Bernard Spolsky
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- January 2022
- ISBN:
- 9781474485463
- eISBN:
- 9781399501811
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474485463.003.0013
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
Most nations emphasize their claim to sovereignty by naming a national language in a constitution, but English dominant states take its primacy for granted. Many states have laws recognizing national ...
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Most nations emphasize their claim to sovereignty by naming a national language in a constitution, but English dominant states take its primacy for granted. Many states have laws recognizing national and some other selected languages. Some empower agencies to enforce these preferences.Less
Most nations emphasize their claim to sovereignty by naming a national language in a constitution, but English dominant states take its primacy for granted. Many states have laws recognizing national and some other selected languages. Some empower agencies to enforce these preferences.
Amílcar Antonio Barreto
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781683401131
- eISBN:
- 9781683401414
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9781683401131.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
In the aftermath of the 1898 Spanish-American War, federal policymakers sought to transform Puerto Ricans from loyal Spaniards to trustworthy Americans. Public schools employing English as the ...
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In the aftermath of the 1898 Spanish-American War, federal policymakers sought to transform Puerto Ricans from loyal Spaniards to trustworthy Americans. Public schools employing English as the language of instruction were the primary vehicles implementing this change. Behind this policy were deeply ingrained attitudes that took for granted the superiority of Anglo Saxons and, by extension, their English vernacular. Contrary to expectations, the Americanization effort backfired and even fueled Puerto Rican nationalism. The island’s intelligentsia took up the banner of preserving Puerto Rican identity (Puerto Ricanness) and canonized the Spanish language as a core feature of puertorriqueñidad. In tandem with a change in education policy was the adoption of a new language law—one that declared Spanish and English co-official languages of the Puerto Rican government. Repealing that law became a holy grail for the island’s nationalists.Less
In the aftermath of the 1898 Spanish-American War, federal policymakers sought to transform Puerto Ricans from loyal Spaniards to trustworthy Americans. Public schools employing English as the language of instruction were the primary vehicles implementing this change. Behind this policy were deeply ingrained attitudes that took for granted the superiority of Anglo Saxons and, by extension, their English vernacular. Contrary to expectations, the Americanization effort backfired and even fueled Puerto Rican nationalism. The island’s intelligentsia took up the banner of preserving Puerto Rican identity (Puerto Ricanness) and canonized the Spanish language as a core feature of puertorriqueñidad. In tandem with a change in education policy was the adoption of a new language law—one that declared Spanish and English co-official languages of the Puerto Rican government. Repealing that law became a holy grail for the island’s nationalists.
Martin Solly
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780748691692
- eISBN:
- 9781474418546
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748691692.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter concentrates on stylistics in legal texts and contexts; since well-chosen language can determine the successive jurisprudence of a particular area of the law, the use of legal language ...
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This chapter concentrates on stylistics in legal texts and contexts; since well-chosen language can determine the successive jurisprudence of a particular area of the law, the use of legal language has its own particularities and responsibilities. First, the chapter draws attention to certain aspects and areas of the language of the law: the importance of legal contexts and settings (for example, the courtroom); forensic linguistics; the different kinds of legal texts, including statutes and witness evidence in the courtroom; some typical features of legal language (such as repetition, vagueness and precision); the formulation of legal concepts and culture-bound legal concepts. Then, focusing on the normative and intercultural dimensions of the language of statutes and the language of the courtroom, the chapter examines various stylistic aspects underpinning the successful deployment of legal discourse. These include some of the typical stylistic features of the language of the law, such as sentence structure, choice of lexis and the various kinds of repetition and word doublings.Less
This chapter concentrates on stylistics in legal texts and contexts; since well-chosen language can determine the successive jurisprudence of a particular area of the law, the use of legal language has its own particularities and responsibilities. First, the chapter draws attention to certain aspects and areas of the language of the law: the importance of legal contexts and settings (for example, the courtroom); forensic linguistics; the different kinds of legal texts, including statutes and witness evidence in the courtroom; some typical features of legal language (such as repetition, vagueness and precision); the formulation of legal concepts and culture-bound legal concepts. Then, focusing on the normative and intercultural dimensions of the language of statutes and the language of the courtroom, the chapter examines various stylistic aspects underpinning the successful deployment of legal discourse. These include some of the typical stylistic features of the language of the law, such as sentence structure, choice of lexis and the various kinds of repetition and word doublings.
Marianne Mason and Frances Rock (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780226647654
- eISBN:
- 9780226647821
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226647821.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
The Discourse of Police Interviews examines how police interviews are discursively constructed and institutionally used to investigate and prosecute crimes. This volume investigates multiple ...
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The Discourse of Police Interviews examines how police interviews are discursively constructed and institutionally used to investigate and prosecute crimes. This volume investigates multiple discursive approaches to the analysis of police-lay person exchanges. It aims to promote dialogue not only between scholars who specialize in language and the law, but also among scholars in cognate disciplines, such as linguistic anthropology, criminology, law, and sociology, to name a few. The volume explores themes including the sociolegal, psychological, and discursive framework of popular police interview methods, such as PEACE and Reid, the role of the discursive practices of institutional representatives (e.g., police officers, interpreters) in bringing about linguistic transformations, and the impact that these transformations can have on the construction and evidential quality and value of linguistic evidence. The analysis includes an examination of both oral and written data, as well as the role of metalanguage and multimodality in understanding the police interview.Less
The Discourse of Police Interviews examines how police interviews are discursively constructed and institutionally used to investigate and prosecute crimes. This volume investigates multiple discursive approaches to the analysis of police-lay person exchanges. It aims to promote dialogue not only between scholars who specialize in language and the law, but also among scholars in cognate disciplines, such as linguistic anthropology, criminology, law, and sociology, to name a few. The volume explores themes including the sociolegal, psychological, and discursive framework of popular police interview methods, such as PEACE and Reid, the role of the discursive practices of institutional representatives (e.g., police officers, interpreters) in bringing about linguistic transformations, and the impact that these transformations can have on the construction and evidential quality and value of linguistic evidence. The analysis includes an examination of both oral and written data, as well as the role of metalanguage and multimodality in understanding the police interview.
Brian G. Slocum (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226445021
- eISBN:
- 9780226445168
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226445168.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Language shapes and reflects how we think about the world. It engages and intrigues us. Our everyday use of language is quite effortless — we are all experts on our native tongues. Despite this, ...
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Language shapes and reflects how we think about the world. It engages and intrigues us. Our everyday use of language is quite effortless — we are all experts on our native tongues. Despite this, issues of language and meaning have long flummoxed the judges on whom we depend for the interpretation of our most fundamental legal texts. Should a judge feel confident in defining common words in the texts without the aid of a linguist? How is the meaning communicated by the text determined? Should the communicative meaning of texts be decisive, or at least influential? To fully engage and probe these questions of interpretation, this volume draws upon a variety of experts from several fields, who collectively examine the interpretation of legal texts. In The Nature of Legal Interpretation, the contributors argue that the meaning of language is crucial to the interpretation of legal texts, such as statutes, constitutions, and contracts. Accordingly, expert analysis of language from linguists, philosophers, and legal scholars should influence how courts interpret legal texts. Offering insightful new interdisciplinary perspectives on originalism and legal interpretation, these essays put forth a significant and provocative discussion of how best to characterize the nature of language in legal texts.Less
Language shapes and reflects how we think about the world. It engages and intrigues us. Our everyday use of language is quite effortless — we are all experts on our native tongues. Despite this, issues of language and meaning have long flummoxed the judges on whom we depend for the interpretation of our most fundamental legal texts. Should a judge feel confident in defining common words in the texts without the aid of a linguist? How is the meaning communicated by the text determined? Should the communicative meaning of texts be decisive, or at least influential? To fully engage and probe these questions of interpretation, this volume draws upon a variety of experts from several fields, who collectively examine the interpretation of legal texts. In The Nature of Legal Interpretation, the contributors argue that the meaning of language is crucial to the interpretation of legal texts, such as statutes, constitutions, and contracts. Accordingly, expert analysis of language from linguists, philosophers, and legal scholars should influence how courts interpret legal texts. Offering insightful new interdisciplinary perspectives on originalism and legal interpretation, these essays put forth a significant and provocative discussion of how best to characterize the nature of language in legal texts.
Hrafn Asgeirsson
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198782889
- eISBN:
- 9780191826108
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198782889.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Scott Soames has argued that the fact that lawmakers and other legal practitioners regard vagueness as having a valuable power-delegating function gives us reason to favour one theory of vagueness ...
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Scott Soames has argued that the fact that lawmakers and other legal practitioners regard vagueness as having a valuable power-delegating function gives us reason to favour one theory of vagueness over another. If Soames is right, facts about legal practice can in an important sense adjudicate between rival theories of vagueness. I argue that due to what I call the ‘Gappiness Problem’—raised by recent critics of the ‘communicative-content theory of law’—we must give up the one premise of Soames’s argument that he seems to take to be uncontroversial: that the legal content of a statute or constitutional clause is identical with, or constituted by, its communicative content. I provide my own account of legal content and show how it provides a response to the Gappiness Problem. This account, however, does not suffice to vindicate Soames’s argument. I conclude by arguing that my point about Soames’s argument is generalizable.Less
Scott Soames has argued that the fact that lawmakers and other legal practitioners regard vagueness as having a valuable power-delegating function gives us reason to favour one theory of vagueness over another. If Soames is right, facts about legal practice can in an important sense adjudicate between rival theories of vagueness. I argue that due to what I call the ‘Gappiness Problem’—raised by recent critics of the ‘communicative-content theory of law’—we must give up the one premise of Soames’s argument that he seems to take to be uncontroversial: that the legal content of a statute or constitutional clause is identical with, or constituted by, its communicative content. I provide my own account of legal content and show how it provides a response to the Gappiness Problem. This account, however, does not suffice to vindicate Soames’s argument. I conclude by arguing that my point about Soames’s argument is generalizable.
Werner Schäfke
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781474438131
- eISBN:
- 9781474465236
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474438131.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines the medieval Icelandic law book Grágás as it is contained in the medieval manuscripts Staðarhólsbók (AM 334 fol.) and Konungsbók (GKS 1157 fol.), and explores in what ways the ...
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This chapter examines the medieval Icelandic law book Grágás as it is contained in the medieval manuscripts Staðarhólsbók (AM 334 fol.) and Konungsbók (GKS 1157 fol.), and explores in what ways the two manuscripts can be considered to function as external tools of legal cognition. The aim of the chapter is to explore how the modern concept of distributed cognition can aid us in understanding historical phenomena, in this case, the function of two medieval Icelandic codices containing collections of laws. The chapter outlines what lines of thought and reasoning the examined medieval codices support when used for finding relevant legal norms or charting applicable law. In order to clarify the relation of the historical development of distributed legal cognition and its textual tools, the chapter’s conclusion compares the Grágás manuscripts to an early modern Icelandic legal manuscript (AM 60 8vo), and to modern statute collections. This comparison shows how the distribution of legal cognition to textual tools slowly developed within the textual culture of a formerly predominantly oral society without a significant domestic administrative literacy.Less
This chapter examines the medieval Icelandic law book Grágás as it is contained in the medieval manuscripts Staðarhólsbók (AM 334 fol.) and Konungsbók (GKS 1157 fol.), and explores in what ways the two manuscripts can be considered to function as external tools of legal cognition. The aim of the chapter is to explore how the modern concept of distributed cognition can aid us in understanding historical phenomena, in this case, the function of two medieval Icelandic codices containing collections of laws. The chapter outlines what lines of thought and reasoning the examined medieval codices support when used for finding relevant legal norms or charting applicable law. In order to clarify the relation of the historical development of distributed legal cognition and its textual tools, the chapter’s conclusion compares the Grágás manuscripts to an early modern Icelandic legal manuscript (AM 60 8vo), and to modern statute collections. This comparison shows how the distribution of legal cognition to textual tools slowly developed within the textual culture of a formerly predominantly oral society without a significant domestic administrative literacy.
William K. Ford and Elizabeth Mertz
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199990559
- eISBN:
- 9780190267407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199990559.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
In their introductory essay, Ford and Mertz survey the articles in the volume and summarize some overarching themes that emerge from the group as a whole. To begin with, the authors of these articles ...
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In their introductory essay, Ford and Mertz survey the articles in the volume and summarize some overarching themes that emerge from the group as a whole. To begin with, the authors of these articles do not view interdisciplinary communication as transparent or easy; the process itself is not to be taken for granted. They also pay close attention to details of language and linguistic contexts. Some articles demonstrate the linguistic structure of legal misunderstandings, others examine the language in which courts translate social science and science, while the final chapters in the volume explicitly examine barriers to translation between law and other disciplines.Less
In their introductory essay, Ford and Mertz survey the articles in the volume and summarize some overarching themes that emerge from the group as a whole. To begin with, the authors of these articles do not view interdisciplinary communication as transparent or easy; the process itself is not to be taken for granted. They also pay close attention to details of language and linguistic contexts. Some articles demonstrate the linguistic structure of legal misunderstandings, others examine the language in which courts translate social science and science, while the final chapters in the volume explicitly examine barriers to translation between law and other disciplines.
Ingo Venzke
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198725749
- eISBN:
- 9780191792731
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198725749.003.0017
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The present chapter combines the ubiquitous metaphor of the language of international law with the analogy between interpretation and the playing of games. It argues that interpretation might not be ...
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The present chapter combines the ubiquitous metaphor of the language of international law with the analogy between interpretation and the playing of games. It argues that interpretation might not be well understood in analogy to games, not if the game is anything like the typical example of chess. In law, as in language, we make the rules as we go along. If that is so, how then can we still see interpretation as an ordered activity? A first answer fleshes out a view of interpretation as a creative practice in which actors struggle for the law. A second, more radical, alternative demonstrates how and why it might make sense to argue that there is no language to play with. Interpretation then aims at a better understanding of the speaker, not of any language of international law.Less
The present chapter combines the ubiquitous metaphor of the language of international law with the analogy between interpretation and the playing of games. It argues that interpretation might not be well understood in analogy to games, not if the game is anything like the typical example of chess. In law, as in language, we make the rules as we go along. If that is so, how then can we still see interpretation as an ordered activity? A first answer fleshes out a view of interpretation as a creative practice in which actors struggle for the law. A second, more radical, alternative demonstrates how and why it might make sense to argue that there is no language to play with. Interpretation then aims at a better understanding of the speaker, not of any language of international law.
Brian G. Slocum
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226445021
- eISBN:
- 9780226445168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226445168.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The main argument of this chapter is relatively simple. The content of a legal text is not solely an instance of linguistic meaning. Rather, legal concerns sometimes trump the linguistic meaning of ...
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The main argument of this chapter is relatively simple. The content of a legal text is not solely an instance of linguistic meaning. Rather, legal concerns sometimes trump the linguistic meaning of the text. Nevertheless, the linguistic meaning of a text is generally an important aspect of the text’s legal meaning, and should be so. Especially because linguistic meaning is an important aspect of legal interpretation, knowledge of the ways in which language operates is important to the proper functioning of the law. Linguists are, by training, experts on language. Judges, in general, are experts on the law, and on principles of legal interpretation, but are not experts on language. It follows that judges can benefit from the expertise of linguists. One benefit is that linguists can demonstrate the contextual nature of language and the flaws of believing that linguistic meaning can accurately be determined without consideration of context. Another important benefit is that knowledge of language can reveal its indeterminacy. By not adhering to valid principles of language usage, judges risk interpreting legal texts in ways that mask the inherently normative nature of interpretation.Less
The main argument of this chapter is relatively simple. The content of a legal text is not solely an instance of linguistic meaning. Rather, legal concerns sometimes trump the linguistic meaning of the text. Nevertheless, the linguistic meaning of a text is generally an important aspect of the text’s legal meaning, and should be so. Especially because linguistic meaning is an important aspect of legal interpretation, knowledge of the ways in which language operates is important to the proper functioning of the law. Linguists are, by training, experts on language. Judges, in general, are experts on the law, and on principles of legal interpretation, but are not experts on language. It follows that judges can benefit from the expertise of linguists. One benefit is that linguists can demonstrate the contextual nature of language and the flaws of believing that linguistic meaning can accurately be determined without consideration of context. Another important benefit is that knowledge of language can reveal its indeterminacy. By not adhering to valid principles of language usage, judges risk interpreting legal texts in ways that mask the inherently normative nature of interpretation.
Jacob Livingston Slosser and Mikael Rask Madsen
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- December 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780192847539
- eISBN:
- 9780191939822
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192847539.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter examines language’s role in the formation of legal categories. It holds that they are not just subject to whims of negotiated power dynamics but also to the dynamics of how human beings ...
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This chapter examines language’s role in the formation of legal categories. It holds that they are not just subject to whims of negotiated power dynamics but also to the dynamics of how human beings involved in the legal process operationalize underlying cognitive processes. We focus on the process of law-making by cognitive category-making. We promote a methodological intervention to examine the processes of meaning-making in legal principles to explore the politics of legal practice in action as, in part, an embodied cognitive process. Although public hearings, consultation, and deliberation are all part of the legal process, we focus on how law is performed as a written exercise with the goal of understanding the law through its use of linguistic choices. The result is an exploration of how language displays the cognitive underpinnings of legal category making and the development of legal institutions, legal rules and, the law itself.Less
This chapter examines language’s role in the formation of legal categories. It holds that they are not just subject to whims of negotiated power dynamics but also to the dynamics of how human beings involved in the legal process operationalize underlying cognitive processes. We focus on the process of law-making by cognitive category-making. We promote a methodological intervention to examine the processes of meaning-making in legal principles to explore the politics of legal practice in action as, in part, an embodied cognitive process. Although public hearings, consultation, and deliberation are all part of the legal process, we focus on how law is performed as a written exercise with the goal of understanding the law through its use of linguistic choices. The result is an exploration of how language displays the cognitive underpinnings of legal category making and the development of legal institutions, legal rules and, the law itself.
Brian G. Slocum and Francis J. Mootz III (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226601656
- eISBN:
- 9780226601793
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226601793.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Justice Scalia: Rhetoric and the Rule of Law offers a novel collection of interrelated and interdisciplinary essays by a diverse and impressive group of scholars that discuss the rhetoric of the late ...
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Justice Scalia: Rhetoric and the Rule of Law offers a novel collection of interrelated and interdisciplinary essays by a diverse and impressive group of scholars that discuss the rhetoric of the late Justice Antonin Scalia as it relates to the rule of law. Justice Scalia authored numerous opinions during his thirty years as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia was well known for his vigorous advocacy in favor of an “originalist” or “new textualist” approach to legal interpretation. His fame came in part from a number of stinging dissents criticizing the Court’s jurisprudential methodology for failing to adhere to originalist or textualist interpretive principles. There will certainly be many efforts to delineate and assess Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence with regard to its legitimacy and effects on American law. The book takes a very different tack. The contributors discuss the rhetorical strategies in Justice Scalia’s opinions rather than the logic of his legal arguments. The focus is on “rhetoric” in its full classical sense, not simply as a reference to style or ornamentation. As defined by Aristotle, rhetoric is the capacity to see the available arguments in any given situation. The guiding theme of this book is that Justice Scalia enacts his vision of the Rule of Law through his rhetorical framing. The medium is the message, and the form is the substance.Less
Justice Scalia: Rhetoric and the Rule of Law offers a novel collection of interrelated and interdisciplinary essays by a diverse and impressive group of scholars that discuss the rhetoric of the late Justice Antonin Scalia as it relates to the rule of law. Justice Scalia authored numerous opinions during his thirty years as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia was well known for his vigorous advocacy in favor of an “originalist” or “new textualist” approach to legal interpretation. His fame came in part from a number of stinging dissents criticizing the Court’s jurisprudential methodology for failing to adhere to originalist or textualist interpretive principles. There will certainly be many efforts to delineate and assess Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence with regard to its legitimacy and effects on American law. The book takes a very different tack. The contributors discuss the rhetorical strategies in Justice Scalia’s opinions rather than the logic of his legal arguments. The focus is on “rhetoric” in its full classical sense, not simply as a reference to style or ornamentation. As defined by Aristotle, rhetoric is the capacity to see the available arguments in any given situation. The guiding theme of this book is that Justice Scalia enacts his vision of the Rule of Law through his rhetorical framing. The medium is the message, and the form is the substance.
Fielding NigelG
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199279357
- eISBN:
- 9780191700057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279357.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Because language is an essential tool for the expression of ideas, language is able to shape thought. The language of law – the methods of discursive action that courts utilize in understanding, ...
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Because language is an essential tool for the expression of ideas, language is able to shape thought. The language of law – the methods of discursive action that courts utilize in understanding, mediating, and ruling on violence – is perceived to be the discourse of violence at court. Wittgenstein's (1958) principle that a rule cannot determine its own application can be demonstrated through the discursive practices of the courtroom, since there are always consequential practices corresponding to a certain rule. Many of the processes of courts and the language used in such settings, as asserted by Rock (1993), are intended to tame savage feelings, and probably even lessen the degrees of conflict. This chapter illustrates the important role of language in court and how this may also serve as a measure for mediation.Less
Because language is an essential tool for the expression of ideas, language is able to shape thought. The language of law – the methods of discursive action that courts utilize in understanding, mediating, and ruling on violence – is perceived to be the discourse of violence at court. Wittgenstein's (1958) principle that a rule cannot determine its own application can be demonstrated through the discursive practices of the courtroom, since there are always consequential practices corresponding to a certain rule. Many of the processes of courts and the language used in such settings, as asserted by Rock (1993), are intended to tame savage feelings, and probably even lessen the degrees of conflict. This chapter illustrates the important role of language in court and how this may also serve as a measure for mediation.
Elizabeth Mertz
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199990559
- eISBN:
- 9780190267407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199990559.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This article analyzes two sets of interactions between legal and linguistic scholars, using these encounters to demonstrate systematic ways in which law resists translations from other disciplines. ...
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This article analyzes two sets of interactions between legal and linguistic scholars, using these encounters to demonstrate systematic ways in which law resists translations from other disciplines. The first encounter occurred at a conference in which legal scholars and linguists came together to attempt to find common ground. A transcript of this conference was subsequently published. The second encounter occurred during two meetings of the working group whose discussions led to formulating this volume. In that second encounter, which was also taped and transcribed, scholars from a variety of fields attempted to identify sources of difficulties (as well as successes) in the prior conversations during the earlier conference. Mertz compares both transcripts to highlight how different kinds of linguistic approaches shed light on legal translations of social science.Less
This article analyzes two sets of interactions between legal and linguistic scholars, using these encounters to demonstrate systematic ways in which law resists translations from other disciplines. The first encounter occurred at a conference in which legal scholars and linguists came together to attempt to find common ground. A transcript of this conference was subsequently published. The second encounter occurred during two meetings of the working group whose discussions led to formulating this volume. In that second encounter, which was also taped and transcribed, scholars from a variety of fields attempted to identify sources of difficulties (as well as successes) in the prior conversations during the earlier conference. Mertz compares both transcripts to highlight how different kinds of linguistic approaches shed light on legal translations of social science.
Gideon Rosen
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226445021
- eISBN:
- 9780226445168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226445168.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The author argues that Deferentialism offers a distinctive form of judicial restraint. In normal adjudication, the deferentialist judge seeks to apply the law made by the legislature, the content of ...
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The author argues that Deferentialism offers a distinctive form of judicial restraint. In normal adjudication, the deferentialist judge seeks to apply the law made by the legislature, the content of which is fixed, not by the linguistic meaning of the legal text, and not by the intended downstream consequences of the enactment, but by what the legislators said or stipulated when they laid it down. The author suggests that we should identify this stipulated content with the content of certain intentions that an informed interpreter would impute to the authors of the law. The framers and ratifiers of (say) the 14th amendment may have any number of long term goals, and any number of beliefs about the consequences of their legislative act. But according to the deferentialist, these real intentions and expectations are irrelevant. If we want to know the legal content of the Due Process Clause, we should ask: What would an interpreter, apprised of the relevant history and context, take the framers and ratifiers to have intended the legal effect of the provision to be? The author’s view is that the deferentialist should regard this as a hard question for which there is no determinately correct answer.Less
The author argues that Deferentialism offers a distinctive form of judicial restraint. In normal adjudication, the deferentialist judge seeks to apply the law made by the legislature, the content of which is fixed, not by the linguistic meaning of the legal text, and not by the intended downstream consequences of the enactment, but by what the legislators said or stipulated when they laid it down. The author suggests that we should identify this stipulated content with the content of certain intentions that an informed interpreter would impute to the authors of the law. The framers and ratifiers of (say) the 14th amendment may have any number of long term goals, and any number of beliefs about the consequences of their legislative act. But according to the deferentialist, these real intentions and expectations are irrelevant. If we want to know the legal content of the Due Process Clause, we should ask: What would an interpreter, apprised of the relevant history and context, take the framers and ratifiers to have intended the legal effect of the provision to be? The author’s view is that the deferentialist should regard this as a hard question for which there is no determinately correct answer.
Brian G. Slocum
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226445021
- eISBN:
- 9780226445168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226445168.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter is an overview of the book. The arrangement of the chapters in this book represent various points on the spectrum of interdisciplinary contributions to legal interpretation, with perhaps ...
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This chapter is an overview of the book. The arrangement of the chapters in this book represent various points on the spectrum of interdisciplinary contributions to legal interpretation, with perhaps the later chapters manifesting a more ambitious role for interdisciplinary scholarship in legal interpretation theory. To be sure, descriptive accounts of language and interpretation have the potential to impact legal interpretation in profound ways. Interdisciplinary scholars can significantly contribute to legal interpretation by exploring the ways in which the nature and structure of language interposes on legal discourse, and by describing whether legal interpretation accounts for the nature of language in valid and accurate ways. Yet, readers of this book should also consider whether scholars that bring a perspective from another discipline might legitimately and productively use their expertise to offer accounts of legal interpretation that are more normative in nature. If the answer is “no,” there will nevertheless remain a considerable area in which interdisciplinary insights should be relevant to legal interpretation. If the answer is “yes,” the possibilities of interdisciplinary insights to legal interpretation are significant indeed, and greater than many have imagined.Less
This chapter is an overview of the book. The arrangement of the chapters in this book represent various points on the spectrum of interdisciplinary contributions to legal interpretation, with perhaps the later chapters manifesting a more ambitious role for interdisciplinary scholarship in legal interpretation theory. To be sure, descriptive accounts of language and interpretation have the potential to impact legal interpretation in profound ways. Interdisciplinary scholars can significantly contribute to legal interpretation by exploring the ways in which the nature and structure of language interposes on legal discourse, and by describing whether legal interpretation accounts for the nature of language in valid and accurate ways. Yet, readers of this book should also consider whether scholars that bring a perspective from another discipline might legitimately and productively use their expertise to offer accounts of legal interpretation that are more normative in nature. If the answer is “no,” there will nevertheless remain a considerable area in which interdisciplinary insights should be relevant to legal interpretation. If the answer is “yes,” the possibilities of interdisciplinary insights to legal interpretation are significant indeed, and greater than many have imagined.
Joanna Radwańska-Williams
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- May 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780198796800
- eISBN:
- 9780191838477
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198796800.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Phonetics / Phonology, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
The Kazan School was born out of a conjunction in the lives of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845‒1929) and his student Mikołaj Kruszewski (1851‒87), during the period of the Kazan Linguistic Circle ...
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The Kazan School was born out of a conjunction in the lives of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845‒1929) and his student Mikołaj Kruszewski (1851‒87), during the period of the Kazan Linguistic Circle (1878‒83). Drawing upon and systematizing Baudouin’s teaching, Kruszewski’s brief monograph On Sound Alternation (1881) was a statement of a synchronic approach to phonology, introducing the terms ‘divergents’ and ‘correlatives’, and proposing a structural definition of the phoneme. Kruszewski extended his theory in An Outline of Linguistic Science (1883), which represented his quest for the laws of language. In An attempt at a Theory of Phonetic Alternations (1895), Baudouin further developed the classification of alternations, and redefined the phoneme as ‘the psychological equivalent of a speech sound’. Baudouin and Kruszewski’s endeavour of theorizing about the relationship between synchrony and diachrony, and between phonetics, phonology, and morphology was the Kazan School’s enduring inspiration for the subsequent worldwide development of phonology.Less
The Kazan School was born out of a conjunction in the lives of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845‒1929) and his student Mikołaj Kruszewski (1851‒87), during the period of the Kazan Linguistic Circle (1878‒83). Drawing upon and systematizing Baudouin’s teaching, Kruszewski’s brief monograph On Sound Alternation (1881) was a statement of a synchronic approach to phonology, introducing the terms ‘divergents’ and ‘correlatives’, and proposing a structural definition of the phoneme. Kruszewski extended his theory in An Outline of Linguistic Science (1883), which represented his quest for the laws of language. In An attempt at a Theory of Phonetic Alternations (1895), Baudouin further developed the classification of alternations, and redefined the phoneme as ‘the psychological equivalent of a speech sound’. Baudouin and Kruszewski’s endeavour of theorizing about the relationship between synchrony and diachrony, and between phonetics, phonology, and morphology was the Kazan School’s enduring inspiration for the subsequent worldwide development of phonology.
Geert Keil and Ralf Poscher (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198782889
- eISBN:
- 9780191826108
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198782889.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. This places the law at odds with ...
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Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. This places the law at odds with rule-of-law values. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and it puts judges in a position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these ideals. In borderline cases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value. In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the past two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes ‘soritical’ vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. The literature discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differences between the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy grouped under the heading of ‘vagueness’, let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena. The volume brings together leading scholars who are working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, collecting essays in the respective fields and fostering a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars. It depicts how philosophers conceive vagueness in law from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness.Less
Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. This places the law at odds with rule-of-law values. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and it puts judges in a position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these ideals. In borderline cases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value. In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the past two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes ‘soritical’ vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. The literature discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differences between the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy grouped under the heading of ‘vagueness’, let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena. The volume brings together leading scholars who are working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, collecting essays in the respective fields and fostering a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars. It depicts how philosophers conceive vagueness in law from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness.
Michael S. Gorham
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452628
- eISBN:
- 9780801470578
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452628.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter demonstrates that political initiatives to legislate language laws and allocate federal funding toward promoting language literacy produce limited results. Far more consequential for the ...
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This chapter demonstrates that political initiatives to legislate language laws and allocate federal funding toward promoting language literacy produce limited results. Far more consequential for the contours of linguist authority would be the actual speaking style of Vladimir Putin as president himself. His strategic use of the “nimbly uttered Russian word” and adept manipulation of national media platforms helped create the sense of national pride, unity, and strong central authority that had made him such a popular figure during his first two terms as president. The chapter then looks at Putin's attempt to use Russian language and culture as a tool for creating a transnational “Rusophonia,” creating the Russian World Foundation to foster a sense of global Russian patriotism among Russians and Russian-language speakers living abroad.Less
This chapter demonstrates that political initiatives to legislate language laws and allocate federal funding toward promoting language literacy produce limited results. Far more consequential for the contours of linguist authority would be the actual speaking style of Vladimir Putin as president himself. His strategic use of the “nimbly uttered Russian word” and adept manipulation of national media platforms helped create the sense of national pride, unity, and strong central authority that had made him such a popular figure during his first two terms as president. The chapter then looks at Putin's attempt to use Russian language and culture as a tool for creating a transnational “Rusophonia,” creating the Russian World Foundation to foster a sense of global Russian patriotism among Russians and Russian-language speakers living abroad.
Nicholas Allott and Benjamin Shaer
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226445021
- eISBN:
- 9780226445168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226445168.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
In this chapter, the authors seek to show that legal speech is best seen not as a radically distinct verbal phenomenon but rather as one variety of verbal interaction, albeit with various distinctive ...
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In this chapter, the authors seek to show that legal speech is best seen not as a radically distinct verbal phenomenon but rather as one variety of verbal interaction, albeit with various distinctive properties that follow from the institutional nature and goals of the legal domain. The authors first sketch a general picture of verbal communication as essentially inferential, drawing on recent work in linguistic pragmatics that takes its inspiration from the work of Paul Grice. The authors then focus on the complex activity of adjudication. The authors analyse adjudication in speech act terms as a “verdictive”, explaining how this act encompasses a number of sub-activities. In doing so, the authors pay particular attention to Endicott’s (2012) claims about the “interpretative” and “non-interpretative” aspects of judging. Significantly, the authors reject some specific claims of his regarding the “non-interpretative” nature of certain components of adjudication. The authors argue (i) that the general picture of verbal communication implies that understanding the speech act content of the law is an interpretative, inferential activity; and (ii) that a court creatively determining extensions of vague terms is also performing interpretation, if it is attempting to respect certain intentions of the legislature in doing so.Less
In this chapter, the authors seek to show that legal speech is best seen not as a radically distinct verbal phenomenon but rather as one variety of verbal interaction, albeit with various distinctive properties that follow from the institutional nature and goals of the legal domain. The authors first sketch a general picture of verbal communication as essentially inferential, drawing on recent work in linguistic pragmatics that takes its inspiration from the work of Paul Grice. The authors then focus on the complex activity of adjudication. The authors analyse adjudication in speech act terms as a “verdictive”, explaining how this act encompasses a number of sub-activities. In doing so, the authors pay particular attention to Endicott’s (2012) claims about the “interpretative” and “non-interpretative” aspects of judging. Significantly, the authors reject some specific claims of his regarding the “non-interpretative” nature of certain components of adjudication. The authors argue (i) that the general picture of verbal communication implies that understanding the speech act content of the law is an interpretative, inferential activity; and (ii) that a court creatively determining extensions of vague terms is also performing interpretation, if it is attempting to respect certain intentions of the legislature in doing so.