferred positions when particular interest groups announce their intention to include the votes on their end-of-year or end-of-Congress scorecards.Less

Minority-Party Power in the Senate and House of Representatives

Sean Gailmard and Jeffery A. Jenkins

in Why Not Parties?: Party Effects in the United States Senate

This chapter explores the conventional wisdom that the minority is considerably stronger in the Senate. If the Senate's institutional arrangements do confer more power on the minority party as ... More

This chapter explores the conventional wisdom that the minority is considerably stronger in the Senate. If the Senate's institutional arrangements do confer more power on the minority party as compared to the House's institutional arrangements, then standard measures of party power should reflect that reality. The chapter is organized as follows. It first discusses the data and measures used to explore minority-party power in the Senate. It then provides preliminary evidence of such power across three different legislative vehicles: Senate-originated bills, confirmation votes, and conference-committee reports. In doing so, it also makes explicit comparisons between minority-party power in the Senate and the House. Following this, it examines the determinants of minority-party power in the Senate for the three legislative vehicles in question and then compares these determinants to those associated with minority-party power in the House on similar legislative vehicles. There is some evidence that the Senate minority party possesses greater negative agenda control than the House minority party. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, the clearest formal source of the Senate minority's negative agenda control—the filibuster—appears not to be a significant instrument of power across a range of legislative vehicles.Less

Distributive and Partisan Politics in the U.S. Senate: An Exploration of Earmarks

Michael H. Crespin and Charles J. Finocchiaro

in Why Not Parties?: Party Effects in the United States Senate

This chapter examines whether and to what degree the distribution of pork-barrel project dollars across states is biased toward the majority party. It begins with a review of the literature on ... More

This chapter examines whether and to what degree the distribution of pork-barrel project dollars across states is biased toward the majority party. It begins with a review of the literature on distributive and partisan theories before turning to more recent efforts at explaining congressional earmarks. It then describes the data and methods employed in the analysis, and presents descriptive and then multiple regression results accounting for the role of parties, institutional status, and other factors in the allocation of pork. It is shown that the majority party does maintain an advantage when it comes to earmark dollars, though the advantage is not present on all of the appropriations bills.Less

The Janata Experiment, 1977–9

Bidyut Chakrabarty

in FORGING POWER: Coalition Politics in India

This chapter examines the coalition experiment of the Janata Party in 1977 and evaluates its importance in the context of the regionalization of Indian politics. The Janata Party alliance exemplified ... More

This chapter examines the coalition experiment of the Janata Party in 1977 and evaluates its importance in the context of the regionalization of Indian politics. The Janata Party alliance exemplified a new political trend by suggesting an alternative to a single-party majority at the Centre. The Morarji Desai government was also illustrative of the regionalization of Indian politics in the sense that though they were ideologically national, the constituents of the Janata Party were region-based. Despite its short duration as a government, the Janata experiment is historically significant. Its formation was the culmination of the effort initiated by Ram Manohar Lohia to break the long one-party domination of Congress and forge a national alternative to it.Less

Greece

Despina Alexiadou

in Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists: Ministers and Policymaking in Parliamentary Cabinets

Chapter 9 investigates the policy role of Greek ministers of social affairs, employment, and finance. Starting in 1981 to the year 2000, the chapter study four social democratic single-party majority ... More

Chapter 9 investigates the policy role of Greek ministers of social affairs, employment, and finance. Starting in 1981 to the year 2000, the chapter study four social democratic single-party majority cabinets. Greece was at a very different developmental level in the eighties, both in terms of democratic institutions but also in terms of its social welfare and labor market policies than the rest of Western Europe. As such, by studying Greece, this chapter tests the impact of ministerial types in polities that do not meet the political and socio-economic standards of Northern European countries. The main finding is that ministers are dominated by the prime minister and ministerial tenure is brief. As a result, more loyalists are appointed but also ideologues and partisans are not successful in adopting their policy agenda as in Ireland and the Netherlands.Less

Introduction: 1968

in Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan

This book asks whether Japanese judges face career incentives with a political bias. The radical left has been wrong about many things, but they were right about the courts. Japanese judges do need ... More

This book asks whether Japanese judges face career incentives with a political bias. The radical left has been wrong about many things, but they were right about the courts. Japanese judges do need to worry about the views of the politicians in the Cabinet. They do not face skewed incentives in most litigation, for most litigation carried no political import, and it is not the capitalists but the politicians who could hurt judicial careers. Capitalists, in fact, are no doubt happier with a level playing field for their contract disputes and corporate litigation anyway, and have in the past let their politician friends know this. In politically charged disputes, however, judges who flouted the majority party paid with their careers.Less