*Ken I. Kersch*

- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781479812370
- eISBN:
- 9781479852697
- Item type:
- chapter

- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9781479812370.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory

This chapter focuses on aspects of “legal conservatism” in the twenty-first century, arguing that the Constitution and the common law in America serve as two central examples of the role of ...
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This chapter focuses on aspects of “legal conservatism” in the twenty-first century, arguing that the Constitution and the common law in America serve as two central examples of the role of constitutive narratives in American conservative thought. In so doing, it also argues that too much attention is paid to the putative within the conservative movement and not enough to what these strands have in common: namely, the conservative rejection of all things liberal as having forsaken the truths of the American founding and Constitution. Ultimately, the chapter highlights the role of the Constitution as a symbol in forging an ecumenical conservative movement.Less

This chapter focuses on aspects of “legal conservatism” in the twenty-first century, arguing that the Constitution and the common law in America serve as two central examples of the role of constitutive narratives in American conservative thought. In so doing, it also argues that too much attention is paid to the putative within the conservative movement and not enough to what these strands have in common: namely, the conservative rejection of all things liberal as having forsaken the truths of the American founding and Constitution. Ultimately, the chapter highlights the role of the Constitution as a symbol in forging an ecumenical conservative movement.

*W David H Sellar*

- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748632909
- eISBN:
- 9780748651436
- Item type:
- chapter

- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748632909.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Comparative Law

This chapter explores the history of the law of succession in Scotland. It aims to provide a historical context for the present law by setting out the main outlines of the law of succession in ...
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This chapter explores the history of the law of succession in Scotland. It aims to provide a historical context for the present law by setting out the main outlines of the law of succession in Scotland before the ground-breaking changes brought about in 1964 by the Succession Act. The chapter suggests that the history of the Scots law of succession is one of quite remarkable legal conservatism rooted in a remote past. It explains that for more than six hundred years before 1964, there was not one law of succession in Scotland but two, depending on whether the property in question was heritable or moveable.Less

This chapter explores the history of the law of succession in Scotland. It aims to provide a historical context for the present law by setting out the main outlines of the law of succession in Scotland before the ground-breaking changes brought about in 1964 by the Succession Act. The chapter suggests that the history of the Scots law of succession is one of quite remarkable legal conservatism rooted in a remote past. It explains that for more than six hundred years before 1964, there was not one law of succession in Scotland but two, depending on whether the property in question was heritable or moveable.

*Eyal Zamir*

- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199972050
- eISBN:
- 9780190215064
- Item type:
- chapter

- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199972050.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter examines the policy implications of the various interactions between loss aversion and the law. It starts by claiming that loss aversion is not irrational per se, and that the ...
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This chapter examines the policy implications of the various interactions between loss aversion and the law. It starts by claiming that loss aversion is not irrational per se, and that the manipulability of reference points is limited. It claims that loss aversion not only explains, but also justifies, the law’s tendency to treat losses and gains differently. The chapter further argues that although the law should not try to negate loss aversion itself, it should discourage the manipulative exploitation of people’s loss aversion by others. It endorses the use of legal default rules to steer people’s decisions in the desirable direction. The chapter also notes that loss aversion provides a prima facie argument against legal reforms. Finally, it observes that legal decision-makers are also susceptible to framing effects, and this susceptibility may be exploited by interested parties. Conscious reframing of an issue in different ways may help overcome such manipulations.Less

This chapter examines the policy implications of the various interactions between loss aversion and the law. It starts by claiming that loss aversion is not irrational per se, and that the manipulability of reference points is limited. It claims that loss aversion not only explains, but also justifies, the law’s tendency to treat losses and gains differently. The chapter further argues that although the law should not try to negate loss aversion itself, it should discourage the manipulative exploitation of people’s loss aversion by others. It endorses the use of legal default rules to steer people’s decisions in the desirable direction. The chapter also notes that loss aversion provides a prima facie argument against legal reforms. Finally, it observes that legal decision-makers are also susceptible to framing effects, and this susceptibility may be exploited by interested parties. Conscious reframing of an issue in different ways may help overcome such manipulations.

*John L. Pollock*

- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780195060133
- eISBN:
- 9780197560129
- Item type:
- chapter

- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195060133.003.0006
- Subject:
- Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning

Much of the usefulness of probability derives from its rich logical and mathematical structure. That structure comprises the probability calculus. The ...
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Much of the usefulness of probability derives from its rich logical and mathematical structure. That structure comprises the probability calculus. The classical probability calculus is familiar and well understood, but it will turn out that the calculus of nomic probabilities differs from the classical probability calculus in some interesting and important respects. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the calculus of nomic probabilities, and at the same time to investigate the logical and mathematical structure of nomic generalizations. The mathematical theory of nomic probability is formulated in terms of possible worlds. Possible worlds can be regarded as maximally specific possible ways things could have been. This notion can be filled out in various ways, but the details are not important for present purposes. I assume that a proposition is necessarily true iff it is true at all possible worlds, and I assume that the modal logic of necessary truth and necessary exemplification is a quantified version of S5. States of affairs are things like Mary’s baking pies, 2 being the square root of 4, Martha’s being smarter than John, and the like. For present purposes, a state of affairs can be identified with the set of all possible worlds at which it obtains. Thus if P is a state of affairs and w is a possible world, P obtains at w iff w∊P. Similarly, we can regard monadic properties as sets of ordered pairs ⧼w,x⧽ of possible worlds and possible objects. For example, the property of being red is the set of all pairs ⧼w,x⧽ such that w is a possible world and x is red at w. More generally, an n-place property will be taken to be a set of (n+l)-tuples ⧼w,x1...,xn⧽. Given any n-place concept α, the corresponding property of exemplifying a is the set of (n + l)-tuples ⧼w,x1,...,xn⧽ such that x1,...,xn exemplify α at the possible world w. States of affairs and properties can be constructed out of one another using logical operators like conjunction, negation, quantification, and so on.
Less

Much of the usefulness of probability derives from its rich logical and mathematical structure. That structure comprises the probability calculus. The classical probability calculus is familiar and well understood, but it will turn out that the calculus of nomic probabilities differs from the classical probability calculus in some interesting and important respects. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the calculus of nomic probabilities, and at the same time to investigate the logical and mathematical structure of nomic generalizations. The mathematical theory of nomic probability is formulated in terms of possible worlds. Possible worlds can be regarded as maximally specific possible ways things could have been. This notion can be filled out in various ways, but the details are not important for present purposes. I assume that a proposition is necessarily true iff it is true at all possible worlds, and I assume that the modal logic of necessary truth and necessary exemplification is a quantified version of S5. States of affairs are things like Mary’s baking pies, 2 being the square root of 4, Martha’s being smarter than John, and the like. For present purposes, a state of affairs can be identified with the set of all possible worlds at which it obtains. Thus if P is a state of affairs and w is a possible world, P obtains at w iff w∊P. Similarly, we can regard monadic properties as sets of ordered pairs ⧼w,x⧽ of possible worlds and possible objects. For example, the property of being red is the set of all pairs ⧼w,x⧽ such that w is a possible world and x is red at w. More generally, an n-place property will be taken to be a set of (n+l)-tuples ⧼w,x1...,xn⧽. Given any n-place concept α, the corresponding property of exemplifying a is the set of (n + l)-tuples ⧼w,x1,...,xn⧽ such that x1,...,xn exemplify α at the possible world w. States of affairs and properties can be constructed out of one another using logical operators like conjunction, negation, quantification, and so on.