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This chapter advocates a modified version of the ‘minimum core approach’ adopted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its third General Comment. It is argued that the normative basis of this approach has not been adequately developed, nor have its full implications been properly considered. The approach involves distinguishing between the two thresholds of interests that individuals have and giving priority to the realisation of the first threshold. Two notions of priority are distinguished: ‘lexical priority’ and ‘weighted priority’. It is argued that any failure to meet the first threshold places a heavy burden of justification upon the government to explain why the most fundamental interests of individuals have not been met. The government also has obligations to take measures progressively to realise the second threshold and is required to justify its actions in this regard. A range of objections are considered and the approach is developed in the course of responding to these objections.

This chapter discusses various substantive and methodological choices involved in formalizing deontological constraints and options. It proposes to determine the permissibility of any act or rule infringing a deontological constraint by means of a threshold function. It outlines the scope of this proposal by describing the role of threshold functions within a broader context that may involve conflicting constraints and require a choice between several deontologically permissible acts. It then delineates the general structure of threshold functions. To capture the essence of deontological constraints, threshold functions set the magnitude and shape of the threshold, as well as the types of costs and benefits that are taken into account in determining whether the act's (or rule's) net benefit meets the threshold. The construction of threshold functions for deontological options is also discussed.

One perspective on justice asks individuals directly to bear the costs of their own choices, whilst the other asks them to do so only after background conditions of justice have been established by fair institutions. The latter is preferable, but the existence of the family seriously limits the realization of a principle of equality of opportunity. The family in some form must exist if any society is to be just, and thus this principle of equal opportunity cannot have lexical priority in a theory of justice.

This chapter addresses the reasonable pro-research position on animal research. It reviews several potential candidates for a defense of (at least some) animal research, ultimately decreasing the field to two broad positions: the lexical priority view and the discounting view. It shows that those who want a reasonable pro-research position to incorporate the widely adopted 3R program should find the discounting approach more plausible than the lexical priority approach. It then develops an approach to justifying discounting.

It is widely recognized that anthropogenic climate change will have harmful effects on many human beings and in particular on the most disadvantaged. In particular, it is projected to result in flooding, heat stress, food insecurity, drought, and increased exposure to waterborne and vector-borne diseases. Various different normative frameworks have been employed to think about climate change. Some, for example, apply cost-benefit analysis to climate change. The Stern Review provides a good example of this approach. It proceeds by comparing the costs (and any benefits) associated with anthropogenic climate change with the costs and any benefits of a program for combating climate change. On this basis, it argues that an aggressive policy of mitigation and adaptation is justified. Whereas the costs of combating climate change, according to Stern, are quite low, the costs of “business of usual” would be considerable. Other analysts adopt a second perspective and conceive of climate change in terms of its impact on security. For example, the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council issued a statement on Climate Change and International Security, which argues that climate change is “a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability.” It argues that climate change will contribute to the following kinds of insecurities: tensions over scarce resources; land loss and border disputes; conflicts over energy sources; conflict prompted by migration; and tensions between those whose emissions caused climate change and those who will suffer the consequences of climate change. In addition to the “economic” approach and “security-based” approach, some adopt a third different perspective, according to which the natural world has intrinsic value. This ecological approach condemns human-induced climate change because it is an instance of humanity’s domination and destruction of the natural world. For all of their merits, these three perspectives omit an important consideration: the impact of climate change on persons’ fundamental human rights. In this chapter, I argue that it is appropriate to analyze climate change in terms of its impact on human rights.