Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
After a Darwinian-type account of what beliefs are and how they arose in animals acting to cope with their environments–“low beliefs,” virtually all of which are true–Professor Matson shows how the ...
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After a Darwinian-type account of what beliefs are and how they arose in animals acting to cope with their environments–“low beliefs,” virtually all of which are true–Professor Matson shows how the invention of language led to imagination and thence to beliefs formed in other ways (“high beliefs”), not true though thought to be, which could be consolidated into mythologies, the first Grand Unified Theories of Everything. Science began when Thales of Miletus produced a Grand Theory based on low (“everyday”) beliefs. Matson traces the course of science and philosophy through seven centuries to their sudden and violent displacement by Christianity with its Grand Theory of the old type. Against the widespread opinion that modern philosophy has slowly but completely emancipated itself from bondage to theology, he shows how remnants from the medieval ‘interlude’ still lurk unnoticed in the purportedly neutral notions of logical possibility, possible worlds, and laws as commands, to the detriment of the natural harmony between science and philosophy, including ethics. Accessibly written, this is a book for all who are interested in the foundations of 21st century thought and who wonder where the cracks might be.Less
After a Darwinian-type account of what beliefs are and how they arose in animals acting to cope with their environments–“low beliefs,” virtually all of which are true–Professor Matson shows how the invention of language led to imagination and thence to beliefs formed in other ways (“high beliefs”), not true though thought to be, which could be consolidated into mythologies, the first Grand Unified Theories of Everything. Science began when Thales of Miletus produced a Grand Theory based on low (“everyday”) beliefs. Matson traces the course of science and philosophy through seven centuries to their sudden and violent displacement by Christianity with its Grand Theory of the old type. Against the widespread opinion that modern philosophy has slowly but completely emancipated itself from bondage to theology, he shows how remnants from the medieval ‘interlude’ still lurk unnoticed in the purportedly neutral notions of logical possibility, possible worlds, and laws as commands, to the detriment of the natural harmony between science and philosophy, including ethics. Accessibly written, this is a book for all who are interested in the foundations of 21st century thought and who wonder where the cracks might be.
Nino B. Cocchiarella and Max A. Freund
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195366587
- eISBN:
- 9780199851898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195366587.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter initially describes possible-worlds semantics, which was first introduced by Rudolf Carnap in 1946 in terms of his state-description semantics, for sentential modal logic. Carnap was not ...
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This chapter initially describes possible-worlds semantics, which was first introduced by Rudolf Carnap in 1946 in terms of his state-description semantics, for sentential modal logic. Carnap was not concerned with different notions of necessity and possibility, but only with logical necessity and logical possibility. He proposed a criterion of adequacy that any formal semantics for these notions must satisfy in his account of logical necessity and logical possibility. The authors construct a formal semantics and modal logic that satisfies Carnap's criterion in terms of the ontology of logical atomism — an ontology that was implicit in Carnap's state-description semantics.Less
This chapter initially describes possible-worlds semantics, which was first introduced by Rudolf Carnap in 1946 in terms of his state-description semantics, for sentential modal logic. Carnap was not concerned with different notions of necessity and possibility, but only with logical necessity and logical possibility. He proposed a criterion of adequacy that any formal semantics for these notions must satisfy in his account of logical necessity and logical possibility. The authors construct a formal semantics and modal logic that satisfies Carnap's criterion in terms of the ontology of logical atomism — an ontology that was implicit in Carnap's state-description semantics.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0024
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter is a summary, emphasizing the principal themes of the book and their connections under the headings The Demarcation Problem, Milesian Science, Science and Philosophy, The Impact of ...
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This chapter is a summary, emphasizing the principal themes of the book and their connections under the headings The Demarcation Problem, Milesian Science, Science and Philosophy, The Impact of Christianity, 'Logical Impossibility', Institutions, Morals and Ethics. Pervading notions are the high/low distinction, the Milesian requirements for science, and the alleged contingency of the world.Less
This chapter is a summary, emphasizing the principal themes of the book and their connections under the headings The Demarcation Problem, Milesian Science, Science and Philosophy, The Impact of Christianity, 'Logical Impossibility', Institutions, Morals and Ethics. Pervading notions are the high/low distinction, the Milesian requirements for science, and the alleged contingency of the world.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Cartesian skepticism, unlike Pyrrhonism, was total, calling into question low beliefs as well as high. Descartes himself was not a skeptic but set out the argument in its favor for the purpose of ...
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Cartesian skepticism, unlike Pyrrhonism, was total, calling into question low beliefs as well as high. Descartes himself was not a skeptic but set out the argument in its favor for the purpose of refuting it and thereby strengthening theology. His argument was only possible against a specifically medieval background, his Evil Demon being the Omnipotent Creator-Legislator (OCL) in disguise. But as the skepticism was more convincing than the refutation, this concept is still around in our day, responsible for ‘modern’ philosophy's obsession with finding ‘foundations’ for knowledge. The pattern of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, which moves from subjective conceivability to objective existence, can still be discerned in David Chalmers's advocacy of mind-body dualism: the subjective ‘logical possibility’ of zombies purporting to show the objective reality of the schism.Less
Cartesian skepticism, unlike Pyrrhonism, was total, calling into question low beliefs as well as high. Descartes himself was not a skeptic but set out the argument in its favor for the purpose of refuting it and thereby strengthening theology. His argument was only possible against a specifically medieval background, his Evil Demon being the Omnipotent Creator-Legislator (OCL) in disguise. But as the skepticism was more convincing than the refutation, this concept is still around in our day, responsible for ‘modern’ philosophy's obsession with finding ‘foundations’ for knowledge. The pattern of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, which moves from subjective conceivability to objective existence, can still be discerned in David Chalmers's advocacy of mind-body dualism: the subjective ‘logical possibility’ of zombies purporting to show the objective reality of the schism.
Ohad Nachtomy
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198786436
- eISBN:
- 9780191828751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786436.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This paper explores the philosophical transitions in the relations between existence and possibility in Leibniz and Kant. It begins with Leibniz’s formulation of a strictly logical notion of ...
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This paper explores the philosophical transitions in the relations between existence and possibility in Leibniz and Kant. It begins with Leibniz’s formulation of a strictly logical notion of possibility; proceeds with Kant’s pre-critical statement in 1763 that existence is not a predicate; and ends with the Critique of Pure Reason in which the theory of possibility is constrained by the subjective conditions of experience (to supply the material for thinking possibilities) and is thus relativized to the human mind. I present Leibniz’s view of possibility against the traditional view of temporal modalities; and, in this light, his dual notion of existence. I then argue that, in Kant’s pre-critical essay of 1763, the view that existence is not a predicate is strongly related to the logical view of possibility advanced by Leibniz. I conclude with Kant’s transition to the critical period and its implications on the analysis of modality.Less
This paper explores the philosophical transitions in the relations between existence and possibility in Leibniz and Kant. It begins with Leibniz’s formulation of a strictly logical notion of possibility; proceeds with Kant’s pre-critical statement in 1763 that existence is not a predicate; and ends with the Critique of Pure Reason in which the theory of possibility is constrained by the subjective conditions of experience (to supply the material for thinking possibilities) and is thus relativized to the human mind. I present Leibniz’s view of possibility against the traditional view of temporal modalities; and, in this light, his dual notion of existence. I then argue that, in Kant’s pre-critical essay of 1763, the view that existence is not a predicate is strongly related to the logical view of possibility advanced by Leibniz. I conclude with Kant’s transition to the critical period and its implications on the analysis of modality.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Judaism held that there was truly only one God, creator, warlord, and legislator, Who accomplished everything simply by willing it. Christianity retained its beliefs about God and imposed this model ...
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Judaism held that there was truly only one God, creator, warlord, and legislator, Who accomplished everything simply by willing it. Christianity retained its beliefs about God and imposed this model on the intellectual world. God's omnipotence made everything about nature contingent. Everything imaginable became ‘logically possible,’ hence could be the case should God will it. God imposed the Laws of Nature and could suspend them–miracles. Together these notions added up to the conception of “possible worlds." When gradually Greek learning revived to the point of being a rival to Christian orthodoxy, St. Thomas Aquinas worked out a compromise: Aristotle was held authoritative as to the usual behavior of Nature, including the human body; but the human soul, and truths knowable only by revelation, were the province of the Church. Thus a new membrane was hung up between high and low beliefs, this time a visible one. But it was fairly soon ruptured, notably in the Galileo case.Less
Judaism held that there was truly only one God, creator, warlord, and legislator, Who accomplished everything simply by willing it. Christianity retained its beliefs about God and imposed this model on the intellectual world. God's omnipotence made everything about nature contingent. Everything imaginable became ‘logically possible,’ hence could be the case should God will it. God imposed the Laws of Nature and could suspend them–miracles. Together these notions added up to the conception of “possible worlds." When gradually Greek learning revived to the point of being a rival to Christian orthodoxy, St. Thomas Aquinas worked out a compromise: Aristotle was held authoritative as to the usual behavior of Nature, including the human body; but the human soul, and truths knowable only by revelation, were the province of the Church. Thus a new membrane was hung up between high and low beliefs, this time a visible one. But it was fairly soon ruptured, notably in the Galileo case.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199662562
- eISBN:
- 9780191748394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662562.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Philosophy
This chapter claims that the whole history of the world is a succession of events, which consist in the instantiation of properties in substances at times. It analyses the criteria for two ...
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This chapter claims that the whole history of the world is a succession of events, which consist in the instantiation of properties in substances at times. It analyses the criteria for two substances, properties, or events being the same. It analyses the nature of metaphysical possibility (via analysing logical possibility), and analyses what it is for one event to supervene on another event. When properties, substances, and times are picked out by informative designators, what is logically possible is also metaphysically possible. The criteria for the identity of a substance depend on whether substances of its genus have thisness or are simply bundles of instantiated properties.Less
This chapter claims that the whole history of the world is a succession of events, which consist in the instantiation of properties in substances at times. It analyses the criteria for two substances, properties, or events being the same. It analyses the nature of metaphysical possibility (via analysing logical possibility), and analyses what it is for one event to supervene on another event. When properties, substances, and times are picked out by informative designators, what is logically possible is also metaphysically possible. The criteria for the identity of a substance depend on whether substances of its genus have thisness or are simply bundles of instantiated properties.
John P. Burgess and Gideon Rosen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250128
- eISBN:
- 9780191597138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250126.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Relates the ideal types of strategies presented in earlier chapters to actual proposals in the literature. We begin with the geometric strategy of Harty Field, and claim that our version better ...
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Relates the ideal types of strategies presented in earlier chapters to actual proposals in the literature. We begin with the geometric strategy of Harty Field, and claim that our version better reveals what is really going on than do his own claims about mathematically formulated theories always being conservative extensions of corresponding nominalistic theories. We also consider strategies using modal logic, as found in the works of Charles Chihara and Geoffrey Hellman, emphasizing that one must distinguish metaphysical necessity and possibility from logical necessity and possibility, and use all the resources of cross‐comparison provided by ordinary language, in order to make these strategies work. A potpourri of further strategies is briefly examined.Less
Relates the ideal types of strategies presented in earlier chapters to actual proposals in the literature. We begin with the geometric strategy of Harty Field, and claim that our version better reveals what is really going on than do his own claims about mathematically formulated theories always being conservative extensions of corresponding nominalistic theories. We also consider strategies using modal logic, as found in the works of Charles Chihara and Geoffrey Hellman, emphasizing that one must distinguish metaphysical necessity and possibility from logical necessity and possibility, and use all the resources of cross‐comparison provided by ordinary language, in order to make these strategies work. A potpourri of further strategies is briefly examined.
Nicholas F. Stang
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198712626
- eISBN:
- 9780191781100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712626.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explores another key element in the pre-Critical Kant’s development of an anti-logicist modal metaphysics: his doctrine that there are logically compatible predicates that are not ...
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This chapter explores another key element in the pre-Critical Kant’s development of an anti-logicist modal metaphysics: his doctrine that there are logically compatible predicates that are not possibly co-instantiated. First, it examines the notion of ‘ground’ in eighteenth-century German metaphysics and then it explains Kant’s rejection of the logicist theory of causal grounding: the relation of a cause to its effect is not a logical relation of conceptual containment or propositional entailment. It goes on to reconstruct Kant’s argument that, if there is what he calls ‘real conflict’ (two causes mutually cancel one another’s effects), then there are logically compatible predicates that are not possibly co-instantiated. This is another key counter-example to the logicist identification of possibility with logical consistency. ‘Real possibility’ refers to what is possible, not merely what is logically consistent.Less
This chapter explores another key element in the pre-Critical Kant’s development of an anti-logicist modal metaphysics: his doctrine that there are logically compatible predicates that are not possibly co-instantiated. First, it examines the notion of ‘ground’ in eighteenth-century German metaphysics and then it explains Kant’s rejection of the logicist theory of causal grounding: the relation of a cause to its effect is not a logical relation of conceptual containment or propositional entailment. It goes on to reconstruct Kant’s argument that, if there is what he calls ‘real conflict’ (two causes mutually cancel one another’s effects), then there are logically compatible predicates that are not possibly co-instantiated. This is another key counter-example to the logicist identification of possibility with logical consistency. ‘Real possibility’ refers to what is possible, not merely what is logically consistent.
Nicholas F. Stang
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198712626
- eISBN:
- 9780191781100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712626.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter opens with an exploration of the core theory of modality shared by three of Kant’s most important rationalist predecessors (Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten), which is henceforth referred ...
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This chapter opens with an exploration of the core theory of modality shared by three of Kant’s most important rationalist predecessors (Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten), which is henceforth referred to as ‘logicism’: everything logically consistent is possible. It then focuses on their shared view that God necessarily exists because existence is contained in his essence. It examines Kant’s famous objection to the ontological argument (that existence is not a “real predicate”) in light of his rejection of this model of divine necessary existence. It argues that, correctly interpreted, the Kantian doctrine that existence is not a real predicate entails that there cannot be a being whose existence is contained in its essence. Kant’s target is not merely a certain argument for God’s existence, but a background metaphysical view of why he exists necessarily.Less
This chapter opens with an exploration of the core theory of modality shared by three of Kant’s most important rationalist predecessors (Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten), which is henceforth referred to as ‘logicism’: everything logically consistent is possible. It then focuses on their shared view that God necessarily exists because existence is contained in his essence. It examines Kant’s famous objection to the ontological argument (that existence is not a “real predicate”) in light of his rejection of this model of divine necessary existence. It argues that, correctly interpreted, the Kantian doctrine that existence is not a real predicate entails that there cannot be a being whose existence is contained in its essence. Kant’s target is not merely a certain argument for God’s existence, but a background metaphysical view of why he exists necessarily.
Christopher J. Insole
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199677603
- eISBN:
- 9780191757068
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199677603.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter provides an account of how Kant understands divine freedom in relation to the creation of the world. The divine will as ‘holy’ is shaped by perfect goodness, and is unable in many ...
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This chapter provides an account of how Kant understands divine freedom in relation to the creation of the world. The divine will as ‘holy’ is shaped by perfect goodness, and is unable in many significant ways to do other than it does. God’s ‘inability to do otherwise’ is not construed by Kant as a lack or impotence on the part of God. Rather, this ‘inability’ is an expression of God’s perfection. While Kant’s conception of human freedom shifts considerably, his conception of divine freedom remains largely stable across the development of his thought. Kant has a positive conception of freedom, expressed paradigmatically in divine freedom, where what matters for freedom is that the will is oriented to the good. The chapter engages in particular with Chignell and Kain, and with Kant’s distinction between real and logical possibility.Less
This chapter provides an account of how Kant understands divine freedom in relation to the creation of the world. The divine will as ‘holy’ is shaped by perfect goodness, and is unable in many significant ways to do other than it does. God’s ‘inability to do otherwise’ is not construed by Kant as a lack or impotence on the part of God. Rather, this ‘inability’ is an expression of God’s perfection. While Kant’s conception of human freedom shifts considerably, his conception of divine freedom remains largely stable across the development of his thought. Kant has a positive conception of freedom, expressed paradigmatically in divine freedom, where what matters for freedom is that the will is oriented to the good. The chapter engages in particular with Chignell and Kain, and with Kant’s distinction between real and logical possibility.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199874187
- eISBN:
- 9780190267674
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199874187.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter contradicts the anti-predictionism theory, which states that as long as an action is determined, it can be predicted, and vice versa. It begins by distinguishing between determinism and ...
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This chapter contradicts the anti-predictionism theory, which states that as long as an action is determined, it can be predicted, and vice versa. It begins by distinguishing between determinism and predictability, and juxtaposing human behavior with physical events. It then describes four types of “possibility of prediction” namely, logical possibility, logical compossibility, physical possibility, and causal composibility in light of explaining how voluntary actions can be scientifically predicted. Finally, it discusses that the causal necessity of an action is what makes it susceptible to scientific prediction, granted that the action is determined.Less
This chapter contradicts the anti-predictionism theory, which states that as long as an action is determined, it can be predicted, and vice versa. It begins by distinguishing between determinism and predictability, and juxtaposing human behavior with physical events. It then describes four types of “possibility of prediction” namely, logical possibility, logical compossibility, physical possibility, and causal composibility in light of explaining how voluntary actions can be scientifically predicted. Finally, it discusses that the causal necessity of an action is what makes it susceptible to scientific prediction, granted that the action is determined.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198779698
- eISBN:
- 9780191825972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779698.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
We learn the meaning or a word or sentence by learning some of the syntactic and semantic rules for its use. A declarative sentence expresses a proposition. A proposition is logically impossible iff ...
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We learn the meaning or a word or sentence by learning some of the syntactic and semantic rules for its use. A declarative sentence expresses a proposition. A proposition is logically impossible iff it entails a contradiction; it is logically necessary iff its negation entails a contradiction; it is logically possible if it is entailed by an obviously logically possible proposition. We may discover the logical modal status of a proposition, when this is not obvious, by the methods of deducing such contradictions or by the method of reflective equilibrium. Or we may infer that a proposition is logically possible by showing that, if it were logically possible, it would probably be true. Neither ‘concept empiricism’ (that is, Hume’s claim that ‘all [conceivable] ideas are derived from impressions’), nor the verification principle, can settle issues of logical status.Less
We learn the meaning or a word or sentence by learning some of the syntactic and semantic rules for its use. A declarative sentence expresses a proposition. A proposition is logically impossible iff it entails a contradiction; it is logically necessary iff its negation entails a contradiction; it is logically possible if it is entailed by an obviously logically possible proposition. We may discover the logical modal status of a proposition, when this is not obvious, by the methods of deducing such contradictions or by the method of reflective equilibrium. Or we may infer that a proposition is logically possible by showing that, if it were logically possible, it would probably be true. Neither ‘concept empiricism’ (that is, Hume’s claim that ‘all [conceivable] ideas are derived from impressions’), nor the verification principle, can settle issues of logical status.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198779698
- eISBN:
- 9780191825972
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779698.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book investigates on which understandings of the nature of God, it is coherent to hold, that is it is metaphysically possible, that God exists. Part I analyses what it is for a proposition to be ...
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This book investigates on which understandings of the nature of God, it is coherent to hold, that is it is metaphysically possible, that God exists. Part I analyses what it is for a proposition to be metaphysically possible, and shows how this normally reduces it to being logically possible; and then analyses how we can show a proposition to be logically possible. Part II analyses what it is for God to be a person, omnipresent, perfectly free, creator of the universe, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and eternal. It claims that it is metaphysically possible that there exists a being with all these properties—given certain definitions of ‘omniscient’ and eternal’. Part III considers whether that being could have these properties essentially, and exist (in some sense) necessarily; and argues that this is possible only if some of the predicates discussed in Part II are understood in analogical senses.Less
This book investigates on which understandings of the nature of God, it is coherent to hold, that is it is metaphysically possible, that God exists. Part I analyses what it is for a proposition to be metaphysically possible, and shows how this normally reduces it to being logically possible; and then analyses how we can show a proposition to be logically possible. Part II analyses what it is for God to be a person, omnipresent, perfectly free, creator of the universe, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and eternal. It claims that it is metaphysically possible that there exists a being with all these properties—given certain definitions of ‘omniscient’ and eternal’. Part III considers whether that being could have these properties essentially, and exist (in some sense) necessarily; and argues that this is possible only if some of the predicates discussed in Part II are understood in analogical senses.