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In wartime, administration supporters' assumption that partisan opposition was disloyal and therefore illegitimate made it acceptable to use the instruments of the state—especially the moral and physical power of the newly created mass citizen army—to aid the victory of loyal candidates. Loyalty Oaths in the border slave states, and the more informal loyalty tests imposed by the presence of soldiers and provost marshals at the polls in some parts of the North, gave a hard edge to the rhetorical conflation of party and nation. While direct military intervention in election results remained very much the exception rather than the rule, the assumption that justified it—that elections were only legitimate so long as the right side won—was widespread.

Minimum loyalty is satisfied by non-betrayal, avoiding treason, idolatry and adultery. The devotional dimension of loyalty requires rituals of attachment and devotion expressed in patriotic observances, religious worship and sexuality intimacy. Patriotism implies more than loyalty to the state. It is a romantic passion for a people and a culture. Patriotism is expressed through rituals such as saluting the flag. The loyalty oath, in contrast, in its current usage, is merely an ineffective and offensive device for weeding out the politically unreliable from positions of responsibility. In Western religious thought, idolatry is the basic sin because it is an act of disloyalty to a jealous God who has entered a covenantal relationship with the community of believers. Religious rituals express and confirm loyalty to God. In monogamous relationships, sexual acts serve as ritualistic confirmation of underlying emotional devotion. Fidelity provides reassurance of the other partner's commitment to the relationship.

This chapter examines security laws, including loyalty oaths, enforced in the wake of the English Revolution, and designed to preserve the new regime from disloyal elements, especially those known as papists. It shows that reading these strictures through the lens of an earlier “equation of Protestantism and loyalty, Catholicism and disloyalty” does not do justice to the way they were now used. This change was due in part to the newly visible phenomenon of disloyal Anglicans, and resulted in the development of new religious tests, such as the Declaration against Transubstantiation, which were aimed only at suspected Catholics. It argues that the equation of Catholicism with political disloyalty was counterfactual, but politically useful to Anglicans. A similar conflation of religious with political identity can be observed today, with the threat of Islamic terrorism.

This chapter takes a look at the Sacred Heart of Jesus during the French Revolution. It first studies the efforts to crush the invading army that was intent on ending the Revolution and restoring the monarchy. The sensational death of President Sauveur and the meeting of the Three Estates' representatives in May 1789 are discussed. The chapter introduces the Estates General, which was a corporate body designed to represent institutional interests, and the cultural revolution that occurred over the place of the Catholic Church in public life. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the loyalty oath that was imposed upon pastors and bishops are examined. The chapter shows that not all of the pastors and bishops took the oath, and that they warned their parishioners of the dangers to salvation posed by the arrival of the intrus, or intruders. The intrus were the clergy who took the loyalty oath, and it was said that the sacraments which they performed were null.

With a close examination of Royce's treatment of the concept, as well as an etymological and historical study of the term, this chapter clarifies what, precisely, loyalty is. “Loyalty” is thus distinguished from “devotion,” “faithfulness,” “fidelity,” and other related terms. Attention is paid to the “chance and misleading associations” of the term which Royce wishes to avoid, most notably those connecting loyalty with war. Moreover, the chapter establishes what is essential to the term, in Royce's estimation, as he develops and deploys the concept in The Philosophy of Loyalty. While Royce's definition of loyalty is often quoted as “the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause,” it is noted that Royce stipulates that this is a preliminary definition. Each of the terms of this preliminary definition is analyzed, as well as its relationship to Royce's completed definition, “the Will to Believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being.”

Chapter 4 chronicles the period of political Reconstruction in the post-Civil War years, from 1865 to about 1874. Despite the formal end of war, the region did not see an end to bloodshed, as former rebels and Federals continued to struggle for political and social control in their neighborhoods and counties. The experiences of Arkansas and Missouri continued to diverge in the postwar era, with Arkansas and other former Confederate states falling under congressional Reconstruction in 1867. The chapter includes a discussion of the experience of uncertain freedom for emancipated slaves.

This chapter examines several specific policies enacted by the George W. Bush administration, including abstinence-only sex education, antiprostitution pledges, and the Prostitution Loyalty Oath in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, that incorporated a conservative Protestant sexual morality into the United States' anti-trafficking project. Beyond the conceptual conflation of human trafficking and sex trafficking, these policies further conflated sex trafficking with bad or immoral sex more generally.

The aftermath of the SDG meeting saw the introduction of the loyalty oath that had been sought by DeMille. Mankiewicz and the SDG board introduced the measure, and it was ratified by directors. The loyalty oath stayed in place for sixteen years until it was removed by the U.S. Supreme Court. After the meeting, Ford successfully attempted to heal the rift between DeMille and the Guild over the next three years.

This chapter examines how the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, progressed from cautious incursions on some of the witch-hunt era's more drastic practices to its breakthrough decisions of June 17, 1957—so-called Red Monday—and the judicial retrenchment that followed. In the mid-1950s, the Supreme Court took cautious steps toward dismantling loyalty programs. The first sign of major change came in May 1957, in two cases where the Court found violations of due process and rejected the guilt-by-association rationale that had been critical to Vinson Court decisions upholding loyalty programs. One involved Rudolph Schware and the other, Raphael Konigsberg. Another case, this time involving Clinton Jencks, had major implications for the use of secret evidence in political cases. This chapter also discusses Warren's treatment of academic freedom in the case of Paul Sweezy and concludes with an analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving test or loyalty oaths.

This chapter focuses on the most difficult time in Ernst Kantorowicz's life. He had supposed that he would be remaining in Berkeley for the rest of his career. Everything was going well. But in June 1949, a bitter controversy broke out at the University of California. Driven by principle, Kantorowicz involved himself in struggle until late August 1950, when he was defeated and fired. At issue was the loyalty oath that President Robert Sproul required all university academic employees to sign. At the time, America was obsessed about communism. Concerned about the possibility of the legislature interfering directly in the university's affairs and curtailing financial support, Sproul asked the Board of Regents to introduce an enhanced loyalty oath to be signed by all university academic employees. Kantorowicz refused to sign the oath, which led to his firing.

This chapter examines how the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, progressed from cautious incursions on some of the witch-hunt era's more drastic practices to its breakthrough decisions of June 17, 1957—so-called Red Monday—and the judicial retrenchment that followed. In the mid-1950s, the Supreme Court took cautious steps toward dismantling loyalty programs. The first sign of major change came in May 1957, in two cases where the Court found violations of due process and rejected the guilt-by-association rationale that had been critical to Vinson Court decisions upholding loyalty programs. One involved Rudolph Schware and the other, Raphael Konigsberg. Another case, this time involving Clinton Jencks, had major implications for the use of secret evidence in political cases. This chapter also discusses Warren's treatment of academic freedom in the case of Paul Sweezy and concludes with an analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving test or loyalty oaths.

This chapter describes experience in the Free Speech Movement (FSM) as member of the faculty of the University of California, Berkeley. It argues that simply looking at the division of the Berkeley faculty into two polarized factions can do justice to the historical reality of the fall of 1964 and the author of this chapter relates his story as member of the pro-FSM Committee of 200. The chapter suggests that the larger story of faculty involvement in free speech and academic freedom issues at Berkeley dates back at least to the bitter loyalty oath controversy of 1949–1950.

Chapter 3 looks at the SDG meeting in detail, using sources such as the meeting transcript to provide a thorough account. DeMille capitulated from the beginning and accepted that Mankiewicz was victorious. Early in the meeting, he seconded motions for the recall ballots to be destroyed. No debate existed between DeMille’s supporters and others, as DeMille simply had no support. The meeting was essentially a sustained attack on DeMille for his actions in recalling Mankiewicz. George Stevens’s attack on DeMille created a demand that DeMille be removed from office. With demands for DeMille’s resignation at their height, John Ford defended DeMille, and his speech stopped the drive to have DeMille resign. Even with Ford’s intervention, the meeting continued to demand the board’s removal. Ford initially defended the board then reluctantly admitted that events had spun out of control and it had to go.

This chapter examines three Supreme Court cases involving teacher loyalty oaths—from Florida, Washington, and Arizona—that set the stage for Keyishian v. Board of Regents. Before discussing how Keyishian essentially led to the demise of statewide anti-subversive programs, the chapter considers the “Feinberg certificate,” which required employees to acknowledge that they had read New York's rules implementing the Feinberg Law and that these rules were terms of their employment. The Feinberg certificate required employees to deny that they were members of the Communist Party or, if they ever had been, to state that they had disclosed this fact to the president of the State University of New York. The chapter also looks at the Supreme Court case Baggett v. Bullitt, which challenges Washington State's two loyalty oaths and concludes with an analysis of Keyishian and its ramifications for academic freedom.

This chapter examines three Supreme Court cases involving teacher loyalty oaths—from Florida, Washington, and Arizona—that set the stage for Keyishian v. Board of Regents. Before discussing how Keyishian essentially led to the demise of statewide anti-subversive programs, the chapter considers the “Feinberg certificate,” which required employees to acknowledge that they had read New York's rules implementing the Feinberg Law and that these rules were terms of their employment. The Feinberg certificate required employees to deny that they were members of the Communist Party or, if they ever had been, to state that they had disclosed this fact to the president of the State University of New York. The chapter also looks at the Supreme Court case Baggett v. Bullitt, which challenges Washington State's two loyalty oaths and concludes with an analysis of Keyishian and its ramifications for academic freedom.

This chapter examines Union attempts during the Civil War to suppress disloyalty with controversial new war measures, including the employment of loyalty oaths and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which blocked detained citizens from access to the courts to obtain their freedom. Taking advantage of these laws, military officers, to silence dissent, were free to arrest and imprison citizens, therefore bypassing the court system. This chapter is a study of the application of these pacification laws in Harrison County, describing the arrests of over sixty citizens, the reasons for the arrests, and incarceration of the political prisoners in Camp Frazer, Camp Chase, and other locations. Cynthiana’s pro-Southern editor was arrested and his paper closed.

The SDG meeting of October 22, 1950, is a famous event in Hollywood history for all the wrong reasons. It is legendary because Cecil B. DeMille, John Ford, and Joseph L. Mankiewicz, along with many other celebrated directors, played prominent roles. Even small anecdotes from the meeting, such as Ford declaring, “My name is John Ford. I make westerns,” have entered Hollywood folklore. The meeting was convened to discuss the forced recall of Mankiewicz as SDG president by its conservative board headed by DeMille. The catalyst for the recall was a debate about a loyalty oath for Guild members, which was also linked to a union-sanctioned blacklist. Mankiewicz apparently protested to the media about the way the SDG’s board was operating—in particular, its use of an open and signed ballot to push through the measure. In response to the attempted recall by DeMille and other conservatives, Mankiewicz and his supporters took legal action and called a general meeting to discuss the issue. Several hundred directors packed into the Beverley Hills Hotel on October 22, 1950, to do just that.

This chapter discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions during its October 1961 term. The number of decisions in “Communist” cases dropped sharply—only three signed decisions compared to fifteen in the preceding term. The signed decisions were in routine cases—another prosecution for filing a false Taft–Hartley affidavit, a challenge to Florida’s loyalty oath for public employees, and a group of contempt-of-Congress cases collected in a single decision. The most significant “Communist” case considered during the term, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, was not decided, because the justices, divided 4–4 following Whittaker’s retirement, ordered reargument. The case marked a convergence of the Court’s lines of decision in NAACP and “Communist” cases.

This chapter explores academic freedom-related issues that have arisen since September 11, 2001, both in the schools and in the courts. The issues include new controversies regarding loyalty oaths, pressures against outspoken professors and against Middle East studies, and broad uses of the word terrorism to silence dissent. This chapter considers the debate over censorship after 9/11 and whether the government's anti-terrorism measures are similar to the anti-communist purges it practicted in the past. In particular, it discusses one anti-terrorism law that relates to academic freedom: the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. It also examines the Supreme Court decision in the Humanitarian Law Project case, the controversy surrounding Middle East studies, and a number of court cases relevant to the question of academic freedom.