Michael Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139167
- eISBN:
- 9780199833214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513916X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This essay is an interpretation of Carnap’s principle of tolerance in his 1934 Logical Syntax of Language, as expressed in his philosophy of mathematics. Friedman argues that Carnap’s deepest ...
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This essay is an interpretation of Carnap’s principle of tolerance in his 1934 Logical Syntax of Language, as expressed in his philosophy of mathematics. Friedman argues that Carnap’s deepest philosophical motivation was to offer scientifically minded philosophers an intellectual responsible, undogmatic way out of their philosophical perplexities. Carnap’s dream of replacing dogmatic metaphysical dispute with the construction of formalized languages failed, for interesting reasons internal to the development of logic. Carnap hoped to provide a purely formal characterization of the intuitive distinction between questions which concern the real natures of objects and those which merely concern alternative ways of speaking. Yet in relying on Gödel’s arithmetization of syntax to formulate a language-relative distinction between synthetic and analytic truth, Carnap’s Syntax philosophy foundered on the incompleteness theorem, for that result shows that there is in principle no wholly formal (philosophical neutral) way to survey the logical consequences of each and every alternative theory of mathematics. This left Carnap with no way to formulate his principle of tolerance neutrally.Less
This essay is an interpretation of Carnap’s principle of tolerance in his 1934 Logical Syntax of Language, as expressed in his philosophy of mathematics. Friedman argues that Carnap’s deepest philosophical motivation was to offer scientifically minded philosophers an intellectual responsible, undogmatic way out of their philosophical perplexities. Carnap’s dream of replacing dogmatic metaphysical dispute with the construction of formalized languages failed, for interesting reasons internal to the development of logic. Carnap hoped to provide a purely formal characterization of the intuitive distinction between questions which concern the real natures of objects and those which merely concern alternative ways of speaking. Yet in relying on Gödel’s arithmetization of syntax to formulate a language-relative distinction between synthetic and analytic truth, Carnap’s Syntax philosophy foundered on the incompleteness theorem, for that result shows that there is in principle no wholly formal (philosophical neutral) way to survey the logical consequences of each and every alternative theory of mathematics. This left Carnap with no way to formulate his principle of tolerance neutrally.
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199252619
- eISBN:
- 9780191712647
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252619.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
In Vienna during the 1920s there emerged a group of philosophers — the logical positivists — who wished to deny that any metaphysical questions were meaningful. Although they held much of the ...
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In Vienna during the 1920s there emerged a group of philosophers — the logical positivists — who wished to deny that any metaphysical questions were meaningful. Although they held much of the Tractatus in high regard, they took the parts of it which gestured towards the unsayable — especially the mystical sections near the end of the book — to embody a straightforward mistake on Wittgenstein's part. If they accepted the Tractarian conception of language, even in outline, their position thus amounted to a denial of the concept of the self. This chapter examines the extent to which the positivists' account of arithmetic, the locus classicus for which is Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, survives their denial of metaphysics.Less
In Vienna during the 1920s there emerged a group of philosophers — the logical positivists — who wished to deny that any metaphysical questions were meaningful. Although they held much of the Tractatus in high regard, they took the parts of it which gestured towards the unsayable — especially the mystical sections near the end of the book — to embody a straightforward mistake on Wittgenstein's part. If they accepted the Tractarian conception of language, even in outline, their position thus amounted to a denial of the concept of the self. This chapter examines the extent to which the positivists' account of arithmetic, the locus classicus for which is Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, survives their denial of metaphysics.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Wittgenstein’s doctrines of what can be said and of what cannot be said but only shown, and the paradoxical conclusion of the Tractatus that the sentences of the book are nonsensical, are outlined. ...
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Wittgenstein’s doctrines of what can be said and of what cannot be said but only shown, and the paradoxical conclusion of the Tractatus that the sentences of the book are nonsensical, are outlined. Professor Cora Diamond’s interpretation of the Tractatus is sketched. It is criticized as inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus, on the one hand, and with everything that Wittgenstein said about the Tractatus, both while writing it and thereafter, on the other.Less
Wittgenstein’s doctrines of what can be said and of what cannot be said but only shown, and the paradoxical conclusion of the Tractatus that the sentences of the book are nonsensical, are outlined. Professor Cora Diamond’s interpretation of the Tractatus is sketched. It is criticized as inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus, on the one hand, and with everything that Wittgenstein said about the Tractatus, both while writing it and thereafter, on the other.
Oskari Kuusela
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- February 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198829751
- eISBN:
- 9780191868252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198829751.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses the relation between the Tractatus’ and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to ...
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This chapter discusses the relation between the Tractatus’ and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. Explained in Carnapian terms, the goal of the Tractatus is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, logical principles and concepts of a logical language to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore part of the Tractatus’ view, and contrary to Carnap’s criticism, the sentences of the Tractatus can be clearly distinguished from nonsensical metaphysical statements. Moreover, despite the Tractatus’ rejection of syntactical statements, there is a correspondence between Wittgenstein’s saying–showing distinction and Carnap’s object-language/syntax-language distinction. Both constitute ways to clarify the logical distinction between the logico-syntactical determinations concerning language and the use of language according to such determinations, a distinction absent in Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein’s distinction thus constitutes a precursor of the object-language/syntax-language distinction which the latter in a certain sense affirms. The saying–showing distinction agrees with Carnap’s position also in marking logic as something that is not true/false about either language or reality, a view that underlies Carnap’s principle of tolerance. The standard view that Carnap overcame the philosophy of logic of the Tractatus in the 1930s must therefore be regarded as problematic and misleading.Less
This chapter discusses the relation between the Tractatus’ and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. Explained in Carnapian terms, the goal of the Tractatus is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, logical principles and concepts of a logical language to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore part of the Tractatus’ view, and contrary to Carnap’s criticism, the sentences of the Tractatus can be clearly distinguished from nonsensical metaphysical statements. Moreover, despite the Tractatus’ rejection of syntactical statements, there is a correspondence between Wittgenstein’s saying–showing distinction and Carnap’s object-language/syntax-language distinction. Both constitute ways to clarify the logical distinction between the logico-syntactical determinations concerning language and the use of language according to such determinations, a distinction absent in Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein’s distinction thus constitutes a precursor of the object-language/syntax-language distinction which the latter in a certain sense affirms. The saying–showing distinction agrees with Carnap’s position also in marking logic as something that is not true/false about either language or reality, a view that underlies Carnap’s principle of tolerance. The standard view that Carnap overcame the philosophy of logic of the Tractatus in the 1930s must therefore be regarded as problematic and misleading.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The controversy between Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch over the correct interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, naming, and the method of projection of names is discussed. Evidence in ...
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The controversy between Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch over the correct interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, naming, and the method of projection of names is discussed. Evidence in favour of Malcolm’s realist interpretation of the Tractatus doctrine is elaborated: the meaning of a Tractatus name is not exhausted by its logico-syntactical role, which determines only its form. The method of projection is meaning by a name in an elementary proposition the object that is its meaning. In an appendix, Professor Cora Diamond’s objections to this interpretation are rebutted.Less
The controversy between Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch over the correct interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, naming, and the method of projection of names is discussed. Evidence in favour of Malcolm’s realist interpretation of the Tractatus doctrine is elaborated: the meaning of a Tractatus name is not exhausted by its logico-syntactical role, which determines only its form. The method of projection is meaning by a name in an elementary proposition the object that is its meaning. In an appendix, Professor Cora Diamond’s objections to this interpretation are rebutted.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter focuses on two main issues: the issue of indexicality, and the extension of the notions of logic to indexical languages; and the issue of the notation itself. It begins with a discussion ...
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This chapter focuses on two main issues: the issue of indexicality, and the extension of the notions of logic to indexical languages; and the issue of the notation itself. It begins with a discussion of logical syntax, and then turns from there to possible characterizations of the notion of consequence. It concludes with a discussion of some further semantic phenomena, which underscore the need to take context and language together.Less
This chapter focuses on two main issues: the issue of indexicality, and the extension of the notions of logic to indexical languages; and the issue of the notation itself. It begins with a discussion of logical syntax, and then turns from there to possible characterizations of the notion of consequence. It concludes with a discussion of some further semantic phenomena, which underscore the need to take context and language together.
L. Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 1977
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244127
- eISBN:
- 9780191680748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter elucidates the logical syntax of inductive probability-gradings. It first presents some logical similarities between inductive and mathematical probability. The inductive ...
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This chapter elucidates the logical syntax of inductive probability-gradings. It first presents some logical similarities between inductive and mathematical probability. The inductive probability-gradings conform to quite different principles from those for mathematical probability in regard to contraposition; in regard to the relation between prior and posterior probabilities; in regard to a proposition's conjunction with other propositions; and in regard to its negation. In terms of inductive probability, it is possible to describe a generalized form of reductio ad absurdum argument. The logical structure of inductive probability cannot be mapped on to the calculus of mathematical probability. Indeed, because inductive support does not seem to be additive, inductive probabilities do not seem to be measurable — though they are rankable. Furthermore, the logical syntax of inductive probability may be deployed axiomatically within a modal logic that generalizes on Lewis' system S4.Less
This chapter elucidates the logical syntax of inductive probability-gradings. It first presents some logical similarities between inductive and mathematical probability. The inductive probability-gradings conform to quite different principles from those for mathematical probability in regard to contraposition; in regard to the relation between prior and posterior probabilities; in regard to a proposition's conjunction with other propositions; and in regard to its negation. In terms of inductive probability, it is possible to describe a generalized form of reductio ad absurdum argument. The logical structure of inductive probability cannot be mapped on to the calculus of mathematical probability. Indeed, because inductive support does not seem to be additive, inductive probabilities do not seem to be measurable — though they are rankable. Furthermore, the logical syntax of inductive probability may be deployed axiomatically within a modal logic that generalizes on Lewis' system S4.
Peter Hylton
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139167
- eISBN:
- 9780199833214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513916X.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Hylton argues that some of the characteristic concerns of Quine are already in place by the 1930s. Hylton examines Quine’s 1934 Harvard lectures on Carnap, his first attempt to explain Carnap’s ...
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Hylton argues that some of the characteristic concerns of Quine are already in place by the 1930s. Hylton examines Quine’s 1934 Harvard lectures on Carnap, his first attempt to explain Carnap’s logical syntax program to an American audience. By pointing out tensions within the exposition the young Quine offered of Carnap’s views, Hylton shows how these lectures already point toward Quine’s subsequent disagreements with Carnap over the analytic/synthetic distinction. Hylton finds that in these lectures Quine departs from exposition because of a philosophical discomfort with Carnap’s assumption that our actual, pre-analytic, language contains a set of implicitly given definitions or rules from which the category of the a priori arises. Moreover, Quine also fastidiously departs from Carnap in trying to avoid assuming that our language contains a distinction between the a priori and the empirical. In the context of an exposition of Carnap’s program, this invites a question Quine was soon to ask: what sort of explanation of a given sentence’s truth could Carnap’s notion of “analytic” possibly provide? Hylton argues that Quine’s later well-known holism about meaning, his famed denial of empiricism’s second reductionist dogma—that “each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience”—was not the sole or primary philosophical factor shaping Quine’s differences with Carnap. Hylton’s examination of the origins of Quine’s differences with Carnap shows that what is fundamentally at stake is the very conception of what counts as a philosophical explanation.Less
Hylton argues that some of the characteristic concerns of Quine are already in place by the 1930s. Hylton examines Quine’s 1934 Harvard lectures on Carnap, his first attempt to explain Carnap’s logical syntax program to an American audience. By pointing out tensions within the exposition the young Quine offered of Carnap’s views, Hylton shows how these lectures already point toward Quine’s subsequent disagreements with Carnap over the analytic/synthetic distinction. Hylton finds that in these lectures Quine departs from exposition because of a philosophical discomfort with Carnap’s assumption that our actual, pre-analytic, language contains a set of implicitly given definitions or rules from which the category of the a priori arises. Moreover, Quine also fastidiously departs from Carnap in trying to avoid assuming that our language contains a distinction between the a priori and the empirical. In the context of an exposition of Carnap’s program, this invites a question Quine was soon to ask: what sort of explanation of a given sentence’s truth could Carnap’s notion of “analytic” possibly provide? Hylton argues that Quine’s later well-known holism about meaning, his famed denial of empiricism’s second reductionist dogma—that “each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience”—was not the sole or primary philosophical factor shaping Quine’s differences with Carnap. Hylton’s examination of the origins of Quine’s differences with Carnap shows that what is fundamentally at stake is the very conception of what counts as a philosophical explanation.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160726
- eISBN:
- 9781400850464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter discusses the methodology that guided logico-linguistic analysis from Gottlob Frege’s 1879 Begriffsschrift to Rudolf Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language. In the first four ...
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This chapter discusses the methodology that guided logico-linguistic analysis from Gottlob Frege’s 1879 Begriffsschrift to Rudolf Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language. In the first four decades of this period, culminating with Bertrand Russell’s 1918–19 lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, analysis was viewed as an increasingly powerful tool employed in the service of solving traditional philosophical problems. The logicist reduction of arithmetic to what was taken to be logic was the driving force, providing the exemplar of philosophical analysis and the model for extending it beyond the philosophy of mathematics. The methodology is indicated by the role played by A2 in answering Frege’s guiding philosophical questions Q1 and Q2.Less
This chapter discusses the methodology that guided logico-linguistic analysis from Gottlob Frege’s 1879 Begriffsschrift to Rudolf Carnap’s 1934 The Logical Syntax of Language. In the first four decades of this period, culminating with Bertrand Russell’s 1918–19 lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, analysis was viewed as an increasingly powerful tool employed in the service of solving traditional philosophical problems. The logicist reduction of arithmetic to what was taken to be logic was the driving force, providing the exemplar of philosophical analysis and the model for extending it beyond the philosophy of mathematics. The methodology is indicated by the role played by A2 in answering Frege’s guiding philosophical questions Q1 and Q2.
Jared Warren
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- December 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190086152
- eISBN:
- 9780190086183
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190086152.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter steps back and provides a general overview. It begins by discussing how each of the classic conventionalist slogans (about truth in virtue of meaning, analyticity, tautologies, and more) ...
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This chapter steps back and provides a general overview. It begins by discussing how each of the classic conventionalist slogans (about truth in virtue of meaning, analyticity, tautologies, and more) fares in light of my conventionalist theory. Then the chapter discuses Carnap’s Logical Syntax-era theory of logic and mathematics in detail, before turning to Giannoni’s less well-known account in Conventionalism in Logic. Finally, the chapter briefly considers how it is that the rejection of conventionalism has turned into a new dogma, not just of empiricism, but of contemporary philosophy as a whole.Less
This chapter steps back and provides a general overview. It begins by discussing how each of the classic conventionalist slogans (about truth in virtue of meaning, analyticity, tautologies, and more) fares in light of my conventionalist theory. Then the chapter discuses Carnap’s Logical Syntax-era theory of logic and mathematics in detail, before turning to Giannoni’s less well-known account in Conventionalism in Logic. Finally, the chapter briefly considers how it is that the rejection of conventionalism has turned into a new dogma, not just of empiricism, but of contemporary philosophy as a whole.
Gennaro Chierchia
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199697977
- eISBN:
- 9780191765971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697977.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Syntax and Morphology
This chapter synthesizes and discusses the main results of the book, namely (i) the treatment of ordinary scalar terms and their implicatures, (ii) pure NPIs (emphatic, weak, strong) (iii) NPIs that ...
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This chapter synthesizes and discusses the main results of the book, namely (i) the treatment of ordinary scalar terms and their implicatures, (ii) pure NPIs (emphatic, weak, strong) (iii) NPIs that double up as FCIs (existential and universal), and (iv) intervention effects of various sorts. The data seem to bear out the claim that Polarity Sensitive Items (PSIs) are indefinites whose alternatives have become obligatorily active (a case of ‘grammaticization’). The behavior of PSIs follows under these assumptions from a general view of how alternatives are factored into meaning via a process of exhaustification. A tightly regulated system of parameters paves the way to understanding both historical and typological variation in the Polarity System. Minimality effects constitute a key piece of evidence in favor of this view and a unique window on how the Polarity System works. The crucial role that logical triviality plays in this account is also discussed along with consequences of such role on the relation between syntax and logic, on the generative paradigm, and on our understanding of human cognition.Less
This chapter synthesizes and discusses the main results of the book, namely (i) the treatment of ordinary scalar terms and their implicatures, (ii) pure NPIs (emphatic, weak, strong) (iii) NPIs that double up as FCIs (existential and universal), and (iv) intervention effects of various sorts. The data seem to bear out the claim that Polarity Sensitive Items (PSIs) are indefinites whose alternatives have become obligatorily active (a case of ‘grammaticization’). The behavior of PSIs follows under these assumptions from a general view of how alternatives are factored into meaning via a process of exhaustification. A tightly regulated system of parameters paves the way to understanding both historical and typological variation in the Polarity System. Minimality effects constitute a key piece of evidence in favor of this view and a unique window on how the Polarity System works. The crucial role that logical triviality plays in this account is also discussed along with consequences of such role on the relation between syntax and logic, on the generative paradigm, and on our understanding of human cognition.
A.W. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198823643
- eISBN:
- 9780191862250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198823643.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The focus of this essay is the idea of the univocity of being, championed by Duns Scotus and given prominence more recently by Gilles Deleuze. Although one concern of the essay is with how this idea ...
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The focus of this essay is the idea of the univocity of being, championed by Duns Scotus and given prominence more recently by Gilles Deleuze. Although one concern of the essay is with how this idea can be established, its primary concern is with something more basic: how the idea can even be properly thought. This issue is explored with the aid of some ideas about logical syntax borrowed from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. One incidental benefit of the exercise is to indicate how there can be dialogue between analytic philosophers and those of other traditions.Less
The focus of this essay is the idea of the univocity of being, championed by Duns Scotus and given prominence more recently by Gilles Deleuze. Although one concern of the essay is with how this idea can be established, its primary concern is with something more basic: how the idea can even be properly thought. This issue is explored with the aid of some ideas about logical syntax borrowed from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. One incidental benefit of the exercise is to indicate how there can be dialogue between analytic philosophers and those of other traditions.
Megan Ma
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- June 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780192858467
- eISBN:
- 9780191949272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192858467.003.0014
- Subject:
- Law, Intellectual Property, IT, and Media Law
This chapter explores smart contracts in their broader historical context. The use of statistics and the so-called ‘mathematization’ of law is not new: from Aristotle to Descartes to Leibniz, the ...
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This chapter explores smart contracts in their broader historical context. The use of statistics and the so-called ‘mathematization’ of law is not new: from Aristotle to Descartes to Leibniz, the common denominator was that mathematical precision should be applied across all disciplines. Currently, ‘computable contracts’—and more broadly, computable law—are making a powerful return. Contracts may be represented as computer data with terms made ‘machine-readable’ through a process of conversion. Conditions of agreements are not explained but listed as structured data records. However, despite the capacity to express contracts in a computable form, there is no means for interpretation. Rather, the interpretation of contractual obligations is perceived as irrelevant. Should digital data inscription and processing be considered a form of legal writing? If so, would it change the character of law? This chapter explores the significance of medium in contract drafting. In particular, it explores the translation of text to numbers by unpacking several formal programming languages currently proposed or used in computable contracts. In identifying the logic of these languages, it tackles methods of legal writing. By analysing the components of both legal and programming language, we can develop a richer dialogue on the sociological implications of translating law to algorithmic form. Further, it would be interesting to consider what contextual understanding may need to exist to ‘interpret’ contractual language.Less
This chapter explores smart contracts in their broader historical context. The use of statistics and the so-called ‘mathematization’ of law is not new: from Aristotle to Descartes to Leibniz, the common denominator was that mathematical precision should be applied across all disciplines. Currently, ‘computable contracts’—and more broadly, computable law—are making a powerful return. Contracts may be represented as computer data with terms made ‘machine-readable’ through a process of conversion. Conditions of agreements are not explained but listed as structured data records. However, despite the capacity to express contracts in a computable form, there is no means for interpretation. Rather, the interpretation of contractual obligations is perceived as irrelevant. Should digital data inscription and processing be considered a form of legal writing? If so, would it change the character of law? This chapter explores the significance of medium in contract drafting. In particular, it explores the translation of text to numbers by unpacking several formal programming languages currently proposed or used in computable contracts. In identifying the logic of these languages, it tackles methods of legal writing. By analysing the components of both legal and programming language, we can develop a richer dialogue on the sociological implications of translating law to algorithmic form. Further, it would be interesting to consider what contextual understanding may need to exist to ‘interpret’ contractual language.