George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on ...
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Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.Less
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
The conclusion of the book reviews the three forms of morally relevant forms of connection with historic injustice, based on benefit, on the inheritance of entitlement, and on an ongoing failure to ...
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The conclusion of the book reviews the three forms of morally relevant forms of connection with historic injustice, based on benefit, on the inheritance of entitlement, and on an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. These are presented as complementary but distinct bases for modern day rectificatory duties. It is claimed that taken together, these mean that those who advocate international libertarianism may have to accept the existence of demanding rectificatory duties, which may, in the short run, coincide with the demands of redistributive cosmopolitanism. Though present day individuals and groups may dislike the idea that they can acquire rectificatory duties in an involuntary fashion, without bearing moral responsibility for the original wrongdoing, they nonetheless act wrongly if they do not seek to rectify historic international injustice.Less
The conclusion of the book reviews the three forms of morally relevant forms of connection with historic injustice, based on benefit, on the inheritance of entitlement, and on an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. These are presented as complementary but distinct bases for modern day rectificatory duties. It is claimed that taken together, these mean that those who advocate international libertarianism may have to accept the existence of demanding rectificatory duties, which may, in the short run, coincide with the demands of redistributive cosmopolitanism. Though present day individuals and groups may dislike the idea that they can acquire rectificatory duties in an involuntary fashion, without bearing moral responsibility for the original wrongdoing, they nonetheless act wrongly if they do not seek to rectify historic international injustice.
Katherin Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
Anselm is the first Christian philosopher to defend a libertarian analysis of created freedom. In doing so he proposes viable answers to perennial questions in the philosophy of religion: If God ...
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Anselm is the first Christian philosopher to defend a libertarian analysis of created freedom. In doing so he proposes viable answers to perennial questions in the philosophy of religion: If God causes everything, does He also cause human choices, including the choice to sin? Can grace and human free will be reconciled? Can free human choices be divinely foreknown? Does divine freedom entail the choice to do other than the best, and to make a different world, or no world at all?Less
Anselm is the first Christian philosopher to defend a libertarian analysis of created freedom. In doing so he proposes viable answers to perennial questions in the philosophy of religion: If God causes everything, does He also cause human choices, including the choice to sin? Can grace and human free will be reconciled? Can free human choices be divinely foreknown? Does divine freedom entail the choice to do other than the best, and to make a different world, or no world at all?
Jeremy Waldron
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay takes up Cohen’s inquiry into freedom and property. It celebrates his evocative example for its illustration of how property restricts the freedom of the majority for the sake of the ...
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This essay takes up Cohen’s inquiry into freedom and property. It celebrates his evocative example for its illustration of how property restricts the freedom of the majority for the sake of the freedom of the propertied. However, although Cohen’s insistence on a view of liberty that is not moralized is salutary in this debate, there is also some loss. There remains some moral appeal to the idea of possession even if freedom, suitably demoralized, is not at issue. Moreover, there is some risk that Cohen’s ‘denuded’ conception of liberty will fail to capture the significance of liberty and why we should care about it.Less
This essay takes up Cohen’s inquiry into freedom and property. It celebrates his evocative example for its illustration of how property restricts the freedom of the majority for the sake of the freedom of the propertied. However, although Cohen’s insistence on a view of liberty that is not moralized is salutary in this debate, there is also some loss. There remains some moral appeal to the idea of possession even if freedom, suitably demoralized, is not at issue. Moreover, there is some risk that Cohen’s ‘denuded’ conception of liberty will fail to capture the significance of liberty and why we should care about it.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Traditional analyses of tax justice demand that the distribution of tax burdens satisfy criteria of vertical and horizontal equity–like cases should be treated alike and relevantly different cases ...
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Traditional analyses of tax justice demand that the distribution of tax burdens satisfy criteria of vertical and horizontal equity–like cases should be treated alike and relevantly different cases should be treated differently. Various criteria for relevant differences have been proposed, drawing on ideas such as ability to pay and taxation in proportion to benefit. All these analyses suffer from the fundamental flaw of treating pretax income as a morally significant baseline. This mistake can partly be traced to a prevailing “everyday libertarianism” according to which our legal property rights simply protect what we are independently morally entitled to; this view is incoherent.Less
Traditional analyses of tax justice demand that the distribution of tax burdens satisfy criteria of vertical and horizontal equity–like cases should be treated alike and relevantly different cases should be treated differently. Various criteria for relevant differences have been proposed, drawing on ideas such as ability to pay and taxation in proportion to benefit. All these analyses suffer from the fundamental flaw of treating pretax income as a morally significant baseline. This mistake can partly be traced to a prevailing “everyday libertarianism” according to which our legal property rights simply protect what we are independently morally entitled to; this view is incoherent.
Michael Otsuka
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243952
- eISBN:
- 9780191598142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243956.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The aim of this book is to vindicate left‐libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of ...
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The aim of this book is to vindicate left‐libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. The book shows how John Locke's Second Treatise of Government provides the theoretical foundations for a left‐libertarianism that is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberal theories of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The author's libertarianism is founded on a right of self‐ownership. Unlike ‘right‐wing’ libertarians such as Robert Nozick who also endorse such a right, the author argues that self‐ownership is compatible with a fully egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare. In embracing this principle, his version of left‐libertarianism is more strongly egalitarian than others which are well known. The author argues that an account of legitimate political authority based upon the free consent of each is strengthened by the adoption of such an egalitarian principle. He defends a pluralistic, decentralized ideal of political society as a confederation of voluntary associations.Less
The aim of this book is to vindicate left‐libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. The book shows how John Locke's Second Treatise of Government provides the theoretical foundations for a left‐libertarianism that is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberal theories of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The author's libertarianism is founded on a right of self‐ownership. Unlike ‘right‐wing’ libertarians such as Robert Nozick who also endorse such a right, the author argues that self‐ownership is compatible with a fully egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare. In embracing this principle, his version of left‐libertarianism is more strongly egalitarian than others which are well known. The author argues that an account of legitimate political authority based upon the free consent of each is strengthened by the adoption of such an egalitarian principle. He defends a pluralistic, decentralized ideal of political society as a confederation of voluntary associations.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical ...
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Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.Less
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It ...
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This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.Less
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate ...
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This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate restitution as a response to wrongdoing argue that such property should be returned to the heirs of the historical victims. This inheritance-based model has often been rejected at a domestic level by theorists who reject the justifiability of inheritance. This response, however, is not available to international libertarians, who endorse backward-looking accounts of distributive justice. The chapter examines Jeremy Waldron's claim that property rights lapse in the absence of sustained possession, and holds that this need not be accepted if one sees international libertarianism as based on historical entitlement. It proceeds to challenge Janna Thompson's claim that the inheritance model is flawed as a result of its indeterminacy, maintaining that it need not rest upon counterfactual reasoning.Less
This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate restitution as a response to wrongdoing argue that such property should be returned to the heirs of the historical victims. This inheritance-based model has often been rejected at a domestic level by theorists who reject the justifiability of inheritance. This response, however, is not available to international libertarians, who endorse backward-looking accounts of distributive justice. The chapter examines Jeremy Waldron's claim that property rights lapse in the absence of sustained possession, and holds that this need not be accepted if one sees international libertarianism as based on historical entitlement. It proceeds to challenge Janna Thompson's claim that the inheritance model is flawed as a result of its indeterminacy, maintaining that it need not rest upon counterfactual reasoning.
Alexander Kaufman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294670.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Two formal arguments in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political thought remain influential. The first argument asserts that Kant's metaphysical principles of right ...
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Two formal arguments in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political thought remain influential. The first argument asserts that Kant's metaphysical principles of right severely constrain the authority of the state to intervene to influence subjective welfare. The second claims that Kant's account of right cannot guide the positive content of the law, since positive law is by definition contingent. The first argument, however, is inconsistent with Kant's explicit arguments in the Rechtslehre, while the second argument confuses contingency of content with contingency of form in Kant's account of positive law.Less
Two formal arguments in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political thought remain influential. The first argument asserts that Kant's metaphysical principles of right severely constrain the authority of the state to intervene to influence subjective welfare. The second claims that Kant's account of right cannot guide the positive content of the law, since positive law is by definition contingent. The first argument, however, is inconsistent with Kant's explicit arguments in the Rechtslehre, while the second argument confuses contingency of content with contingency of form in Kant's account of positive law.
Alexander Kaufman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294672
- eISBN:
- 9780191599637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294670.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Many scholars view Kant's explicit rejection of the principle of ’welfare’, as a basis for legislation, as decisive in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political ...
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Many scholars view Kant's explicit rejection of the principle of ’welfare’, as a basis for legislation, as decisive in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political thought. This reading, in fact, misconstrues both the subject matter and analytical level of Kant's claims. First, the traditional interpretation conflates the notion of welfare to which Kant objects with the general notion of social welfare. Second, the traditional interpretation misconstrues the level of generality of Kant's argument: Kant argues against a principle of welfare as the ground of a system of legislation, not as the ground of individual legislative acts.Less
Many scholars view Kant's explicit rejection of the principle of ’welfare’, as a basis for legislation, as decisive in favour of the traditional (libertarian) interpretation of Kant's political thought. This reading, in fact, misconstrues both the subject matter and analytical level of Kant's claims. First, the traditional interpretation conflates the notion of welfare to which Kant objects with the general notion of social welfare. Second, the traditional interpretation misconstrues the level of generality of Kant's argument: Kant argues against a principle of welfare as the ground of a system of legislation, not as the ground of individual legislative acts.
David B. Resnik
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195309782
- eISBN:
- 9780199871285
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195309782.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter describes three types of intellectual property that have an impact on research and development: patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. It examines several views of the intellectual ...
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This chapter describes three types of intellectual property that have an impact on research and development: patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. It examines several views of the intellectual property system, including libertarianism, utilitarianism, Marxism, and contractarianism. To maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of protecting intellectual property, society should develop intellectual property policies that strike an appropriate balance between public and private interests.Less
This chapter describes three types of intellectual property that have an impact on research and development: patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. It examines several views of the intellectual property system, including libertarianism, utilitarianism, Marxism, and contractarianism. To maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of protecting intellectual property, society should develop intellectual property policies that strike an appropriate balance between public and private interests.
Michael Freeden
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294146
- eISBN:
- 9780191599323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829414X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
From the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, the author has selected four case‐studies of clusters of thought claiming to be liberal, in order to perform the twofold task of assembling ...
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From the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, the author has selected four case‐studies of clusters of thought claiming to be liberal, in order to perform the twofold task of assembling the units of liberalism into an identifiable structure, and of testing concrete instances against whatever dominant morphological configuration may emerge. First, there is what is misleadingly known as classical liberalism, an early‐ to mid‐nineteenth‐century creed associated in Britain with J. S. Mill; some of its tenets are examined while being careful not to fall into the trap of assigning lexical correctness to its conceptual definitions and merely secondary or derivative status to its successors. Second, there are versions of reformist (or new) liberalism, such as those associated with T. H. Green, the British new liberalism, and their German and French counterparts; here, an assessment is made of both the question of family continuity and the boundary problems these permutations have, particularly with socialism; the analysis of new liberalism is taken further in the next chapter. Third, there is a recent genre of philosophical liberalism, much in fashion in the American academic world but achieving success abroad through the prominence of American political philosophy; an inquiry is made into whether this school produces a possibly innovative but stipulative model and whether it is reconcilable with mainstream American liberal traditions; the ideological elements in this philosophical position are also examined; the analysis of philosophical liberalism is taken further in Ch. 6. Finally, there is a variant broadly known as libertarianism, with both nineteenth‐century and contemporary instances; an exploration is made of its claim to be representative of a (or the) legitimate strand of liberalism, and of the extent to which it is situated within or outside the accepted boundaries of liberalism; the analysis of libertarianism is taken further in Ch. 7.Less
From the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, the author has selected four case‐studies of clusters of thought claiming to be liberal, in order to perform the twofold task of assembling the units of liberalism into an identifiable structure, and of testing concrete instances against whatever dominant morphological configuration may emerge. First, there is what is misleadingly known as classical liberalism, an early‐ to mid‐nineteenth‐century creed associated in Britain with J. S. Mill; some of its tenets are examined while being careful not to fall into the trap of assigning lexical correctness to its conceptual definitions and merely secondary or derivative status to its successors. Second, there are versions of reformist (or new) liberalism, such as those associated with T. H. Green, the British new liberalism, and their German and French counterparts; here, an assessment is made of both the question of family continuity and the boundary problems these permutations have, particularly with socialism; the analysis of new liberalism is taken further in the next chapter. Third, there is a recent genre of philosophical liberalism, much in fashion in the American academic world but achieving success abroad through the prominence of American political philosophy; an inquiry is made into whether this school produces a possibly innovative but stipulative model and whether it is reconcilable with mainstream American liberal traditions; the ideological elements in this philosophical position are also examined; the analysis of philosophical liberalism is taken further in Ch. 6. Finally, there is a variant broadly known as libertarianism, with both nineteenth‐century and contemporary instances; an exploration is made of its claim to be representative of a (or the) legitimate strand of liberalism, and of the extent to which it is situated within or outside the accepted boundaries of liberalism; the analysis of libertarianism is taken further in Ch. 7.
Michael Freeden
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294146
- eISBN:
- 9780191599323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829414X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The last three chapters have examined a number of examples of liberal ideology, including an American version, which contains considerable departures from what has normally been identified as ...
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The last three chapters have examined a number of examples of liberal ideology, including an American version, which contains considerable departures from what has normally been identified as liberalism; there is now sufficient evidence to confirm the hypothesis advanced in Ch. 4 that J. S. Mill's morphology is central to the liberal family. However, there is a further category—libertarianism—which is addressed in this chapter and claims to be part of the liberal family, but which on closer observation appears to be seriously attenuated, lacking many of the attributes that bestow on the liberal profile its distinctive contours. It is etymologically related to liberalism through the concept of liberty, but eschews the unique configuration of concepts that typifies liberalism, preferring instead to overemphasize heavily one concept (liberty) at the expense of the others. In some of its variants, libertarianism can lean towards anarchism, when the core concept of power as dispersed (or, if centralized, accountable) is replaced by the absence of any centralized power; in others, organized political power is retained, but as the guarantor of individual liberty alone, and the question of accountability diminishes in importance. Libertarianism may also differ from liberalism in surrounding liberty with adjacent concepts drawn from a political culture that displays conservative characteristics, without itself being wholly conservative.Less
The last three chapters have examined a number of examples of liberal ideology, including an American version, which contains considerable departures from what has normally been identified as liberalism; there is now sufficient evidence to confirm the hypothesis advanced in Ch. 4 that J. S. Mill's morphology is central to the liberal family. However, there is a further category—libertarianism—which is addressed in this chapter and claims to be part of the liberal family, but which on closer observation appears to be seriously attenuated, lacking many of the attributes that bestow on the liberal profile its distinctive contours. It is etymologically related to liberalism through the concept of liberty, but eschews the unique configuration of concepts that typifies liberalism, preferring instead to overemphasize heavily one concept (liberty) at the expense of the others. In some of its variants, libertarianism can lean towards anarchism, when the core concept of power as dispersed (or, if centralized, accountable) is replaced by the absence of any centralized power; in others, organized political power is retained, but as the guarantor of individual liberty alone, and the question of accountability diminishes in importance. Libertarianism may also differ from liberalism in surrounding liberty with adjacent concepts drawn from a political culture that displays conservative characteristics, without itself being wholly conservative.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as ...
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Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as self‐interested utility‐maximizer.Less
Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as self‐interested utility‐maximizer.
Etienne Schweisguth
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294757
- eISBN:
- 9780191599040
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294751.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The central hypothesis of this chapter is that members of the middle class are conservative on socio‐economic issues but progressive on cultural issues, whereas members of the working class are ...
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The central hypothesis of this chapter is that members of the middle class are conservative on socio‐economic issues but progressive on cultural issues, whereas members of the working class are progressive on socio‐economic issues but conservative on cultural issues. This can create contradictory effects within an individual's political orientation, in terms of three value orientations – left‐right materialism, libertarianism/post‐modernism, and materialism/post‐materialism.Less
The central hypothesis of this chapter is that members of the middle class are conservative on socio‐economic issues but progressive on cultural issues, whereas members of the working class are progressive on socio‐economic issues but conservative on cultural issues. This can create contradictory effects within an individual's political orientation, in terms of three value orientations – left‐right materialism, libertarianism/post‐modernism, and materialism/post‐materialism.
Harry Brighouse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257874
- eISBN:
- 9780191598845
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257876.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Describes the main kinds of school choice: public school choice, charter schools, and school vouchers. It looks at a series of arguments for school choice reforms, including Milton Friedman's ...
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Describes the main kinds of school choice: public school choice, charter schools, and school vouchers. It looks at a series of arguments for school choice reforms, including Milton Friedman's original argument for vouchers, arguments based on parental rights, and arguments based on libertarianism. It examines the public goods based argument for state funding of schools (which Milton Friedman's case for vouchers assumes) and shows why it fails.Less
Describes the main kinds of school choice: public school choice, charter schools, and school vouchers. It looks at a series of arguments for school choice reforms, including Milton Friedman's original argument for vouchers, arguments based on parental rights, and arguments based on libertarianism. It examines the public goods based argument for state funding of schools (which Milton Friedman's case for vouchers assumes) and shows why it fails.
Harry Brighouse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257874
- eISBN:
- 9780191598845
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257876.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Responds to a series of objections to the principle of educational equality, including the argument from elitism, the argument from the value of the family, libertarian arguments that reject ...
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Responds to a series of objections to the principle of educational equality, including the argument from elitism, the argument from the value of the family, libertarian arguments that reject redistribution even in the service of equal opportunity, and arguments that claim that only an adequate education is required as a matter of justice.Less
Responds to a series of objections to the principle of educational equality, including the argument from elitism, the argument from the value of the family, libertarian arguments that reject redistribution even in the service of equal opportunity, and arguments that claim that only an adequate education is required as a matter of justice.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198278641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198278640.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Market socialism is an alternative both to the free‐market thinking of the libertarian Right and to the statist thinking of many socialists. It aims to combine the freedom and efficiency advantages ...
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Market socialism is an alternative both to the free‐market thinking of the libertarian Right and to the statist thinking of many socialists. It aims to combine the freedom and efficiency advantages of markets with a more democratic organization of work and more equal distribution of resources. Co‐operatives can be an efficient way of organizing production, provided suitable investment agencies can be created to supply them with capital.Less
Market socialism is an alternative both to the free‐market thinking of the libertarian Right and to the statist thinking of many socialists. It aims to combine the freedom and efficiency advantages of markets with a more democratic organization of work and more equal distribution of resources. Co‐operatives can be an efficient way of organizing production, provided suitable investment agencies can be created to supply them with capital.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198278641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198278640.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Libertarians defend a narrow version of negative freedom. Hayek defines freedom as the absence of coercion, but this position is shown to be untenable. A more common view is that laws and other such ...
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Libertarians defend a narrow version of negative freedom. Hayek defines freedom as the absence of coercion, but this position is shown to be untenable. A more common view is that laws and other such deliberately imposed obstacles restrict freedom, but a lack of economic opportunities, for instance, does not. Against this, it is argued that any obstacle for which human beings can be held morally responsible should count as a constraint on freedom. Furthermore, contrary to Steiner, a constraint does not have to prevent an action, it can merely make it ineligible.Less
Libertarians defend a narrow version of negative freedom. Hayek defines freedom as the absence of coercion, but this position is shown to be untenable. A more common view is that laws and other such deliberately imposed obstacles restrict freedom, but a lack of economic opportunities, for instance, does not. Against this, it is argued that any obstacle for which human beings can be held morally responsible should count as a constraint on freedom. Furthermore, contrary to Steiner, a constraint does not have to prevent an action, it can merely make it ineligible.
