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This chapter sets out the European comparative approach to the legal construction of personal work relations, which will be tested and explored in the subsequent parts of the book. It considers, firstly, the function of the European comparative analysis of the work; secondly, the perspective from which the analysis is conducted; thirdly, the comparative method which will be followed; fourthly, the theory of institutional embeddedness which the work pursues, and the book's view that personal work contracts in general, and the contract of employment in particular, form the essential starting point though not the endpoint of this book's comparative analysis. Finally, the chapter expresses the aspiration that this comparative approach might ultimately give rise to an outcome consisting in the formulation of a common framework for the legal construction of personal work relations in European law.

This chapter seeks to elucidate the role of ‘European law’ in the legal construction of personal work relations in European national legal systems in general, and in national labour law systems in particular. It begins by identifying the set of problems which beset the legal construction of personal work relations in European national labour law. It suggests that European law, and EU law in particular, has itself become deeply implicated in that complex set of issues. It then proceeds to suggest ways in which EU law could begin to provide solutions to these analytical problems for national labour law systems, to which EU law itself is, to a certain extent, a contributor. In particular, the chapter advances the notion of a European Common Legal Framework for the Law of Personal Work Relations.

This chapter discusses the definition, policy, and application of the doctrine of sham in Australia. It covers sham and principles of legal construction; sham in the context of legislative regimes; sham in tax law; and elements of sham in Australia; and the policy and law of sham.

This chapter takes a look at vagueness and law from an intentionalist perspective. If meaning ultimately resides in the intentions of speakers, vagueness must have its origin in these intentions. This intentionalist account resonates with a rising interest in intentionalism in legal theory, where it figures prominently in the debate about legislative intent. The chapter tries to broaden this interest by applying intentionalism to the specific, but for legal methodology central phenomenon of vagueness. After laying out the general structure of an intentionalist reconstruction of vagueness, the chapter sketches its consequences for the different aspects of the vagueness discussion such as the sorites paradoxes, higher-order vagueness, or the relationship between truth and vagueness. The law is especially apt to illustrate the values of vagueness, which are reflected in the institutional framework of the legal system.

This chapter presents the book's hypothesis suggesting that the community of Spanish natives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a highly complex social and legal construction, based not on cultural or linguistic traits nor principally dependent on birth. Instead, it was founded on the assumption that people who wanted to live together and who were willing to commit themselves permanently to the community had the right to consider themselves members, both as citizens and as natives. This organic community depended on natural processes of integration and was limited in only two respects. First, in order to be integrated, candidates had to be Catholics. Second, candidates were judged not solely by their individual behavior, but also by their inclusion in certain social groups.