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The Significance of Tarski's Theory of Truth

Scott Soames

in Understanding Truth

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195123357
eISBN:
9780199872114
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195123352.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Can Tarski's definition of truth be taken to be an analysis of truth – i.e., a method of defining formal truth predicates that are capable of playing the role of truth in all theoretical contexts in ... More


Molecular Propositions

Marie McGinn

in Elucidating the ‘Tractatus’: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Logic and Language

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199244447
eISBN:
9780191714146
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244447.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

In showing that all representation of the world takes place through the representation of possible states of affairs in elementary propositions, Wittgenstein has begun to clarify both how one ... More


Are There Model‐Theoretic Logical Truths that are not Logically True?

Mario Gómez‐Torrente

in New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199296309
eISBN:
9780191712272
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Tarski implicitly postulated that a certain pre-theoretical concept of logical consequence and his technical concept of logical consequence are co-extensional. This chapter makes explicit a few ... More


Tracking over the Rivals

Sherrilyn Roush

in Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199274734
eISBN:
9780191603228
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199274738.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that the new tracking view is superior to externalist rivals: process reliabilism, the safety view, and the relevant alternatives view. This is because of the generality problem, ... More


Truth and Truth at a Time

Michael Tooley

in Time, Tense, and Causation

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198250746
eISBN:
9780191598623
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250746.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Defends both the concepts of truth at a time and of truth simpliciter.It rejects arguments against truth at a time, according to which this concept involves a confusion between propositions and ... More


Theist solutions

Brian Leftow

in God and Necessity

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199263356
eISBN:
9780191741777
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263356.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The chapter first displays how Descartes and Leibniz offered contrasting theist approaches to the conflicts — Leibniz’ being in a broad sense Platonic. Theists, it argues, should hold that necessary ... More


The Problem of De Re Modality

Kit Fine

in Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199278701
eISBN:
9780191603105
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199278709.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

It is maintained that Quine had two arguments against quantified modal logic; one rooted in an opposition to the idea of an essential property; and the other rooted in an opposition to the idea that ... More


Logic

Theodore Sider

in Writing the Book of the World

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199697908
eISBN:
9780191732096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The highly general notion of structure lets us raise metaphysical questions about logic. Is it conjunction or disjunction that is most fundamental? (An uncomfortable question! ‐ fortunately we may ... More


Kant on logic

Penelope Maddy

in Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199273669
eISBN:
9780191706264
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

For Kant, logical truth arises from the structure of the discursive intellect (i.e., an intellect that relates to objects indirectly, by means of concepts). Discursive cognition necessarily involves ... More


Modality

Theodore Sider

in Writing the Book of the World

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199697908
eISBN:
9780191732096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Modal operators are unneeded in fundamental inquiries, and so they probably do not carve at the joints. A reduction of modality is therefore demanded. A “Humean” reduction is proposed, according to ... More


Naturalistic options

Penelope Maddy

in Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199273669
eISBN:
9780191706264
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Here the book turns to doing, rather than describing, Second Philosophy. In preparation for the philosophy of mathematics in Part IV, Part III takes up the question of the nature of logical truth. In ... More


Quine on Quantifying In

Kit Fine

in Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199278701
eISBN:
9780191603105
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199278709.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter provides shorter version of the previous chapter and develops some of its themes. It argues that the status of Quine’s arguments against quantifying into modal contexts varies depending ... More


What is Truth, and What is a Theory of Truth?

Tim Maudlin

in Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199247295
eISBN:
9780191601781
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199247293.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Considers criteria of adequacy for a theory of truth. The semantics of the truth predicate is explicated, together with accounts of what the proximate and ultimate truth conditions of logically ... More


Possible Worlds Semantics

Charles S. Chihara

in The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199246557
eISBN:
9780191697609
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246557.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses the philosophical theories and presuppositions of applying possible worlds semantics in order to draw conclusions about matters involving what are called conceptual or broadly ... More


Disagreement and the A Priori

Ralph Wedgwood

in The Nature of Normativity

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199251315
eISBN:
9780191719127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter traces out some implications of this epistemological account. First, it is explained how the account developed in Chapter 10 implies that under favourable conditions, normative truths ... More


What Laws of Logic Say

Charles Travis

in Objectivity and the Parochial

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199596218
eISBN:
9780191595783
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596218.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics

How does a law of logic speak to thought? How, if at all, might the world speak to such a law's truth? Is there such a thing as things being other than it says? What does it say? This chapter ... More


No Requirement of Relevance

John P. Burgess

in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780195148770
eISBN:
9780199835560
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195148770.003.0024
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

There are schools of logicians who claim that an argument is not valid unless the conclusion is relevant to the premises. In particular, relevance logicians reject the classical theses that anything ... More


The status of rudimentary logic

Penelope Maddy

in Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199273669
eISBN:
9780191706264
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0020
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

According to this second-philosophical account, rudimentary logic is contingent on certain very general structural features and is true only when and where they are present. (We tend to think logic ... More


Undoing the Copernican revolution 1

Penelope Maddy

in Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199273669
eISBN:
9780191706264
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0017
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Kant's two-level scheme allows him to say two things at once: speaking empirically, logic is objectively true (empirically real) because of the structure of the world (e.g., because it's made up of ... More


Rationalism Regained 1: The Benacerraf Dilemmas

Robert Hanna

in Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780198716297
eISBN:
9780191785009
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716297.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 6 re-presents the famous Benacerraf Dilemma, now extended from its original version in the context of mathematical truth and knowledge, to logical truth and knowledge, and then generalized to ... More


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