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This chapter aims to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and cross-listing focusing on European firms. Using proprietary data on corporate governance in the largest European corporations, constituents of the FTSE Eurotop 300 index over the period 2000 and 2004 combined with data on the cross-listing status of European companies (covering both US listings as well as cross-listings within Europe), it considers two major research questions: How does the corporate governance of US cross-listed European companies compare to the corporate governance of companies from the same country that do not cross-list in the US, and what is the relationship between cross-listing within Europe and corporate governance? It is shown that companies with a US cross-listing commanded higher corporate governance ratings than those without.

This chapter focuses on the process whereby a company raises finance by offering its equity securities to investors in the market. Topics discussed include reasons for going public; where shares can be listed; EU capital market regulation; giving effect to EU law in the UK; standards for admission to trading on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM); forms of public offer of shares; determining the issue price; the principle of mandatory prospectus disclosure; the operation of the mandatory prospectus disclosure regime; enforcement of securities laws regulating public issues and admission to trading; civil liability in the UK for defective prospectuses; civil liability for false prospectuses; public offers of securities by private companies; periodic and episodic disclosure obligations of listed and quoted companies; issuer disclosure obligations derived from the transparency obligations directive; and annual corporate governance disclosures by issuers admitted to trading on a regulated market; and civil liability for periodic and episodic disclosures.

In this chapter, the design and the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms in the four types of Chinese enterprises—state-owned enterprises (SOEs), listed companies, village enterprises (TVEs), and private enterprises—are examined in terms of the impact they all have on the Chinese economy's growth prospects and on firm performance. Aside from investigating the reform strategies for the different enterprises and identifying the common problems across the reforms, the chapter studies the reform and restrictions imposed on improvements in corporate governance. This chapter reveals how the need for further reform or better implementation arose, how privatization was carried out in a decentralized manner, how efficiency gains were achieved, and how private enterprises served as the major contributor to employment expansion and economic growth.

This chapter empirically examines the performance of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs). The sample consists of 437 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 447 companies listed on the Shenzhen exchange (for a longer time period) from 1995 to 1999. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the equity structure and corporate governance mechanism. Section 7.3 establishes financial indicators to evaluate the operational performance of listed companies. Section 7.4 reports the empirical results of the IPOs' performance, and Section 7.5 provides concluding remarks. The results show that in terms of growth, profitability, and stability, the only industries in China in which listed companies display strong performance are the public utilities, transportation, and finance. The overall operational performance of all other industries is poor, especially in terms of growth. Two commentaries are also included at the end of the chapter.

This chapter examines the savings rates of China's listed business enterprises. It compares the savings patterns of 1,557 Chinese publicly listed firms with those of 29,330 listed firms in fifty-one other countries from 2002–2007, and compares state-owned enterprises with majority privately owned firms within China. The results show that Chinese listed firms did not seem to have higher gross savings than listed firms in other countries during the sample period. Moreover, the gross savings rate for a typical listed Chinese firm declined from 2002 to 2007. A comparison of state-owned versus nonstate Chinese firms showed no significant differences between these two groups in terms of their savings and dividend patterns. A commentary is included at the end of the chapter.

The mechanics of a public issue of corporate securities and its legal setting are the focus of this chapter. These aspects are largely governed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008; Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009; and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares) Regulations, 2013. These regulations, being delegated legislation, are often amended by SEBI to attend to new developments in the securities market. Nonetheless, their core features remain intact. This chapter focuses more on the core features and reference is made to peripheral matters for adding completeness and coherence. Some of the peripheral matters like issue procedure—how to apply in the public issue and how are applications processed—have been simplified for a meaningful analysis.

This chapter describes the ways in which members make decisions for a company and the procedures for obtaining their decisions. The members of the company are the subscribers and any other person who agrees to become a member, by allotment or transfer, and whose name is entered on the register of members. The company is required to keep a register of members, which the court has power to rectify. Alternatively, the company will in due course be able to opt to keep information on a central register in order to avoid the need for a register of members.

It is usual for a valid board meeting to be chaired by one of the directors who will act as the chairman of the board. The chairman is the person who has control of the conduct of the meeting. The person who occupies the position of chairman of the board of directors holds an important position in the hierarchy of a company. It is the responsibility of the chairman to manage the board meeting and, in consultation with the chief executive officer and the company secretary, to set the agenda for board meetings. In managing a board meeting a chairman must ensure that all members of the board receive accurate and proper information in a timely manner so as to enable them to take informed management decisions.

It is legitimate for the issued share capital of a company to be divided into shares of different classes, for example, the share capital may include deferred shares, preference shares or redeemable shares as well as ordinary shares. The reasons for such a subdivision of a company’s share capital may be many and arise in a variety of different situations. Where the issued share capital of a company is so divided it may be necessary from time to time to convene separate class meetings when such a course is required by statute or under the terms of a company’s articles of association. Provided that there is due and proper compliance with the legislation and with any applicable provisions in a company’s articles or shareholders’ agreement it is possible for members of a company to vary the rights that may be attached to a particular class of shares. This power must not be abused and the court has specific jurisdiction under CA 2006, s 633 to protect a minority of the members of a class of shares provided that they constitute not less than 15% of the issued shares of the class. Such persons may apply to the court to have