Christopher Lake
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241743
- eISBN:
- 9780191599743
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241740.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people ...
More
These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. In a wide‐ranging discussion, the author asks what it is that draws us to these two ideas and whether they lend themselves to being combined, in the way contemporary egalitarian thinkers seek to combine them, or whether they necessarily pull in different directions. Along the way, he examines how arguments about responsibility and natural talents bear upon the standing of market rewards and he looks at recent theoretical attempts to show that the recipients of social benefits should be willing to engage in contributive activity in return. The conclusion is clear—there is no natural tendency for a commitment to equality to support an attachment to responsibility nor for an attachment to responsibility to support a commitment to equality.Less
These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. In a wide‐ranging discussion, the author asks what it is that draws us to these two ideas and whether they lend themselves to being combined, in the way contemporary egalitarian thinkers seek to combine them, or whether they necessarily pull in different directions. Along the way, he examines how arguments about responsibility and natural talents bear upon the standing of market rewards and he looks at recent theoretical attempts to show that the recipients of social benefits should be willing to engage in contributive activity in return. The conclusion is clear—there is no natural tendency for a commitment to equality to support an attachment to responsibility nor for an attachment to responsibility to support a commitment to equality.
Susan Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the implications of self-interest for equality in the context of the ‘luck egalitarian’ view that an individual’s wealth is justly owned only if it is the result of a responsible ...
More
This essay considers the implications of self-interest for equality in the context of the ‘luck egalitarian’ view that an individual’s wealth is justly owned only if it is the result of a responsible choice. A possible response to Cohen’s argument against incentives might be that since individuals can choose to work harder on behalf of the disadvantaged, they are also partly responsible for, and entitled to, the extra wealth they produce. This view is rejected, noting that were the tax rate adjusted to accommodate responsibility for being productive, it would whittle away the benefits of productivity for redistributive purposes.Less
This essay considers the implications of self-interest for equality in the context of the ‘luck egalitarian’ view that an individual’s wealth is justly owned only if it is the result of a responsible choice. A possible response to Cohen’s argument against incentives might be that since individuals can choose to work harder on behalf of the disadvantaged, they are also partly responsible for, and entitled to, the extra wealth they produce. This view is rejected, noting that were the tax rate adjusted to accommodate responsibility for being productive, it would whittle away the benefits of productivity for redistributive purposes.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These ...
More
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.Less
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ...
More
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.Less
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.
Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of ...
More
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.Less
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.
Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of ...
More
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.Less
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.
Christopher Lake
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241743
- eISBN:
- 9780191599743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241740.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Ch. 5 tests the egalitarian intuition—the intuition that it is objectionable for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. It does this by examining how claims about the ...
More
Ch. 5 tests the egalitarian intuition—the intuition that it is objectionable for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. It does this by examining how claims about the background conditions facing an individual bear upon claims about the legitimacy of his foreground holdings. It argues that it is simply careless to suppose that responsibility for foreground holdings necessarily requires equality of background conditions and it points to the ways in which the commitment of egalitarians to the claims of responsibility is compromised by their focus on the elimination of differential chances, opportunities, or luck.Less
Ch. 5 tests the egalitarian intuition—the intuition that it is objectionable for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. It does this by examining how claims about the background conditions facing an individual bear upon claims about the legitimacy of his foreground holdings. It argues that it is simply careless to suppose that responsibility for foreground holdings necessarily requires equality of background conditions and it points to the ways in which the commitment of egalitarians to the claims of responsibility is compromised by their focus on the elimination of differential chances, opportunities, or luck.
Colin M. Macleod
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293972
- eISBN:
- 9780191599798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293976.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Critically evaluates Dworkin's use of a hypothetical insurance market scheme to illuminate the degree to which justice requires the provision of compensation to persons with significant physical or ...
More
Critically evaluates Dworkin's use of a hypothetical insurance market scheme to illuminate the degree to which justice requires the provision of compensation to persons with significant physical or mental disabilities. The chapter argues that the hypothetical insurance market scheme is procedurally unfair, is plagued by epistemic difficulties, and is insufficiently sensitive to the importance of addressing features of the social environment in virtue of which persons with disabilities are disadvantaged.Less
Critically evaluates Dworkin's use of a hypothetical insurance market scheme to illuminate the degree to which justice requires the provision of compensation to persons with significant physical or mental disabilities. The chapter argues that the hypothetical insurance market scheme is procedurally unfair, is plagued by epistemic difficulties, and is insufficiently sensitive to the importance of addressing features of the social environment in virtue of which persons with disabilities are disadvantaged.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book offers a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define ...
More
This book offers a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define virtue in terms of its benefits for the virtuous person or for human society more generally. Part One of this book presents and defends a conception of virtue as intrinsic excellence of character, worth prizing for its own sake and not only for its benefits. The other two parts address two challenges to the ancient idea of excellence of character. One challenge arises from the importance of altruism in modern ethical thought, and the question of what altruism has to do with intrinsic excellence. Part Two argues that altruistic benevolence has indeed a crucial place in excellence of character, but that moral virtue should also be expected to involve excellence in being for other goods besides the well-being (and the rights) of other persons. It explores relations among cultural goods, personal relationships, one's own good, and the good of others, as objects of excellent motives. The other challenge is typified by doubts about the reality of moral virtue, arising from experiments and conclusions in social psychology. Part Three of the book explores in detail the prospects for an empirically realistic conception of excellence of character as an object of moral aspiration, endeavour, and education. It argues that such a conception will involve renunciation of the ancient thesis of the unity or mutual implication of all virtues, and acknowledgement of sufficient ‘moral luck’ in the development of any individual's character to make virtue very largely a gift, rather than an individual achievement, though nonetheless excellent and admirable for that.Less
This book offers a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define virtue in terms of its benefits for the virtuous person or for human society more generally. Part One of this book presents and defends a conception of virtue as intrinsic excellence of character, worth prizing for its own sake and not only for its benefits. The other two parts address two challenges to the ancient idea of excellence of character. One challenge arises from the importance of altruism in modern ethical thought, and the question of what altruism has to do with intrinsic excellence. Part Two argues that altruistic benevolence has indeed a crucial place in excellence of character, but that moral virtue should also be expected to involve excellence in being for other goods besides the well-being (and the rights) of other persons. It explores relations among cultural goods, personal relationships, one's own good, and the good of others, as objects of excellent motives. The other challenge is typified by doubts about the reality of moral virtue, arising from experiments and conclusions in social psychology. Part Three of the book explores in detail the prospects for an empirically realistic conception of excellence of character as an object of moral aspiration, endeavour, and education. It argues that such a conception will involve renunciation of the ancient thesis of the unity or mutual implication of all virtues, and acknowledgement of sufficient ‘moral luck’ in the development of any individual's character to make virtue very largely a gift, rather than an individual achievement, though nonetheless excellent and admirable for that.
Steve Vanderheiden
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195334609
- eISBN:
- 9780199868759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195334609.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter begins by introducing the normative principle of responsibility, then surveys several relevant distinctions within the concept of responsibility (causal vs. moral, positive vs. negative) ...
More
This chapter begins by introducing the normative principle of responsibility, then surveys several relevant distinctions within the concept of responsibility (causal vs. moral, positive vs. negative) along with some degrees of responsibility (fault, liability, moral blame), and applies these to problems analogous to the climate case. Three distinct problems for attributing responsibility for climate change are examined in the chapter: the first involves what Nagel terms the problem of moral luck; the second concerns the difficulty in establishing causation for harm that results from the aggregate effects of many similar acts; and the third involves the attribution of collective responsibility to nations. The chapter examines the mistakes that lead to these objections, illuminating the proper manner in which persons and nations can be held responsible for climate-related harm and how a climate regime might assign remedial liability on that basis.Less
This chapter begins by introducing the normative principle of responsibility, then surveys several relevant distinctions within the concept of responsibility (causal vs. moral, positive vs. negative) along with some degrees of responsibility (fault, liability, moral blame), and applies these to problems analogous to the climate case. Three distinct problems for attributing responsibility for climate change are examined in the chapter: the first involves what Nagel terms the problem of moral luck; the second concerns the difficulty in establishing causation for harm that results from the aggregate effects of many similar acts; and the third involves the attribution of collective responsibility to nations. The chapter examines the mistakes that lead to these objections, illuminating the proper manner in which persons and nations can be held responsible for climate-related harm and how a climate regime might assign remedial liability on that basis.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical ...
More
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.Less
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Psychological experiments and other empirical data seem to show that good traits of character (even if real) are frail, rather easily overcome by some types of temptation, and are dependent on social ...
More
Psychological experiments and other empirical data seem to show that good traits of character (even if real) are frail, rather easily overcome by some types of temptation, and are dependent on social context and social support (and thus on ‘moral luck’) for their development, continuance, and behavioural manifestation. It is argued that excellence is not incompatible with fragility, and that the excellence of virtue is no less valuable for being in large part a gift rather than an individual achievement.Less
Psychological experiments and other empirical data seem to show that good traits of character (even if real) are frail, rather easily overcome by some types of temptation, and are dependent on social context and social support (and thus on ‘moral luck’) for their development, continuance, and behavioural manifestation. It is argued that excellence is not incompatible with fragility, and that the excellence of virtue is no less valuable for being in large part a gift rather than an individual achievement.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198278641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198278640.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Could a market economy produce outcomes that meet our criteria of distributive justice? Some egalitarians, such as Carens, have proposed that markets should govern production but not distribution, ...
More
Could a market economy produce outcomes that meet our criteria of distributive justice? Some egalitarians, such as Carens, have proposed that markets should govern production but not distribution, relying on moral incentives to motivate the producers, but this seems unrealistic. Instead, we can ask whether a suitably framed market might give people the income that they deserved, as measured by their productive contribution. A conception of economic desert is elaborated by considering various challenges to this proposal. The conclusion is that a market socialist economy can at least come close to achieving distributive justice.Less
Could a market economy produce outcomes that meet our criteria of distributive justice? Some egalitarians, such as Carens, have proposed that markets should govern production but not distribution, relying on moral incentives to motivate the producers, but this seems unrealistic. Instead, we can ask whether a suitably framed market might give people the income that they deserved, as measured by their productive contribution. A conception of economic desert is elaborated by considering various challenges to this proposal. The conclusion is that a market socialist economy can at least come close to achieving distributive justice.
Colin M. Macleod
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293972
- eISBN:
- 9780191599798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293976.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines Dworkin's use of the market to track how considerations of individual responsibility should affect entitlement to resources over time. Liberals should favour a responsibility sensitive ...
More
Examines Dworkin's use of the market to track how considerations of individual responsibility should affect entitlement to resources over time. Liberals should favour a responsibility sensitive theory of income and resource distribution, but the account offered by Dworkin's theory of equality of resources does accurately track the relationship between entitlement and choice.Less
Examines Dworkin's use of the market to track how considerations of individual responsibility should affect entitlement to resources over time. Liberals should favour a responsibility sensitive theory of income and resource distribution, but the account offered by Dworkin's theory of equality of resources does accurately track the relationship between entitlement and choice.
Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199565801
- eISBN:
- 9780191725463
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of ...
More
Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. This book both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards.Less
Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. This book both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. ...
More
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.Less
A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.
Richard Foley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154725
- eISBN:
- 9781400842308
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers a different puzzle to the luck issue. It discusses another story and stresses that not only is knowledge not incompatible with luck, it actually requires it. It requires, in ...
More
This chapter considers a different puzzle to the luck issue. It discusses another story and stresses that not only is knowledge not incompatible with luck, it actually requires it. It requires, in effect, the world to be kind. The inclination to think otherwise derives from a failure to distinguish global from local luck. When one has a true belief as a result of local luck, one usually does lack knowledge, but this is so because the luck is accompanied by local ignorance. The chapter then turns to address questions on closure and skepticism, which in turn are more in line with questions about justified belief rather than knowledge.Less
This chapter considers a different puzzle to the luck issue. It discusses another story and stresses that not only is knowledge not incompatible with luck, it actually requires it. It requires, in effect, the world to be kind. The inclination to think otherwise derives from a failure to distinguish global from local luck. When one has a true belief as a result of local luck, one usually does lack knowledge, but this is so because the luck is accompanied by local ignorance. The chapter then turns to address questions on closure and skepticism, which in turn are more in line with questions about justified belief rather than knowledge.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as ...
More
This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.Less
This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.
Neil Levy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199601387
- eISBN:
- 9780191729256
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. This ...
More
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. This book develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. It argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, event-causal and agent-causal, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But the book also argues that compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection. Historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck. Non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Because a failure to satisfy the epistemic condition on control is excusing, the book argues, if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; for non-akratic actions, agents either fail to satisfy the epistemic condition on moral responsibility or lack control in some other way. But akratic actions are themselves unacceptably subject to luck. The book ends with a discussion of recent non-historical compatibilisms. Some of these new compatibilisms hold that agents are morally responsible for actions just in case these actions express the agent's attitudes. The book argues that accounts of this type do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. Finally, the book argues that other kinds of non-historical compatibilism have no resources to deploy against the hard luck view because the latter does not entail that instant agents have a different degree of moral responsibility than agents who have a history.Less
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. This book develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. It argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, event-causal and agent-causal, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But the book also argues that compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection. Historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck. Non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Because a failure to satisfy the epistemic condition on control is excusing, the book argues, if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; for non-akratic actions, agents either fail to satisfy the epistemic condition on moral responsibility or lack control in some other way. But akratic actions are themselves unacceptably subject to luck. The book ends with a discussion of recent non-historical compatibilisms. Some of these new compatibilisms hold that agents are morally responsible for actions just in case these actions express the agent's attitudes. The book argues that accounts of this type do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. Finally, the book argues that other kinds of non-historical compatibilism have no resources to deploy against the hard luck view because the latter does not entail that instant agents have a different degree of moral responsibility than agents who have a history.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297023
- eISBN:
- 9780191711411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a more developed defence of the account of knowledge than that offered in Chapter 2, which exploits the animal/reflective distinction towards solving traditional sceptical ...
More
This chapter presents a more developed defence of the account of knowledge than that offered in Chapter 2, which exploits the animal/reflective distinction towards solving traditional sceptical problems.Less
This chapter presents a more developed defence of the account of knowledge than that offered in Chapter 2, which exploits the animal/reflective distinction towards solving traditional sceptical problems.
