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This chapter identifies the area of decision-making as central to the protection of older people. It addresses the recognition of legal capacity as a central issue to avoid choices being ignored and not respected. The chapter discusses some of the law and policy reforms necessary to meet international human rights standards, as set out in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the European Convention on Human Rights. Lessons from research in other jurisdictions are highlighted to avoid the pitfalls identified from similar law reform elsewhere.

The chapter presents a new theory of legal personhood. It argues that legal personhood is a cluster property, and best understood in terms of disseverable but interconnected incidents. It sets out by distinguishing passive and active incidents, and then enumerates and presents both types of incidents. While doing so, the chapter highlights the benefits of an incident-based approach to legal personhood. After presenting the incidents, the notion of a ‘subject of law’ is offered as an alternative way of analysing legal personhood. The chapter concludes by addressing some of the connections between personhood and legal personhood.

One of the most important contributions of the international legal doctrine along the last six decades has been the rescue of the individual as subject of the law of nations. Such contribution is of historical significance. The individual's presence and participation has been growing in the international legal order. The international legal personality of individuals has been asserted before organs of international supervision of his rights, and his international legal capacity has consolidated before international legal tribunals (e.g., European and Inter-American Courts) of human rights. The individuals’ legal subjectivity is beyond question in contemporary international law.

This chapter explores the right to legal capacity for people with dementia. The analysis focuses on General Comment 1 of the UN Committee on the rights of persons with disabilities. The chapter also provides some examples of law reform around the world on the issue of legal capacity and considers how these reforms may impact on people with dementia. Finally the chapter considers how the right to legal capacity may be framed in any new UN Convention on the rights of older persons. The chapter argues that legal capacity is a critical human rights issue in the context of dementia and that Article 12 (CRPD) and the general comment 1 provide a strong base for respecting the autonomy and self determination of people with dementia

This chapter introduces the reader to the topic of legal personhood. It presents the central concepts, terminology, and legal doctrines pertaining to legal personhood, and explains the relevance of the notion for various contemporary legal debates. The chapter also presents the book’s methodology, which is a version of the reflective equilibrium. It thus lays the groundwork for one of the central theses the book: that the Orthodox View of legal personhood is unable to explain many of the convictions regarding legal personhood that are accepted widely by jurists in the Western world.

The legal status of international organizations matters because issues of their jurisdictional immunity would not arise, a priori, if they did not have both international personality and legal personality. This chapter addresses the legal status of international organizations under both international and national laws, examining their international and legal personalities that enable them to participate in international and national life. To carry out their functions, international organizations must have the requisite legal status, which also has a bearing on their jurisdictional immunity. The chapter also includes a discussion of the difference between international personality and legal personality.

This chapter introduces “Sara,” a teen revisited throughout the book. It details how her workplace supervisor sexually exploited her. It describes how other teenagers at work, at school, and in numerous other contexts experience sexual coercion by their adult mentors and supervisors. The chapter explains how the book addresses teen sexual exploitation in its successive chapters. It notes that adolescent psychosocial and neurobiological development influences the way teenagers cope with adult sexual advances. It suggests that state and federal, statutory and case law fail to protect teens adequately. In introducing the topic, this chapter defines key terms and cabins the discussion, explaining what the book does not cover. This chapter also reviews basic legal principals regarding capacity and consent. It introduces the notion of legal assent and distinguishes it from medical assent. It concludes that legal assent is one response among many available to ameliorate the sexual abuse of teenagers.

This chapter evaluates the extent to which the international community's recent actions have modified the traditional norms that establish the legal capacity of a ruling apparatus to assert the sovereign rights of a state in the international system. It evaluates cases in Haiti, Angola, and Cambodia as precedents for international enforcement of U.N. monitored solutions to internal crises.

This chapter explores the development of the legal concepts of idiocy and imbecility over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, examining legal theory as well as evidence from civil court cases to reveal an ongoing conflict between libertarian resistance to state intervention in the lives of citizens, however mentally incapacitated they might be, and a belief that the state should be responsible for protecting individuals against exploitation and the corruption of bloodlines. From the late eighteenth century, French medico-legal theorists, supported by the ‘scientific’ enlightenment ideals of the French revolution, proposed a medicalised appropriation of legal decision-making over capacity. While these ideas gained some currency among a small group of British medical men working in the field of idiocy, they faced strong public and legal resistance throughout the nineteenth century on the grounds of liberty of the subject. Both legal and medical formulations of idiocy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries borrowed heavily from popular, ‘common-sense’ public notions about what constituted an idiot.

This chapter consists of the commentary to, and explanation of, the proposed modern national law of arbitration. It endeavors to elucidate the language of the statutory rules?to reveal the motivation and goals that underlie the proposed law. The observations seek to position the rule in the landscape of the Court's decisional law. In places, the commentary identifies gaps or unresolved issues in the Court's holdings and provides a means of filling the void or repairing incongruities. The revised FAA has the ambition not only of mirroring the essential content of the Court's decisional law on arbitration, but also to innovate and bring the U.S. law of arbitration in line with and transcend the global legal regulation of arbitration. According to the proposed law, ordinary legal capacity includes a basic right to arbitrate. It also establishes federal question jurisdiction for arbitration and a federal law regulating the formation of arbitration contracts.

This chapter reviews the cutting-edge science of adolescent development and explains how teenagers, as a group, are different from mature adults. It explores adolescent neurobiological, psychosocial, and sexual maturation to determine whether teenagers have the legal capacity to opt for and handle sex with a work supervisor, a teacher, or another adult authority figure. It discusses how a teenager’s environment and experiences may influence the development of her brain. Distinguishing between cognition and other factors that influence decision-making, this chapter demonstrates that adolescents are not simply mini-adults. Chapter 3 provides the background for an evaluation of whether laws designed for adult targets can adequately protect juveniles and their “developing capacities.” Thus, Chapter 3’s review of adolescent development informs a discussion of the law that affects and purportedly protects teenagers. It answers the question of whether teenagers are developmentally different from adults; they are.

The history of international legal institutions has largely ignored the early activities of the United Nations, specifically of the UN War Crimes Commission (UNWCC). Based on an assessment of its work and with access to new archival evidence, contemporary international legal institutional design could benefit significantly from revisiting the commission’s achievements, particularly the principle of complementarity identified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and support for domestic tribunals for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The article begins by examining the history, multilateral basis for, and practical activities of the commission. Subsequently, it assesses its contemporary relevance. Finally, it analyses—with reference to modern literature on complementarity—the degree to which the commission’s wartime model provides positive examples of implementation of the principle that could be replicated today, with particular reference to domestic capacity-building and international coordination.

At Athens male and female prostitutes often provided sexual services pursuant to agreements containing reciprocal covenants, frequently of some complexity, often covering extended periods, sometimes in written form. Agreements in writing, publicly confirmed by witnesses, helped to establish at least an appearance that commercial sexual labor was appropriately egalitarian, thereby differentiating the work of a hetairos or hetaira from the dependence inherent in brothel slavery. These arrangements were truly “contracts” for juridical purposes, not mere informal arrangements of convenience giving rise to no legal obligation, since (1) substantial evidence establishes that mutual promises, even those merely oral, were legally binding at Athens, (2) even persons ordinarily lacking legal capacity, such as women or slaves, might in business contexts enter into agreements enforceable in Athenian courts, and (3) there were no conceptual or practical barriers at Athens to the enforcement of contracts for the practice of prostitution.