Search Results

Once an individual is able to record psychophysiological measures successfully, the question arises as to how these measures might be used in understanding the interdependence between psychological and physiological processes. What fields of study might significantly benefit from psychophysiological approaches? Before beginning a discussion of applications of psychophysiological recording, some of the principles of psychophysiology are considered. Psychophysiological studies can be grouped into five categories: response variables, stimulus/situational variables, subject variables, correlational variables, and the applications of psychophysiological research. Studies involving the responsible variables are primarily concerned with properties of the psychophysiological response. Examples include examining the relation between electroencephalogram (EEG) alpha activity and metabolic activity in the thalamus. Three examples of application studies are biofeedback, lie detection, and brain plasticity and pain. Areas that have benefited from psychophysiological techniques are those of attention and cortical plasticity and reorganization after injury.

This chapter discusses brain-based lie detection. It examines two types of brain-based technology that are currently being studied in laboratory settings and marketed for real-world use. The first type uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine whether someone is exhibiting neural activity correlated with deceptive lies or with sincere responses. The second type uses electroencephalography (EEG) to examine whether someone possesses “guilty knowledge” (e.g., incriminating details about a crime scene). The chapter outlines the various empirical and practical issues facing the use of this type of evidence in litigation settings, but the bulk of the discussion focuses on several problematic conceptual presuppositions underlying arguments about this evidence and the inferences that may legitimately be drawn from it in litigation settings.

Chapter 3 focuses on the first two steps of the TRUST untruthfulness heuristic: CLAIM and EVIDENCE. It begins by noting four principal rational motives for calling out lies and bullshit (confession, detection, self-contradiction, and falsification), but stresses that in the majority of cases one relies primarily on falsification. This is problematic because Chapters 1 and 2 stress that both discursive insincerity and epistemic irresponsibility are subjective rather than objective notions. The reliance on falsification as a starting point for analysis restricts the application of the framework primarily to “factually significant” and “falsifiable” claims. A distinction is made between “salty-type” statements that invite further investigation and “tasty-type” statements that invite agreement or disagreement but not further investigation. Only “salty-type” claims are open to a TRUST analysis. Finally, the challenge of anti-realism is taken up, and it is argued that there is more consensus about evidence than the “truth wars” would suggest.

This chapter presents the proposed applications of mind–brain relationships, which lack the empirical database backing that links the neurophysiological measures with behavior. It presents reasons, including lack of description and correlation and inconsistent empirical results, which prove why the brain activity's physiological measure cannot be used to predict behavior in a person. The applications proposed by the promoters are probabilistic in nature, with a substantial amount of variation. The chapter discusses the incompetency of cognitive neuroscience applications in measuring the motor-skill level and native ability or talent of an individual. Lack of empirical support for cognitive neuroscience applications proposing deception or lie detection with the use of brain imaging or EEG is presented.

In a well-known case of “back from the dead,” Teng Xingshan was convicted in Hunan for murdering his mistress and sentenced to death in 1988. Several years after his execution, it was discovered that the supposed victim was still alive. The Hunan High People's Court issued a revised judgment in accordance with trial supervision procedure and declared that Teng Xingshan was not guilty. Based on analysis of the Teng Xingshan case, this chapter outlines major types of interpretive errors and asserts the importance of accurate interpretation of scientific evidence as well as awareness of its fallibility.

Theory of mind is embedded within a great many fundamental human activities and ideas. A concluding review of some additional research and topics helps sum up the nature and import of theory of mind and its development. Thus, this concluding chapter considers our human propensity for gossip, our fascination with stories, and the ever presence of narratives and narrative cognition in human life, including our own autobiographical cognitions. It explores as well telling errors in adult understanding of minds, including our incorrect everyday theories of how perception works (extromission) and incorrect understanding of how lying works and how to detect liars. Complementing such errors are fascinating, unsuspected accuracies, evident at the least in blind individuals’ understandings of seeing. The chapter and book end by considering alternative, developed theories of mind that differ from our more standard, lay, Western theory, and in particular Buddhist understanding of mind and mindfulness.

The discussion so far has assumed a cooperative witness, ready to share information with law enforcement and attorneys. The witness may not remember all the information we need, and may make mistakes in recalling the past. But at least the witness is trying to share what he knows. Obviously, though, the justice system often encounters a different situation—one in which a witness is not cooperative, and tries to deceive investigators. Anyone assessing witness evidence, therefore, needs to consider this other scenario, namely witnesses who lie. This chapter starts by examining strategies that have long been in place for lie detection—strategies that focus on the emotional state of the person who’s lying. The idea here is that this person is likely to be anxious or tense while telling the lie, and so we can detect lies by detecting these states. This idea is at the center of many interviewers’ attempts at lie detection; it is also central for lie detection via the polygraph. There’s little evidence to support these notions, however, and other approaches to lie detection should probably be sought.

The deception detection method Münsterberg advocates is grounded on principles of association. Although this approach derives partially from a Freudian view of the unconscious, it is not terribly dissimilar to more modern, physiologically based lie detection methods. In recent years, deception detection has become a major focus within psychology and law. Research shows that humans’ ability to detect deception is limited but, summarizing across the body of studies, slightly better than chance. However, most police investigators believe they can detect when suspects are lying. This chapter covers the reliability of modern deception detection techniques with the exception of the polygraph, which is covered in the next chapter.

This chapter focuses on using suspects’ subtle emotional displays as an indication of their veracity. Münsterberg mentions several physiological indicators of an unconscious emotional reaction, such as changes in pulse, breathing, and galvanic skin response. The sorts of physiological measures described by Münsterberg foreshadow the polygraph, which relies on just such measures. The polygraph has been controversial since its inception and continues to be held in lower esteem by the scientific community than by law enforcement. The present chapter reviews psychological research on the polygraph as a lie detection tool. More specifically, it traces the history and uses of lie detectors, up to the most current methodologies. The chapter reviews the advantages and limitations of the various techniques used by polygraphers to establish the truth or deceptiveness of statements. Finally, the chapter discusses the history of the legal status of the polygraph.

The use of physiological signals to detect deception can be traced back almost a century. Historically, the polygraph has been used—and debated. This chapter discusses the merits of polygraph testing, and to what extent the introduction of measures of brain activity—most notably functional magnetic imaging (fMRI)—have solved the problems associated with polygraph testing. It discusses the different question formats used with polygraph and brain activity measures, and argues that these formats are the main factor contributing to the tests’ validity. Moreover, the authors argue that erroneous test outcomes are caused by errors in logical inferences, and that these errors will not be remedied by new technology. The biggest challenge for the field is to find a question format that isolates deception, and to corroborate laboratory data with methodologically sound field studies.

Throughout history it has been assumed that lying is accompanied by specific nonverbal behaviors; various sources still claim that nonverbal behavior is very revealing about deception. Systematic research, however, examining nonverbal cues to deceit has shown that nonverbal cues to deceit are faint and unreliable. This chapter starts with discussing under which circumstances people pay attention to nonverbal behavior and provides reasons why they do so. This is followed by a theoretical background of nonverbal cues to deception and discussions of the (weak) empirical evidence about (1) the relationship between nonverbal cues and deception, including the empirical evidence regarding the Behavior Analysis Interview and Ekman’s approach of observing facial expressions, and (2) people’s (poor) ability to detect deceit when paying attention to nonverbal behavior. Despite the popularity of observing nonverbal behavior to detect deception, analyzing speech content provides more accurate results, particularly when specific interview protocols are used.

This chapter focuses on neuroscience-based lie-detection from the perspective of the policies and epistemic norms underlying the law of evidence and legal proof. It makes the case that in some instances neuroscientific evidence is superior to forms of evidence (scientific and non-scientific) routinely admitted in legal proceedings. In analysing whether neuroscientific evidence should be admitted or excluded in legal proceedings, the chapter asks the important question: ‘compared to what’? Excluding neuroscientific evidence in order to base decisions on evidence that may be more epistemically problematic appears to run afoul of the law’s evidentiary principles and goals. The chapter also emphasizes the extent to which the epistemic norms and standards at issue involve fundamentally legal and not just scientific questions.

This chapter presents the challenges of, and advances made in, assessing the veracity of accounts in the forensic context. Initially, the difficulties in discriminating truths from lies, without tools, are discussed. Subsequently, primary examples of lie detection methods are reviewed, and their accuracy rates and limitations discussed. Their applicability to specific situations and interviewees is assessed, as well as their vulnerability to countermeasures and judgemental biases. Finally, several steps are proposed that an investigator might take to improve his or her ability to detect lies.