Robert J. Stainton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199250387
- eISBN:
- 9780191719523
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199250387.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on language-thought relations. It argues that grasping a proposition does not require deploying internally a sentence of natural language that expresses it. This alone threatens ...
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This chapter focuses on language-thought relations. It argues that grasping a proposition does not require deploying internally a sentence of natural language that expresses it. This alone threatens the view that thought is inner speech. It then considers a specific subcase, viz. where the proposition so grasped is part of an argument. It points out that, if premises/conclusions can be conveyed sub-sententially, then there are things that are not items of natural language but which have logical form.Less
This chapter focuses on language-thought relations. It argues that grasping a proposition does not require deploying internally a sentence of natural language that expresses it. This alone threatens the view that thought is inner speech. It then considers a specific subcase, viz. where the proposition so grasped is part of an argument. It points out that, if premises/conclusions can be conveyed sub-sententially, then there are things that are not items of natural language but which have logical form.
Jonathan Barnes
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199568178
- eISBN:
- 9780191702037
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568178.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the ...
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This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the Aristotelian conception of predication; thirdly, various ideas about connectors which were developed by the ancient logicians and grammarians; fourthly, the notion of logical form, insofar as it may be discovered in the ancient texts; fifthly, the question of the ‘justification of deduction’; and sixthly, the attitude which has been called logical utilitarianism and which restricts the scope of logic to those forms of inference which are or might be useful for scientific proofs.Less
This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the Aristotelian conception of predication; thirdly, various ideas about connectors which were developed by the ancient logicians and grammarians; fourthly, the notion of logical form, insofar as it may be discovered in the ancient texts; fifthly, the question of the ‘justification of deduction’; and sixthly, the attitude which has been called logical utilitarianism and which restricts the scope of logic to those forms of inference which are or might be useful for scientific proofs.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199226993
- eISBN:
- 9780191710223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226993.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, General
According to the Truth-Conditional Pragmatics framework, optional pragmatic processes of modulation map the (bare) logical form of an utterance to a ‘modified logical form’ which corresponds to its ...
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According to the Truth-Conditional Pragmatics framework, optional pragmatic processes of modulation map the (bare) logical form of an utterance to a ‘modified logical form’ which corresponds to its intuitive truth-conditional content. This chapter considers alternative ways of construing the framework. On the syntactic construal modulation is thought of as operating on expressions. When so construed, modulation amounts to supplementing the overt expression with implicit elements. On the semantic construal of pragmatic modulation, the meaning of an expression is mapped to a distinct meaning. Different versions of the syntactic approach are discussed, some of which involve the idea of a ‘language of thought’. Different approaches to the idea of ‘logical form’ are also discussed.Less
According to the Truth-Conditional Pragmatics framework, optional pragmatic processes of modulation map the (bare) logical form of an utterance to a ‘modified logical form’ which corresponds to its intuitive truth-conditional content. This chapter considers alternative ways of construing the framework. On the syntactic construal modulation is thought of as operating on expressions. When so construed, modulation amounts to supplementing the overt expression with implicit elements. On the semantic construal of pragmatic modulation, the meaning of an expression is mapped to a distinct meaning. Different versions of the syntactic approach are discussed, some of which involve the idea of a ‘language of thought’. Different approaches to the idea of ‘logical form’ are also discussed.
Benjamin Morison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199696482
- eISBN:
- 9780191738036
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696482.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This paper argues (contra Timothey Smiley and John Corcoran) that Aristotle did not invent a ‘formal language’ for his syllogistic, and (contra Jonathan Barnes) that Aristotle did not analyse ...
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This paper argues (contra Timothey Smiley and John Corcoran) that Aristotle did not invent a ‘formal language’ for his syllogistic, and (contra Jonathan Barnes) that Aristotle did not analyse syllogistic validity in terms of logical form, if a logical form is some sort of syntactical schema. The paper also argues that Aristotle does not hold there is a canonical way of propounding a syllogism: namely, by using locutions such as ‘X does/does not belong to all/some Y’. In this he differs from the Stoics, who probably did hold that there was a canonical way of presenting syllogisms. The paper concludes that these unusual locutions which Aristotle uses are ways of generalising over what propositions say, rather than attempts to (i) invent a formal language, (ii) provide a syntactical logical form, or (iii) suggest canonical language in which to propound syllogisms.Less
This paper argues (contra Timothey Smiley and John Corcoran) that Aristotle did not invent a ‘formal language’ for his syllogistic, and (contra Jonathan Barnes) that Aristotle did not analyse syllogistic validity in terms of logical form, if a logical form is some sort of syntactical schema. The paper also argues that Aristotle does not hold there is a canonical way of propounding a syllogism: namely, by using locutions such as ‘X does/does not belong to all/some Y’. In this he differs from the Stoics, who probably did hold that there was a canonical way of presenting syllogisms. The paper concludes that these unusual locutions which Aristotle uses are ways of generalising over what propositions say, rather than attempts to (i) invent a formal language, (ii) provide a syntactical logical form, or (iii) suggest canonical language in which to propound syllogisms.
Zoltán Gendler Szabó
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199697519
- eISBN:
- 9780191742316
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697519.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
According to the traditional doctrine of logical form, sentences have an underlying structure which lays bare their inferential profiles. Logical form is supposed to be inherent in the sentence (not ...
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According to the traditional doctrine of logical form, sentences have an underlying structure which lays bare their inferential profiles. Logical form is supposed to be inherent in the sentence (not ascribed to it as a result of formalization), and it is supposed to capture its logical (not merely syntactic or semantic) features. This chapter argues against the existence of logical form in this sense by casting doubt on the coherence of the idea that certain inferences are valid solely in virtue of their form. And while the idea that some inferences are valid in virtue of their form and facts of logic is perfectly coherent, these inferences are arguably unavailable in natural languages. Moreover, appeal to semantic competence is no help, because logical competence is distinct from our knowledge of language. The upshot of the argument is that we should abandon the Davidsonian hope that an adequate compositional semantics could explain why logical validities are valid, or how we know that they are.Less
According to the traditional doctrine of logical form, sentences have an underlying structure which lays bare their inferential profiles. Logical form is supposed to be inherent in the sentence (not ascribed to it as a result of formalization), and it is supposed to capture its logical (not merely syntactic or semantic) features. This chapter argues against the existence of logical form in this sense by casting doubt on the coherence of the idea that certain inferences are valid solely in virtue of their form. And while the idea that some inferences are valid in virtue of their form and facts of logic is perfectly coherent, these inferences are arguably unavailable in natural languages. Moreover, appeal to semantic competence is no help, because logical competence is distinct from our knowledge of language. The upshot of the argument is that we should abandon the Davidsonian hope that an adequate compositional semantics could explain why logical validities are valid, or how we know that they are.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199226993
- eISBN:
- 9780191710223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226993.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, General
This chapter criticizes the view that weather verbs such as ‘rain’ carry an argument slot for a location. It argues that the tacit reference to a location which is typical of sentences like: ‘It is ...
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This chapter criticizes the view that weather verbs such as ‘rain’ carry an argument slot for a location. It argues that the tacit reference to a location which is typical of sentences like: ‘It is raining’ (and which affects their truth-conditions) is a matter of pragmatics. The argument centres around the ‘weatherman example’, introduced in a previous article (‘Unarticulated Constituents’, Linguistics and Philosophy 2002), and discussed by several authors. Several levels relevant to semantic analysis are distinguished: the metaphysical level, the pragmatic level, the phrasal/sentential level, and the lexical level.Less
This chapter criticizes the view that weather verbs such as ‘rain’ carry an argument slot for a location. It argues that the tacit reference to a location which is typical of sentences like: ‘It is raining’ (and which affects their truth-conditions) is a matter of pragmatics. The argument centres around the ‘weatherman example’, introduced in a previous article (‘Unarticulated Constituents’, Linguistics and Philosophy 2002), and discussed by several authors. Several levels relevant to semantic analysis are distinguished: the metaphysical level, the pragmatic level, the phrasal/sentential level, and the lexical level.
Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270255
- eISBN:
- 9780191601477
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270252.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
An introduction to formal semantic theories (focusing on truth-conditional semantics) and dual pragmatic accounts (focusing on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Recanati’s contextualism). The ...
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An introduction to formal semantic theories (focusing on truth-conditional semantics) and dual pragmatic accounts (focusing on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Recanati’s contextualism). The chapter gives an initial examination of the distinct challenges posed by advocates of dual pragmatic accounts and the precise nature of the debate between the two approaches. The chapter also looks at the notion of logical form deployed by both kinds of semantic theory.Less
An introduction to formal semantic theories (focusing on truth-conditional semantics) and dual pragmatic accounts (focusing on Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory and Recanati’s contextualism). The chapter gives an initial examination of the distinct challenges posed by advocates of dual pragmatic accounts and the precise nature of the debate between the two approaches. The chapter also looks at the notion of logical form deployed by both kinds of semantic theory.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of a formal ontological relation is introduced and illustrated. Distinctions are drawn between various types of ontological dependence relations. The hierarchical character of systems of ...
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The notion of a formal ontological relation is introduced and illustrated. Distinctions are drawn between various types of ontological dependence relations. The hierarchical character of systems of ontological categories is examined, together with the ontological status of such categories themselves. It is argued that neither ontological categories nor formal ontological relations, such as instantiation and characterization, should be regarded as elements of being, that is, as entities in their own right. A distinction is drawn between form and content in ontology, paralleling but distinct from a similar distinction commonly made in logic.Less
The notion of a formal ontological relation is introduced and illustrated. Distinctions are drawn between various types of ontological dependence relations. The hierarchical character of systems of ontological categories is examined, together with the ontological status of such categories themselves. It is argued that neither ontological categories nor formal ontological relations, such as instantiation and characterization, should be regarded as elements of being, that is, as entities in their own right. A distinction is drawn between form and content in ontology, paralleling but distinct from a similar distinction commonly made in logic.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246274
- eISBN:
- 9780191715198
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246270.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render ...
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This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.Less
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246274
- eISBN:
- 9780191715198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246270.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Davidson attempts to state the logical form of sentences in which actions are adverbially modified (e.g. ‘Jones buttered the toast slowly, with a knife, at midnight’); he wishes to regiment them into ...
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Davidson attempts to state the logical form of sentences in which actions are adverbially modified (e.g. ‘Jones buttered the toast slowly, with a knife, at midnight’); he wishes to regiment them into first‐order notation such that all valid inferences to sentences containing words of the original one are preserved. He claims that the only effective way of doing so is to transform the adverbs into predicates and recognize an implicit quantification over an entity to which the predicates apply (cf Appendix A); this entity he identifies as a dated, non‐recurrent particular––an event. Rival construals that do not require such an ontology either fail to preserve the inferences or end up assigning the adverbs to distinct actions. Davidson appends his replies to various critics of the paper in which he clarifies his methodology (applying the concept of logical form to sentences of natural language), the individuation of events (see further Essay 8), and suggests how his analysis can be extended to cover tensed action sentences.Less
Davidson attempts to state the logical form of sentences in which actions are adverbially modified (e.g. ‘Jones buttered the toast slowly, with a knife, at midnight’); he wishes to regiment them into first‐order notation such that all valid inferences to sentences containing words of the original one are preserved. He claims that the only effective way of doing so is to transform the adverbs into predicates and recognize an implicit quantification over an entity to which the predicates apply (cf Appendix A); this entity he identifies as a dated, non‐recurrent particular––an event. Rival construals that do not require such an ontology either fail to preserve the inferences or end up assigning the adverbs to distinct actions. Davidson appends his replies to various critics of the paper in which he clarifies his methodology (applying the concept of logical form to sentences of natural language), the individuation of events (see further Essay 8), and suggests how his analysis can be extended to cover tensed action sentences.
Gary Ebbs
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557936
- eISBN:
- 9780191721403
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557936.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
We cannot actually write out all of the sentences of any given logical form, and so we cannot express logical generalizations by writing out and affirming conjunctions of all of their instances. We ...
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We cannot actually write out all of the sentences of any given logical form, and so we cannot express logical generalizations by writing out and affirming conjunctions of all of their instances. We therefore need some way to express such conjunctions without writing them out. This chapter explains how this need may motivate us to use a truth predicate, and, ultimately, to embrace the Tarski–Quine thesis that there is no more to truth than what is captured by a Tarski-style disquotational truth predicate defined for one's own sentences. It starts by examining Quine's classic argument that we need a truth predicate to generalize on sentences, and explaining why Brian Loar's objection to Quine's argument fails. It then examines three unsuccessful attempts to generalize on sentences without using a truth predicate, and outlines a Tarskian method of defining truth for sentences in terms of disquotational definitions of satisfaction for predicates.Less
We cannot actually write out all of the sentences of any given logical form, and so we cannot express logical generalizations by writing out and affirming conjunctions of all of their instances. We therefore need some way to express such conjunctions without writing them out. This chapter explains how this need may motivate us to use a truth predicate, and, ultimately, to embrace the Tarski–Quine thesis that there is no more to truth than what is captured by a Tarski-style disquotational truth predicate defined for one's own sentences. It starts by examining Quine's classic argument that we need a truth predicate to generalize on sentences, and explaining why Brian Loar's objection to Quine's argument fails. It then examines three unsuccessful attempts to generalize on sentences without using a truth predicate, and outlines a Tarskian method of defining truth for sentences in terms of disquotational definitions of satisfaction for predicates.
Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199290932
- eISBN:
- 9780191710445
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290932.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book examines the foundations and applications of the program of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages introduced in 1967 by Donald Davidson in his classic paper ‘Truth and Meaning’. ...
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This book examines the foundations and applications of the program of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages introduced in 1967 by Donald Davidson in his classic paper ‘Truth and Meaning’. Its primary aim is to illustrate the promise of the truth-theoretic approach by laying out the philosophical foundations of it, and then sketching and discussing applications to a range of important natural language constructions. A subsidiary aim is to clarify the concept of the logical form of a natural language sentence. Chapter 1 lays out the philosophical foundations of the program of truth-theoretic semantics. Chapters 2-9 consider a variety of topics in natural language semantics: quantifiers, proper names, demonstratives (including complex demonstratives), and quotation, adverbial and adjectival modification, tense, opaque contexts, and non-declarative sentences, that is, imperatives and interrogatives. These treatments are intended to illustrate the sorts of resources we must invoke within a broadly Davidsonian framework in order to provide a compositional semantic theory and to illustrate the sorts of obstacles naturally encountered and which must be overcome. The book considers, where appropriate, Davidson's own suggestions, but often offers a different or modified account to deal with problems that arise in trying to carry those out. Chapters 13 and 14 turn to more general issues: a characterization of sameness of logical form between any two sentences in any two languages, and the relation of the concept of truth employed in the semantic theory to various theories of it.Less
This book examines the foundations and applications of the program of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages introduced in 1967 by Donald Davidson in his classic paper ‘Truth and Meaning’. Its primary aim is to illustrate the promise of the truth-theoretic approach by laying out the philosophical foundations of it, and then sketching and discussing applications to a range of important natural language constructions. A subsidiary aim is to clarify the concept of the logical form of a natural language sentence. Chapter 1 lays out the philosophical foundations of the program of truth-theoretic semantics. Chapters 2-9 consider a variety of topics in natural language semantics: quantifiers, proper names, demonstratives (including complex demonstratives), and quotation, adverbial and adjectival modification, tense, opaque contexts, and non-declarative sentences, that is, imperatives and interrogatives. These treatments are intended to illustrate the sorts of resources we must invoke within a broadly Davidsonian framework in order to provide a compositional semantic theory and to illustrate the sorts of obstacles naturally encountered and which must be overcome. The book considers, where appropriate, Davidson's own suggestions, but often offers a different or modified account to deal with problems that arise in trying to carry those out. Chapters 13 and 14 turn to more general issues: a characterization of sameness of logical form between any two sentences in any two languages, and the relation of the concept of truth employed in the semantic theory to various theories of it.
Juliet Floyd
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139167
- eISBN:
- 9780199833214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513916X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Wittgenstein’s treatment of number words and arithmetic in the Tractatus reflects central features of his early conception of philosophy. In rejecting Frege’s and Russell’s analyses of number, ...
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Wittgenstein’s treatment of number words and arithmetic in the Tractatus reflects central features of his early conception of philosophy. In rejecting Frege’s and Russell’s analyses of number, Wittgenstein rejects their respective conceptions of function, object, logical form, generality, sentence, and thought. He thereby surrenders their shared ideal of the clarity a begriffsschrift could bring to philosophy. The development of early analytic philosophy thus evinces far less continuity than some readers of Wittgenstein, from Russell and the Vienna positivists to many contemporary readers of the Tractatus, have supposed.Less
Wittgenstein’s treatment of number words and arithmetic in the Tractatus reflects central features of his early conception of philosophy. In rejecting Frege’s and Russell’s analyses of number, Wittgenstein rejects their respective conceptions of function, object, logical form, generality, sentence, and thought. He thereby surrenders their shared ideal of the clarity a begriffsschrift could bring to philosophy. The development of early analytic philosophy thus evinces far less continuity than some readers of Wittgenstein, from Russell and the Vienna positivists to many contemporary readers of the Tractatus, have supposed.
David G. Stern
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195080001
- eISBN:
- 9780199786145
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195080009.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
An analysis of the sources of Wittgenstein’s picture theory — which include not only his moment of insight on reading a magazine story about the use of models in a traffic court, but also the work of ...
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An analysis of the sources of Wittgenstein’s picture theory — which include not only his moment of insight on reading a magazine story about the use of models in a traffic court, but also the work of Russell, Hertz, and Boltzmann — provides the basis for an exploration of Wittgenstein’s articulation of a pictorial conception of representation in his wartime notebooks and its crystallization in the Tractatus. A discussion of Wittgenstein’s later criticism of the picture theory and his notion of a “philosophical picture” illustrates the fundamental reversal in his transition to his later conception of philosophy: instead of taking literal pictures as a guide to the nature of meaning, he came to regard philosophical theories as akin to expressing an aesthetic preference for a certain style of representation. Wittgenstein’s treatment of factual language in the picture theory is related to his Tractarian approach to logical form, and the role of the show/say distinction in his early conception of logic and language. Particular attention is given to the difficulties generated by the idea that the conditions for the possibility of a given domain of discourse cannot be described in language, but must be shown by the form of words in question.Less
An analysis of the sources of Wittgenstein’s picture theory — which include not only his moment of insight on reading a magazine story about the use of models in a traffic court, but also the work of Russell, Hertz, and Boltzmann — provides the basis for an exploration of Wittgenstein’s articulation of a pictorial conception of representation in his wartime notebooks and its crystallization in the Tractatus. A discussion of Wittgenstein’s later criticism of the picture theory and his notion of a “philosophical picture” illustrates the fundamental reversal in his transition to his later conception of philosophy: instead of taking literal pictures as a guide to the nature of meaning, he came to regard philosophical theories as akin to expressing an aesthetic preference for a certain style of representation. Wittgenstein’s treatment of factual language in the picture theory is related to his Tractarian approach to logical form, and the role of the show/say distinction in his early conception of logic and language. Particular attention is given to the difficulties generated by the idea that the conditions for the possibility of a given domain of discourse cannot be described in language, but must be shown by the form of words in question.
Juliet Floyd
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195133264
- eISBN:
- 9780199833580
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195133269.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Wittgenstein's treatment of number words and arithmetic in the Tractatus reflects central features of his early conception of philosophy. In rejecting Frege's and Russell's analyses of number, ...
More
Wittgenstein's treatment of number words and arithmetic in the Tractatus reflects central features of his early conception of philosophy. In rejecting Frege's and Russell's analyses of number, Wittgenstein rejects their respective conceptions of function, object, logical form, generality, sentence, and thought. He, thereby, surrenders their shared ideal of the clarity a Begriffsschrift could bring to philosophy. The development of early analytic philosophy thus evinces far less continuity than some readers of Wittgenstein, from Russell and the Vienna positivists to many contemporary readers of the Tractatus, have supposed.Less
Wittgenstein's treatment of number words and arithmetic in the Tractatus reflects central features of his early conception of philosophy. In rejecting Frege's and Russell's analyses of number, Wittgenstein rejects their respective conceptions of function, object, logical form, generality, sentence, and thought. He, thereby, surrenders their shared ideal of the clarity a Begriffsschrift could bring to philosophy. The development of early analytic philosophy thus evinces far less continuity than some readers of Wittgenstein, from Russell and the Vienna positivists to many contemporary readers of the Tractatus, have supposed.
DAVID PAPINEAU
- Published in print:
- 1979
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245858
- eISBN:
- 9780191680908
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245858.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the objection that a holist account of meaning for scientific terms cannot accommodate the fact that we understand and decide on new sentences on the basis of our understanding ...
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This chapter considers the objection that a holist account of meaning for scientific terms cannot accommodate the fact that we understand and decide on new sentences on the basis of our understanding of their constituent parts. The answer to this objection involves a lengthy discussion of ‘semantic accounts’ of logical form and related topics. The chapter concludes by criticizing Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and by distinguishing this thesis from the approach to translation that emerges from holism.Less
This chapter considers the objection that a holist account of meaning for scientific terms cannot accommodate the fact that we understand and decide on new sentences on the basis of our understanding of their constituent parts. The answer to this objection involves a lengthy discussion of ‘semantic accounts’ of logical form and related topics. The chapter concludes by criticizing Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and by distinguishing this thesis from the approach to translation that emerges from holism.
Pieter A. M. Seuren
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559480
- eISBN:
- 9780191721144
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559480.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This chapter describes the basic notions of logic, entailment, truth value, bivalence and multivalence, truth‐value gap, proposition, logical form. It discusses the distinction between sentence types ...
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This chapter describes the basic notions of logic, entailment, truth value, bivalence and multivalence, truth‐value gap, proposition, logical form. It discusses the distinction between sentence types and utterance tokens and it introduces the notions of contextual anchoring and referential (intentional) keying. It ends with a discussion of the cognition‐dependent assignment of truth values.Less
This chapter describes the basic notions of logic, entailment, truth value, bivalence and multivalence, truth‐value gap, proposition, logical form. It discusses the distinction between sentence types and utterance tokens and it introduces the notions of contextual anchoring and referential (intentional) keying. It ends with a discussion of the cognition‐dependent assignment of truth values.
Eros Corazza
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270187
- eISBN:
- 9780191601484
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019927018X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Proposes a picture of attitude ascriptions, which relies on the notion of quasi-indicators. The main idea defended is that in an attitude ascription we relate the attributee to a proposition and a ...
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Proposes a picture of attitude ascriptions, which relies on the notion of quasi-indicators. The main idea defended is that in an attitude ascription we relate the attributee to a proposition and a sentence. The latter is the sentence the reporter uses to classify the attributee’s mental state. This classification can be more or less accurate and often it can only be partial.Less
Proposes a picture of attitude ascriptions, which relies on the notion of quasi-indicators. The main idea defended is that in an attitude ascription we relate the attributee to a proposition and a sentence. The latter is the sentence the reporter uses to classify the attributee’s mental state. This classification can be more or less accurate and often it can only be partial.
Stephen J Barker
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199263660
- eISBN:
- 9780191601354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263663.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
I identify the Frege model as the cluster of views affirming the sense/force distinction, compositional truth-conditional semantics, and quantification theory as a necessary component in any analysis ...
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I identify the Frege model as the cluster of views affirming the sense/force distinction, compositional truth-conditional semantics, and quantification theory as a necessary component in any analysis of generality in a natural language. I outline a theory that rejects all three elements of the Frege model. This is the STA approach.Less
I identify the Frege model as the cluster of views affirming the sense/force distinction, compositional truth-conditional semantics, and quantification theory as a necessary component in any analysis of generality in a natural language. I outline a theory that rejects all three elements of the Frege model. This is the STA approach.
David G. Stern
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195080001
- eISBN:
- 9780199786145
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195080009.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The first section of this chapter presents a close reading of Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Logical Form”, focusing on the conception of the relationship between language and experience, and the nature ...
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The first section of this chapter presents a close reading of Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Logical Form”, focusing on the conception of the relationship between language and experience, and the nature of the analysis of immediate experience that are set out there. Section two sets out an interpretation of what Wittgenstein meant when he said that he had rejected “phenomenological language” or “primary language” as his goal. Distinguishing between a weak and a strong sense of these terms shows how he could have given up the goal of formulating a language that would amount to a complete analysis of immediate experience, yet retain the goal of finding ways of clarifying what we say about experience. Section three discusses Wittgenstein’s use of the analogy of the pictures on a roll of film in a movie projector and the pictures on a cinema screen for the relationship between world and experience. The final section analyzes how and why the analogy leads Wittgenstein to a paradoxical conception of immediate experience as a separate realm, “timeless” and “neighborless”, a conception of the “world as idea” that is supposedly inexpressible.Less
The first section of this chapter presents a close reading of Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Logical Form”, focusing on the conception of the relationship between language and experience, and the nature of the analysis of immediate experience that are set out there. Section two sets out an interpretation of what Wittgenstein meant when he said that he had rejected “phenomenological language” or “primary language” as his goal. Distinguishing between a weak and a strong sense of these terms shows how he could have given up the goal of formulating a language that would amount to a complete analysis of immediate experience, yet retain the goal of finding ways of clarifying what we say about experience. Section three discusses Wittgenstein’s use of the analogy of the pictures on a roll of film in a movie projector and the pictures on a cinema screen for the relationship between world and experience. The final section analyzes how and why the analogy leads Wittgenstein to a paradoxical conception of immediate experience as a separate realm, “timeless” and “neighborless”, a conception of the “world as idea” that is supposedly inexpressible.
