Uriah Kriegel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199742974
- eISBN:
- 9780199914449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any item x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the ...
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Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any item x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the non-experiential-intentional content of x? This chapter considers four possible answers to this question, defending and developing the fourth among them, which is an interpretivist account. According to the proposed account, a property F figures in the non-experiential-intentional content of a state x just in case an ideal interpreter would, under ideal conditions, interpret x as having F in its intentional content. The chapter first discusses a ‘potentialist’ approach developed by Searle (Section 4.1), then an ‘inferentialist’ approach developed by Loar (Section 4.2) and an ‘eliminativist’ approach defended by Strawson (Section 4.3), and finally the ‘interpretivist’ approach it defends as superior (Section 4.4).Less
Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any item x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the non-experiential-intentional content of x? This chapter considers four possible answers to this question, defending and developing the fourth among them, which is an interpretivist account. According to the proposed account, a property F figures in the non-experiential-intentional content of a state x just in case an ideal interpreter would, under ideal conditions, interpret x as having F in its intentional content. The chapter first discusses a ‘potentialist’ approach developed by Searle (Section 4.1), then an ‘inferentialist’ approach developed by Loar (Section 4.2) and an ‘eliminativist’ approach defended by Strawson (Section 4.3), and finally the ‘interpretivist’ approach it defends as superior (Section 4.4).
William Lyons
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198752226
- eISBN:
- 9780191695087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752226.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter is concerned with the primitive yet foundational intentionality of the brain. It argues that, while it is true that all sensory systems produce effects in the brain in currency called ...
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This chapter is concerned with the primitive yet foundational intentionality of the brain. It argues that, while it is true that all sensory systems produce effects in the brain in currency called electrical impulses, this currency is not a language of any kind. Firstly, the book provides general comments on the lessons learned in part one of the book. Then it discusses the layers of intentionality: brain-level intentionality, sensory experience intentionality, linguistic intentionality, and the intentionality of the propositional attitudes. The third section outlines the distinction between a language, a code, and an analogue transmission device. The fourth section examines the brain as an analogue information transmitter and processor. The next two sections introduce the concept of mapping and transforming, and maps and records.Less
This chapter is concerned with the primitive yet foundational intentionality of the brain. It argues that, while it is true that all sensory systems produce effects in the brain in currency called electrical impulses, this currency is not a language of any kind. Firstly, the book provides general comments on the lessons learned in part one of the book. Then it discusses the layers of intentionality: brain-level intentionality, sensory experience intentionality, linguistic intentionality, and the intentionality of the propositional attitudes. The third section outlines the distinction between a language, a code, and an analogue transmission device. The fourth section examines the brain as an analogue information transmitter and processor. The next two sections introduce the concept of mapping and transforming, and maps and records.
