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This chapter analyzes commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and illustrates how CMBS loan collateral performance impacts the CMBS capital structure and the price–yield profile of individual CMBS bonds. It first reviews the CMBS capital structure and then examines the CMBS collateral default and loss history and describes those factors found to be most predictive of commercial mortgage loan credit performance. Evaluating a CMBS bond for investment purposes requires a review of the underlying loan collateral characteristics in order to formulate appropriate future default probability and loss severity assumptions for the underlying loan collateral. In the analysis of CMBS, being cognizant of the lending conditions at the time of loan pool origination is perhaps the overarching factor that will drive a CMBS pool’s default and loss performance.

This chapter presents concluding remarks on credit programs conducted for the betterment of poor people, and discusses how histories of African finance, like histories of African economy in general, have looked pretty dismal. Typical have been financial credit unmatched by saving, loans delivered tardily and in amounts that shrink as they proceed from city to countryside, subsidies set too high and gobbled by elites, agronomically inappropriate packages of farm inputs, gender biases in loan allocation and extension services, culturally inappropriate requirements about loan collateral, low and falling repayment rates, and rising disaffection and debt. Often, both borrowers and lenders have, paradoxically, felt burned. The chapter also attempts to draw together some lessons, adds some broader reflections about development aid over the past half-century, and discusses how it might be reconceived in the light of what else we know about entrustment and obligation.

Free competition in product markets is a common characteristic in capitalist economies. Meanwhile, regulations on the land, labour, and financial markets have changed over time in each capitalist economy and are distinct. We address this issue in the Japanese context. Medieval Japan under the second shogunate of Muromachi in the fourteenth century instituted a free competition regime for land, labour, and financial markets. An outcome was wealth inequality and social destabilization. The third shogunate of Edo vested peasants with property rights and regulated the land, labour, and financial market to maintain them as owner-farmers. The regime created an institutional arrangement where the stem farming family functioned as the centre of resource allocation. Deregulation after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 weakened the family-focused arrangement but did not entirely remove it. Traits of the family-focused arrangement form the specific characteristic of modern Japanese capitalism.