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Liberal order is not embodied in a fixed set of principles or practices. Instead, aspects of the liberal vision have made appearances in various combinations and changing ways over the last century. This chapter argues that it is possible to identify three versions of liberal order. The first is associated with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson; the second is the liberal internationalism of the post-1945 decades; and the third version is a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain. The chapter develops a set of dimensions that allow for identifying different logics of liberal order and identify variables that will shape the movement from liberal internationalism 2.0 to 3.0.

This chapter explores how the premises of the secularization theory have affected the diplomatic climate of opinion. After some cautions about the limits of intellectual history, it surveys the writings of scholars and policy makers in each of the three major schools of thought in contemporary U.S. foreign policy: realism, liberal internationalism, and neoconservatism. Each of these schools avoids the subject of religion, but for very different reasons. Realists, generally uninterested in the internal affairs of nations, see religion only as a “passion” and a drive to power. Liberal internationalists, although interested in domestic issues, see traditional religion as an obstacle to the furthering of progressive goals like human autonomy. Neoconservatives, despite their commitment to democracy promotion, have seen little connection between religion-driven culture and political development.

This chapter examines the United States' liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1989–2008, with particular emphasis on the evolution of American democracy promotion from what Reinhold Niebuhr called its “fortunate vagueness” to a hard ideology. It begins with a discussion of the neo-Wilsonian ideology that appeared in the “long decade” of the 1990s—a way of thinking characterized by both voluntarism and a pseudoscientific certitude that was absent in liberalism of the earlier periods. In particular, it considers the emergence of a “hard liberal internationalist ideology” that was comparable to Marxism–Leninism. It also explores the rise of democratic globalism as progressive imperialism, focusing on democratic peace theory and democratic transition theory. The chapter argues that American democracy promotion had become a pretext for “just war,” as evidenced by the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

This book offers a historical account of American efforts “to make the world safe for democracy” and the results of these attempts in the context of their own ambitions. It also examines how American foreign policy has contributed to the increase in the number, strength, and prestige of liberal democratic governments worldwide at the end of the twentieth century. The book focuses on American liberal democratic internationalism and the United States's democratizing mission on a selected group of countries such as Japan, Germany, Iran, and the Philippines, along with the impact of this agenda on world politics as a whole. To better understand the American operational code with respect to liberal democratic internationalism, this chapter analyzes the nature of American liberal democracy and cites a historical example that reflects the character of American liberal democratic internationalism in the twentieth century: the Reconstruction after the Civil War.

This chapter covers the historical components and emergence of liberal internationalism as a political ideology, discussing the Victorian liberalism and the visions of international politics that grew out of and were important for the ascendancy of internationalism. The popularity of Cobdenite ideas is closely related to their compatibility not only with dissent, but also with philosophical radicalism, traditional Whig views about war and peace, and the evangelically inspired, economic arguments in favour of free trade. William Ewart Gladstone argued against Lord Palmerston's meddling foreign policy, his conception of the English as ‘universal schoolmasters’, his ‘insular temper’ and his ‘self-glorifying tendency’. Lord Salisbury provides a helpful contrast to liberal internationalism. Internationalist ideology was underwritten by expectations of intellectual, moral and/or political progress, which would issue in a public morality and the reconciliation of nationalism and internationalism, ensuring the entrenchment of order and justice in international politics.

This chapter examines the United States' liberal democratic internationalism from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. It first considers the Bush administration's self-ordained mission to win the “global war on terrorism” by reconstructing the Middle East and Afghanistan before discussing the two time-honored notions of Wilsonianism espoused by Democrats to make sure that the United States remained the leader in world affairs: multilateralism and nation-building. It then explores the liberal agenda under Obama, whose first months in office seemed to herald a break with neoliberalism, and his apparent disinterest in the rhetoric of democratic peace theory, along with his discourse on the subject of an American “responsibility to protect” through the promotion of democracy abroad. The chapter also analyzes the Obama administration's economic globalization and concludes by comparing the liberal internationalism of Bush and Obama.

This chapter examines the United States's Wilsonianism in the post-Cold War era, first under George H. W. Bush and then under Bill Clinton. It considers how Bush, who became president as the Soviet Union was disintegrating and its leaders were looking for a new framework of understanding with the West, used Wilsonianism to address the question of establishing a world order favorable to American national security. It also discusses various Bush initiatives that were designed to establish a new world order after the cold war, Clinton's selective approach to liberal democratic internationalism, the effects of liberal economic practices on American national security, and the link between nationalism and liberal democracy. Finally, it assesses some of the challenges involved in the United States' efforts to bring about stable constitutional governance in many parts of the world.

This book addresses the assumption that the historiography of International Relations (IR) and (British) intellectual history needs to be integrated, arguing that liberal internationalism is best conceptualised as an ideology focused on encouraging progress, sowing order and enacting justice in international affairs. It shows how liberal internationalism travelled into the twentieth century. The chapter then brings the insights of British intellectual history to bear on British international thought and to supply IR with a more sophisticated understanding of its own intellectual roots. Michael Freeden's approach provides tools for understanding how different versions of the same ideology coexist and change over time, and enables a differentiation of contexts or ‘languages’ in which liberal internationalism was promulgated by ideological agents. The book deploys a contextualist approach to the study of liberal internationalist ideology in Britain between 1880 and 1930. This chapter provides an overview of the chapters included in the book.

This chapter investigates the historical language of internationalist ideology as it was displayed in the writings of three prominent liberal historians who informed and augmented liberal internationalism: James Bryce, John Morley and Lord Acton. Their different approaches to the emerging discipline and the practice of history reflect the broad appeal of historical representations and its relationship to political debates. The Holy Roman Empire covered the ideas which bolstered that empire, and one of the most fascinating episodes of the story – what Bryce termed the ‘theory of the Medieval Empire’ – now appeared outrageously anachronistic. Morley's Cobden represented the pinnacle of an honest and simple liberalism. The Life of Gladstone is above all the story of the young conservative High Church disciple who became the grand old man of liberalism. Acton's spirit was truly the spirit of a combative internationalism that would have an army of historians on its side.

This chapter examines Woodrow Wilson's comprehensive program for world order that came to constitute the foundation of liberal democratic internationalism, also known as Wilsonianism. Wilson's policy, designed “to make the world safe for democracy,” was not a radical departure from traditional American national security policy. His proposals to restructure world politics on the basis of a liberal world order were consistent with basic propositions of past American foreign policy. The chapter first considers the theory and practice underlying Wilsonianism before discussing the dilemma of Wilson's policy in Europe. It also explores the virtues of Wilsonianism for the postwar world, such as its acknowledgment of the fundamental political importance of nationalism. Finally, it emphasizes the resurgence of Wilsonianism in American foreign policy in the aftermath of World War II.

This epilogue discusses the irony of American liberal democratic internationalism that became apparent by late 2011: it has been instrumental in establishing the United States' preeminence in international affairs between 1945 and 2001, but has also contributed much to its decline thereafter. If containment had been the primary basis of American foreign policy during the Cold War, there was also a secondary track, which consolidated the political and economic unity of the liberal democratic regimes through multilateral organizations under U.S. leadership. Under the auspices of neoconservatism and neoliberalism, democracy was envisioned as having a “universal” appeal capable of promoting international peace. The epilogue considers some of the negative consequences of Wilsonianism as well as some of the forces challenging the future role of liberalism. It argues that the fate of liberal democratic internationalism depends in large part on the behavior of those who guide the policies of the democratic world.

This chapter shows how Angell sacrificed his considerable popularity by first urging British neutrality towards the European conflict and then co-founding the Union of Democratic Control. He soon came to regret these controversial moves, but after a period of hesitation decided he could not disavow them. No longer in great demand for lectures and articles, he wrote several longer works, in the course of which he revised his thinking, embracing liberal internationalism and a league of nations, while trying not to be disloyal to the radical isolationism of the Union of Democratic Control. To improve his tarnished image he declared his support for the war effort and briefly undertook ambulance work in France.

This chapter examines Franklin D. Roosevelt's liberal democratic internationalism and his efforts to assure American national security by constructing a stable world order based on the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which the United States sought to globalize in the aftermath of the Axis defeat in World War II. It first considers how FDR infused American liberalism with a healthy dose of realism about the appropriateness of democracy for other countries in the aftermath of World War II before discussing anti-imperialism as a component of American foreign policy. It also explores the United States's promotion of democracy and pursuit of a liberal world order as a means of countering Soviet imperialism. It argues that liberal democratic internationalism has been the American way of practicing balance-of-power politics in world affairs, and that the dominant logic of American foreign policy was dictated by concerns for national security.

This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a Wilsonian advocacy of democracy and a Rooseveltian preference for nonintervention. A third option had emerged since then: intervention for dictatorships, even against indigenous political forces that might be seeking to create constitutional, democratic regimes. The chapter first provides an overview of American realism and mass politics in the twentieth century, with emphasis on the modernity of fascism, communism, and democracy, before discussing American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years. In particular, it considers the Eisenhower administration's policy decisions with respect to Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam. It also explores the geopolitical realism of American support for democratic governments abroad.

This chapter explores the internationalist ideology that emerged from the political and social thought of Herbert Spencer and Henry Sidgwick. A discussion of the role of philosophical idealists, including Thomas Hill Green, David George Ritchie and Bernard Bosanquet, is presented. Green influenced a new generation of liberals and internationalists in important ways. Ritchie foresaw how the struggle among states would be tamed through the development of ethics and the widening of communities. Spencer's ideas about international politics fall clearly within the bounds of liberal internationalism. It is Sidgwick's scepticism towards dogmatism in religious affairs that has coloured his image. The Elements of Politics and The Development of European Polity were consistent in their projection and pursuit of basic internationalist ideals. The analysis points to the concomitant diversity and strength of internationalism as a political ideology among successful liberal philosophers and their audiences in the late nineteenth century.

This chapter examines Ronald Reagan's commitment to the tenets of liberal democratic internationalism, and in particular his promotion of a global “democratic revolution” characterized by an apparent contradiction between activism and moderation in American foreign policy. It begins with a discussion of the Reagan administration's strategy that called for a a minimal effort on its part to realize its vision of a world order dominated by democratic governments, with emphasis on three key operational programs: “constructive engagement”; the push for antistatist, free markets abroad; and the Reagan Doctrine. The chapter then considers the role played by the Reagan administration's policies to the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the succeeding prestige of democratic governance worldwide. It argues that the American role in the spread of democracy worldwide in the twentieth century was a necessary, but not sufficient, cause for the current strength of democratic government.

This chapter examines the American democratization policy for postwar Japan and Germany as part of its liberal democratic internationalism. World War II stands as one of the great watersheds in history; it not only marked the defeat of fascism as a viable form of political organization, but also opened the possibility of promoting democracy in Germany and Japan. Thus, it created the conditions for a liberal world order that could contain and ultimately eclipse communism's pretension to world revolution. The chapter considers American efforts to liberalize Germany and Japan after World War II by analyzing the fate of what the American Army referred to as the four D's for Germany: demilitarization, democratization, decartelization, and denazification or deprogramming. It also discusses the extent to which the eventual democratization of Germany and Japan ultimately helped create a more powerful liberal world order.

This chapter examines Jimmy Carter's promotion of human rights abroad as part of his foreign policy. The Carter administration gave a relatively precise interpretation of the meaning of human rights and connected it to a clear-cut set of political instruments, thus operationalizing traditional Wilsonianism in a novel and sometimes effective fashion. Indeed, Carter established a reputation for his abiding concern for human rights in other parts of the globe. The chapter begins with an analysis of what the Carter administration's commitment to human rights meant exactly, noting that the campaign for human rights did not originally intend to promote democracy in world affairs. It then considers the lessons of the Carter years for our understanding of liberalism's strengths and weaknesses in the conduct of American foreign policy by focusing on the debacle in Nicaragua and Iran. It also assesses Carter's legacy with respect to liberal democratic internationalism.