Matthew Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780226164878
- eISBN:
- 9780226164908
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226164908.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
One of the most contentious issues with which the emerging naturalism had to grapple was the question of what, if anything, was beyond science’s grasp. Both naturalists and theists accused each other ...
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One of the most contentious issues with which the emerging naturalism had to grapple was the question of what, if anything, was beyond science’s grasp. Both naturalists and theists accused each other of making unsupportable claims of absolute knowledge about the world, and of intellectual arrogance. However, in practice, both sides agreed quite closely about the limits of scientific investigation and knowledge, and tied the establishment of those limits to their naturalistic or theistic worldview. One important example was the question of the origin of the universe. Surprisingly, human ignorance of this question was justified in very similar terms by both groups. Maxwell and Huxley undertook sophisticated analyses of the limits of science - Huxley through his articulation of agnosticism, Maxwell through his work on scientific models. The limits of science question was not solely a rhetorical debate, and appeared in important ways in scientific practice.Less
One of the most contentious issues with which the emerging naturalism had to grapple was the question of what, if anything, was beyond science’s grasp. Both naturalists and theists accused each other of making unsupportable claims of absolute knowledge about the world, and of intellectual arrogance. However, in practice, both sides agreed quite closely about the limits of scientific investigation and knowledge, and tied the establishment of those limits to their naturalistic or theistic worldview. One important example was the question of the origin of the universe. Surprisingly, human ignorance of this question was justified in very similar terms by both groups. Maxwell and Huxley undertook sophisticated analyses of the limits of science - Huxley through his articulation of agnosticism, Maxwell through his work on scientific models. The limits of science question was not solely a rhetorical debate, and appeared in important ways in scientific practice.
Ian Shaw
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780231166409
- eISBN:
- 9780231541602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231166409.003.0009
- Subject:
- Social Work, Research and Evaluation
Following reflections on how scientists in social work and other fields have contemplated the challenge of contributing to the application of their work, I consider four questions: 1. How should we ...
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Following reflections on how scientists in social work and other fields have contemplated the challenge of contributing to the application of their work, I consider four questions: 1. How should we think about the uses and misuses of science in social work? 2. What should we make of the demands for the impact of science? 3. Are some forms of social work science less susceptible to influence than others? 4. What is the relationship between knowing and doing in social work science? I close the chapter, and the book, with a reminder of the limits of social work science.Less
Following reflections on how scientists in social work and other fields have contemplated the challenge of contributing to the application of their work, I consider four questions: 1. How should we think about the uses and misuses of science in social work? 2. What should we make of the demands for the impact of science? 3. Are some forms of social work science less susceptible to influence than others? 4. What is the relationship between knowing and doing in social work science? I close the chapter, and the book, with a reminder of the limits of social work science.
Eric T. Freyfogle
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226326399
- eISBN:
- 9780226326429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226326429.003.0004
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Environmental Studies
This chapter explores two related issues: science and what it is and is not, and the sources of moral values and other normative standards that we might use to evaluate nature and our changes to it. ...
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This chapter explores two related issues: science and what it is and is not, and the sources of moral values and other normative standards that we might use to evaluate nature and our changes to it. For various reasons modern society is prone to turn to science and objective, empirically grounded facts to identify problems and set public policy. To do this, though, is to fail to see the limits of science and thus to expect science to do work for which it is ill-suited. This drive for objectivity in the public realm comes at great cost because it pushes normative factors into the individual realm as if they were not matters for public decision. Related is the tendency to use scientific burdens of proof (for instance, when evaluating climate change) when the choice of a burden of proof is itself a normative issue and scientific burdens are rarely appropriate outside science. Overuse of reason has sapped strength from longstanding moral norms and made the work of crafting and embracing new ones more dubious. The chapter highlights the incompleteness of both rights-based (deontological) and consequentialist normative schemes, explores the fact-value distinction, and asserts the legitimacy of social construction of norms. Less
This chapter explores two related issues: science and what it is and is not, and the sources of moral values and other normative standards that we might use to evaluate nature and our changes to it. For various reasons modern society is prone to turn to science and objective, empirically grounded facts to identify problems and set public policy. To do this, though, is to fail to see the limits of science and thus to expect science to do work for which it is ill-suited. This drive for objectivity in the public realm comes at great cost because it pushes normative factors into the individual realm as if they were not matters for public decision. Related is the tendency to use scientific burdens of proof (for instance, when evaluating climate change) when the choice of a burden of proof is itself a normative issue and scientific burdens are rarely appropriate outside science. Overuse of reason has sapped strength from longstanding moral norms and made the work of crafting and embracing new ones more dubious. The chapter highlights the incompleteness of both rights-based (deontological) and consequentialist normative schemes, explores the fact-value distinction, and asserts the legitimacy of social construction of norms.
Jeroen de Ridder
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190462758
- eISBN:
- 9780190462772
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
Does scientific knowledge have limits? This chapter tries to answer this question by first investigating the distinct nature of scientific knowledge, as contrasted with other kinds of knowledge. Two ...
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Does scientific knowledge have limits? This chapter tries to answer this question by first investigating the distinct nature of scientific knowledge, as contrasted with other kinds of knowledge. Two plausible proposals are considered: scientific knowledge as high-grade knowledge and scientific knowledge as objectifying knowledge. The chapter then investigates what these two proposals entail for the question of whether scientific knowledge is limited. It turns out that, on both proposals, there are in-principle limits to what can be known scientifically. This spells trouble for any forms of scientism denying this.Less
Does scientific knowledge have limits? This chapter tries to answer this question by first investigating the distinct nature of scientific knowledge, as contrasted with other kinds of knowledge. Two plausible proposals are considered: scientific knowledge as high-grade knowledge and scientific knowledge as objectifying knowledge. The chapter then investigates what these two proposals entail for the question of whether scientific knowledge is limited. It turns out that, on both proposals, there are in-principle limits to what can be known scientifically. This spells trouble for any forms of scientism denying this.
Massimiliano Di Ventra
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198825623
- eISBN:
- 9780191864605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198825623.003.0002
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics, Theoretical, Computational, and Statistical Physics
This chapter defines the object of study of the Natural Sciences: the unique material reality existing irrespective of the observer. This is a logical necessity for scientists to even start doing ...
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This chapter defines the object of study of the Natural Sciences: the unique material reality existing irrespective of the observer. This is a logical necessity for scientists to even start doing Science. It also reminds the reader that this unique material reality is the only object of study for Science. Nothing else that is not testable with empirical means can be accessed by Science.Less
This chapter defines the object of study of the Natural Sciences: the unique material reality existing irrespective of the observer. This is a logical necessity for scientists to even start doing Science. It also reminds the reader that this unique material reality is the only object of study for Science. Nothing else that is not testable with empirical means can be accessed by Science.
Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels, and Rene van Woudenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190462758
- eISBN:
- 9780190462772
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190462758.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Adherents of scientism tend to answer both questions with yes. Scientism is ...
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Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Adherents of scientism tend to answer both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism.
Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook, and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism?Less
Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Adherents of scientism tend to answer both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism.
Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook, and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism?
