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This chapter discusses technologies adopted by the law enforcement community over a half century. Specifically, it looks at the use of computing by policing agencies, courts, and corrections, with a brief introduction to the early history of computer crime as it currently represents a new class of criminal activity made possible by the existence of the digital hand.

This chapter analyses the obligations concerning the enforcement of substantive Union policies by the member states within the national legal systems. The use of criminal penalties for the enforcement of substantive Union law arises in two main categories of situation. The first can usefully be termed the ‘velvet glove’: in the absence of Union legislation prescribing precise sanctions for its own enforcement, the member states are free to impose appropriate sanctions within their own legal systems — including penalties of a criminal nature — subject to various obligations imposed under Union law as interpreted by the Court in the famous Greek Maize ruling. In the second situation, the Union legislature positively requires the member states to criminalize certain infringements of Union law, and may even prescribe the detailed rules governing the imposition of liability and the type/level of sanction. That ‘iron fist’ can claim a constitutional provenance both more recent and more rumbustious than the Greek Maize jurisprudence: pre-Lisbon, bitter institutional disputes about whether criminal sanctions could or should be imposed under the First (or instead the Third) Pillar culminated in the Court's controversial rulings in the Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source Pollution cases; since 1 December 2009, the revised provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union have radically changed the relevant legal framework once again.

In a polycentric constitutional order, as distinct from a monocentric one, multiple legal systems exercise the judicial function and law enforcement agencies exercise the executive function. These multiple decision‐makers operate within constitutional constraints that permit them to co‐exist and adjust to each other. A decentralized or polycentric constitutional order provides an institutional framework to address more effectively the problem of enforcement abuse. Such an order will arise naturally if two new constitutional principles are adopted: the nonconfiscation principle stipulates that law enforcement and adjudicative agencies should not be able to confiscate their income by force, but should have to contract with the persons they serve; the competition principle stipulates that law enforcement and adjudicative agencies should not be able to put their competitors out of business by force. How a polycentric legal order better handles the problems of selection, corruption, capture, and the halo effect is explained.

Nation-states use a bipartite response system to maintain order: Professional law enforcement officers overtly maintain internal order by responding to violations of the criminal rules that control chaos within a state; and professional military personnel overtly maintain external order by responding to assaults from other nation-states. The activities of both implicitly maintain order by discouraging internal rule violations and external attacks. However, this system is not adept at dealing with threats vectored through cyberspace. There are two ways we can go about doing this: One is to retain the default nation-state governance structure but modify our current threat response processes so they are effective in both the real and virtual worlds. The other option is to replace the threat response processes we presently rely upon with an entirely new approach to maintaining order; this might, or might not, involve replacing the nation-state with a governing configuration that is not predicated on, and therefore limited by, territory. This chapter explores both options.

In a legal system based on pure restitution and self‐defence combined with enhanced reliance on several property and freedom of contract, the ability to effectively prevent crime rather than deter its commission by ex‐ post punishment is greatly enhanced. Unlike public property, several property creates incentives to invest in crime prevention and the ability to exclude dangerous persons before they can act. Freedom of contract makes possible far more responsive law enforcement agencies than can be provided by a coercive monopoly. While pure restitution will not ‘deter’ all criminal behaviour, it is a fallacy to believe that increased deterrence invariably or logically follows, increasing the severity of punishment. Restitution increases the incentives to catch and prosecute defendants, thus increasing the rate at which legal sanctions are imposed.

This chapter looks at the role of constitutional courts from a compliance perspective. It focuses on how constitutional courts deal with challenges of unconstitutionality in the course of application of EU law in the member states. It starts with a short overview of the European mandate for national courts. It then discusses how constitutional courts may hinder or facilitate compliance with EU law. It argues that, despite their firm position of upholding the constitution vis-à-vis EU law and some cases of restricting the full effects of EU law, constitutional courts in several ways may act as facilitators of compliance for member states. They do so, for instance, by finding the least harmful solution for the full application of EU law whilst constructing constitutional reservations; by instructing other political branches on how to introduce constitutional or legislative amendments in order to ensure full compliance; and in the pre-accession setting, by putting forward the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law within the ambit of the obligation of approximation.

Before the 1960s crime wave, American police officers were little trained and spent much of their time responding to citizen calls about crime. A Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) in the 1970s began to upgrade police education. A round of studies questioned the effectiveness of police patrol tactics. Analysts advocated more sophisticated methods, called ‘problem‐oriented policing’ and later the more general ‘community policing.’ New York lawyer Adam Walinsky promoted a concept called the Police Corps that would encourage more college‐educated officers. The reform ideas coalesced in the presidency of Bill Clinton, who successfully argued for federal funding for an additional 100,000 community‐oriented local officers, an idea that Walinsky complained was a watered‐down form of his concept (which still was instituted on a smaller scale). Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, was initially skeptical of the massive federal program called ‘Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS), but she eventually backed it. It was not certain how many officers were hired and permanently funded—it may have been closer to 50,000—but the program did have a significant impact on police hiring in the nation. Less clear was the effect of COPS on the crime rate. The program's supporters asserted success, but other factors like the economy, demographics and alternate policing methods might have been just as important.

This chapter examines the partitioned response model that is essentially the norm in modern nation-states. This model divides official responsibility for responding to crime, terrorism, and warfare between two governmental institutions: civilian law enforcement and the military. While the focus is almost exclusively on the laws implementing this model in the United States, comparable provisions, and a similar allocation of responsibility, are in effect in many other countries, as well.

The federal government asserted a role in fighting narcotics abuse since the early 20^th century, but it was not until the Richard Nixon administration starting in 1969 that a federal “war on drugs” became high profile. Nixon stressed drives against smuggling heroin from counties like Turkey and Mexico. His administration's efforts were marred by raids on erroneous locations by a new federal Office of Drug Law Enforcement. A successor agency called the ‘Drug Enforcement Administration’ jockeyed with the FBI for supremacy in the drug enforcement field. Drug treatment generally had lower priority when it came to funding. A scourge of “crack” cocaine spread in the mid‐1980s, causing Congress to increase penalties for drug abuse in such a way that black people who primarily used crack were punished much more severely than whites who tended to use cocaine's powder form. An effort to coordinate federal antidrug resources better resulted in the establishment of a White House director of drug control policy (“drug czar”) in 1989; the first to hold the position was former education secretary William Bennett. Drug abuse declined in the 1990s, but there was disagreement over the primary cause. Advocates credited a combination of more‐intense law enforcement, better treatment, and establishment of more than 500 “drug courts” that could ride herd on offenders. The numbers of drug abusers were creeping back up by 1999.

Part 3 scrutinizes the scope of enforcement powers granted to States by Articles 110 and 105 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and by virtue of the various Security Council Resolutions. The guiding questions in this section are: What kind of enforcement measures are States currently allowed to employ? Against whom can these enforcement powers be used? What is the geographical scope of the enforcement powers now granted? In particular, is a coherent and uniform regime of enforcement powers in place or does it make a difference whether pirates and armed robbers at sea are pursued on the high seas, within Somalia's or other States' coastal waters or on the Somali mainland? Secondly, given that the Security Council has explicitly called for the use of shipriders in the present context, this rather novel mechanism is examined. Thirdly, the analysis aims to identify the applicable legal constraints that confine and regulate the execution of enforcement powers in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and in the larger Gulf of Aden region. In addition, the attribution of possible human rights violations in the United Nations-mandated multinational counter-piracy operations is considered.

This chapter examines the provisions made for the enforcement of sumptuary law, the instances of prosecutions that have so far been discovered, and the possible reasons for the ultimate failure of sumptuary legislation. It shows that rulers employed various methods in order to ensure that all the relevant members of the population were aware that sumptuary laws were in force and what these laws prohibited, and that they were properly enforced. It adds that the majority of prosecutions that were discovered dealt with women who had violated the clothing laws. It argues that the primary cause of failure of sumptuary laws was associated with the job for which the legislation was designed. It explains that legislative regulation of fashion proved impossible to the legislators for they still had to identify luxurious clothing by employing specific fashion terminology. It also presents several criticisms made against sumptuary laws.

This chapter discusses how the procedure envisaged in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union works in practice, from the perspective of a sector where enforcement against member states has been particularly important: environmental policy. Although the general procedures for handling complaints are the same across the Commission, the individual Directorates-General have different approaches depending on the number and type of complaints they receive. In the field of environment, cases of alleged ‘bad application’ of Union law are relatively more frequent but are also harder to establish since the Commission does not have inspectors that it can send to member states to verify conflicting claims in situ. It is negotiated compliance rather than Court action that is most important. Although the direct enforcement procedure led by the Commission will remain important, the Commission is also encouraging the improvement of enforcement procedures at national level, through national courts.

After a short introduction to law enforcement in the law of the sea, this chapter considers each maritime zone in turn, beginning with those closest to the state's land territory (ports and internal waters) and the territorial sea (straits, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone, and the high seas). For each zone addressed, particular issues for law enforcement in relation to maritime security threats are discussed, notably in relation to transnational crime (such as drug trafficking and people-smuggling), piracy and armed robbery, marine pollution, and IUU fishing. It is shown that there has been greater recognition of enforcement powers to respond to maritime security threats, and this recognition has usually come at the expense of sovereign interests in certain maritime areas and over vessels.

A major federal anticrime agency had its roots in an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance established in the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The agency was enacted into law in a wide‐ranging crime law enacted in 1968. Its name was changed to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA); its purpose was to distribute federal aid to state and local criminal justice programs. But Congress ordered the agency to be headed by an unwieldy troika of administrators. A succession of leaders over a decade frequently changed policy directions, setting an erratic course while spending almost $1 billion annually in some years. The agency funded some pioneering programs, such as units in prosecutors’ offices to help crime victims and witnesses. Eventually, however, its programs lacked sufficient proof of significant impact on the crime problem or the justice system. President Jimmy Carter proposed its elimination in 1980 and Congress agreed.

In the late 1990s the European Commission set out on the most radical transformation of the enforcement of European competition law in forty years. The highly centralized enforcement regime where competition law was seen as a key tool in market integration was replaced with a decentralized, self-regulatory model with an emphasis on economic principles. The creation of a network of national competition authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission Directorate General for Competition (DGComp) was a key element in this reform. The European Competition Network (ECN) is the institutional form under which the efficient and smooth enforcement of European competition norms by all NCAs and the Commission is to be achieved, enforcement having been (re)delegated downwards to the national level as part of the modernization process. This chapter reflects on the constitutional implications of the modernization of European competition law with particular reference to the ECN, which as a form of network governance creates a number of constitutional challenges, notably relating to the questions of consistency and accountability. The chapter first addresses the constitutionalization of the EU before moving on to discuss the architecture of competition law enforcement in the EU. It then sets out how, primarily in functional terms, the ECN is seen as successful. The particular constitutional challenges posed by the operation of the network, notably consistency and accountability, are analysed. It then discusses the role the courts have played in endorsing and challenging the competition law enforcement governance structures before concluding.

This chapter focuses on government employment. It begins by examining those placed at the highest positions in the country, because political elites set the tone for America in general. The chapter shows that politicians do not practice what they preach: they may give rhetorical support to classical liberalism, but both parties commonly follow racial-realist logics when appointing government officials, including judges. It then shows the long and prominent support given to racial realism in policing and education. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence that has authorized racial realism in law enforcement but barred it in other sectors, including education.