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This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.

The avant-garde clerical group came to enjoy ascendancy in the 1630s, and consequently, their comprehension of the Polity enjoyed a dominant position. This collapsed, however, with the crumbling of royal power, and something akin to a Reformed understanding of Hooker reasserted itself before the English Church was suppressed entirely during the Civil War. In the face of outright hostility, even former Church moderates amongst them were forced to become more extreme and embrace what can arguably be described as an Anglican interpretation of Hooker.

Holland's rebel towns could only be defended by garrisons of professional soldiers, paid on time. To this end the States of Holland appropriated the sole reliable revenue stream: the provincial taxes that had hitherto funded Holland's debt. The Lords States (as they styled themselves) induced creditors to accept unsecured notes (underline obligatiën), and town corporations got burghers to subscribe to war loans. To satisfy those impatient for repayment, magistrates (with approval from the states) used properties confiscated from the Catholic Church, or from loyalists who had chosen exile instead of joining in the rebellion. Just as the Habsburg government had depended on the provinces to manage its finances, the States of Holland now depended on the towns to manage provincial finances.

While Virginia's establishment was forced to negotiate with its religious dissenters to encourage mobilization, and while Britain had historically been associated with protecting dissenter interests in the late colonial period, Britain did not effectively use religion to encourage loyalty. Lord Dunmore was ineffective in rallying loyalists in Virginia, especially after he supported mobilization of slaves and Indians, and apparently did not understand the serious problem of dissent in Virginia. More generally, British officials, convinced by loyalists that dissenters had played a leading role in fomenting rebellion, planned to win the war and establish the Anglican Church even more fully in America, preventing any serious effort to use British protection of religious dissent to encourage loyalty. Reports that Britain used John Wesley to encourage loyalism among American Methodists are ill‐founded but indicative of the deep concerns of Virginia's establishment.

Ulster unionist identity is analysed in three stages. The first examines the ideological content of unionism’s historical myths that function to legitimize contemporary beliefs. The second focuses on how unionists sought to secure their identity in unionism’s ‘golden era’; the period from Partition to the collapse of Stormont. The third discusses the reasons why unionist identity has experienced a profound crisis since 1972. The evidence reveals a pessimistic, fissured, and flawed identity, struggling to envision its future in the post-Good Friday Agreement era.

This chapter follows the story of the Loyalists — who came to call themselves “Nova Scotians” — in their exodus to an African promised land. It traces their efforts to put into practice the transformative project that Gustavus Vassa had outlined at the conclusion of his Interesting Narrative. In these settlers' struggles with the Sierra Leone Company, which governed the colony, and their efforts to forge relationships with the Koya Temne people who surrounded the colony, the Nova Scotians confronted some of the inherent complexities in the emerging diasporic vision of African identity. In the process they, and some black New Englanders who hoped to follow them, began to forge an alternate way to think about the links connecting “Africans” to one another.

The peace between Britain and America was the achievement on the British side of Lord Shelburne. He had opposed the war and hoped that the Americans would return to a close relationship with Britain short of full independence. Initially he was prepared to give them generous terms over their territorial and other claims. He was, however, to discover that the Americans would not compromise on full independence, which he reluctantly conceded, and that any settlement with them would involve highly contentious issues, such as what was to be done for loyalists who had sided with Britain or what were to be the boundaries of the remaining British American colonies. To attain a quick peace, Britain yielded on most points. Concessions were denounced in the press and in parliament leading to Shelburne’s resignation.

Quebec and Nova Scotia were the most important North American colonies which remained British after 1783. Both attracted loyalists who had opposed the Revolution. Ambitious initial hopes that these colonies would prosper within the empire and would become show cases to the United States for the virtues of British constitutional government proved difficult to realise. Rather than separation from the Americans, informal links across the international border developed. Nova Scotia and its offshoot the new colony of New Brunswick were governed according to old established models of colonial government. In the 1791 Canada Act Quebec was divided to give the loyalists their own colony separate from the French majority and attempts were made to strengthen imperial authority in both the new colonies.

In the closing stages of the American war Britain gave priority to the defence of the West Indies, regarded as a British asset of the utmost national importance, over efforts to subdue the mainland colonies. The war had posed acute problems for the islands, but they quickly regained much of their prosperity through their slave‐worked plantation agriculture. Jamaica remained Britain's most valued colony. Although the Florida colonies had been surrendered to Spain at the peace, British governments were still interested in expanding Britain's stake in the Caribbean and around the Gulf of Mexico. The settlement of loyalists from the southern colonies in the Bahamas was supported, trade with the Spanish colonies was encouraged and plans for disrupting the Spanish empire by inciting Indian and creole revolts were revived in 1790 at the prospect of war with Spain.

War cut off migration into America except for those British and German soldiers who elected to stay there. After the war, there were few effective restrictions on moving from Britain to the United States of America. To the dismay of most British opinion, emigration quickly began again on its pre‐war scale. Irish people mostly looking to improve their lot rather than the victims of impoverishment or persecution, were by far the largest element. Emigration from Scotland was slower to resume and initially tended to be to British colonies. The ending of the war enabled Americans to visit Britain as before and loyalists fled from from America to Britain, including some of African origin who later went on to Sierra Leone.

American independence drove many refugees into the remaining British colonies. This chapter discusses the diverse elements in the loyalist exodus: those who were deeply committed enemies of the Revolution and upholders of the values of the British empire were mixed with many, such as disbanded soldiers, to whom the British colonies with their free land and initial financial support might seem an attractive refuge from the turmoil of the last stages of the war. Migration to and from the United States was to continue after the war. Although the British colonies were British in government and institutions, large parts of their population were essentially Americans, if not committed republicans, who were not necessarily very different from those on the other side of the border with whom they maintained many links.

This chapter examines the consolidation of British America during the period from 1783 to 1860. After the American Revolution what remained of British America consisted of various centres of ethnic settlements loosely connected to the British Empire. The Treaty of Paris and the Loyalist resettlement combined to transform British America from being a marginal jurisdiction to provinces of new importance to Great Britain. The first round of Imperial reorganization took place in 1784 and by 1860 these provinces had developed sophisticated economies and responsible government under the Imperial umbrella.