Dray William H.
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238812
- eISBN:
- 9780191679780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238812.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the kind of understanding which R. G. Collingwood himself more often contrasted with the re-enactive sort: understanding achieved through scientific explanation, or explanation ...
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This chapter examines the kind of understanding which R. G. Collingwood himself more often contrasted with the re-enactive sort: understanding achieved through scientific explanation, or explanation in terms of laws. Two views of re-enactive explanation itself are considered, along with some implications of Collingwood's theory for some related questions concerning re-enactment, such as the viability of assuming determinism in history and the extent to which historians properly use generalisations. Collingwood's ‘scientific’ theory of explanation is also sometimes known as the ‘nomological’ or ‘law-subsumption’ theory. The fact that Collingwood at least sometimes represents re-enactive explanation as logically excluding nomological explanation of the same thing raises the general question of where he stands on the issue of historical determinism.Less
This chapter examines the kind of understanding which R. G. Collingwood himself more often contrasted with the re-enactive sort: understanding achieved through scientific explanation, or explanation in terms of laws. Two views of re-enactive explanation itself are considered, along with some implications of Collingwood's theory for some related questions concerning re-enactment, such as the viability of assuming determinism in history and the extent to which historians properly use generalisations. Collingwood's ‘scientific’ theory of explanation is also sometimes known as the ‘nomological’ or ‘law-subsumption’ theory. The fact that Collingwood at least sometimes represents re-enactive explanation as logically excluding nomological explanation of the same thing raises the general question of where he stands on the issue of historical determinism.
