Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental ...
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What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.Less
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular ...
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This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.Less
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199218219
- eISBN:
- 9780191711596
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What fundamental account of the world is implicit in physical theory? Physics straightforwardly postulates quarks and electrons, but what of the more intangible elements, such as laws of nature, ...
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What fundamental account of the world is implicit in physical theory? Physics straightforwardly postulates quarks and electrons, but what of the more intangible elements, such as laws of nature, universals, and the direction of time? Do they have a place in the physical structure of the world? This book argues that the ontology derived from physics takes a form quite different from those most commonly defended by philosophers. Physics postulates irreducible fundamental laws, eschews universals, does not require a fundamental notion of causation, and makes room for the passage of time. The book contains a series of linked essays in the form of chapters and through them it outlines an approach to metaphysics opposed to the Humean reductionism that motivates much analytical metaphysics.Less
What fundamental account of the world is implicit in physical theory? Physics straightforwardly postulates quarks and electrons, but what of the more intangible elements, such as laws of nature, universals, and the direction of time? Do they have a place in the physical structure of the world? This book argues that the ontology derived from physics takes a form quite different from those most commonly defended by philosophers. Physics postulates irreducible fundamental laws, eschews universals, does not require a fundamental notion of causation, and makes room for the passage of time. The book contains a series of linked essays in the form of chapters and through them it outlines an approach to metaphysics opposed to the Humean reductionism that motivates much analytical metaphysics.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
According to the meta‐theoretic conception of laws of nature, the concept of a law of a scientific theory is prior to that of a law of nature. To be a law of a theory is not just to be called a law ...
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According to the meta‐theoretic conception of laws of nature, the concept of a law of a scientific theory is prior to that of a law of nature. To be a law of a theory is not just to be called a law by that theory; it is to play a certain special role within that theory. It is tempting, but wrong, to suppose that to be a law of nature is just to be a law of some true theory. Instead, the predicate ‘law of nature’ must be given a contextualist semantics: ‘It is a law of nature that P’ is true at world w as asserted in context k just in case P plays the law‐role within a scientific theory that is salient in k and true at w. The meta‐theoretic account of laws is surprising, but it helps to explain some important features of scientific practice.Less
According to the meta‐theoretic conception of laws of nature, the concept of a law of a scientific theory is prior to that of a law of nature. To be a law of a theory is not just to be called a law by that theory; it is to play a certain special role within that theory. It is tempting, but wrong, to suppose that to be a law of nature is just to be a law of some true theory. Instead, the predicate ‘law of nature’ must be given a contextualist semantics: ‘It is a law of nature that P’ is true at world w as asserted in context k just in case P plays the law‐role within a scientific theory that is salient in k and true at w. The meta‐theoretic account of laws is surprising, but it helps to explain some important features of scientific practice.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice ...
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This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice when actually giving explanations from his theory of how these explanations work. It is argued that while the practical instances usually make good sense, the theoretical explanation which identifies telos with form is wholly misleading. This brings the discussion back to the very puzzling chapter 9 of Physics II, and thence to a consideration of the idea that absolutely everything in nature is for some purpose. There are places where Aristotle seems to endorse this, although a more sober view would also assign a role to what may be called ‘laws of matter’, independent of teleology. The essay ends with some general reflections on Aristotle’s view of explanation in the natural sciences.Less
This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice when actually giving explanations from his theory of how these explanations work. It is argued that while the practical instances usually make good sense, the theoretical explanation which identifies telos with form is wholly misleading. This brings the discussion back to the very puzzling chapter 9 of Physics II, and thence to a consideration of the idea that absolutely everything in nature is for some purpose. There are places where Aristotle seems to endorse this, although a more sober view would also assign a role to what may be called ‘laws of matter’, independent of teleology. The essay ends with some general reflections on Aristotle’s view of explanation in the natural sciences.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, ...
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The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.Less
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198235446
- eISBN:
- 9780191705618
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book is a short and non-technical presentation of the cumulative argument for the existence of God. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise ...
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This book is a short and non-technical presentation of the cumulative argument for the existence of God. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (this is knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis and this last criterion drops out when there is little outside the scope of the hypothesis.) By these criteria, the existence and operation of God provides the best and most probably true explanation of the existence of the universe, it being governed by simple laws of nature — these laws (and the boundary conditions of the universe) being as such to lead to the evolution of humans, human consciousness, occasional miracles, and the religious experiences of millions of humans. The existence of evil does not count against the existence of God.Less
This book is a short and non-technical presentation of the cumulative argument for the existence of God. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (this is knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis and this last criterion drops out when there is little outside the scope of the hypothesis.) By these criteria, the existence and operation of God provides the best and most probably true explanation of the existence of the universe, it being governed by simple laws of nature — these laws (and the boundary conditions of the universe) being as such to lead to the evolution of humans, human consciousness, occasional miracles, and the religious experiences of millions of humans. The existence of evil does not count against the existence of God.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The idea that science has discovered that our universe is governed by laws of nature is arguably an important part of the modern scientific world‐view. The distinction between laws and other truths ...
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The idea that science has discovered that our universe is governed by laws of nature is arguably an important part of the modern scientific world‐view. The distinction between laws and other truths discovered by science is essential in at least some scientific reasoning, for example in statistical mechanics. The idea that laws of nature really govern the universe—and that they are not merely regularities that form an elegant system, as they are according to proponents of Humeanism (e.g. David Lewis)—turns out to play a crucial role in much scientific reasoning having to do with so‐called fine‐tuning. This chapter offers a formulation of the law‐governed world‐picture and outlines an argument for a new account of lawhood that vindicates that picture.Less
The idea that science has discovered that our universe is governed by laws of nature is arguably an important part of the modern scientific world‐view. The distinction between laws and other truths discovered by science is essential in at least some scientific reasoning, for example in statistical mechanics. The idea that laws of nature really govern the universe—and that they are not merely regularities that form an elegant system, as they are according to proponents of Humeanism (e.g. David Lewis)—turns out to play a crucial role in much scientific reasoning having to do with so‐called fine‐tuning. This chapter offers a formulation of the law‐governed world‐picture and outlines an argument for a new account of lawhood that vindicates that picture.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285549
- eISBN:
- 9780191713965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter makes a negative case for Kant's manifest realism by criticizing the leading contemporary version of maximal scientific realism, namely, scientific essentialism. It begins with a ...
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This chapter makes a negative case for Kant's manifest realism by criticizing the leading contemporary version of maximal scientific realism, namely, scientific essentialism. It begins with a discussion of what is scientific essentialism. It presents four distinct ways that Kant would criticize scientific essentialism: the empirical inaccessibility of the microphysical world, why there is no necessary a posteriori, the antimony of essentialism, and the logical contingency of the laws of nature.Less
This chapter makes a negative case for Kant's manifest realism by criticizing the leading contemporary version of maximal scientific realism, namely, scientific essentialism. It begins with a discussion of what is scientific essentialism. It presents four distinct ways that Kant would criticize scientific essentialism: the empirical inaccessibility of the microphysical world, why there is no necessary a posteriori, the antimony of essentialism, and the logical contingency of the laws of nature.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. ...
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The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.Less
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at ...
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This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. Many philosophers have recently defended a version of necessitarianism about laws called scientific essentialism; this chapter argues that even if the key metaphysical theses of scientific essentialism are correct, it is still more plausible than not that some (though not all) laws of nature are contingent. For the regularities that are related to counterfactuals in the ways that are distinctive of laws must include some regularities that are contingent, even if scientific essentialism is true. The other three assumptions defended in this chapter are that laws are propositions, that laws are true, and that the logically contingent consequences of laws are laws themselves.Less
This chapter defends four assumptions that will be taken for granted in the chapters to follow. None of these four assumptions is uncommon, but none is uncontroversial. One assumption is that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. Many philosophers have recently defended a version of necessitarianism about laws called scientific essentialism; this chapter argues that even if the key metaphysical theses of scientific essentialism are correct, it is still more plausible than not that some (though not all) laws of nature are contingent. For the regularities that are related to counterfactuals in the ways that are distinctive of laws must include some regularities that are contingent, even if scientific essentialism is true. The other three assumptions defended in this chapter are that laws are propositions, that laws are true, and that the logically contingent consequences of laws are laws themselves.
T.L.S. Sprigge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199283040
- eISBN:
- 9780191603662
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199283044.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter begins with a description of the life and early works of Bernard Bosanquet which show some remarkable insights into the future of Christianity. It then turns to his later work, ...
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This chapter begins with a description of the life and early works of Bernard Bosanquet which show some remarkable insights into the future of Christianity. It then turns to his later work, particularly his Gifford Lectures. Its strange mixture of materialism and idealism is considered and explained. Accounts and evaluations are provided of his views on panpsychism, on the State, on the problem of evil, on teleology, and on how all things operate according to the kind of whole to which they belong. His ethical outlook is charged with a lack of compassion and this is exhibited in his connection with the Charity Organization Society.Less
This chapter begins with a description of the life and early works of Bernard Bosanquet which show some remarkable insights into the future of Christianity. It then turns to his later work, particularly his Gifford Lectures. Its strange mixture of materialism and idealism is considered and explained. Accounts and evaluations are provided of his views on panpsychism, on the State, on the problem of evil, on teleology, and on how all things operate according to the kind of whole to which they belong. His ethical outlook is charged with a lack of compassion and this is exhibited in his connection with the Charity Organization Society.
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199218219
- eISBN:
- 9780191711596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter outlines the systematic connections between beliefs about laws of nature and a small assortment of other beliefs. The examination has been carried out predominantly in what may be called ...
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This chapter outlines the systematic connections between beliefs about laws of nature and a small assortment of other beliefs. The examination has been carried out predominantly in what may be called a conceptual model, focusing on inferences so as to sidestep the problem of ontological commitment. This may be likened to examining John's tacit theory of knowledge without affirming whether or not anyone has any knowledge, whether there is any such thing.Less
This chapter outlines the systematic connections between beliefs about laws of nature and a small assortment of other beliefs. The examination has been carried out predominantly in what may be called a conceptual model, focusing on inferences so as to sidestep the problem of ontological commitment. This may be likened to examining John's tacit theory of knowledge without affirming whether or not anyone has any knowledge, whether there is any such thing.
J. Todd Billings
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199211876
- eISBN:
- 9780191706004
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211876.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
This chapter shows the way in which Calvin has a complex, multifaceted theology of the law with strong connections to his notion of ‘participation in Christ’. The law is God's accommodation to ...
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This chapter shows the way in which Calvin has a complex, multifaceted theology of the law with strong connections to his notion of ‘participation in Christ’. The law is God's accommodation to humanity intended to unite humans to God. Its ‘principle end’ lies in inviting humans to God so that they can experience ‘true happiness’, in ‘being united to God’. Before the Fall, the law was the primal mode by which humans could participate in God. After the Fall, the law leads humans to repentance and curbs the social wickedness of humanity. However, through participating in Christ — the fulfilment of the law — believers can have a taste of the delight and intimacy with God that was lost in the Fall.Less
This chapter shows the way in which Calvin has a complex, multifaceted theology of the law with strong connections to his notion of ‘participation in Christ’. The law is God's accommodation to humanity intended to unite humans to God. Its ‘principle end’ lies in inviting humans to God so that they can experience ‘true happiness’, in ‘being united to God’. Before the Fall, the law was the primal mode by which humans could participate in God. After the Fall, the law leads humans to repentance and curbs the social wickedness of humanity. However, through participating in Christ — the fulfilment of the law — believers can have a taste of the delight and intimacy with God that was lost in the Fall.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically ...
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Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically parsimonious and consistent with Humean Supervenience; like Non‐Humean views, it denies that the laws are simply economical summaries of the universe, it provides a robust sense in which laws govern the universe, and it does not make the relation between laws and counterfactuals depend on what we choose to ‘hold constant’ in our counterfactual reasoning. The chapter concludes with an examination of the MAL's implications for various metaphysical issues, including natural theology, the relation between God and the universe, freedom and responsibility, and what the law‐governedness of the world consists in.Less
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically parsimonious and consistent with Humean Supervenience; like Non‐Humean views, it denies that the laws are simply economical summaries of the universe, it provides a robust sense in which laws govern the universe, and it does not make the relation between laws and counterfactuals depend on what we choose to ‘hold constant’ in our counterfactual reasoning. The chapter concludes with an examination of the MAL's implications for various metaphysical issues, including natural theology, the relation between God and the universe, freedom and responsibility, and what the law‐governedness of the world consists in.
Marc Lange
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195328134
- eISBN:
- 9780199870042
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what ...
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Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.Less
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the ...
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The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.Less
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Categoricalism is the view that all fundamental natural properties are categorical — they have no nomic or causal essences. Categoricalism is explored as a conception of properties and as a basis for ...
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Categoricalism is the view that all fundamental natural properties are categorical — they have no nomic or causal essences. Categoricalism is explored as a conception of properties and as a basis for accounts of laws of nature. The commitment of categoricalism to quidditism is explained and criticized. Categoricalist accounts of the laws of nature — the regularity theory (and Humean supervenience) and nomic necessitation — are each shown in turn to face serious objections.Less
Categoricalism is the view that all fundamental natural properties are categorical — they have no nomic or causal essences. Categoricalism is explored as a conception of properties and as a basis for accounts of laws of nature. The commitment of categoricalism to quidditism is explained and criticized. Categoricalist accounts of the laws of nature — the regularity theory (and Humean supervenience) and nomic necessitation — are each shown in turn to face serious objections.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail ...
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The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail a difference in the laws. NP plausibly captures the relation that must hold between laws and counterfactuals in order for the laws to govern the universe. But NP is not true in all contexts of utterance: there are some possible theological contexts in which the true counterfactuals conflict with NP; there may also be philosophical contexts in which this is so. However, NP appears to be true in all possible scientific contexts. David Lewis's arguments about backtracking do pose apparent counterexamples to NP even in scientific contexts. But those counterexamples are merely apparent.Less
The principle NP (nomological preservation) says (roughly) that the actual laws of nature would still have been the laws of nature under any counterfactual supposition that does not logically entail a difference in the laws. NP plausibly captures the relation that must hold between laws and counterfactuals in order for the laws to govern the universe. But NP is not true in all contexts of utterance: there are some possible theological contexts in which the true counterfactuals conflict with NP; there may also be philosophical contexts in which this is so. However, NP appears to be true in all possible scientific contexts. David Lewis's arguments about backtracking do pose apparent counterexamples to NP even in scientific contexts. But those counterexamples are merely apparent.
John Foster
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199250592
- eISBN:
- 9780191600913
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250596.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
In our experience so far, the universe has worked in remarkably regular ways, and these regularities call for explanation. One way of accounting for them would be to suppose that things have been ...
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In our experience so far, the universe has worked in remarkably regular ways, and these regularities call for explanation. One way of accounting for them would be to suppose that things have been kept regular by laws of nature, construed as forms of natural necessity, and if we can make sense of there being such laws, this mode of explanation is the most plausible one. Another attractive feature of it is that, if it is accepted, it points the way to a solution to the problem of induction; for, assuming that the relevant laws are uniform across space and time, we know that the way things turn out in the unexamined cases, will conform, in the nomologically relevant respects, to the way they have turned out in the examined cases. If nomological explanations are excluded, the only alternative way of accounting for the regularities, with any prospect of acceptability, would be theistic. Can we, then, make sense of there being laws of the relevant sort? Only, I think, by construing a law as what is created by the causal imposing of a regularity on the universe as a regularity. But the only plausible account of such causal imposing would be theistic. So, whatever explanatory role, if any, we assign to laws, there is a strong case for the acceptance of theism. Once theism is accepted, there are further reasons for insisting that the God it postulates imposes regularities on the universe in a law‐creating way.Less
In our experience so far, the universe has worked in remarkably regular ways, and these regularities call for explanation. One way of accounting for them would be to suppose that things have been kept regular by laws of nature, construed as forms of natural necessity, and if we can make sense of there being such laws, this mode of explanation is the most plausible one. Another attractive feature of it is that, if it is accepted, it points the way to a solution to the problem of induction; for, assuming that the relevant laws are uniform across space and time, we know that the way things turn out in the unexamined cases, will conform, in the nomologically relevant respects, to the way they have turned out in the examined cases. If nomological explanations are excluded, the only alternative way of accounting for the regularities, with any prospect of acceptability, would be theistic. Can we, then, make sense of there being laws of the relevant sort? Only, I think, by construing a law as what is created by the causal imposing of a regularity on the universe as a regularity. But the only plausible account of such causal imposing would be theistic. So, whatever explanatory role, if any, we assign to laws, there is a strong case for the acceptance of theism. Once theism is accepted, there are further reasons for insisting that the God it postulates imposes regularities on the universe in a law‐creating way.
