Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore ...
More
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.Less
This book contains chapters on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on a conception of rational agency autonomy. The opening chapters explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including an account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and a view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These chapters stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the chapters develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final chapters explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that ...
More
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are indeed true. Many philosophers have taken the Law to be central to many of our most important philosophical concepts. This book mounts the case against this view. Starting with an analysis of Aristotle on the Law, it discusses the nature of truth, rationality, negation, and logic itself, and argues that the Law is inessential to all of these things. The book develops Priest’s earlier ideas in In Contradiction.Less
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The so-called Law has been the subject of radical challenge in recent years by dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are indeed true. Many philosophers have taken the Law to be central to many of our most important philosophical concepts. This book mounts the case against this view. Starting with an analysis of Aristotle on the Law, it discusses the nature of truth, rationality, negation, and logic itself, and argues that the Law is inessential to all of these things. The book develops Priest’s earlier ideas in In Contradiction.
Jason Ralph
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199214310
- eISBN:
- 9780191706615
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214310.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book is among the first to address the issues raised by the International Criminal Court from an International Relations perspective. By clearly outlining a theoretical framework to interpret ...
More
This book is among the first to address the issues raised by the International Criminal Court from an International Relations perspective. By clearly outlining a theoretical framework to interpret these issues, it makes a significant contribution to the English School's study of international society. More specifically, it offers a concise definition of ‘world society’ and thus helps to resolve a longstanding problem in international theory. This groundbreaking conceptual work is supported by an indepth empirical analysis of American opposition to the ICC. The book goes beyond the familiar arguments related to national interests and argues that the Court has exposed the extent to which American notions of accountability are tied to the nation‐state. Where other democracies are willing to renegotiate their social contract because they see themselves as part of world society, the US protects its particular contract with ‘the American people’ because it offers a means of distinguishing that nation and its democracy from the rest of the world. In opposing the ICC, therefore, the US seeks to defend a society of states because this kind of society can accommodate American exceptionalism and advance particular US interests. This ‘sovereigntist’, or more accurately ‘Americanist’, influence is further illustrated in chapters on the customary international law, universal jurisdiction, transatlantic relations and US policy on international humanitarian law in the war on terror. The book concludes by evoking E.H. Carr's criticism of those great powers who claim that a harmony exists between their particular interests and those of wider society. It also recalls his argument that great powers sometimes need to compromise and in this context it argues that support for the ICC is a more effective means of fulfilling America's purpose and a less costly sacrifice for the US to make than that demanded by the ‘Americanist’ policy of nation‐building.Less
This book is among the first to address the issues raised by the International Criminal Court from an International Relations perspective. By clearly outlining a theoretical framework to interpret these issues, it makes a significant contribution to the English School's study of international society. More specifically, it offers a concise definition of ‘world society’ and thus helps to resolve a longstanding problem in international theory. This groundbreaking conceptual work is supported by an indepth empirical analysis of American opposition to the ICC. The book goes beyond the familiar arguments related to national interests and argues that the Court has exposed the extent to which American notions of accountability are tied to the nation‐state. Where other democracies are willing to renegotiate their social contract because they see themselves as part of world society, the US protects its particular contract with ‘the American people’ because it offers a means of distinguishing that nation and its democracy from the rest of the world. In opposing the ICC, therefore, the US seeks to defend a society of states because this kind of society can accommodate American exceptionalism and advance particular US interests. This ‘sovereigntist’, or more accurately ‘Americanist’, influence is further illustrated in chapters on the customary international law, universal jurisdiction, transatlantic relations and US policy on international humanitarian law in the war on terror. The book concludes by evoking E.H. Carr's criticism of those great powers who claim that a harmony exists between their particular interests and those of wider society. It also recalls his argument that great powers sometimes need to compromise and in this context it argues that support for the ICC is a more effective means of fulfilling America's purpose and a less costly sacrifice for the US to make than that demanded by the ‘Americanist’ policy of nation‐building.
Ignacio Cano and Patrícia Salvão Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199291922
- eISBN:
- 9780191603716
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199291926.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This paper evaluates the federal reparations program for fatal victims of political violence in Brazil. The Brazilian reparations program was born of an amnesty movement for political prisoners, ...
More
This paper evaluates the federal reparations program for fatal victims of political violence in Brazil. The Brazilian reparations program was born of an amnesty movement for political prisoners, followed by the discovery of mass graves exposing atrocities of the State. In response to pressure from civil society groups and the media, President Cardoso signed the 1995 Law of Victims of Political Assassination and Disappearance. The paper explores the limitations of the law, its exclusion of many victims of political violence, and the charge that the law transferred the burden of proof to victims’ families. It examines the Commission’s structure and operation, as well as the voting patterns of its members. It provides data concerning the cost of the entire reparations process, and sheds light on the surprising truth-telling function the Commission acquired in a country in which official truth-telling about the years of the dictatorship has yet to take place.Less
This paper evaluates the federal reparations program for fatal victims of political violence in Brazil. The Brazilian reparations program was born of an amnesty movement for political prisoners, followed by the discovery of mass graves exposing atrocities of the State. In response to pressure from civil society groups and the media, President Cardoso signed the 1995 Law of Victims of Political Assassination and Disappearance. The paper explores the limitations of the law, its exclusion of many victims of political violence, and the charge that the law transferred the burden of proof to victims’ families. It examines the Commission’s structure and operation, as well as the voting patterns of its members. It provides data concerning the cost of the entire reparations process, and sheds light on the surprising truth-telling function the Commission acquired in a country in which official truth-telling about the years of the dictatorship has yet to take place.
Jeffrey Kahn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246991
- eISBN:
- 9780191599606
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246998.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This book examines the development of Russia's current federal system of government from its Soviet origins, through Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, to the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and the early ...
More
This book examines the development of Russia's current federal system of government from its Soviet origins, through Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, to the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and the early years of Vladimir Putin. The theoretical relationship between democracy, law, and federalism is examined with a focus on its application to the study of post‐authoritarian state systems. Federal institutions shape political agendas in the constituent units of a federation just as much as those units influence the shape of the federal whole. Case studies focus on Russia's 21 ethnic ‘republics’ (out of 89 units in a complicated multi‐level federal hierarchy) using previously unpublished primary source materials, including official documents and interviews with key participants on a variety of institutional levels.Less
This book examines the development of Russia's current federal system of government from its Soviet origins, through Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, to the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and the early years of Vladimir Putin. The theoretical relationship between democracy, law, and federalism is examined with a focus on its application to the study of post‐authoritarian state systems. Federal institutions shape political agendas in the constituent units of a federation just as much as those units influence the shape of the federal whole. Case studies focus on Russia's 21 ethnic ‘republics’ (out of 89 units in a complicated multi‐level federal hierarchy) using previously unpublished primary source materials, including official documents and interviews with key participants on a variety of institutional levels.
Alexis Keller
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275359
- eISBN:
- 9780191603686
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275351.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
According to Keller, we have no hope of explaining what is or is not a Just Peace in global relations unless we pay more attention to the intellectual context in which international law was formed. ...
More
According to Keller, we have no hope of explaining what is or is not a Just Peace in global relations unless we pay more attention to the intellectual context in which international law was formed. From its birth in the 16th century, there was a progressive retreat by Europeans from conceding sovereign rights to specific non-European peoples, to then only recognizing a conditional sovereignty, and eventually to denying any right to self-determination of non-white peoples. However, there was a tradition of thought that recognized and accommodated cultural diversity that can be found in the writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau, among others. This chapter argues that these writers proposed one of the cornerstones of the concept of a Just Peace, the principle of recognition. This notion was developed from an effort to understand another’s point of view and an appreciation of otherness.Less
According to Keller, we have no hope of explaining what is or is not a Just Peace in global relations unless we pay more attention to the intellectual context in which international law was formed. From its birth in the 16th century, there was a progressive retreat by Europeans from conceding sovereign rights to specific non-European peoples, to then only recognizing a conditional sovereignty, and eventually to denying any right to self-determination of non-white peoples. However, there was a tradition of thought that recognized and accommodated cultural diversity that can be found in the writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau, among others. This chapter argues that these writers proposed one of the cornerstones of the concept of a Just Peace, the principle of recognition. This notion was developed from an effort to understand another’s point of view and an appreciation of otherness.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental ...
More
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.Less
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.
Karma Nabulsi
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294078
- eISBN:
- 9780191599972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294077.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This short introduction describes the approach taken by the book and gives a brief outline of its contents. The story is about wars and military occupation, and the ideas underlying them, and the ...
More
This short introduction describes the approach taken by the book and gives a brief outline of its contents. The story is about wars and military occupation, and the ideas underlying them, and the search for these ideas is carried out in the domain of the laws of war by addressing the challenge posed by a particular principle in these laws: the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, a concept which has been recognized as the fundamental principle upon which the entire notion of ‘humanity in warfare’ rests (and has also been acknowledged as the most fragile). The forces underpinning this distinction (more precisely, a distinction between the lawful and unlawful combatant) are explored by presenting three ideologies, each representing a distinct political tradition of war, and each rooted in incommensurable conceptions of the good life; the overall argument of the book is that this incommensurability lay at the source of the failure fully to resolve the problem of distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants between 1874 and 1949. The book makes use of concepts and methods borrowed from a range of intellectual disciplines: political thought, history, and the ‘classical’ traditions of international theory. In the case of the latter, it examines the influence of key thinkers on war, such as Machiavelli, Grotius, and Rousseau, but differs from this orthodox approach in two ways: first, it is not seeking to ascertain the ‘true’ meaning of their philosophies, but rather to find how their political thoughts were interpreted and shaped by later generations; second, the examination is not restricted to abstract theorists and philosophers but is centrally concerned with paradigms constructed by practitioners of war, both professional and civilian.Less
This short introduction describes the approach taken by the book and gives a brief outline of its contents. The story is about wars and military occupation, and the ideas underlying them, and the search for these ideas is carried out in the domain of the laws of war by addressing the challenge posed by a particular principle in these laws: the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, a concept which has been recognized as the fundamental principle upon which the entire notion of ‘humanity in warfare’ rests (and has also been acknowledged as the most fragile). The forces underpinning this distinction (more precisely, a distinction between the lawful and unlawful combatant) are explored by presenting three ideologies, each representing a distinct political tradition of war, and each rooted in incommensurable conceptions of the good life; the overall argument of the book is that this incommensurability lay at the source of the failure fully to resolve the problem of distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants between 1874 and 1949. The book makes use of concepts and methods borrowed from a range of intellectual disciplines: political thought, history, and the ‘classical’ traditions of international theory. In the case of the latter, it examines the influence of key thinkers on war, such as Machiavelli, Grotius, and Rousseau, but differs from this orthodox approach in two ways: first, it is not seeking to ascertain the ‘true’ meaning of their philosophies, but rather to find how their political thoughts were interpreted and shaped by later generations; second, the examination is not restricted to abstract theorists and philosophers but is centrally concerned with paradigms constructed by practitioners of war, both professional and civilian.
David Little
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275359
- eISBN:
- 9780191603686
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275351.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Little raises many questions of international legality in addressing the finer concepts of peace enforcing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. He accentuates the rule of law, democracy, ...
More
Little raises many questions of international legality in addressing the finer concepts of peace enforcing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. He accentuates the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as foundations for each of these stages towards a Just Peace. Looking towards collectively accepted international treaties for a concept of justice, Little taps into a notion of legal validity that is at least partially composed of a legitimacy that emanates from the people themselves. Although there are valid reasons for questioning who has been allowed to participate in the process developing international law, protecting the human rights of all, and labelling it justice certainly does not seem to create an untenable starting point. In fact, this approach that looks to protect the rights of all can be quite constructive because, ultimately, it is the people involved in a conflict who will determine whether a peace is just, and therefore lasting.Less
Little raises many questions of international legality in addressing the finer concepts of peace enforcing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. He accentuates the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as foundations for each of these stages towards a Just Peace. Looking towards collectively accepted international treaties for a concept of justice, Little taps into a notion of legal validity that is at least partially composed of a legitimacy that emanates from the people themselves. Although there are valid reasons for questioning who has been allowed to participate in the process developing international law, protecting the human rights of all, and labelling it justice certainly does not seem to create an untenable starting point. In fact, this approach that looks to protect the rights of all can be quite constructive because, ultimately, it is the people involved in a conflict who will determine whether a peace is just, and therefore lasting.
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199218219
- eISBN:
- 9780191711596
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What fundamental account of the world is implicit in physical theory? Physics straightforwardly postulates quarks and electrons, but what of the more intangible elements, such as laws of nature, ...
More
What fundamental account of the world is implicit in physical theory? Physics straightforwardly postulates quarks and electrons, but what of the more intangible elements, such as laws of nature, universals, and the direction of time? Do they have a place in the physical structure of the world? This book argues that the ontology derived from physics takes a form quite different from those most commonly defended by philosophers. Physics postulates irreducible fundamental laws, eschews universals, does not require a fundamental notion of causation, and makes room for the passage of time. The book contains a series of linked essays in the form of chapters and through them it outlines an approach to metaphysics opposed to the Humean reductionism that motivates much analytical metaphysics.Less
What fundamental account of the world is implicit in physical theory? Physics straightforwardly postulates quarks and electrons, but what of the more intangible elements, such as laws of nature, universals, and the direction of time? Do they have a place in the physical structure of the world? This book argues that the ontology derived from physics takes a form quite different from those most commonly defended by philosophers. Physics postulates irreducible fundamental laws, eschews universals, does not require a fundamental notion of causation, and makes room for the passage of time. The book contains a series of linked essays in the form of chapters and through them it outlines an approach to metaphysics opposed to the Humean reductionism that motivates much analytical metaphysics.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular ...
More
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.Less
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.
Antony Black
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199281695
- eISBN:
- 9780191713101
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281695.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book examines the political thought of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Israel, Iran, India, China, Greece, Rome, and early Christianity from prehistory to c.200 CE. The most common discourse was sacred ...
More
This book examines the political thought of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Israel, Iran, India, China, Greece, Rome, and early Christianity from prehistory to c.200 CE. The most common discourse was sacred monarchy, ranging from absolutism in Egypt to a conditional mandate in China. Justice, the rule of law, and meritocracy were generally regarded as essential. ‘The people’ were seen as recipients of royal beneficence. The exceptions were Greece and Rome; here democracy and liberty were invented. Theories of class evolved in India and China, and of the nation in Israel. Stoics and Cicero saw humanity as a single unit. Christianity revolutionized moral discourse. Philosophy, using logic, evidence, and dialectic, developed in both China and Greece. Confucius and Mozi argued for ‘humaneness’ and ethical consensus, ‘Legalists’ for coercion, realpolitik, and an authoritarian state. Plato and Aristotle, followed by Polybius and Cicero in Rome, initiated ‘Western’ political philosophy and science. Practical politics was developed by Aristotle and the Indian Kautilya. Chinese and Greek thinkers investigated the origin and purpose of the state. This book covers political philosophy, religious ideology, public ethics, constitutional theory, and official and popular political culture.Less
This book examines the political thought of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Israel, Iran, India, China, Greece, Rome, and early Christianity from prehistory to c.200 CE. The most common discourse was sacred monarchy, ranging from absolutism in Egypt to a conditional mandate in China. Justice, the rule of law, and meritocracy were generally regarded as essential. ‘The people’ were seen as recipients of royal beneficence. The exceptions were Greece and Rome; here democracy and liberty were invented. Theories of class evolved in India and China, and of the nation in Israel. Stoics and Cicero saw humanity as a single unit. Christianity revolutionized moral discourse. Philosophy, using logic, evidence, and dialectic, developed in both China and Greece. Confucius and Mozi argued for ‘humaneness’ and ethical consensus, ‘Legalists’ for coercion, realpolitik, and an authoritarian state. Plato and Aristotle, followed by Polybius and Cicero in Rome, initiated ‘Western’ political philosophy and science. Practical politics was developed by Aristotle and the Indian Kautilya. Chinese and Greek thinkers investigated the origin and purpose of the state. This book covers political philosophy, religious ideology, public ethics, constitutional theory, and official and popular political culture.
Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275359
- eISBN:
- 9780191603686
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275351.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
While an old doctrine of Just War exists, surprisingly little conceptual thinking has gone into what constitutes a Just Peace. This book presents various — and at times conflicting — viewpoints on ...
More
While an old doctrine of Just War exists, surprisingly little conceptual thinking has gone into what constitutes a Just Peace. This book presents various — and at times conflicting — viewpoints on this question of Just Peace from perspectives originating in political science, history, international law, political philosophy, cultural studies, and theology, as well as from a policy perspective. The book challenges a liberal perception of peace founded on norms claiming universal scope, and instead looks to negotiation for arriving at shared views that help build a consensus on what justice might mean in specific circumstances. Although some contributors explicitly outline and advocate specific cases for ‘justifiable violence’, it is made clear that alternative and non-violent ways to peace need to be contemplated, and conceptualized. Even though the path through justice is a demanding one, its accomplishment opens the way to a durable settlement accepted by the parties initially engaged in conflict. Clearly, the more ambitious goal of peace with justice can lead to smaller chances for success. It may even derail the whole enterprise and keep the flames of violent conflict alive through the search for ‘justice’, particularly because this concept is not necessarily the same for all concerned parties. Ultimately, an inter-subjective consensus needs to be built through negotiation with both parties to a conflict so that the concepts of shared history, and an often inextricable future, can be reached with a mutual understanding. In this collective process, it is more likely that a stable foundation can be created through recognition, renouncement, and rule, and thus a Just Peace can be achieved.Less
While an old doctrine of Just War exists, surprisingly little conceptual thinking has gone into what constitutes a Just Peace. This book presents various — and at times conflicting — viewpoints on this question of Just Peace from perspectives originating in political science, history, international law, political philosophy, cultural studies, and theology, as well as from a policy perspective. The book challenges a liberal perception of peace founded on norms claiming universal scope, and instead looks to negotiation for arriving at shared views that help build a consensus on what justice might mean in specific circumstances. Although some contributors explicitly outline and advocate specific cases for ‘justifiable violence’, it is made clear that alternative and non-violent ways to peace need to be contemplated, and conceptualized. Even though the path through justice is a demanding one, its accomplishment opens the way to a durable settlement accepted by the parties initially engaged in conflict. Clearly, the more ambitious goal of peace with justice can lead to smaller chances for success. It may even derail the whole enterprise and keep the flames of violent conflict alive through the search for ‘justice’, particularly because this concept is not necessarily the same for all concerned parties. Ultimately, an inter-subjective consensus needs to be built through negotiation with both parties to a conflict so that the concepts of shared history, and an often inextricable future, can be reached with a mutual understanding. In this collective process, it is more likely that a stable foundation can be created through recognition, renouncement, and rule, and thus a Just Peace can be achieved.
Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter distinguishes the various claims that make up the thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality, and offers a reconstruction of the arguments on which they depend. To do ...
More
This chapter distinguishes the various claims that make up the thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality, and offers a reconstruction of the arguments on which they depend. To do so it argues that autonomy should be interpreted as a kind of sovereignty. The model for the autonomous agent is the political sovereign not subject to any outside authority, who has the power to enact law. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section II distinguishes some of the claims that go into Kant's doctrine of autonomy. Since the Sovereignty Thesis follows analytically from the concept of an unconditional moral requirement, Section III takes up Kant's concept of a practical law, to provide supporting material for later arguments. Sections IV to VII are organized around showing that the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and the Formula of Autonomy (FA) are equivalent in content. The equivalence of the FUL and FA is established by the two ideas just cited (the Sovereignty Thesis and the claim that the FUL is the constitutive principle of a will with autonomy). It serves as a capsule statement of Kant's thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality. Finally, Section VIII shows how the normative conception of autonomy developed in this chapter bears on the analytical arguments of Groundwork, III, where Kant identifies freedom with autonomy on the way to arguing that a free will is subject to moral principles.Less
This chapter distinguishes the various claims that make up the thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality, and offers a reconstruction of the arguments on which they depend. To do so it argues that autonomy should be interpreted as a kind of sovereignty. The model for the autonomous agent is the political sovereign not subject to any outside authority, who has the power to enact law. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section II distinguishes some of the claims that go into Kant's doctrine of autonomy. Since the Sovereignty Thesis follows analytically from the concept of an unconditional moral requirement, Section III takes up Kant's concept of a practical law, to provide supporting material for later arguments. Sections IV to VII are organized around showing that the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and the Formula of Autonomy (FA) are equivalent in content. The equivalence of the FUL and FA is established by the two ideas just cited (the Sovereignty Thesis and the claim that the FUL is the constitutive principle of a will with autonomy). It serves as a capsule statement of Kant's thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality. Finally, Section VIII shows how the normative conception of autonomy developed in this chapter bears on the analytical arguments of Groundwork, III, where Kant identifies freedom with autonomy on the way to arguing that a free will is subject to moral principles.
Ian Clark
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297009
- eISBN:
- 9780191711428
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297009.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Unlike the other cases, the two conferences held at The Hague are not normally identified with a single normative principle. Nonetheless, the meetings were characterized by a great emphasis upon ...
More
Unlike the other cases, the two conferences held at The Hague are not normally identified with a single normative principle. Nonetheless, the meetings were characterized by a great emphasis upon humanitarian concerns, and also upon the need for the acts of state representatives to be endorsed by a wider public. This was best captured by the language of the ‘public conscience’ employed during the conference and embodied in the famous Martens clause. The first conference was held in response to the Imperial Rescript of Tsar Nicholas II, and the subject matter covered disarmament, the laws of war, and international arbitration. The meetings were the subject of major attention from a variety of popular pressure groups, much of it orchestrated by the international peace movement, and publicists such as W. T. Stead. The long term significance, however, lay in the idea that there was a wider public constituency to which international legitimacy principles had to appeal.Less
Unlike the other cases, the two conferences held at The Hague are not normally identified with a single normative principle. Nonetheless, the meetings were characterized by a great emphasis upon humanitarian concerns, and also upon the need for the acts of state representatives to be endorsed by a wider public. This was best captured by the language of the ‘public conscience’ employed during the conference and embodied in the famous Martens clause. The first conference was held in response to the Imperial Rescript of Tsar Nicholas II, and the subject matter covered disarmament, the laws of war, and international arbitration. The meetings were the subject of major attention from a variety of popular pressure groups, much of it orchestrated by the international peace movement, and publicists such as W. T. Stead. The long term significance, however, lay in the idea that there was a wider public constituency to which international legitimacy principles had to appeal.
Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195168167
- eISBN:
- 9780199790159
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168167.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Ecology
The main focus of the book is the presentation of the inertial view of population growth. This view provides a rather simple model for complex population dynamics, and is achieved at the level of the ...
More
The main focus of the book is the presentation of the inertial view of population growth. This view provides a rather simple model for complex population dynamics, and is achieved at the level of the single species without invoking species interactions. An important part of the account is the maternal effect. Investment of mothers in the quality of their daughters makes the rate of reproduction of the current generation depend not only on the current environment, but also on the environment experienced by the previous generation.Less
The main focus of the book is the presentation of the inertial view of population growth. This view provides a rather simple model for complex population dynamics, and is achieved at the level of the single species without invoking species interactions. An important part of the account is the maternal effect. Investment of mothers in the quality of their daughters makes the rate of reproduction of the current generation depend not only on the current environment, but also on the environment experienced by the previous generation.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198235446
- eISBN:
- 9780191705618
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book is a short and non-technical presentation of the cumulative argument for the existence of God. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise ...
More
This book is a short and non-technical presentation of the cumulative argument for the existence of God. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (this is knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis and this last criterion drops out when there is little outside the scope of the hypothesis.) By these criteria, the existence and operation of God provides the best and most probably true explanation of the existence of the universe, it being governed by simple laws of nature — these laws (and the boundary conditions of the universe) being as such to lead to the evolution of humans, human consciousness, occasional miracles, and the religious experiences of millions of humans. The existence of evil does not count against the existence of God.Less
This book is a short and non-technical presentation of the cumulative argument for the existence of God. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (this is knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis and this last criterion drops out when there is little outside the scope of the hypothesis.) By these criteria, the existence and operation of God provides the best and most probably true explanation of the existence of the universe, it being governed by simple laws of nature — these laws (and the boundary conditions of the universe) being as such to lead to the evolution of humans, human consciousness, occasional miracles, and the religious experiences of millions of humans. The existence of evil does not count against the existence of God.
Andrews Reath
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288830
- eISBN:
- 9780191603648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288836.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular ...
More
This chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular categorical imperatives or moral requirements. The Formula of Universal Law is a law that Kant derives from the nature of rational volition or rational choice. In this sense, it is a law that the rational will legislates or gives to itself. Roughly, the will is a law to itself since the nature of rational volition leads to a principle that governs its own exercise, namely the Categorical Imperative. To understand the sense in which rational agents legislate particular moral requirements, it is important to bear in mind that Kant is led to this idea by considering how such requirements get their normative authority. Kant appears to claim that the agents who are subject to moral law must be the ‘legislators’ from whom these requirements receive their authority, because only then can we explain their unconditional authority as categorical imperatives. The view ascribed to Kant is that the reasons to comply with moral requirements are given simply by the reasoning that establishes them as requirements, from which it follows that moral agents are bound to moral requirements in such a way that they model the source of their authority.Less
This chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular categorical imperatives or moral requirements. The Formula of Universal Law is a law that Kant derives from the nature of rational volition or rational choice. In this sense, it is a law that the rational will legislates or gives to itself. Roughly, the will is a law to itself since the nature of rational volition leads to a principle that governs its own exercise, namely the Categorical Imperative. To understand the sense in which rational agents legislate particular moral requirements, it is important to bear in mind that Kant is led to this idea by considering how such requirements get their normative authority. Kant appears to claim that the agents who are subject to moral law must be the ‘legislators’ from whom these requirements receive their authority, because only then can we explain their unconditional authority as categorical imperatives. The view ascribed to Kant is that the reasons to comply with moral requirements are given simply by the reasoning that establishes them as requirements, from which it follows that moral agents are bound to moral requirements in such a way that they model the source of their authority.
Neil MacCormick
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780198268772
- eISBN:
- 9780191713071
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268772.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law — acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do ...
More
The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law — acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of ‘right and wrong’ fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom — our freedom to form our own moral commitments — relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments? This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents an account of practical reason. It also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Adam Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's ‘moral sentiments’ to Kant's ‘categorical imperative’.Less
The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law — acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of ‘right and wrong’ fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom — our freedom to form our own moral commitments — relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments? This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents an account of practical reason. It also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Adam Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's ‘moral sentiments’ to Kant's ‘categorical imperative’.
Jeffrey Kahn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246991
- eISBN:
- 9780191599606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246998.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
Theories of federalism are explored in detail, with particular attention to the work of Dahl, Lijphart, Riker, and Wheare. Issues addressed include anti‐majoritarianism, asymmetry, centralization, ...
More
Theories of federalism are explored in detail, with particular attention to the work of Dahl, Lijphart, Riker, and Wheare. Issues addressed include anti‐majoritarianism, asymmetry, centralization, the role of the judiciary and the rule of law, nullification, over‐representation, secessionism, self‐determination, sovereignty, and subsidiarity. A wide variety of federal systems are possible under the rubric of federalism (including confederation, federacy, etc.) and these are explored. Different constitutional and institutional choices have different effects (and paradoxes) for democracy, law, and sovereignty in federal states. The role of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other social cleavages on the development and stability of federal systems is addressed. Empirical analysis of federalism in Brazil, Spain, Yugoslavia, the United States, and other state systems is provided. The theory of ‘non‐democratic federalism’ is disputed.Less
Theories of federalism are explored in detail, with particular attention to the work of Dahl, Lijphart, Riker, and Wheare. Issues addressed include anti‐majoritarianism, asymmetry, centralization, the role of the judiciary and the rule of law, nullification, over‐representation, secessionism, self‐determination, sovereignty, and subsidiarity. A wide variety of federal systems are possible under the rubric of federalism (including confederation, federacy, etc.) and these are explored. Different constitutional and institutional choices have different effects (and paradoxes) for democracy, law, and sovereignty in federal states. The role of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other social cleavages on the development and stability of federal systems is addressed. Empirical analysis of federalism in Brazil, Spain, Yugoslavia, the United States, and other state systems is provided. The theory of ‘non‐democratic federalism’ is disputed.