Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199282593
- eISBN:
- 9780191603587
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282595.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book examines and proposes a solution to the knowability paradox. The paradox derives from the proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known, which was first published by ...
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This book examines and proposes a solution to the knowability paradox. The paradox derives from the proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known, which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It identifies two problems created by Fitch’s proof: a perceived anti-realism and the paradox created by the proof. It is argued that although the two problems are related, a defence against the threat to anti-realism is no solution to the paradox. The neo-Russellian theory of quantification is considered the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.Less
This book examines and proposes a solution to the knowability paradox. The paradox derives from the proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known, which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It identifies two problems created by Fitch’s proof: a perceived anti-realism and the paradox created by the proof. It is argued that although the two problems are related, a defence against the threat to anti-realism is no solution to the paradox. The neo-Russellian theory of quantification is considered the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.
Steven French and Décio Krause
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278244
- eISBN:
- 9780191603952
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278245.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Drawing on philosophical accounts of identity and individuality, as well as the histories of both classical and quantum physics, this book explores two alternative metaphysical approaches to quantum ...
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Drawing on philosophical accounts of identity and individuality, as well as the histories of both classical and quantum physics, this book explores two alternative metaphysical approaches to quantum particles. It asks if quantum particles can be regarded as individuals, just like books, tables, and people. Taking the first approach, the book argues that if quantum particles are regarded as individuals, then Leibniz’s famous Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is in fact violated. Recent discussions of this conclusion are analysed in detail and the costs involved in saving the Principle are carefully considered. For the second approach, the book considers recent work in non-standard logic and set theory to indicate how we can make sense of the idea that objects can be non-individuals. The concluding chapter suggests how these results might then be extended to quantum field theory.Less
Drawing on philosophical accounts of identity and individuality, as well as the histories of both classical and quantum physics, this book explores two alternative metaphysical approaches to quantum particles. It asks if quantum particles can be regarded as individuals, just like books, tables, and people. Taking the first approach, the book argues that if quantum particles are regarded as individuals, then Leibniz’s famous Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is in fact violated. Recent discussions of this conclusion are analysed in detail and the costs involved in saving the Principle are carefully considered. For the second approach, the book considers recent work in non-standard logic and set theory to indicate how we can make sense of the idea that objects can be non-individuals. The concluding chapter suggests how these results might then be extended to quantum field theory.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that ...
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The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are indeed true. Many philosophers have taken the Law to be central to many of our most important philosophical concepts. This book mounts the case against this view. Starting with an analysis of Aristotle on the Law, it discusses the nature of truth, rationality, negation, and logic itself, and argues that the Law is inessential to all of these things. The book develops Priest’s earlier ideas in In Contradiction.Less
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are indeed true. Many philosophers have taken the Law to be central to many of our most important philosophical concepts. This book mounts the case against this view. Starting with an analysis of Aristotle on the Law, it discusses the nature of truth, rationality, negation, and logic itself, and argues that the Law is inessential to all of these things. The book develops Priest’s earlier ideas in In Contradiction.
Marie McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199244447
- eISBN:
- 9780191714146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244447.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Discussions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond and James ...
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Discussions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond and James Conant. This book aims to develop an alternative interpretative line, which rejects the idea central to the metaphysical reading that Wittgenstein sets out to ground the logic of our language in features of an independently constituted reality, but which allows that he aims to provide positive philosophical insights into how language functions. It takes as a guiding principle the idea that we should see Wittgenstein’s early work as an attempt to eschew philosophical theory and to allow language itself to reveal how it functions. By this account, the aim of the work is to elucidate what language itself makes clear, namely, what is essential to its capacity to express thoughts that are true or false. The anti-metaphysical interpretation presented includes a novel reading of the problematic opening sections of the Tractatus, in which the apparently metaphysical status of Wittgenstein’s remarks is shown to be an illusion. The book includes a discussion of the philosophical background to the Tractatus, a comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early views of logic and language, and an interpretation of the remarks on solipsism. The final chapter is a discussion of the relation between the early and the later philosophy that articulates the fundamental shift in Wittgenstein’s approach to the task of understanding how language functions and reveal the still more fundamental continuity in his conception of his philosophical task.Less
Discussions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond and James Conant. This book aims to develop an alternative interpretative line, which rejects the idea central to the metaphysical reading that Wittgenstein sets out to ground the logic of our language in features of an independently constituted reality, but which allows that he aims to provide positive philosophical insights into how language functions. It takes as a guiding principle the idea that we should see Wittgenstein’s early work as an attempt to eschew philosophical theory and to allow language itself to reveal how it functions. By this account, the aim of the work is to elucidate what language itself makes clear, namely, what is essential to its capacity to express thoughts that are true or false. The anti-metaphysical interpretation presented includes a novel reading of the problematic opening sections of the Tractatus, in which the apparently metaphysical status of Wittgenstein’s remarks is shown to be an illusion. The book includes a discussion of the philosophical background to the Tractatus, a comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early views of logic and language, and an interpretation of the remarks on solipsism. The final chapter is a discussion of the relation between the early and the later philosophy that articulates the fundamental shift in Wittgenstein’s approach to the task of understanding how language functions and reveal the still more fundamental continuity in his conception of his philosophical task.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of ...
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This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of thought’ and the ‘meaningfulness of language’, which logical truths would delimit, and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk, and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk, and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we enchant and are enchanted by words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them and the world which we then see them as ‘fitting’, responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, the book offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inferential relations, subjectivity, solipsism, and the inexpressible. It offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a book — which infamously declares itself to be nonsensical— can clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.Less
This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of thought’ and the ‘meaningfulness of language’, which logical truths would delimit, and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk, and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk, and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we enchant and are enchanted by words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them and the world which we then see them as ‘fitting’, responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, the book offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inferential relations, subjectivity, solipsism, and the inexpressible. It offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a book — which infamously declares itself to be nonsensical— can clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow for the representation of non-distributive plural predication. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow for the representation of non-distributive plural predication. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
David J. Pym and Eike Ritter
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198526339
- eISBN:
- 9780191712012
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198526339.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This a research study about logic. Logic is both part of and has roles in many disciplines, including inter alia, mathematics, computing, and philosophy. The topic covered here — the mathematical ...
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This a research study about logic. Logic is both part of and has roles in many disciplines, including inter alia, mathematics, computing, and philosophy. The topic covered here — the mathematical theory of reductive logic and proof-search — draws upon the techniques and cultures of all three disciplines, but is mainly about mathematics and computation. Since its earliest presentations, mathematical logic has been formulated as a formalization of deductive reasoning: given a collection of hypotheses, a conclusion is derived. However, the advent of computational logic has emphasized the significance of reductive reasoning: given a putative conclusion, what are sufficient premises? Whilst deductive systems typically have a well-developed semantics of proofs, reductive systems are typically well-understood only operationally. Typically, a deductive system can be read as a corresponding reductive system. The process of calculating a proof of a given putative conclusion, for which non-deterministic choices between premises must be resolved, is called proof-search and is an essential enabling technology throughout the computational sciences. This study suggests that the reductive view of logic is as fundamental as the deductive view, and discusses some of the problems that must be addressed in order to provide a semantics of proof-searches of comparable value to the corresponding semantics of proofs. Just as the semantics of proofs is intimately related to the model theory of the underlying logic, so too should be the semantics of reductions and of proof-search. The study discusses how to solve the problem of providing a semantics for proof-searches in intuitionistic logic, which adequately models both not only the logical but also via an embedding of intuitionistic reductive logic into classical reductive logic, the operational aspects, i.e., control of proof-search, of the reductive system. It concludes with a naturally motivated example of our semantics of proof-search: a class of games.Less
This a research study about logic. Logic is both part of and has roles in many disciplines, including inter alia, mathematics, computing, and philosophy. The topic covered here — the mathematical theory of reductive logic and proof-search — draws upon the techniques and cultures of all three disciplines, but is mainly about mathematics and computation. Since its earliest presentations, mathematical logic has been formulated as a formalization of deductive reasoning: given a collection of hypotheses, a conclusion is derived. However, the advent of computational logic has emphasized the significance of reductive reasoning: given a putative conclusion, what are sufficient premises? Whilst deductive systems typically have a well-developed semantics of proofs, reductive systems are typically well-understood only operationally. Typically, a deductive system can be read as a corresponding reductive system. The process of calculating a proof of a given putative conclusion, for which non-deterministic choices between premises must be resolved, is called proof-search and is an essential enabling technology throughout the computational sciences. This study suggests that the reductive view of logic is as fundamental as the deductive view, and discusses some of the problems that must be addressed in order to provide a semantics of proof-searches of comparable value to the corresponding semantics of proofs. Just as the semantics of proofs is intimately related to the model theory of the underlying logic, so too should be the semantics of reductions and of proof-search. The study discusses how to solve the problem of providing a semantics for proof-searches in intuitionistic logic, which adequately models both not only the logical but also via an embedding of intuitionistic reductive logic into classical reductive logic, the operational aspects, i.e., control of proof-search, of the reductive system. It concludes with a naturally motivated example of our semantics of proof-search: a class of games.
Dov M. Gabbay and Larisa Maksimova
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198511748
- eISBN:
- 9780191705779
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198511748.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
This book focuses on interpolation and definability. This notion is not only central in pure logic, but has significant meaning and applicability in all areas where logic itself is applied, ...
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This book focuses on interpolation and definability. This notion is not only central in pure logic, but has significant meaning and applicability in all areas where logic itself is applied, especially in computer science, artificial intelligence, logic programming, philosophy of science, and natural language. The book provides basic knowledge on interpolation and definability in logic, and contains a systematic account of material which has been presented in many papers. A variety of methods and results are presented beginning with the famous Beth's and Craig's theorems in classical predicate logic (1953-57), and to the most valuable achievements in non-classical topics on logic, mainly intuitionistic and modal logic. Together with semantical and proof-theoretic methods, close interrelations between logic and universal algebra are established and exploited.Less
This book focuses on interpolation and definability. This notion is not only central in pure logic, but has significant meaning and applicability in all areas where logic itself is applied, especially in computer science, artificial intelligence, logic programming, philosophy of science, and natural language. The book provides basic knowledge on interpolation and definability in logic, and contains a systematic account of material which has been presented in many papers. A variety of methods and results are presented beginning with the famous Beth's and Craig's theorems in classical predicate logic (1953-57), and to the most valuable achievements in non-classical topics on logic, mainly intuitionistic and modal logic. Together with semantical and proof-theoretic methods, close interrelations between logic and universal algebra are established and exploited.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263301
- eISBN:
- 9780191718823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The previous chapters advocate a novel logical theory and explore its rationale and some of its applications. By implication, the applications provide a sustained attack on the dominant logical ...
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The previous chapters advocate a novel logical theory and explore its rationale and some of its applications. By implication, the applications provide a sustained attack on the dominant logical theory of our times, the logic of Frege, Russell, and their successors, or, as it has come to be known, classical logic. It is true that this logic can be seen as a special case of dialetheic logic, and is therefore subsumed by it. Nonetheless, the claims to universality of classical logic must be rejected.Less
The previous chapters advocate a novel logical theory and explore its rationale and some of its applications. By implication, the applications provide a sustained attack on the dominant logical theory of our times, the logic of Frege, Russell, and their successors, or, as it has come to be known, classical logic. It is true that this logic can be seen as a special case of dialetheic logic, and is therefore subsumed by it. Nonetheless, the claims to universality of classical logic must be rejected.
Jay L. Garfield, Tom J. F. Tillemans, and Mario D'Amato
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195381559
- eISBN:
- 9780199869244
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381559.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This book contains chapters by philosophers and scholars working at the interface of Western philosophy and Buddhist Studies. Many have distinguished scholarly records in Western philosophy, with ...
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This book contains chapters by philosophers and scholars working at the interface of Western philosophy and Buddhist Studies. Many have distinguished scholarly records in Western philosophy, with expertise in analytic philosophy and logic, as well as deep interest in Buddhist philosophy. Others have distinguished scholarly records in Buddhist Studies with strong interests in analytic philosophy and logic. All are committed to the enterprise of cross-cultural philosophy and to bringing the insights and techniques of each tradition to bear in order to illuminate problems and ideas of the other. These chapters address a broad range of topics in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics, and demonstrate the fecundity of the interaction between the Buddhist and Western philosophical and logical traditions.Less
This book contains chapters by philosophers and scholars working at the interface of Western philosophy and Buddhist Studies. Many have distinguished scholarly records in Western philosophy, with expertise in analytic philosophy and logic, as well as deep interest in Buddhist philosophy. Others have distinguished scholarly records in Buddhist Studies with strong interests in analytic philosophy and logic. All are committed to the enterprise of cross-cultural philosophy and to bringing the insights and techniques of each tradition to bear in order to illuminate problems and ideas of the other. These chapters address a broad range of topics in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics, and demonstrate the fecundity of the interaction between the Buddhist and Western philosophical and logical traditions.
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199215836
- eISBN:
- 9780191721243
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Wittgenstein's philosophical career began in 1911 when he went to Cambridge to work with Russell. He compiled the Notes on Logic two years later as a kind of summary of the work he had done so far. ...
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Wittgenstein's philosophical career began in 1911 when he went to Cambridge to work with Russell. He compiled the Notes on Logic two years later as a kind of summary of the work he had done so far. Russell thought that they were ‘as good as anything that has ever been done in logic’, but he had Wittgenstein himself to explain them to him. Without the benefit of Wittgenstein's explanations, most later scholars have preferred to treat the Notes solely as an interpretative aid in understanding the Tractatus (which draws on them for material), rather than as a philosophical work in their own right. This book demonstrates the philosophical and historical importance of the Notes. By teasing out the meaning of key passages, it shows how many of the most important insights in the Tractatus they contain. It discusses in detail how Wittgenstein arrived at these insights by thinking through ideas he obtained from Russell and Frege. And it uses a blend of biography and philosophy to illuminate the methods Wittgenstein used in his work. The book features the complete text of the Notes in a critical edition, with a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which they were compiled.Less
Wittgenstein's philosophical career began in 1911 when he went to Cambridge to work with Russell. He compiled the Notes on Logic two years later as a kind of summary of the work he had done so far. Russell thought that they were ‘as good as anything that has ever been done in logic’, but he had Wittgenstein himself to explain them to him. Without the benefit of Wittgenstein's explanations, most later scholars have preferred to treat the Notes solely as an interpretative aid in understanding the Tractatus (which draws on them for material), rather than as a philosophical work in their own right. This book demonstrates the philosophical and historical importance of the Notes. By teasing out the meaning of key passages, it shows how many of the most important insights in the Tractatus they contain. It discusses in detail how Wittgenstein arrived at these insights by thinking through ideas he obtained from Russell and Frege. And it uses a blend of biography and philosophy to illuminate the methods Wittgenstein used in his work. The book features the complete text of the Notes in a critical edition, with a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which they were compiled.
Mark Richard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239955
- eISBN:
- 9780191716881
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239955.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it ...
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Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it incoherent to profess to believe something but not think it true, or to say that some of the things we believe are only relatively true. Common sense disagrees. It sees many opinions, such as those about matters of taste, as neither true nor false; it takes it as obvious that some of the truth is relative. This book argues that when it comes to truth, common sense is right, philosophical orthodoxy wrong. The first half of the book examines connections between the performative aspects of talk (what we do when we speak), our emotions and evaluations, and the conditions under which talk and thought qualifies as true or false. It argues that the performative and expressive sometimes trump the semantic, making truth and falsity the wrong dimension of evaluation for belief or assertion. Among the topics taken up are: racial slurs and other epithets; relations between logic and truth; the status of moral and ethical talk; vagueness, and the liar paradox. The book's second half defends the idea that much of everyday thought and talk is only relatively true or false. Truth is inevitably relative, given that we cannot work out in advance how our concepts will apply to the world. The book explains what it is for truth to be relative, rebuts standard objections to relativism, and argues that relativism is consistent with the idea that one view can be objectively better than another. The book concludes with an account of matters of taste and of how it is possible for divergent views of such matters to be equally valid, even if not true or false.Less
Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it incoherent to profess to believe something but not think it true, or to say that some of the things we believe are only relatively true. Common sense disagrees. It sees many opinions, such as those about matters of taste, as neither true nor false; it takes it as obvious that some of the truth is relative. This book argues that when it comes to truth, common sense is right, philosophical orthodoxy wrong. The first half of the book examines connections between the performative aspects of talk (what we do when we speak), our emotions and evaluations, and the conditions under which talk and thought qualifies as true or false. It argues that the performative and expressive sometimes trump the semantic, making truth and falsity the wrong dimension of evaluation for belief or assertion. Among the topics taken up are: racial slurs and other epithets; relations between logic and truth; the status of moral and ethical talk; vagueness, and the liar paradox. The book's second half defends the idea that much of everyday thought and talk is only relatively true or false. Truth is inevitably relative, given that we cannot work out in advance how our concepts will apply to the world. The book explains what it is for truth to be relative, rebuts standard objections to relativism, and argues that relativism is consistent with the idea that one view can be objectively better than another. The book concludes with an account of matters of taste and of how it is possible for divergent views of such matters to be equally valid, even if not true or false.
Andreas Herberg‐Rothe
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199202690
- eISBN:
- 9780191707834
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202690.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter introduces the trinity as Clausewitz's attempt to summarize his different war experiences. The internal development of the first chapter with the trinity at its end follows an immanent ...
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This chapter introduces the trinity as Clausewitz's attempt to summarize his different war experiences. The internal development of the first chapter with the trinity at its end follows an immanent logic of action and (symmetrical as well as asymmetrical) counter-action, which is explained in a detailed interpretation of all consequent paragraphs. Clausewitz's various preliminary efforts to conceptualize warfare (like his definition, his concept of war, and even his world-renowned formula) finally result in the wondrous trinity, which he himself called his result for theory. Clausewitz therefore introduces the trinity at the end of the first chapter, because it integrates methodologically all previous concepts. By making the trinity a basis for the whole interpretation, it is possible to combine all of Clausewitz's various conceptualizations into one comprehensive theory.Less
This chapter introduces the trinity as Clausewitz's attempt to summarize his different war experiences. The internal development of the first chapter with the trinity at its end follows an immanent logic of action and (symmetrical as well as asymmetrical) counter-action, which is explained in a detailed interpretation of all consequent paragraphs. Clausewitz's various preliminary efforts to conceptualize warfare (like his definition, his concept of war, and even his world-renowned formula) finally result in the wondrous trinity, which he himself called his result for theory. Clausewitz therefore introduces the trinity at the end of the first chapter, because it integrates methodologically all previous concepts. By making the trinity a basis for the whole interpretation, it is possible to combine all of Clausewitz's various conceptualizations into one comprehensive theory.
Andreas Herberg‐Rothe
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199202690
- eISBN:
- 9780191707834
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202690.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The problem with Clausewitz's world-renowned formula depends on an internal tension within his concept of policy/politics. This tension invalidates neither his formula nor his theory, but it has to ...
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The problem with Clausewitz's world-renowned formula depends on an internal tension within his concept of policy/politics. This tension invalidates neither his formula nor his theory, but it has to be unfolded in order that the formula could serve as an analytical tool. Otherwise, the formula would become a dogma. Clausewitz emphasized this fundamental tension only indirectly by saying that war is the continuation of policy, but with ‘other means’. Peter Paret has clearly revealed this tension by declaring: ‘The readiness to fight and the readiness to compromise lie at the core of politics’. By following up this tension in Clausewitz's work, this chapter introduces a ‘small’ change in the understanding of what Clausewitz endorses with a ‘state’: nothing else than any kind of community. By taking this ‘small’ change into account, it argues that Clausewitz's trinity enables a general theory of war.Less
The problem with Clausewitz's world-renowned formula depends on an internal tension within his concept of policy/politics. This tension invalidates neither his formula nor his theory, but it has to be unfolded in order that the formula could serve as an analytical tool. Otherwise, the formula would become a dogma. Clausewitz emphasized this fundamental tension only indirectly by saying that war is the continuation of policy, but with ‘other means’. Peter Paret has clearly revealed this tension by declaring: ‘The readiness to fight and the readiness to compromise lie at the core of politics’. By following up this tension in Clausewitz's work, this chapter introduces a ‘small’ change in the understanding of what Clausewitz endorses with a ‘state’: nothing else than any kind of community. By taking this ‘small’ change into account, it argues that Clausewitz's trinity enables a general theory of war.
John F. Horty
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744077
- eISBN:
- 9780199932566
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reason interact to support the ...
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Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reason interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. The goal of this book is to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. It then shows that the resulting theory helps to explain how the interplay among reasons can determine what we ought to do by developing two different deontic logics, capturing two different intuitions about moral conflicts. The central part of the book elaborates the basic theory to account for reasoning about the strength of our own reasons, and also about the related concepts of undercutting defeaters and exclusionary reasons. The theory is illustrated with an application to particularist arguments concerning the role of principles in moral theory. The book concludes by introducing a pair of issues new to the philosophical literature: the problem of determining the epistemic status of conclusions supported by separate but conflicting reasons, and the problem of drawing conclusions from sets of reasons that can vary aribtrarily in strength, or importance.Less
Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reason interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. The goal of this book is to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. It then shows that the resulting theory helps to explain how the interplay among reasons can determine what we ought to do by developing two different deontic logics, capturing two different intuitions about moral conflicts. The central part of the book elaborates the basic theory to account for reasoning about the strength of our own reasons, and also about the related concepts of undercutting defeaters and exclusionary reasons. The theory is illustrated with an application to particularist arguments concerning the role of principles in moral theory. The book concludes by introducing a pair of issues new to the philosophical literature: the problem of determining the epistemic status of conclusions supported by separate but conflicting reasons, and the problem of drawing conclusions from sets of reasons that can vary aribtrarily in strength, or importance.
Nino B. Cocchiarella and Max A. Freund
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195366587
- eISBN:
- 9780199851898
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195366587.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of ...
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In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of Lewis and Langford, among others, are constructed. A matrix, or many-valued semantics, for sentential modal logic is formalized, and an important result that no finite matrix can characterize any of the standard modal logics is proven. Exercises, some of which show independence results, help to develop logical skills. A separate sentential modal logic of logical necessity in logical atomism is also constructed and shown to be complete and decidable. On the first-order level of the logic of logical necessity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism is valid and every de re sentence is provably equivalent to a de dicto sentence. An elegant extension of the standard sentential modal logics into several first-order modal logics is developed. Both a first-order modal logic for possibilism containing actualism as a proper part as well as a separate modal logic for actualism alone are constructed for a variety of modal systems. Exercises on this level show the connections between modal laws and quantifier logic regarding generalization into, or out of, modal contexts and the conditions required for the necessity of identity and non-identity. Two types of second-order modal logics, one possibilist and the other actualist, are developed based on a distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. The result is a deeper second-order analysis of possibilism and actualism as ontological frameworks. Exercises regarding second-order predicate quantifiers clarify the distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general.Less
In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision, and philosophical insight. All of the S1-S5 modal logics of Lewis and Langford, among others, are constructed. A matrix, or many-valued semantics, for sentential modal logic is formalized, and an important result that no finite matrix can characterize any of the standard modal logics is proven. Exercises, some of which show independence results, help to develop logical skills. A separate sentential modal logic of logical necessity in logical atomism is also constructed and shown to be complete and decidable. On the first-order level of the logic of logical necessity, the modal thesis of anti-essentialism is valid and every de re sentence is provably equivalent to a de dicto sentence. An elegant extension of the standard sentential modal logics into several first-order modal logics is developed. Both a first-order modal logic for possibilism containing actualism as a proper part as well as a separate modal logic for actualism alone are constructed for a variety of modal systems. Exercises on this level show the connections between modal laws and quantifier logic regarding generalization into, or out of, modal contexts and the conditions required for the necessity of identity and non-identity. Two types of second-order modal logics, one possibilist and the other actualist, are developed based on a distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general. The result is a deeper second-order analysis of possibilism and actualism as ontological frameworks. Exercises regarding second-order predicate quantifiers clarify the distinction between existence-entailing concepts and concepts in general.
Michael Potter
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199215836
- eISBN:
- 9780191721243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.003.0099
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This introductory chapter discusses the theoretical approach used in this book, which focuses on Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus during the First World War, but it had ...
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This introductory chapter discusses the theoretical approach used in this book, which focuses on Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus during the First World War, but it had its birth in the two years he spent working in Cambridge with Russell between 1911 and 1913. He compiled the Notes on Logic at the very end of that period, as a summary for Russell of the work he had accomplished. The destruction of his notebooks makes the Notes almost the only guide to the work he had been doing in Cambridge. Studying them provides insight on which of his ideas Wittgenstein owed to this period, and which to the very different circumstances in which he worked later, first in Norway and then on active service during the war. It also lays bare some of the influences which helped to form Wittgenstein's views.Less
This introductory chapter discusses the theoretical approach used in this book, which focuses on Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus during the First World War, but it had its birth in the two years he spent working in Cambridge with Russell between 1911 and 1913. He compiled the Notes on Logic at the very end of that period, as a summary for Russell of the work he had accomplished. The destruction of his notebooks makes the Notes almost the only guide to the work he had been doing in Cambridge. Studying them provides insight on which of his ideas Wittgenstein owed to this period, and which to the very different circumstances in which he worked later, first in Norway and then on active service during the war. It also lays bare some of the influences which helped to form Wittgenstein's views.
Keith Hossack
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206728
- eISBN:
- 9780191709777
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. ...
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This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.Less
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.
Berit Brogaard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199796908
- eISBN:
- 9780199933235
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the ...
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What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense. This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and retain mental states over time, an examination of how the phenomenology of mental states bears on the content of mental states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic. The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to features about the subject who does the representing. If this view is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our own position in the world.Less
What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense. This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and retain mental states over time, an examination of how the phenomenology of mental states bears on the content of mental states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic. The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to features about the subject who does the representing. If this view is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our own position in the world.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This account of rational belief revision explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief — a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent’s old beliefs. Belief ...
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This account of rational belief revision explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief — a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent’s old beliefs. Belief systems are modeled as finite dependency networks. So one can attend not only to what the agent believes, but also to the variety of reasons the agent has for so believing. The computational complexity of the revision problem is characterized. Algorithms for belief revision are formulated, and implemented in Prolog. The implementation tests well on a range of simple belief‐revision problems that pose a variety of challenges for any account of belief‐revision. The notion of ‘minimal mutilation’ of a belief system is explicated precisely. The proposed revision methods are invariant across different global justificatory structures (foundationalist, coherentist, etc.). They respect the intuition that, when revising one's beliefs, one should not hold on to any belief that has lost all its former justifications. The limitation to finite dependency networks is shown not to compromise theoretical generality. This account affords a novel way to argue that there is an inviolable core of logical principles. These principles, which form the system of Core Logic, cannot be given up, on pain of not being able to carry out the reasoning involved in rationally revising beliefs. The book ends by comparing and contrasting the new account with some major representatives of earlier alternative approaches, from the fields of formal epistemology, artificial intelligence and mathematical logic.Less
This account of rational belief revision explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief — a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent’s old beliefs. Belief systems are modeled as finite dependency networks. So one can attend not only to what the agent believes, but also to the variety of reasons the agent has for so believing. The computational complexity of the revision problem is characterized. Algorithms for belief revision are formulated, and implemented in Prolog. The implementation tests well on a range of simple belief‐revision problems that pose a variety of challenges for any account of belief‐revision. The notion of ‘minimal mutilation’ of a belief system is explicated precisely. The proposed revision methods are invariant across different global justificatory structures (foundationalist, coherentist, etc.). They respect the intuition that, when revising one's beliefs, one should not hold on to any belief that has lost all its former justifications. The limitation to finite dependency networks is shown not to compromise theoretical generality. This account affords a novel way to argue that there is an inviolable core of logical principles. These principles, which form the system of Core Logic, cannot be given up, on pain of not being able to carry out the reasoning involved in rationally revising beliefs. The book ends by comparing and contrasting the new account with some major representatives of earlier alternative approaches, from the fields of formal epistemology, artificial intelligence and mathematical logic.
